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ABSTRACT
This thesis explains how some organized crime outlaws, such as anti-Prohibitionists, the
North American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and Aboriginal street
gangs, come to exist and thrive in Canadian society. It sets f01ih the historical development
and nature of criminal organization laws in Canada, and compares the definition of
"criminal organization" in the Criminal Code with other criminal law concepts, such as
corporate criminals and white-collar criminals; conventional criminality or garden-variety
predatory crime; terrorists; and criminal conspirators, parties, and accessories. It uses
various concepts and assertions within criminological, sociological and psychological
theories to explain the formation and perpetuation of the identity of individuals who engage
in organized crime and who are members of organized crime groups. Aspects of social
constructionism, social control and bond theory, differential association in the context of
subcultures of violence, deviance and labelling, and social psychology theories are
discussed to explain why some individuals, or some individuals who are criminals, become
organized crime outlaws. Some of these reasons or explanations overlap and some
complement one another. From these theoretical reasons or explanations, this thesis extracts
a list of requisites that anti-organized crime measures should address in order to effectively
combat organized crime. The conflicts among some ofthese requisites are set forth and
reconciled, and the requisites are used to evaluate the present Canadian criminal
organization provisions in the Criminal Code and to suggest non-criminal law as well as
non-legal ways to effectively combat organized crime. After the application and discussion
of each requisite, this thesis makes recommendations as to what anti-organized crime
measures should include and how they should approach the problems posed by organized
crime outlaws in this country.
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Alphonse "Scarface" Capone. Salvatore "Charlie Lucky" Luciano. I James Butler "Wild
Bill" Hickok. Ralph Hubert "Sonny" Barger. Robin Hood. Some of these old villains
have morphed into heroes. Others continue to conjure images of violence and feelings of
fear. Some do both. All ofthese outlaws capture our attention largely due to the
mystique of the activities within their underworld, and the devilish threat that they pose to
societal order. This thesis delves into the past as well as the present to see how society,
with its ability to shape an individual' s identity and affect his future non-criminal and
criminal behaviour, creates outlaws generally, and specifically, how society creates some
organized crime outlaws. It uses the results of this search to determine whether present
criminal laws will effectively combat contemporary outlawry in the form of prganized
crime.

Various concepts and assertions within criminological, sociological and psychological
theories explain the formation and perpetuation of organized crime outlaws and outlawry.
This thesis does not intend to explain why all individuals become criminals, but rather, it
tries to explain why some individuals, or some individuals who are criminals, become

organized crime outlall's? There does not exist anyone or any group of causes or reasons
for all organized crime outlaws. However, there are similar reasons for some organized
crime outlaws, different reasons for others, and sometimes overlapping reasons. This
thesis uses theoretical explanations or reasons as a means to evaluate whether organized
crime legislation in Canada effectively responds to the societal states or factors that form
and perpetuate organized crime identities and outlawry. In order to understand and
provide an effective solution to organized crime in society, one must analyse the roots of
the organized crime problem.

I David Critchley, The Origin o/Orgallized Crime ill America: The New York City Mafia, /891-193/ (New
York: Routledge, 2009) at 199. Luciano's real name was Salvatore Lucania.
2 This term will be defined later in this Chapler in section three "Organized Crime Oullaws: Who They Are
and Who They Are Not."

1

Chapter One of this thesis sets forth the historical development and nature of criminal
organization laws in Canada. It reviews the definition of "criminal organization" in the
Criminal Code, 3 and discusses the various provisions that directly pertain to organized

crime. It defines "organized crime outlaw" and "organized crime outlaw group'! for the
purposes of this thesis, and distinguishes these entities fi.'om corporate criminals and
white-collar criminals; conventional criminality or garden-variety predatory crime;
terrorists; and criminal conspirators, parties, and accessories.
Chapter Two describes various organized crime outlaws and their outlawry. While many
types of outlaws have existed and continue to exist in contemporary society, only a few
remain instructive in an evaluation of criminal organization legislation - namely, those
outlaws who have adopted a criminal identity; who have become members of organized
crime outlaw groups; and who have perpetuated the reputation of their outlaw group.
Anti-Prohibitionists, the North American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle
gangs, and Aboriginal street gangs exemplify some of these outlaws. Each of these
outlaw groups contribute to explaining the historical development of outlawry generally;
the formation and maintenance of organized crime outlaw identities based on reputations
for violence and intimidation; and the problems of organized crime outlawry in Canada.
Chapter Three sets forth the essential and relevant concepts of various criminological and
sociological theories that explain, or contribute to an explanation for, the development
and maintenance of organized crime outlaws and organized crime outlaw groups.
Concepts from social constructionism, social control and bond theory, differential
association or social learning within subcultures, deviance and labelling theory, and social
psychology are discussed, and then applied to explain the origins and workings of AntiProhibitionists, the North American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs,
and Aboriginal street gangs. Some aspects of these theories are very divergent and
distinct, and thus, account for many different causes of or reasons for the formation of
outlaw identities. In other respects, concepts within these theories overlap and are
3

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code].

2

compatible - patlicularly in relation to the creation and maintenance of identities within
society, and internal cohesion within societal groups. This compatibility and divergence
of these theoretical concepts reveal insights as to what anti-organized crime measures
should do in order to prevent or remedy the formation of organized crime outlaw
identities and organized crime outlaw groups. Essentially, these theoretical insights thirteen in number - form a rubric for evaluating anti-organized crime legislation in
Canada.

Just as some of the theories in Chapter Three overlap to some degree, so do the thitleen
insights regarding outlaw identities revealed by these theories. Chapter Four synthesizes
these insights into seven basic requisites for anti-organized crime measures. Then, each
section of Chapter Four examines one of these requisites, and analyses whether and how
criminal law measures, civil law measures, and non-law measures can be used to give
effect to that requisite. In so doing, amendments to, or the repeal of, some laws in
Canada are proposed in order to obtain the goals of a particular requisite. Some
references to legislative provisions from other countries, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Italy, are made in order to critique and inform laws that target
organized crime in Canada. Notably, conflict exists among some of the seven requisites
for anti-organized crime measures as well as with some concepts within the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 4 and may lead to different and incompatible conclusions
as to how to address organized crime. In addition, conflict exists as to whether the nature
of organized crime necessi tates the employment of criminal laws that specifically target
criminal organizations, or whether criminal laws that existed prior to the introduction of
criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code in 1997 are effective in combating
organized crime. These conflicts are discussed. At the end of each section in Chapter
Four, this thesis makes recommendations for anti-organized crime measures based on the
examination of the requisite in that section.

Chapter Five contains conclusions. It determines whether present measures can
adequately and effectively address the causes and reasons for organized crime outlaws

4

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.

3

and outlawry according to the requisites synthesized from criminological, sociological
and psychological theories. It reconciles any conflicts among requisites, or if such
reconciliation cannot take place, it suggests which requisite ought to have paramountcy
over another. It decides whether the criminal law, as it presently exists, can and should
effectively combat organized crime.

Appendix B summarizes the recommendations made in Chapter Four.

4

1.2

THE BIRTH OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION LEGISLATION IN

CANADA

The moral panic' that arose from the ferocious biker wars primarily in Quebec in the
1990s and early 2000S2 in Canada, heightened by pressures of pending federal elections,
were the impetuses for the enactment of criminal organization provisions in the Criminal
Code 3 in 1997 as well as subsequent amendments in 2002. From 1994 to 2002, over ISO
deaths occurred as a result of turf wars among outlaw motorcycle gangs including the
Hells Angels, the Rock Machine, and the Bandidos. 4 Moral panic stemmed from the very
real presence and significant threat of violence within society as well as against innocent
societal members - as exemplified by the killing of 11-year-old Daniel Desrochers in
1995 and two prison guards in 1997. On the eve of a federal election,S the Canadian

, Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Pallics: The Creation oJthe Mods and Rockers (London:
MacGibbon and Kee, 1972) [Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation oJthe Mods and Rockers] at 9.
Cohen defines "moral panic" in this way:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fhshion by the mass
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking
people; socially accredited expelts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and
becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is
something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.
Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at
other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as
those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.
2 Stephen Schneider, Iced: The StOlY oJOrganized Crime in COllado (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons
Canada, 2009) [Iced: The StOl)' oJOrganized Crime in Canada] at 422; and Don Stualt, "Time to RecodifY
Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors
Prosecution" (2000) 28 Man. LJ. 89 ["Time to Recodify Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order
Expediency: Lessons /i'om the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution"] at para. 3. Schneider asserts that between
July 1994 and March 200 I in Quebec, 17 innocent victims among 157 people were killed; 167 attempted
murders were committed, 16 disappearances occurred; 140 arson cases took placed, and 190 bombings
happened.
, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code].
4 U.S. Department of Justice, "Hells Angels Motorcycle Club" in National Drug Intelligence Cenler, Drugs
and Crime: Olltlml' Motorcycle Gang Profile (October 2002) ["Hells Angels Motorcycle Club"] at 7.
Between 1994 and 2000, the Hells Angels and Rock Machine participated in numerous acts ofviolencc
against one another in Canada, and this violence continued even after the Rock Machine patched over to
become part ofthe Bandidos in 2000.
, "Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", sllpro note 2 al para. 3. Before the federal election, the government
perceived a need to respond to the Quebec Attorney-General and Quebec mayors who sought measures to
address the deadly war between the Hell's Angels and the Rock Machine.
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government responded by creating "a new category of crime,,6 in order to target outlaw
motorcycle gangs as well as other organized crime groups in Canada. Further violence,
including the shooting of a journalist in 2000,1 as well as the eve of another federal
election, fuelled subsequent amendments to the 1997 legislation in 2002. 8

With respect to the 1997 provisions, then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, Allan Rock, asserted on behalf of the government that the purposes behind the
legislation were to deprive criminal organizations and their members of the proceeds of
crime and their means to conduct criminal activities; to deter criminal organizations and
their members from using violence to further their criminal aims; and to provide law
enforcement officials with effective investigative, prosecutorial and forfeiture measures to
prevent and deter the commission of criminal activity by criminal organizations and their
members. 9 All of the new provisions were meant to be consistent with the constitutional
principles and rights in the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms. 10 The legislation
came close to outright criminalization of membership in organized crime groups, but did
not explicitly do so. It did not intend to do SO.II It also did not ban certain organized
crime groups. Instead, it took a circuitous and convoluted route to targeting organized
crime.
The first criminal organization provisions of May 2, 1997 criminalized "participation in"
or "contribution to" a criminal organization. Section 467.1 (l) in 1997 stated:
Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, No. 160 (21 April 1997) [Hollse a/Commons Debates,
April21, 1997] at 10013 (Han. Allan Rock).
7 CSC News Online, "Canada's Anti-Gang Law" (10 April 2006), online: CSC News
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bikergangs/antiganglaw.html > .
Notably, the shooting of Montreal journalist Michel Auger occurred in 2000, and fuelled the subsequent
amendments to the original 1997 criminal organization legislation in Canada.
, "Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", .II/pro note 2 at paras 34-36. A Quebec minister, Serge Menard, sought
new and clearer organized crime provisions that would prohibit membership in organized crime groups,
such as outlaw motorcycle gangs the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine, and he advocated the use of the
notwithstanding clause to override the ITeedom of association in the COllodion Charier a/Rights and
Freedoms, Part I ofthe COlls/itl/tioll Ac/, 1982, being Schedule S to the COllado Ac/1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.11 [Charier].
9 HOl/se o/Comlllolls Deba/es, April 21, 1997, supra note 6 at 10013 and 10014 (Han. Allah Rock); and R.
v. Beauchamp (2009), 68 C.R: (6,h) 293, [2009) O.J. No. 3006 (Q.L.) (Ollt. S.C.J.) [R. v. Beauchamp) at
Pcara. 13.
o R. v. Beauchamp, supra note 9 at para. 13.
11 House a/Commons Debates, April21, 1997, sl/pra note 6 at 10013 (Hon. Allan Rock).

G Canada,
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Everyone who:
a) participates in or substantially contributes to the activities of a criminal
organization knowing that any or all of the members of the organization
engage in or have, within the preceding five years, engaged in the
commission of a series of indictable offences under this or any other Act
of Parliament for each of which the maximum punishment is imprisonment
of five years or more, and
b) is a party to the commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of,
at the direction of or in association with the criminal organization for
which the maximum punishment is imprisonment of five years or more is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding fourteen years. 12
The wording of these provisions amounts to proscription of being in a criminal
organization,13 or at the velY least, come close to proscription, since any person who is a
member of a criminal organization would most likely, if not be obliged to, paliicipate in
or contribute to that organization. Proscription would have simplified the means to effect
the aims of Parliament. Instead, proof of participation or contribution required
prosecutors to additionally prove the accused's knowledge of members' criminal history.

Further, the provisions set fmih this broad, convoluted, and complex definition of
organized crime, and cast a social control net too widely - that is to say, the provisions
captured more groups than were likely intended. They empowered law enforcement
against organized crime by increasing powers of search through the interception of
private communications; 14 expanding 'preventative judicial restraint measures by allowing
cOUlis to impose recognizances for individuals who may commit a criminal organization
offence; 15 criminalizing activities in connection with organized crime; 16 bolstering

Criminal Code, supra note 3 at s. 467.1 as it existed in 1997.
"Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 2 at para. 15.
" Criminal Code, supra note 3 at ss. IS5( l.l), 186(1.1) and 196. Pursuant to sections IS5( 1.1) and
186(1.1), applications for judicial authorization need not demonstrate investigative necessity; and pursuant
to section 196, an authorizing judge may extend the time that that the Anomey General or Minister for
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must give notice to the persons inlercepted pursuant to an
authorization made in relation to criminal organization investigations, to a period nol exceeding three years
rather than the usual 90 days.
" Ibid at s. 810.01 (I )-(3) and (4). Section SI 0.0 I of the Canadian Criminal Code allows a provincial court
judge to impose a peace bond or recognizance on an individual for a 12-month period if there are
reasonable grounds to fear that the person will commit a criminal organization offence. Section 2 of the
Criminal Code defines "criminal organization offence";
cr iminal organization offence It means
12

13

lI
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proceeds of crime legislation in relation to organized crime; 17 creating a reverse onus in
relation to bail hearings for individuals accused of criminal organization offences; 18 and
augmenting sentencing laws. 19 However, they left to triers of fact - either judge alone or
juries - the task of determining for each and every prosecution (even of the same
organized crime group) whether a group constitutes a criminal organization.
Amendments to the 1997 criminal organization legislation came into force on January 7,
2002. Again, the Canadian government did not criminalize membership in a criminal
organization20 or proscribe criminal organization groups in order to avoid possible
infringements of rights within the Charter, such as freedom of association in section
2(d).21 Instead, the legislation responded to concerns expressed by police and
prosecutors that the definition of "criminal organization" was "too complex and too
narrow in scope" in spite of the fact that the definition had already been successfully
applied in Quebec against members of the Hells Angels and Rock Machine. 22 The
government sought to create a "more flexible definition" in section 467.1, and to create
three clear offences23 of participation in or facilitation of ac~ivities of a criminal
organization in section 467.11; commission of an offence for a criminal organization in
(a) an offence under section 467.11, 467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, or
(b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation to, or any
counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a); ....
16 Ibid at ss. 82(2). The government increased penalties for some activities that were thought to be
conducted by organized crime groups, such as the possession of explosive substances. If done in
connection with a criminal organization, an offender would receive a greater sentence of imprisonment.
17 Ibid at s. 462.37.
"Ibid at ss. SIS(6)(a)(ii).
19 Ibid at ss. 467.14 and 82(2). Pursuant to section 467.14, sentences for offences committed under
sections 467.11, 467.12 and 467. 13 must be served consecutively to any other sentence, even a sentence
imposed in relation to the same event or series of events for which the offender is convicted. Pursuant to
section 82(2), the liability to imprisonment for possession of explosive substances fj'om five years to 14
years if possession is in connection with a criminal organization.
20 R. v. Beauchamp. supra note 9 at para. 64.
21 CharIer, supra note 8 at s. 2(d). Section 2(d) states:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental rreedoms:

(d) freedom of association.
" "Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 2 at para. 38. Stuart refers to R. v. Leclerc, [2001] R.J.Q. 747,
[2001] Q.J. No. 426 (Q.L.) (Que. Ct. (Crim. and Pen. Div.)) in which four accused, three of whom were
members of the Rock Machine outlaw motorcycle gang ibid at para. 284, were convicted of criminal
organization charges. One accused, ibid. at para. 167, had no status but was so convicted.
23 R. v. Beauchamp, supra note 9 at para. 21.
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section 467.12; and instructing the commission of an offence for a criminal organization
in section 467.13:
467.1 (l) The following definitions apply in this Act.
"criminal organization" means a group, however organized, that
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or
commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would
likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including
a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute
the group.
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate
commission of a single offence.
"serious offence" means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of
Parliament for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or
more, or another offence that is prescribed by regulation.
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 467.11, facilitation of an offence
does not require knowledge of a particular offence the commission of which is
facilitated, or that an offence actually be committed.
.
(3) In this section and in sections 467.11 to 467.13, committing an offence means
being a party to it or counselling any person to be a party to it.
(4) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing offences that are
included in the definition "serious offence" in subsection (1).
467.11 (l) Every person who, for the purpose of enhancing the ability of a
criminal organization to facilitate 01' commit an indictable offence under this or
any other Act of Parliament, knowingly, by act or omission, pm1icipates in or
contributes to any activity of the criminal organization is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (J), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that
(a) the criminal organization actually facilitated or conunitted an indictable
offence;
(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhanced the ability
of the criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence;
(c) the accused knew the specific nature of any indictable offence that may have
been facilitated or committed by the criminal organization; or
(d) the accused knew the identity of any of the persons who constitute the
criminal organization.
(3) In determining whether an accused pal1icipates in or contributes to any activity
of a criminal organization, the Comt may consider, among other factors, whether
the accused
(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is
associated with, the criminal organization;
(b) frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the criminal
organization;
(c) receives any benefit from the criminal organization; or
9

(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any of the persons
who constitute the criminal organization.
467.12 (1) Every person who commits an indictable offence under this or any
other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with, a criminal organization is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fOUlieen years.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that the accused knew the identity of any of the persons who
constitute the criminal organization.
467.13 (1) Every person who is one of the persons who constitute a criminal
organization and who knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to
commit an offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with, the criminal organization is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that
(a) an offence other than the offence under subsection (1) was actually
committed;
(b) the accused instructed a palticular person to commit an offence; or
(c) the accused knew the identity of all of the persons who constitute the
criminalorganization. 24
At the time of the 2002 amendments, proscription did exist (and still does exist) within
the Criminal Code in the anti-terrorism provisions to the extent that those provisions list
"terrorist groups. ,,25 They also created an offence for the participation in or contribution
to any activity of a terrorist group that enhances its ability to carry out an activity.26
Canada did not criminalize actual membership in terrorist groups due to the rights to

Criminal Code. sllpra note 3 at ss. 467.1,467.11,467.12 and 467.13.
Ibid at ss. 83.01 and 83.05; and Order Recommending that Each Entity Listed as ofJllly 23,2004, in the
Regulations Establishing a List of Entilies Remain a Listed Entity, S.I.I2004-155, schedule (Criminal
Code). The schedule to this Regulation lists the entities declared to be terrorist organizations. Section
83.0 I of the Criminal Code defines "terrorist group" as follows:

24

21

"terrorist grouptl means

(a) an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist
activity, or
(b) a listed entity,
and includes an association of such entities.
26 Ibid at s. 83.18. Ibid at sections 83.05 and 83.07, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Governor in Council in Canada lists terrorist organizations if the
group "has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, or participated in or facilitated a terrorist
activity", or act on behalf of or in association with such a group. The Minister must review the validity of
the list of terrorist organizations every two years.
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freedom of expression in section 2(b

i7 and freedom of association in section 2(di 8of the

Charler?9 However, in spite ofthe use of proscription for other groups posing threats to
the safety of the public and societal order, the Canadian government has not proscribed
specific or particular organized crime groups as criminal organizations.

Since the proclamation of the first legislative provisions regarding criminal organizations,
other amendments to the Criminal Code and related statutes have taken place to increase
the power of the state in the war against organized crime. For instance, amendments have
deemed a murder to be in the first degree regardless of whether it was planned and
deliberate, if the killing was done in connection with a criminal organization, or if it was
done while committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence in connection with
a criminal organization. 3D In addition, the government has criminalized drive-by
shootings, and has proscribed an aggravated sentence for such shootings when they are
done in connection with a criminal organization? I And, the definition of "serious
offence" was expanded in relation to defining what constitutes a criminal organization
pursuant to section 467.1 so as to include activities usually associated with organized
32
crime, such as prostitution and gaming. Also, the length of judicial preventative
restraints, that is to say recognizances for individuals convicted of a criminal organization
offence, terrorism offence or offence involving the intimidation of a criminal justice
participant or journalist, has been increased from one year to up to two years?3 Further,

27

Chartel; supra note 10 at s. 2(b). Section 2(b) states:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and

other media of communication; ....
Ibid. at s. 2(d). Section 2(d) is set fOlih supra note 2 J.
29 Kent Roach, "A Comparison of Australian and Canadian Anti-terrorism Laws" (2007) 30 V.N.S.W. L. J.
53 at 63.
30 Criminal Code, supra note 3 at s. 231.
31 Ibid. at s. 244.2.
32 Regulations Prescribing Certain Offences to be Serious Offences, S.O.R.l20 10-161 July 13,2010, s. I,
online: Canada Gazette <http://canadagazette.gc.cairp-pr/p2/2010/20 10-08-04Ihtmllsor-dors 161eng.hlml>. "Serious offence" undel' section 467.1 will now include:
(a) keeping a common gaming or betting house (subsection 201(1) and paragraph 201 (2)(b»;
(b) betting, pool-selling and book-making (section 202);
(c) committing offences in relation to lotteries and games of chance (section 206);
(d) keeping a common bawdy-house (subseclion 21 O( I) and paragraph 210(2)(e».
"Criminal Code, supra note 3 at s. 810.01(3.1).
28
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in 1999 parole review periods were limited for organized crime offenders. 34 In 2005, the
burden of proof connected with forfeiture applications regarding proceeds of crime was
reversed and imposed on an individual convicted of a criminal organization offence. 35

The response of the Canadian government to organized crime, namely, the creation of
new and unique criminal organization legislation, demonstrates a resolt to the use of laws
to combat a social problem. The 1997 legislation sought to " ... help the police achieve
their goal, which is to stop criminals.,,36 While the government advocated a "coordinated
response",37 it meant coordination in the provision of resources for implementation of the
laws, rather than coordination of social, political, economic and legal provisions. Then
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Allan Rock stated:
Of course, improving the legislation is only one weapon in the arsenal that we
must deploy to fight violence associated with criminal organizations and
organized crime. All the provinces have a major role to play, since the
Constitution provides that the administration of justice comes under their
jurisdiction. The provinces must allocate adequate resources, so that police
officers can do their job, and so that, when people are arrested, they are
prosecuted by specialized crown prosecutors expressly mandated for that purpose.
At the federal level, there is a need to co-ordinate the fight led by police forces
across the country. Organized crime is a national concern which requires national
measures. That is why the solicitor general agreed to table in Parliament an annual
progress repOlt on the fight against organized crime, and on the situation across
the country. The solicitor general also announced that he will set up a national
committee and five regional co-ordination committees to address police concerns
regarding the need to co-ordinate measures to enforce the act. 38
The government reacted to the social problem of violence from organized crime groups.

It did not evaluate the pre-existing arsenal of civil and criminal laws that might combat
34 Dominique Valiquet, "Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection
of Justice System Paliicipants" (16 March 2009). online: Parliament of Canada
<http://www2.parl.gc.calSites/LOP/Legislati veSummarieslB ilis_ls.asp?lang~E&ls~c 14&source~1 ibraryyr
b&Parl~0&Ses~2#c95> ["Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and
Protection of Justice System Participants"). Amendments in 1999 to the Corrections andCollditiollal
Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 at s. 125, prevented inmates convicted of organized crime offences from
having access to accelerated parole review which some offenders may seek after service of one-sixth of
their sentence.
""Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection of Justice System
Participants", supra note 34.
J6 fiouse olColllmons Debates, April21, 1997, supra note 6 at 10013 (Han. Allan Rock).
J7 Ibid at 10014 (Hon. Allan Rock).
38 fiouse olCommons Debates, April 21, 1997, supra note 6 at 10014 (Hon. Allan Rock).
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organized crime. It did not emphasize a proactive response to organized crime groups by
analysing the reasons for the formation and perpetuation of organized crime outlaws. It
did not aim to increase community resources to bolster pro-social controls at a grassroots
level. The reactive response of the Canadian government to organized crime placed much
stock in the ability of the criminal law to remedy the problem of organized crime in
society - perhaps too much so.
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1.3

ORGANIZED CRIME OUTLAWS: WHO THEY ARE AND WHO

THEY ARE NOT

1.3.1

Organized Crime Outlaws and Organized Crime Outlaw

Groups
Outlawry has manifested itself in a variety of ways. However, common attributes or
characteristics exist among outlaws. In order to analyse criminal organization
legislation, this thesis must analyse what constitutes organized crime or criminal
organizations. Organized crime or criminal org;anizations do not amount to simply
another type of criminal act as defined in the Criminal Code. Rather, organized crime
criminals are outlaws in society. Criminal organizations transcend ordinary criminals
and ordinary crime. Their uniqueness stems from who they are, rather than what they do.
"Who they are" also makes them unique because their identity plays a role in how they

commit crime.
Outlaws adopt or become assigned an identity of otherness within conventional society,
and their internalization of this identity leads them to reside outside society - that is to
say, outside societal norms and laws. Not every individual who stands in contrast to
conventional societal norms and laws is an outlaw, however. More is required, such as
adopting an identity, posing a challenge to societal order, and using a reputation for
violence and intimidation to effect one's ends.
Helen Phillips, in a non-legal analysis, characterizes outlaws in relation to the political
threat they pose to social order. l Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm suggests that the phenomenon
of "banditry" (which this thesis asserts is synonymous with "outlawry") calUlot exist in

I Helen Phillips, "Scott and the Outlaws" in Helen Phillips, ed., Bandit Territories: British Olltlaw
Traditions (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2008) at 120-21. Ibid at 121, Phillips uses an analysis of the

characters of Sir Walter Scott to illustrate the historical understanding or p0l1ray of the nature of outlaws.
She asserts that Scott always depicted his outlaws within a state of political unrest:
... Whatever his historical setting, Scott's outlaw rellects political anxieties threatening early
nineteenth centUlY political security: radicalism and popular unrest. Any identification with this
political 'Other' of Scott's own world is complex and he often approaches the outlaw through a
strange double perspective, presenting him as a play-actor or character in traditional minstrelsy thus denuded of political substance - yet also as a serious threat of political violence.
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the absence of socio-economic and political orders whose powers, laws and resources
can be challenged.
On mountain and in forest bands of men outside the range of law and
authority (traditionally females are rare), violent and armed, impose their will by
extortion, robbery or otherwise on their victims. In doing so, banditry
simultaneously challenges the economic, social and political order by
challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and the control of
resources. That is the historic significance of banditry in societies with class
divisions and states. 'Social banditry', ... is an aspect of this challenge.
BanditlY as a specific phenomenon cannot therefore exist outside socioeconomic and political orders which can be so challenged. For instance - and
this, as we shall see, is important - in stateless societies where' law' takes the
form of blood-feud (or negotiated settlement between the kin of offenders and the
kin of victims), those who kill are not outlaws but, as it were, belligerents. They
only become outlaws, and punishable as such, where they are judged by a
criterion ofpublic law and order which is not theirs. [Emphasis added]?
To some degree or another, implicitly or explicitly, outlaws challenge the economic,
social, political, or legal order of a government or societal rulers.

Not all outlaws are organized crime outlaws. Organized crime is not synonymous with
outlawry, but rathel', it is a subset of outlawry. Organized crime outlaws or criminal
organization outlaws in this thesis are those outlaws who engage in acts which fall within
the Criminal Code definition of "criminal organization,,3 in Canada. In a number of
ways, and for many reasons, they become members of an organized group of individuals
whose purpose is to commit crime, and they internalize their identity as part of this
group. Organized crime outlaws challenge societal order by adopting norms and values
within a criminal subculture of violence, and consistently engaging in criminal acts that
2
3

Eric J. Hobsbawm, Bandils (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2000) at 7-8.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] at s. 467.1. Section 467.1 states:
467.1 (I) The following definitions apply in this Act.
"criminal organization tt means a group, however organized, that

(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of
one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or
indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any
of the persons who constitute the group.
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate
commission of a single offence.
"serious offence" means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament
for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years 01' more, or another
offence that is prescribed by regulation.
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counter the efforts of the state to maintain social control and obedience to the law.
Unlike some other outlaws, they do not employ political or religious ideologies to
directly challenge state authority, and they do not simply commit certain types of crimes
01'

subsist by committing crimes. Their challenge to the state may sometimes be subtle

and implicit, but manifests itself not only by the participation in ongoing criminal
activity, but by using the power of the outlaw group's reputation to commit crime, and in
so doing, perpetuating the power of the group.
The definition of "criminal organization" in the Criminal Code may capture not only
organized crime outlaws, but also groups who commit crime for profit and who are
organized to do so. However, organized crime outlaws have attributes or characteristics
that this "profit-making" definition fails to capture. In addition, they have attributes or
characteristics that are not captured by pre-existing criminal categories, such as
conspiracies, parties and accessories. They are groups of individuals who not only
commit organized crimes, but who also identify with one another as a group, and who
use and perpetuate their group reputation in effecting their criminal purposes.
Indeed, Margaret Beare notes the presence of a reputation to intimidate for some
"criminal enterprises":
For some criminal enterprises, the main benefit is the ability to intimidate. In
those criminal operations that require the "organizing" of hundreds of employers
(as in the case of criminal-controlled corrupt unions), effective control is
maintained through the ability to make "credible threats of continuing violence"
against competitors or resisters (Reuter 1987, 182). To some extent this is a
"reputational" capacity. However, there must be the potential capacity (tested in
reality or tumour) to inflict violence or economic desttuction upon an individual
opponent. ... 4
Beare seems to suggest that some "criminal enterprises" do not use their reputation to
intimidate. However, in this thesis, organized crime outlaws, and members of criminal
, Margaret A. Beare, Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada (Toronto: Nelson, 1998)
[Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada] at 43. This benefit remains very significant to the
definition of "criminal organization" in the Criminal Code which requires a criminal organization to
receive a "material benefit" from the alleged criminal activity. This aspect ofthe definition will be
discussed section " .......". Beare cites Peter Reuter, "Methodological and Institutional Problems in
Organized Crime Research" in Herbert Edelhet1z, ed., Major Issues in Organized Crillle Con/I'ol (National
Institute of Justice Symposium Proceedings, 25-26 September 1987).
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organizations as defined in the Criminal Code, do indeed adopt and use a reputation for
violence and intimidation.
The adoption and use of such a reputation has been crucial to proving connections of
predicate offences to criminal organizations in organized crime prosecutions, as
exemplified in R. v. Lindsa/ where the Hells Angels name and insignia proved that the
extortion of a victim was committed in association with the Hells Angels criminal
organization. The Honourable Madam Justice Michelle Fuerst asserted the significance
of this connection:
The "in association with" element is established by the evidence of the
manner in which Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Bonner chose to portray themselves to Mr.
M. I have found that on January 23,2002, both Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Bonner went
to Mr. M.'s house wearing jackets bearing the primary symbols of the HAMC, the
name "Hells Angels" and the death head logo. In so doing, they presented
themselves not as individuals, but as members of a group with a reputation for
violence and intimidation. Only full members ofthe organization could wear its
symbols. It is a reasonable inference and one that I draw, that Mr. Lindsay and
Mr. Bonner were each well aware of the implications oftheir choice of attire.
1085

1088 Both Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Bonner were full members of the HAMC at
the time.... It is a reasonable inference and one that I draw, that both men were
well aware of what the organization was about, including its composition and
characteristics, globally and specifically as it existed in Canada and in Ontario. In
particular, both men knew the HAMC's reputation for violence and intimidation.
They deliberately invoked their membership in the HAMC with the intent to
inspire fear in their victim. They committed extortion with the intent to do so in
association with a criminal organization, the HAMC to which they belonged. 6

While the significance of identity and reputation has been demonstrated in prosecutions
dealing with outlaw motorcycle gangs, other organized crime outlaws that presently exist
in Canada, such as La Cosa Nostra and Aboriginal street gangs, also have great internal
cohesion within their groups and rely on the power of their reputations to effect their
ends. Thus, the significance of group identity, and the use and perpetuation of a
powerful reputation, remain important in understanding who or what is an organized

, R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLII 24240, [2005] OJ. No. 2870 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.C.J.) [R. v. Lindsay trial decision].
6

Ibid at paras. ]085 and ]088.
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crime outlaw, who and what anti-organized crime measures should target, and how they
should target them.
Many different configurations of organized crime groups and operations exist due to the
variance in historical, economic, social and political circumstances in which they form. 7
Fut1her, motivations for paliicipation in organized crime activity vary among organized
crime members. 8 Such motivations are important to consider because they illuminate the
reasons that individuals participate in organized crime acts, and thus, reveal the kinds of
responses required to deal with it. 9 For these reasons, applying one legal definition to all
organized crime outlaws, and unveiling evidence to prove the legal attributes or
characteristics of such groups and their operations, remains problematic. However, the
presence of identity and use of a powerful reputation set criminal organizations apati
from other criminals and other criminal law concepts, and thus, remain important in
determining whether the laws pertaining to criminal organizations will effectively
combat organized crime outlawry.
In keeping with the attributes that characterize outlaws generally, and the distinctions
between organized crime outlaws and other individuals or groups that commit crime, this
thesis defines "organized crime outlaw", and "organized crime outlaw group" or
"criminal organization outlaw group" as follows:
7
S

Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 4 at 15.
E.J. Dickson·Gilmore & Chris Whitehead, "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a

Typology for Understanding and Strategizing Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3
["Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a Typology for Understanding and Strategizing
Responses"] at 7.
9 Ibid. at 7. For instance, Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead assert that much, if not all, of "Aboriginal
organized crime" stems from political activism and nationalism as a conscious and unconscious response to
societal oppression both historically and contemporarily. They state, ibid. at 8-9, that not all organized
crime activities are motivated by profit as suggested by Beare in Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime
in Canada, supra note 4 at 74. Rather, they assert, ibid. at 17, that profit is a rare motive. However, in
Catherine Bainbridge, Katherine Cisek & CBC Newsworld, Indian Posse: Li/e in Aboriginal Gang
Terri/O/y YHS (Monb'eaI: Wild Heart Productions Inc., 1998), one youth who was tempted to join and
targeted by the Indian Posse in the north end of Winnipeg assel1s that money is indeed attractive. Ibid. at
12:49, the unemployment rate for Natives is three times higher than for non-Natives, and when asked how
the gang makes money, Indian Posse member Trevor Lacasse laughs and replies, "How does anybody
make money that doesn't have a job? Drug trade ...." Ibid. at 03: I0 and 07:23, the Posse engages in
prostitution and drug trades and that attracts youth. As will be discussed in later sections of this thesis
dealing with theoretical explanations for the foronation of outlaw identities, social factors alone, or
combined with economic factors, also play significant roles.
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An organized crime oUllaw is an individual whose consensual association with an
organized crime group and participation in anti-social learning of the norms and
values ofthat group, has led to his and her adoption or internalization of the
norms and values of that group to such a degree that the individual identifies with
that organized crime group more than or rather than identifying with law-abiding
conventional members of society. Once this individual so identifies with the
organized crime group, (s)he reinforces this identity, and thus, simultaneously
perpetuates and reinforces the identity of the group, by using or displaying this
identity in a matlller that accords with the values and norms of the group during
the commission of criminal activities generally, and organized crime activities
specifically.
An organized crime oUllaw group is a group comprised of a number of
individuals who have adopted or internalized the collective norms and values of
the group, which norms and values include the commission of crime and the use
of violence or intimidation during the commission of some of these crimes; and
who use the power of this group identity (that is to say, the power of its
reputation) in order to gain some personal or group benefit or advantage whether
this benefit or advantage be economic, social, political, or (il)legal. The use of
the power of this group identity or reputation may include committing criminal
acts, or acts of violence or intimidation, with the group; or it may include
committing criminal acts, or acts of violence or intimidation while displaying the
group insignia or referring to the group in some way.
The identity component within these definitions of organized crime outlaws and

organized crime outlaw groups distinguishes them from other types of criminals and
from other ways that criminals commit criminal acts. Whether a well-organized
international group has existed for decades or a small gang of young adults who have
only recently banded together, organized crime outlaws have common traits and they
remain distinct from other legal concepts or definitions of criminals. The following
sections will compare organized crime oUflaws and organized crime outlaw groups, with
other types of criminals and other ways that criminals commit crime, such as corporate
criminals or white-collar criminals, conventional criminality or garden-variety predatory
criminals, terrorists, and criminal conspirators, parties and accessories to crime.
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1.3.2

Corporate Criminals and White-Collar Criminals

The concept of corporate crime is often entangled with the concept of white-collar crime,
and with the concept of socioeconomic class. 10 However, contemporary definitions of
corporate crime do not include class distinctions. I I The term white-collar crime seeks to
distinguish monetary criminal offences from ordinary crimes; it is crime that is not
"ordinarily associated with criminality.,,12 Corporate crime is a subset of white-collar
crime,13 and embodies criminal conduct that is subject to punitive sanction, rather than
conduct that may result in non-punitive civil liabilities and damages. This thesis adopts
the definition of corporate crime as espoused by John Braithwaite, which definition
accords with Canadian laws regarding corporate responsibility and liability:
... [C]orporate crime is defined here as conduct of a corporation, or employees
acting on behalfoja corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law.
The conduct could be punishable by imprisonment, probation, fine, revocation of
licence, community service order, internal discipline order or other court-imposed
penalities .... 14 [Emphasis added].
Corporate crime is committed for organizational ends rather than individual benefits,'5
and the corporation via individuals who have authority to act on behalf of the
corporation, may be criminally liable for offences committed in violation of the Canadian
Criminal Code. 16

10 Edwin H. Sutherland, "Crime ofCorpomtions - 1947", in Albert Cohen, Alfred Lindesmith & Karl
Schuessler, eds., The SlItheriand Papers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956) at 79. Edwin H.
Sutherland developed the concept of white-collar crime, and defined a white-collar criminal as " ... a person
in the upper socioeconomic class who violates the laws designed to regulate his occupation."
11 Marshall B. Clinard, Peter C. Yeager & Ruth Blackburn Clinard, Corporate Crime (New York: Free
Press, 1980) [COIporate Crime] at 18. Based on their research, David Weisburd, Stanton Wheeler, Elin
Waring & Nancy Bode in Crimes a/the Middle Classes: White-Collar Offenders in the Federal COllrls
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) at 73, conclude that while some of the offenders in their studies
"fit the image of respectability and high social status" that characterizes white-collar criminals, most
offenders appeared to represent the "very broad middle of the society."
12 COIporate Crime, slIpra note II at 17.
J3 Ibid ; and Sally S. Simpson, COIporate Crime, Law, and Social Control (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) [Co/porate Crime, Lml', and S ocial Conlro/] at 6.
" John Braithwaite, Co/porate Crime in the Pharmacellticallndllsl/y (London: Routledge & Kegall Paul,
1984) at 6. In a similar but more general vein, James Gobert and Maurice Punch in Rethinking CO/porate
Crime (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) at II define "corporate crime" as " .. .criminal offences
which are committed by companies and other for-profit organizations and are punishable by the State."
" Co/porate Crime, Law, and Social Control, sllpra note 13 at 7.
16 The concept of "directing mind" was set fOlth in R. v. Calladian Dredge & Dock Co ., [1 985]1 S.C.R.
662, S.C.J. No. 28 (Q.L.) at para. 29 and 43. The Court states at paragraph 29:
29 In summary, therefore, the courts in this country can be said to this date to have declined
generally to apply the principle of respondeat superior in the determination o f corporate criminal
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Although some organized crime outlaws are members of groups or criminal
organizations that have been incorporated, such as some outlaw motorcycle gang
corporations, 17 not many organized crime outlaws are corporations. Further, even if the
name of a criminal organization has corporate status, not all organized crime outlaw
incorporations engage in corporate crime. In addition, the members of the outlaw group
- whether incorporated or unincorporated - do not always act on behalf a/the
organization, so much as they may act in connection with the organization, or use the
name of the organization to effect their criminal purposes. While some criminal acts by
members may be "of the direction" of the criminal organization,IS not all such acts will

responsibility. Criminal responsibility in our courts thus far has been achieved in the mens rea
offences by the attribution to the corporation of the acts of its employees and agents on the more
limited basis of the doctrine of the directing mind or identification. Corporate responsibility in
both strict and absolute liability offences has been found to arise on the direct imposition of a
primary duty in the corporation in the statute in question, as construed by Ihe COUlt. . ..
Subsequently, amendments to the Crimillal Code, supra note 3, proscribed corporate responsibility in
sections 22.1 and 22.2:
22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an organization is
a party to the offence if
(a) acting within the scope oftheir authority
(i) one ofils represenlatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or
omission,
such that, if it had been Ihe conduct of only one representative, that representative would
have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization's activities that
is relevant to the offence depmts - or the senior officers, collectively, depart - markedly
ft'om the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to
prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the offence.
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault - other than negligence an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to benetit the
organization, one of its senior officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the
scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so
that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the
offence~

does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a pa'ty to the offence.
17 Examples of outlaw motorcycle gang incorporation include the Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation
and the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc.
" Section 467.12 of the Criminal Code, supra note 3, allows the prosecution to prove connection of a
predicate offence to a criminal organization in three ways:
467.12 (I) Every person who commits an indictable offence under this or any other Act of
Parliament/or Ihe benefil of, allhe direClioll of, or ill association with, a criminal organization is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
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be "at the direction" of the organization. Criminal acts by members may simply be "in
association with" or "for the benefit of' the criminal organization. 19

Another significant difference between organized crime outlaws and corporate criminals
or white-collar criminals is that organized crime outlaws identify with a group. That
group may 01' may not be a corporation. That the organized crime outlaw group is a
business or is incorporated is not a necessary component of the definition. In contrast,
corporate criminals or white-collar criminals do not necessarily identify with their
corporation and internalize it as a part of their identity. And, unlike organized crime
outlaws, corporate criminals or white-collar criminals may follow most conventional
values and norms of society except for engaging in some crime via the corporation. They
may not see themselves as outlaws or individuals who do not subscribe to conventional
values and norms.
This comparison demonstrates that organized crime outlaws do not fall squarely, and do
not fall wholly, within the definition of corporate criminals nor white-collar criminals.
While some organized crime outlaws may commit corporate crimes, and some may
amount to white-collar criminals, not all such outlaws do. FUlther, corporate crime or
white-collar crime does not only include organized crime outlawry, and does not include
all organized crime outlawry. These differences in the essence of organized crime
outlaws and corporate or white-collar criminals mean that legislation aimed at corporate
or white-collar crime will not adequately capture organized crime outlaw acts.

Conventional Criminality or Garden-Variety Predatory

1.3.3
Criminals

Conventional criminality20 or garden-variety predatory crime21 generally includes acts
that the public has commonly 01' traditionally thought of as being crime. While some

(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (I), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to
prove that the accused knew the identity of any of the persons who constitute the criminal
organization. [Emphasis added).
19

20

Ibid.
Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 81h ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) at 54.
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law-abiding citizens may engage in conventional or garden-variety crimes, the predatory
nature of such crime distinguishes such law-abiding citizens from conventional or
garden-variety criminals22 who "live by plundering others,,:23
... Predators, according to the dictionary, live by plundering others. The term
garden variety draws attention to the fact that the majority of citizens have their
most frequent and most direct experiences with relatively crude larcenies,
burglaries, robberies, automobile thefts, and other predatory acts. Although many
citizens are actually victimized in subtle but more serious and costly ways by
white-collar crime, fraud, and borderline criminal acts in the marketplace, their
recognizable experiences are most frequently with garden-variety predatory
crimes.
In the imagery carried about in the heads of many laypersons, gardenvariety predatory crimes are attributed to "criminals," who are members of "the
24
dangerous classes," as opposed to law-abiding citizens. [Emphasis original].
In spite of this imagery, predatory crimes are committed largely by amateur criminals
who reside in the same areas as law-abiding citizens, and" ... who are relatively
uncommitted to lawbreaking or procrime sentiments .... ,,25 This latter characteristic of
garden-variety predatory or conventional criminals distinguishes them from organized
crime outlaws who become committed to "lawbreaking and procrime sentiments"; join
groups that possess similar entrenched values and corresponding nOimative behaviour;
come to identify themselves with the such groups; and perpetuate the identity of such
groups. The internalization or adoption of a group identity by an individual, and the
power that that group bestows on that individual is what sets organized crime outlaws
and organized crime outlaw groups apal1 from convention or garden-variety criminals
and even "predators." The identity and power of the organized crime group takes the
ordinary criminal to a different realm because that organized crime group requires
members to behave a certain way and uphold the reputation of the group.

Don C. Gibbons, Society, Crime. olld Crimillal Bellavior, 61h ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1992) at 229.
22 Ibid at 248.
23 Ibid at 229. [Emphasis added].
24 Ibid
" Ibid.
21
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1.3.4

Terrorists

Like outlawry, terrorism has existed for centuries, if not millelmia,26 and is part of
society. Terrorism also epitomizes what a society 01' nation is not 01' does not strive to
be, and it reinforces internal cohesion of that society 01' nation. Terrorists may indeed
fall within a broad category of "outlaws", since the concept of "otherness" exists within
the terrorist label, and since terrorism employs violence to cause fear 01' terro1'27 to effect
its purpose. Fm1hel', terrorists may internalize the values and norms of an
unconventional or sub-cultural group, and commit acts that simultaneously perpetuate
and reinforce the identity of the group. Some terrorist groups may even fall within the
definition of organized crime outlaw groups in that a ten'orist group may be comprised of
"a number of individuals who have adopted 01' internalized the collective norms and
values of the group, which norms and values include the commission of crime and the
use of violence or intimidation during the commission of some of these crimes; and who
use the power ofthis group identity (that is to say, the power of its reputation) in order to
gain some personal 01' group benefit or advantage whether this benefit or advantage be
economic, social, political, or (il)legal."
Some terrorist acts indeed amount to organized crime, as declared in the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act 0/2001 or USA Patriot Act?8 And, some terrorists may have

associations with or be funded by organized crime groups. However, terrorism does not
include all acts 01' endeavours of organized crime. 29
Tell'orism presents a violent challenge to the beliefs, values and norms of one nation or
group which in turn denounces the "otherness" of the terrorist. Terrorism, by its general

Robert A. Friedlander, Terror- Violence: Aspects ofSocial Control (New York: Oceana Inc., 1983)
[Terror-Violence: Aspects ofSocial Controfj at 7-8; and Ikechi Mgbeoji, "The Bearded Bandi~ the Outlaw

26

Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards a North-south (De)construction of the Texts and Contexts of
International Law's (Dis)engagement with Terrorism" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105 at para. 9.
Mgbeoj i cites Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World (New York: Routledge, 1994) at 3.
27 Clive Walker, Blackstone's Guide to The Ami-Terrorism Legis/ation, 2"' ed. (New York: Oxford
University, 2009) [Blacks/one 's Guide /0 The Anli-Terrorism Legis/ation] at 7.
28 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [USA Patriot Act].
" [bid at s. 813.
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nature and according to the Canadian Criminal Code and case law, may stem from
political or religious motivations30 and challenges the legitimacy of government and law.
[T]he essence [of terrorism] is a tripartite relationship whereby the actors
(terrorists) seek to impact on a target (specific victims) with a view to influencing
a political audience (typically the government or the general public).31
Unlike terrorists, organized crime outlaws do not by definition seek to influence a
political audience or a government. While some organized crime outlaws, such as
Mafiosi groups, do indeed exert political influence, they do so by infiltrating and
affecting politics from the inside rather than from the outside like terrorists activities?2
Further, terrorism may include acts ofwar,33 assassination,34 guerilla warfare and
revolution,35 piracy and hijacking,36 and the use of violence and fear-mongering. 37

Unlike organized crime outlawry, terrorism generally does not involve a group of
individuals who use their identity to commit crimes for the benefit of the members of the
group or for the group itself. Terrorists may act alone and not identify with a pm1icular
In R. v. Khawqja (2006), 214 C.C.c. (3d) 399, [2006] OJ. No. 4245 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.c.J.) [R. v.
Khawaja], the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice determined that the inclusion of religious or political
motive in an element ofterrorist activity constituted an unjustified violation of the right to freedom of
expression, religious and association in section 2 of the Canadian Charter a/Rights and Freedoms, PaIt I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. As a result,
prosecutors will not be required to lead, and courts will not be required to consider, evidence of the
religious and political view of an accused person to prove the terrorist activity. However, the Cl'Own may
still seek to lead, and the court may admit, evidence of political or religious motive as circumstantial
evidence that proves the charge, as part ofthe narrative, or in order to demonstrate an association to a
terrorist group, according to Kent Roach, "The Recent Decision in R. v. Khmvaja on the Constitutionality
ofthe Definition of Terrorism and a Variety of Terrorism Offences" (Case comment presented to the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto Constitutional Roundtable 30 January 2007) [unpublished] at 15-16.
Parliament has not yet amended the Criminal Code definition to accord with the decision in R. v. Khawaja
according to Kent Roach, "A Comparison of Australian and Canadian Anti-terrorism Laws" (2007) 30
U.N.S.W. L. J. 53 at 59-60. As a result of R. v. Khawaja, Parliament amended section 83.01(l.!) as
follows:
(1.1) For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious or ideological thought, belief or
opinion does not come within paragraph (b) of the definition "terrorist activity" in subsection (I)
unless it constitutes an act or omission that satisfies the criteria of that paragraph.
31 Blackstone's Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, supra note 27 at 2.
32 Stefano Maffei & Isabella Merzagora Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and
Modernity in a Tl'Oubled Country" (2007) 4 European J. of Criminology 461 at 470.
33 Mary Kaldor, "Strengthening Civil Society" in Leonard Weinberg, ed. Democratic Responses to
Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2008) at 34.
34 Matthew Evangelista, Lmv, Ethics, and the War on Terror (Cambridge: Polity, 2008) [Lmv, Ethics, and
the War on Terror] at 40; and Terror-Violellce: Aspects a/Social Control, supra note 26 at 10.
35 Terror-Violence: Aspects a/Social Control, supra note 26 at 14-15.
36 Ibid at 11 and 13.
37 Ibid at 156; and Law, Ethics, alld the War on TerrOl~ supra note 34 at 38.
30
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group. Terrorists may be patt of a group that has a common goal, but having a conmlon
goal that is achieved by way of an act or acts of crime differs from having a main
purpose of committing crime - sllch as is characteristic of organized crime outlaw
groups. For these reasons, and based on the above definition and descriptions, terrorism
does not fall within the category of organized crime outlaws, and will only be included
within the parameters of this thesis in order to critique atld inform patticular legislative
approaches to organized crime, such as proscription.

1.3.5

Criminal Conspiracies, Parties, and Accessories

1.3.5.1

Overview

Organized crime outlaws transcend ordinary criminality and criminal groups like
conspirators, parties or accessories because they do not simply commit crimes in a group
on one occasion or on many occasions. Rather, organized crime outlaws are members of
an identifiable and identifying group that exists more than simply for profit or for a
specific criminal operation or operations - namely, organized crime outlaw groups
perpetuate and reinforce the identity of the group through the commission of violent,
intimidating or criminal acts, and they use the power of the reputation of the group in
order to gain some personal or group benefit or advantage that may not always be for a
specific criminal act. And, they do not always commit criminal acts via conspiracy,
acting as parties, or acting as accessories after the fact. The group may not involve itself
in a particular conspiracy, and members ofthe group may not always be parties or
accessories to the crimes of other members ofthe group. According to the Criminal
Code definition of "criminal organization", an organized crime group has a main purpose

of committing or facilitating the commission of crime for the benefit of the group.
Notably, this Criminal Code definition accords the non-legal definition of organized
crime outlaw groups employed in this thesis because the formal legal definition requires
the "criminal organization" to have as a "main purpose", but not necessarily the only
purpose, the commission or facilitation of crime for the benefit of the group. The
. Criminal Code definition also does not mandate that the criminal acts be committed by

way of conspiracy, acting as parties, or acting as accessories.
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1.3.5.2

Conspiracy Distinguished from "Organized Crime Outlaw

Groups" and "Criminal Organizations"
As set forth in the Criminal Code definition of "criminal organization", a conspiracy can
be committed in relation to a criminal organization offence:
"criminal organization offence" means
(a) an offence under section 467.11, 467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a
criminal organization, or
(b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact
in relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in
paragraph (a); ... 38
However, not all conspiracies involve criminal organization offences, and not all
criminal organization offences involve conspiracies. Conspiracy does not require the
commission of a criminal offence, but rather "the agreement itself is the gist of the
offence.,,39 Thus, membership in a group itself does not fall within this category.
Criminal Code. supra note 3 at s. 2.
.
Paradis v. R., [1934] S.C.R. 165 at 168. While conspiracy is not formally defined in the Criminal Code,
common law cases, such as United States ofAmerica v. Dynar. [1997]2 S.C.R. 462; S.C.J. No. 64 <Q.L.)
38

39

at paras. 86-88, have set forth the elements of the offence:
<a) What is a Criminal Conspiracy?
86 In R. v. O'Brien, [1954] S.C.R. 666, at pp. 668-69, this Court adopted the definition of
conspiracy from the English case of Mulcahy v. The Queen (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 306, at p. 317:
A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the
agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.
So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to
carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties ...
punishable if for a criminal object. ...
There must be an intention to agree, the completion of an agreement, and a common design.
Taschereau J., in O'Brien, supra, at p. 668, added that:
Although it is not necessary that there should be an ovelt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, to complete the crime, 1 have no doubt that there must exist an illtention to
put the commoll design into effect. A common design necessarily involves an intention.
Both are synonymous. The intention cannot be anything else but the will to attain the
object ofthe agreement. [Emphasis in origina!.]
87 In Papalia v. The Queen, [1979]2 S.C.R. 256, at p. 276, Dickson J. <as he then was)
described the offence of conspiracy as "an inchoate or preliminary crime". In setting out the
necessary elements of the offence, he noted at pp. 276-77 that:
The word "conspire" derives from two Latin words, "con" and IIspirare", meaning "to

breathe together". To conspire is to agree. The essence of criminal conspiracy is proof of
agreement. On a charge of conspiracy the agreement itself is the gist of the offence:
Paradis v. R. , [( 1934] S.C.R. 165], at p. 168. The actlls rells is the fact of agreement:
D.P.? v. Nock, at p. 66. The agreement reached by the co-conspirators may contemplate
a number of acts or offences. Any number of persons may be privy to it. Additional
persons may join the ongoing scheme while others may drop out. So long as there is a
continuing overall, dominant plan there may be changes in methods of operation,
personnel, or victims, without bringing the conspiracy to an end. The important inquby is
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Conspiracy does not include the act of being part of a group that has a main purpose of
committing or facilitating the commission of crime for the benefit of the group since
membership in such a group does not constitute an offence - that is to say, membership
in a criminal organization is not illegal. Members of a criminal organization may engage
in a conspiracy to commit an offence, but their state of being is not a conspiracy in and of
itself.
Adoption of group identity, and the use and perpetuation of a powerful reputation are two
attributes that distinguish organized crime outlaws from other criminal groups, such as
conspirators or parties. In spite of this distinction, Margaret E. Beare incorporates the
concept of conspiracy into her definition of organized crime:
Organized crime is ongoing activity, involving a continuing criminal conspiracy,
with a structure greater than any single member, with the potential for corruption
and/or violence to facilitate the criminal process. 40 [Emphasis original].
However, to incorporate the legal concept of conspiracy into the definition of criminal
organization or organized crime is too limiting and not helpful. At the very least, such
incorporation is problematic - particularly in relation to some Aboriginal groups that
may be captured in the definition but with conspiracy would not be. 41 Notably, the

not as to the acts done in pursuance ofthe agreement, but whether there was, infact, a
common agreement to which the acts are referable and to which all ofthe alleged
offenders were privy. [Emphasis original.]

Conspiracy is in fact a more "preliminaIY" crime than attempt, since the offence is considered to
be complete before any acts are taken that go beyond mere preparation to put the common design
into effect. The Crown is simply required to prove a meeting of the minds with regard to a
common design to do something unlawful, specifically the commission of an indictable offence.
See s. 465(1)(c) ofthe Criminal Code.
88 A conspiracy must involve more than one person, even though all the conspirators may not
either be identified, or be capable of being convicted. See for example O'Brien, supra; Guimond
v. The Queen, [1979]1 S.C.R. 960. Further, each ofthe conspirators must have a genuine
intention to participate in the agreement. A person cannot be a conspirator ifhe or she merely
pretends to agree. In O'Brien, Rand J. held at p. 670 that
... a conspiracy requires an actual intention in both pat1ies at the moment of exchanging
the words of agreement to pal1icipate in the act proposed; mere words purporting
agreement without an assenting mind to the act proposed are not sufficient.
Where one member of a so-called conspiracy is a police informant who never intends to cany out
the common design, there can be no conspiracy involving that person. Nonetheless, a conspiracy
can still exist between other pal1ies to the same agreement.
40 Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 4 at 15.
41 "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a Typology for Understanding and Strategizing
Responses", supra note 8 at 6-7.
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Supreme Comt of Canada stated in R. v. Venneri42 that the concept and offence of
conspiracy remains different fi'om the definition of "criminal organization":
3S The structured nature of targeted criminal organizations also sets them apart
from criminal conspiracies: see Sharif!, [[2011] OJ. No. 3985 (QL) (S.C.J.)] at
para. 39. Stripped of the features of continuity and structure, "organized crime"
simply becomes all serious crime committed by a group of three or more persons
for a material benefit. Parliament has already criminalized that activity through
the offences of conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and the "col11l11on intention"
provisions of the Code (see e.g. ss. 21 and 465(1)). The increased penalties and
stigma associated with the organized crime regime distinguish it from these
offences. 43

Organized crime outlaws 01' criminal organization outlaws may employ conspiracy at
times, but they are not only and not always co-conspirators. Not all criminal
organization members form a common intention to carry out certain criminal activities
which elements are necessary in a legal definition of conspiracy. Some members may be
involved in one kind of drug production, others in trafficking in another kind of drug, and
".[Some] concern coagulates around the use of the term 'conspiracy' in Beare's definition,
insofar as this would seem to imply a purposive knowledge on the part of individual participants
not only of their role in, and contribution to, the ultimate 'goal' ofa particular organized criminal
activity. It seems likely that, especially in the arena of what has been deemed 'aboriginal
organized crime'. '" that such uniformity of intention across participants may not characterize
most organized crime. For those who are the most conspicuous and consistent participants may
be expected to share common and informed intentions, as one progresses to more marginal
'conspirators,' participation becomes much more ad hoc and unsystematic than is implied in the
term 'conspiracy'. For example, while it is unquestioned that there would not be a cigarette trade
in the absence of customers for 'smuggled smokes,' can we say that those who enter aboriginal
reserves to purchase tax-free cigarettes are willing and conscious conspirators? Similarly, those
peripheral participants, who may include aboriginal people who work briefly 01' on only one or
two occasions running cigarettes, may not share in an implied common goal at all. Indeed, such
agreement may be quite absent in the core of the 'conspiracy' as well, where the goals may be
similar, but far from commonly held - each individual may be pursuing not only idiosyncratic
aims, but ones which both diverge from, and may even conflict with, those held by their putative
'co-conspirators' .
Conspiracy also obscures the degree offormalization which characterizes the social and other
relationships which are taken together to comprise most organized crime activities. While there
can be little doubt that, at the centre of most organized crime activities there is a relatively high
degree of formalization of relationships, as one moves outside this core, it is likely that the
relationships are far fi'om formal. Indeed, there is an argument to be made that some types of
organized crime are less organized than coincident - that is, those who move liquor 01' cigarettes
across the border to evade taxes and duties may all be participating in the same general activity,
but this may not mean that they are coordinated and integrated in that pursuit. Rather, they are all
engaging in same basic process for possibly quite variant reasons and goals, and their success in
this category of activities implies both competition and some degree of complicity which may be
more or less overt. ...
42 2012 SCC 33, [2012] S.C.J. No. 33 (Q.L.) [R. v. Venneri].
43 Ibid. at para. 35.
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others still in prostitution or bawdy-house'offences. All criminal organization members
may indeed agree to use and maintain the reputation for violence and intimidation in their
criminal activities, but they may not all collectively or even in small groups engage in the
same criminal activities.
Indictments that allege criminal organizations to be simply a group of individuals who
have on one or more occasions joined forces to effect criminal activities, such as drug
production or trafficking, fail to strike at the heart of organized crime groups - namely,
the adoption of a group identity and the use and perpetuation of a replltation for violence
and intimidation. While great difficulties may sometimes exist in successfully proving
that an organized crime outlaw group is a "criminal organization" pursuant to the
Criminal Code, these difficulties demonstrate failures with the definitional provisions of

the legislation rather than the true essence of what a criminal organization is.

1.3.5.3

Parties To An Offence and Accessories After the Fact

Distinguished from "Organized Crime Outlaw Groups" and "Criminal
Organizations"
To be a patty to an offence, an individual must commit the offence, or aid, or abet a
person who commits the offence; and that individual must intend to do so in conjunction
with one or more other persons. 44 To be an accessory after the fact, an individual must
assist a person whom he knows has committed a criminal offence. 45 Not all members
within an organized crime outlaw group will be patties or accessories after the fact to
offences committed by other members. The possibility exists that in some instances,
44

Criminal Code. supra note 3 at s. 2 I. Section 2 I states:
21. (I) EvelY one is a party to an offence who

(a) actually commits it;
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose ofaiding any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to cany out an unlawful purpose
and to assist each other therein and anyone of them, in carrying out the common purpose,
commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission ofthe
offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that
offence.
" Ibid at s. 23, Section 23 states:
23. (I) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one wito, knowing that a person has been a
party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that
person to escape.
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there are no parties - that is to say, only one member may commit a criminal
organization offence or offences that are connected to the criminal organization, but to
which other members were not privy or in which other members had no involvement.
Indeed, the non-legal definition of organized crime outlaw group employed in this thesis
emphasizes that the group must have a common identity and perpetuate that identity,
rather than simply decide to assist one another on a single or more given occasion with a
criminal act.
The difference between organized crime outlaws and parties or accessories is
exemplified by the case of R. v. Lindsay,46 where full-patch members of the Hells Angels
Steven Patrick Lindsay or Raymond Lawrence Bonner first attended the home of their
extortion victim,47 they were wearing Hells Angels paraphernalia - they were wearing
their full colours. 48 At a subsequent meeting with the complainant, Lindsay and Bonner
wore Hells Angels paraphernalia, but the victim may not have seen it,49 The Ontario
Superior COUli of Justice held that the extOliion was committed in association with a
criminal organization, the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club as it existed in Canada,s°
contrary to section 467.12 of the Criminal Code because the accused knew the Hells
Angel's reputation for violence and intimidation and deliberately used their membership
to instill fear in their victim. 51 No evidence existed that the Hells Angels Woodbridge
Chapter as a whole or its executive members specifically knew of their attendance and
extortion. Further, if either Lindsay or Bonner had acted separately, the offence of
extortion would likely still have been in connection with the Hells Angels criminal
organization. Because the legal possibility exists that members of a criminal
organization do not assist other members before, during or after the commission of an
offence, criminal organization outlaws remain distinct and separate from parties to
offences 01' accessories after the fact.

46

2009 ONCA 532, (2009) 245 C.C.C. (3d) 301, aff'g 2005 CanLII 24240, [2005] O.J. No. 2870 (Q.L.)
(Ont. S.C.J.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 2009 S.C.C.A. No. 540 [R. v. Lindsay].
47 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 5 at paras. 30-31.
48 Ibid at paras. 38-41.
49 Ibid at para. 89.
50 Ibid at para. 1090.
51 Ibid at paras. 1088-89.
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This case also demonstrates the identity component within the non-legal definition of
organized crime outlaw" employed in this thesis. That is to say, the accused Lindsay and
Bonner demonstrated that they identified with an organized crime group, the Hells
Angels, and they reinforced this identity, and thus, simultaneously perpetuated and
reinforced the identity of the Hells Angels, by using or displaying their group identity in
a manner that accords with the values and norms ofthe group during the commission of
the extortion. The concept of parties and accessories ignores this aspect of organized
crime outlaws.

1.3.6

Summary

The criminal organization provisions, like categories of corporate or white-collar crime,
conventional or garden-variety crime; terrorism; as well as conspirators, parties and
accessories all attempt to hold individuals accountable for acts performed by a group.
Safety in numbers does not, or is not meant to, protect individuals fl:om committing or
participating in illegal acts. The criminal organization provisions are another attempt by
the state to capture the workings of a group that commits crime.

While organized crime outlaws may bear resemblance to other outlaw groups, such as
terrorists and white-collar criminals, they remain distinct by their nature and the means to
effect their ends. Organized crime or criminal organization acts may employ or embody
pre-existing legal concepts and illegal means to conduct their outlawry, such as in a
conspiracy, as parties, or as accessories. However, these concepts and means cannot
adequately capture and define organized crime or criminal organizations because these
concepts and means seek to define the act of a unique group, without reference to the
unique and distinct qualities or characteristics of the group. They seek to create a
criminal offence to capture the nature of this group, without criminalizing the group
itself. However, it is the nature of the group itself that remains unique and distinct from
other criminals and groups, not necessarily their acts. That is to say, their acts or the
offences they commit are not always unique or distinct. Organized crime outlaw
individuals and organized crime outlaw groups may commit any kind of crime. What
remain unique and distinct is who they are and how this identity plays a role in the
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conmlission of their crimes. Because the state fails to incorporate or target these unique
elements of organized crime outlaw groups into anti-organized crime laws, the statutmy
definition of organized crime may not succeed in holding individuals who are organized
crime outlaws accountable for their actions or acts performed in connection with their
organized crime outlaw group.
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CHAPTER TWO

2.1

ORGANIZED CRIME OUTLAWS

INTRODUCTION

Who organized crime outlaws are and how their identity plays a role in the commission
of their crimes will be illustrated in this Chapter by examining four of the most
significant organized crime outlaw groups in Canada, both historically and
contemporarily: Anti-Prohibitionists, La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and
Aboriginal street gangs. Each group exemplifies the unique nature of organized crime
outlaws, and the difficulty in using pre-existing concepts and legal means to combat
them. Their similarities and differences reveal the ways in which a number of organized
crime outlaw groups and their identities form. Further, examples of policing and
prosecutorial efforts to dismantle these outlaw groups suggest some ofthe merits and
demerits of the law as an effective anti-organized crime measure.

Organized crime first infiltrated Canada through bootlegging during Prohibition. I
Prohibition refers to the movement in North America in the late 191h and early 20

th

centuries during which the production, sale, and distribution of alcoholic beverages was
regulated and at times prohibited by various governmental laws. Prohibition had sought
to reduce social ills and unrefined behaviour, but ironically, it created a set of
circumstances in which outlaw bootleggers thrived as they satisfied the social vices of a
large segment of society. While anti-Prohibitionists took many different forms, the
presence of Prohibition in Canada and the United States allowed organized crime outlaws
who had existed prior to Prohibition laws to enter into and eventually seize control ofthe
illegal liquor trade as well as its enormous profits. Prohibition significantly tightened the
"umbilical economic relationship,,2 between Canada and the United States, and enabled
anti-Prohibitionist outlaws to expand their territories and their power. The failures in the
law and its enforcement during this time allowed for all anti-Prohibitionist bootleggers-

Hunt, Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold! (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1988) at xi.
2 Stephen Schneider, Iced: The StOI)' oj Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons
Canada, 2009) at 554.
1 C.W.
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the pre-existing organized crime groups as well as the independent less powerful groups
- to manufacture and smuggle liquor without, for the most part, significant legal
sanction.

The North American Mafia, which came to be known as La Cos a Nostra, began in cities
with large immigrant populations in the eastern American States, such as New York and
Chicago, and migrated to the eastern part of Canada. It seized control of a number of
businesses and enterprises - both legitimate and illegitimate. The development of La
Cosa Nostra in the United States and Canada in the late 19th and early 20 th centuries
spulTed the war against organized crime by the American government and influenced the
implementation of its innumerable statutes and law enforcement initiatives. 3 While
enforcement efforts targeting Mafiosi groups occurred in Canada as well, these eff0l1s
were largely ineffective, and unlike the United States, the Canadian government did not
pass specific legislation in a timely fashion to attempt to address these organized crime
outlaws. This late and ineffectual effort at combating La Cosa Nostra in Canada allowed
the outlaw organization to cement its power within the criminal milieu and within
conventional society. Its continued presence today in North America makes it relevant to
an analysis of criminal organization legislation in Canada.
Outlaw motorcycle gangs developed in America in the mid_20 th century. They infiltrated
Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, and cemented themselves within the criminal milieu ever
since. Although a number of significant law enforcement and prosecutorial effOlts have
occurred in the last two decades, outlaw motorcycle gangs remain an economically and
socially powerful force to be reckoned with.

Aboriginal street gangs are uniquely Canadian. They comprise one-fifth of all known
gang members in Canada. 4 The largest Aboriginal street gangs, the Indian Posse; the
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta Warriors; the Native Syndicate; and the Redd

J

Ibid at 227.

Mark Totten, "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada" (2009) 3 Institute for the
Prevention of Crime Review 135 at 136. In Canada, about 22 per cent of known gang members are
Aboriginal. The Prairie provinces have 800 to 1000 Aboriginal gang members.
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Alert,5 originated in the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s, and continue to persist in
primarily the Prairie provinces ofCanada. 6 Law enforcement in Canada during the
1980s and 1990s did not directly and adequately target gangs or organized crime outlaw
groups, and this failure allowed Aboriginal street gangs to become powerfully entrenched
within the criminal milieu.? This thesis recognizes that Aboriginal peoples in Canada
have great cultural diversitl and generalizations about their cultures and experiences
further negative stereotypes relating not only to Aboriginal organized crime members,
but to all Aboriginal peoples. In addition, analysis of Aboriginal organized crime or
crime groups should focus on the crime and not the cultural group with which it has
9

come to be associated. Commonalities among Aboriginal street gangs within Western
Canada suggest some of the underlying causes for the formation of these organized crime

'''A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs in Canada: Well-Known Gangs, Membership, Offences,
Risk, and Reconviction" (2006) online: Insideprison.com <http://www.insideprison.com/prison-gangscanada. asp>.
'''Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile" (2006) online: Insideprisoncom
<http://www.insideprison.comiprison.J;ang.Jlrofile_IP.asp>; "Manitoba Wan'iors: Prison Gang Profile"
(2006) online: Insideprison.com <http://www.insideprison.com/PRISON_GANG]RO FILE_ MW .ASP>;
"Alberta Warriors: Prison Gang Prafile" (2006) online: Insideprison.com
<http://www.insideprison.com/PRISON_GANG]ROFILE_A W.ASP>; "Native Syndicate: Prison Gang
Profile" (2006) online: Insideprison.com
<http://wlVw.insideprison.com/PRISON_GANG]ROFILE_NS.ASP>; and "Redd Alert: Prison Gang
Profile" (2006) online: Insideprison.com
<http://www.insideprison.comiPRISON_GANG]ROFILE_RA.ASP>. For instance, although the Indian
Posse began in 1988 in a prison in the Prairies, and extended to street gangs in the Prairie provinces, this
Aboriginal street gang now exists in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, British Columbia and
Texas. The Manitoba Warriors began in 1992, and now exists on the street in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba. The Alberta Warriors began in 1997, and have been reported in Alberta. The Native Syndicate
likely formed in the 1980s or early 1990s, and now exists in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Redd
Alert began in either the mid-1990s in Edmonton, or in 2000 in Regina, and now exists in Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, Colorado, Texas, and California.
7 Notably, the first charges utilizing the criminal organization provisions targeted the Manitoba Warriors:
R. v. Pangman,2001 MBCA 64, [2001] M.J. No. 217 (Q.L.); and Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
decisions in R. v. Pangman, (1999), 143 Man. R. (2d) 161, [1999] M.J. No. 396 (Q.L.); (1999), 141 Man.
R. (2d) 143, [1999] M.J. No 475 (Q.L.); (2000), 141 Man. R. (2d) 200, [2000] M.J. No.5; [2000] M.J. No.
31 (Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B. (2d) 155; [2000] M.J. No. 51 (Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B. (2d) 56; (2000),144
Man. R. (2d) 144, [2000] M.J. No. 60 (Q.L.); (2000),144 Man. R. (2d) 192, [2000] M.J. No. 123 (Q.L.);
(2000),32 C.R.(5 th ) 272, [2000] M.J. No. 125 (Q.L.); 2000 MBQB 47, [2001] M.J. No. 235 (Q.L.); 2000
MBQB 85, [2000] M.J. No. 300 (Q.L.). This case dealt with the criminal organization provisions as they
existed in 1997 prior to the amendments in 200 I.
8 E.J. Dickson-Gilmore & Chris Whitehead, "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a
Typology for Understanding and Strategizing Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3 at 18.
Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead assert that no homogenous "Canadian Indian" or "Indian offender"
exists, and that Aboriginal people and offenders come from various backgrounds and cultures. In Canada,
there are 50 Aboriginal languages, 52 cultural groups, and six major cultural regions - the Woodland,
lraquoian, Plains, Plateau, Pacific Coast, and Mackenzie and Yukon River basins.
9 Ibid at 18. Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead warn against ascribing an ethnic basis to organized crime.
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outlaws. 1o This thesis will analyse Aboriginal street gangs as an outlaw crime group,
rather than an ethnic group, in order to reveal what organized crime measures should
address.

10 Ibid. at 18. Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead assert that their study on "Aboriginal organized crime"
should focus on the crime and not the cultural group. However. the label that they have assigned to their
study itself targets demonstrates that consideration of a cultural aspect of "Aboriginal organized crime",
the same as "Aboriginal street gangs" remains inevitable.
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2.2

2.2.1

ANTI-PROHIBITIONIST BOOTLEGGERS

Overview

Anti-Prohibitionists as an outlaw group demonstrates the fine line between individuals
who are organized crime outlaws, and individuals who violate a law that a large segment
of the public perceives as unfair, unjust, or unwanted. Sometimes, members of the latter
group developed into the former. Both groups are more akin to anti-Prohibitionist
outlaws rather than white-collar criminals or garden-variety criminals because they
collectively shared significant disrespect for Prohibition laws. Though, some antiProhibitionists, such as presidents and owners of distilleries and breweries, may also fall
within the category of white-collar criminal to some degree.
Overall, anti-Prohibitionists who were or who became organized crime outlaws were not
simply opportunistic "criminals" who violated the law during Prohibition. AntiProhibitionist organized crime outlaws were those individuals who identified with the
criminal subculture and were part of a group that continued to engage in criminal
outlawry in one form or another after Prohibition laws were repealed. The existence of
two types of anti-Prohibitionists - organized crime outlaw anti-Prohibitionists and
conventional societal members who violated Prohibition laws - stems from the history of
the Prohibition movement, the divisive nature ofthe concept of Prohibition, the lack of
cohesive,just, enforced laws, and the lucrative appeal of violating these laws.
The movement towards Prohibition began in the latter part of the 1800s in both Canada I
and the United States. 2 In Canada, Prohibitionists were primarily from the middle and
upper classes3 and sought to convince the public that drinking alcohol was a social
scourge ofless-refined individuals4 and those who were "un-British" and "un-

I

Gerald Hallowell, "Prohibition" The Canadian Encyclopedia (2010), online: The Canadian Encyclopedia

<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.comiindex.cfm?PgNm~TCE&Params~A 1ARTA000651 5#ArticleC

ontents> ["Prohibition"] at t.
Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crillle, 8th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) [Organized Crillle]
at 52.
J Craig Heron, Booze: A Dis/illed His/olY (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003) [Booze: A Dis/illed
His/DIY] at 165.
4 Ibid at 131-32.
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Canadian."s After little success in spite of extensive propaganda campaigns,6
Prohibitionists politicized the issue as they sought to mobilize governments to enact laws
to address the problem. 7 In spite ofthe passage in 1878 of the Canada Temperance Act

8

which allowed municipalities to impose Prohibition by plebiscite, the movement made
little progress until World War 19 when Prohibition began to be seen as " ... a patriotic
duty and a sacrifice to help win the war. ... ,,10
The unsavoury nature of saloons had a great deal to do with the growth of
prohibitionist sentiment. But it was the Great War of 1914-18 that finally led to
the passage of the Ontario Temperance Act. The cream of Canada's youth was
being massacred on the battlefields of Europe. If abstaining from alcohol would
help bring the lads home, surely that was a small sacrifice for the civilian
population to pay, especially when compared to the sacrifices and horrors being
endured by the boys overseas. Prohibition would lead to a more efficient work
force -less absenteeism - which would mean more arms and ammunition for the
war effort. Prohibition would also mean more money in people's pockets which
could be diverted into war bonds. In short, Prohibition would lead to a quicker
end to the war and, most importantly, to the return home of Canada's young
soldiers. I I
Federal Prohibition in Canada occurred in 1918, and ended in 1919. Provincial measures
slowly ended in years thereafter.

, Ibid. at 178.
Ibid. at 149. In the late 1800s, the temperance movement distributed news-sheets, pamphlets, poster,

6

songbooks, poelIy, playlets and recitations with their message.
Ibid. at 131 and 150-51. Heron describes the efforts of Prohibitionists in the political arena in this way,
ibid. at 150-51:
... They positioned themselves as a morally superior grouping of concerned citizens capable of
shaping public opinion and bringing it to bear on politicians. They were open and
uncompromising, using their organizations to broadcast compelling arguments through speeches
and lectures, newsletters, and pamphlets, to demonstrate the numerical strength of their support
through large public meetings, mass demonstrations, and voluminous petitions, and to marshal
large delegations to meet with politicians, especially premiers and their cabinet members.
8 1878,41 Vict. c. 16 [Canadian Temperance Act] also known as the Scott Act after proponent Sir Richard
William Scott.
9 Booze: A Distilled HistOl)" supra note 3 at 176-77 and 376-77; and Philip P. Mason, Rumrunning and
the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Wate/way (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1995) [RulIlrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway] at
15.
10 \\Prohibition", supra note 1 at I.
11 C. W. Hunt, Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold! (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1988) [Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!] at 36. Further, grain could be used for food
rather than for alcoholic beverages.
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In the United States, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution l2 in 1919 declared
Prohibition for the nation. Its passage was a large part of the reason for and longevity of
bootlegging in Canada. Even after the creation or declaration of drinking alcohol as a
socio-economic problem in Canada and the United States, public support for Prohibition
remained mixed. As a result, the law did not receive respect from a great number of
Canadian and American subjects some of whom became bootleggers during Prohibition,
and some of those bootleggers continued to be organized crime outlaws thereafter.
" ... [T]he thirst for alcohol did not disappear, and new channels of commerce soon
opened up to supply the demand.,,13

The presence of American Prohibition increased the market for Canadian bootlegged
liquor. 14 With demand came supply. Bootlegging in Canada and the United States
began within hours after American Prohibition laws in the Volstead Act came into effect
on January 17, 1920,15 and quickly established smuggling routes,16 such as along the
Atlantic coast, across Lakes Ontario and Erie predominantly via the "Detroit-Windsor
Funnel" along the Detroit River,17 and along the Pacific coast l8 but to a lesser extent. 19

J2 Organized Crime, supra note 2 at 52-53; and U.S. Const. amend. XVII as repealed by amend. XXI. The
Eighteenth Amendment states:
I. After one year rrom the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transpo,1ation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereoflTom the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.
2. The Congress and the several States have concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
3. This 311icle shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the
Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven
years from the date of the submission hereofto the States by the Congress.
Notably, this last paragraph asserts a sunset clause for the Amendment.
13 Booze: A Distilled HistOlY, supra note 3 at 236.
14 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at xi.
" Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition 01/ the Michigan-Ontario Watenvoy, supra note 9 at
41; and Booze. Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!. supra note II at 21. Mason asserts that
smuggling occurred within hours after the Volstead Act came into effect, while Hunt states that it occurred
within the first two weeks.
16 Booze. Boats and Bil/ions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!. supra note II at 21.
" Ibid at 49; and Booze: A Distil/ed His/OIY, supra note 3 at 248. Hunt asserts that in the 1920s,
smugglers used the Detroit River to transport approximately 80 per cent of the Canadian beer and 60 per
cent of the Canadian whisky that went into the United States. Heron asserts that four-fifths of smuggled
liquor entered the United States via the "Detroit-Windsor Funnel."
" Marion Parker & Robert Tyrrell, RUlllrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr (Victoria: Orca
Book Publishers Ltd., 1988) [RulIIl'llnner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr] at 4. From 1920 until
(wo days before the end of Prohibition on April 4, 1933, ibid. at 217, Schnarr made over 400 liquor runs

40

Within years, it became prolific,2o and American bootleggers distilled alcohol to
transpOlt back into Canada as well. 21 While some liquor entered the United States from
Europe during Prohibition,22 legalloopholes,2J the long undefended border, coupled with
law enforcement difficulties and disdain, rendered smuggling between these two
countries easy and inexpensive24 in comparison to the lucrative financial rewards. 25 The
rapid growth of the Canadian liquor industry during Canadian and American Prohibition
made it one of the largest liquor industries in the world, and made liquor one of the most
significant exports ofthis country.26

2.2.2

Lack of Respect for Prohibition Laws Encouraged Anti-

Prohibitionism
The piecemeal and inconsistent approach to Prohibition laws made them unfair and
resoundingly unpopular, and only encouraged criminals and law-abiding citizens alike to
violate them. In Canada, private enterprises, although provincially licenced, had .
historically produced and supplied liquor. 27 After the federal government passed the

Canada Temperance Ad8 which focused on the making and trading of liquor,29
between 1920 and 1930 to almost 40 different locations along the Washington coast in the Strait of Juan de
Fuca and down inlo Puget Sound, as well as to California and Mexico. He estimates transporting over 60
000 cases of liquor to the United States, and bringing over $4 000 000 into Canada, ibid. at 2 J9.
I. Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise alld Fall of Prohibitiall (New York: Scribner, 2010) [Last Call: The
Rise alld Fall of Prohibition] at 284. Okrent asserts that "rum row" did nol develop as much on the Pacific
Coast due to the lesser populated West in comparison to the East, and due to domestic production ofwine
in California.
20 Booze, Boats and Billions: SlIIuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 22. Hunt cites an estimate that in
1926, at least 100000 individuals smuggled liquor into the United States.
21 Ibid. at 163.
22 Ibid. at 22.
23 Rumrunner: The Life and Tillles ofJolmny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 63. Schnarr asserts that
rumrunners only had to register wilh the customs office in Canada and provide a location to which it was
legal to ship liquor. Proof of docking and delivery ofthe shipment were not required. In the early days of
Prohibition, the Canadian government did not prohibit exportation of liquor to the United States, ibid. at
66.
2. Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 22.
" Ibid. at25. Hunt states that along Lake Ontario, a smuggler using a speedboat could earn more money in
a week than a fisherman could earn during an eight-month season. Hunt asserts, ibid. at 51-52, that in one
run, bootleggers transported 2 544 qualt bottles of whisky which had a $20 000 street value - equivalent to
about $250 000 by 1988.
26 Ibid. at xi. Hunt states that liquor is Canada's sixth largest export.
27 Ibid. at 35.
28 Canadian Temperance Act, supra note 8.
29 Ibid. at s. 99-100; and "Prohibition", supra note I. Prohibition of the sale and trade of alcohol in Canada
began in the early 1900s until approximately 1930. Prince Edward Island first enacted laws prohibited
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municipalities could vote to adopt Prohibition in their area. 30 However, although some
municipalities enacted Prohibition laws, others did not, and although all provinces had
implemented some form of regulation of alcohol consumption by 1913,31 some provinces
remained predominantly "wet.,,32 Such jurisdictional issues only muddied the waters.

The provinces had the power to outlaw, and many did outlaw, the consumption ofliquor
in drinking establishments and prohibited the sale of liquor other than through
government stores in "wet" municipalities. 33 However, only the federal government had
the power to regulate the manufacture of liquor, and it did not prohibit liquor
production34 including brewing beer for home consumption. 35 Thus, breweries and
distilleries could legally manufacture alcoholic beverages and legally expOli it to the
United States. 36 In Ontario, the purchase of liquor in the province was illegal, but the
consumption of liquor in a private residence remained legal and ordering liquor from
outside Ontario remained legal. 37 Thus, distilleries and breweries produced liquor in
Ontario, shipped it to established warehouses in Quebec which had rejected Prohibition
in 1898,38 and then sold it tln'ough the mail to Ontario residents. 39 Prohibition in Canada
remained far from straightforward, and the piecemeal and inconsistent application of

alcohol in 190 I, and continued to do so until 1948. Other Canadian provinces, the Yukon and
Newfoundland began prohibition during World War I, but by 1930, had de-criminalized it. For the most
part, provincial temperance legislation closed legal drinking establishments and prohibited the sale of
alcoholic beverages except in a private dwelling. Licenced distillers and brewers could sell outside the

provinces.
Booze: A Distilled Histo/y, supra note 3 at 160.
ibid. at 175.
32 ibid. at 160. For instance, although Fredericton, New Brunswick voted itself"dry" in 1879, other
municipalities took twenty more years to enact Prohibition legislation. By 1900, two-thirds of the
Maritime municipalities and 70 per cent of the area's population, had become "dry."
33 Ibid. at 179-81. For instance, Prince Edward Island stopped liquor retailing in 190 I. Saskatchewan
closed all drinking establishments and allowed the sale ofliquor through government stores in 1915.
Alberta and Manitoba followed also in 1915. British Columbia, then Ontario, then Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, and then the Dominion of Newfoundland, did so at varying points in 1916. Quebec reluctantly
abolished retail alcohol sales in 1919, and even then, allowed light beer, cider and wine to continue to be
sold.
34 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 22-23.
35 Booze: A Distilled Histo/y, supra note 3 at 240.
36 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 23.
37 Ibid. at 32. Ibid. at 35, the Temperance Act of Ontario came into effect in 1916.
38 ibid. at 38.
39 Ibid. at 32-33.
30

31
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Prohibition laws fostered disrespect for the law. Further, bootleggers took advantage of
some legal loopholes, and blatantly disregarded other legal provisions.

At a critical period during World War I in the spring of 1918, Prohibition in Canada
expanded to completely prohibit all activities - that is to say, the manufacture, impOlt
and expOlt of liquor. 4o However, until 1930, smugglers could export liquor to countries
other than the United States, and thus, they would leave Canada on the pretext of
expOlting liquor to the these countries, but then actually export it to the United States or
reroute it back into Canada. 41 The federal government intended the measures of 1918 to
be temporary, and placed an expiration date on them: one year after the end of the Warone year after November 11,1918.42 The measures lasted until the end of the year
1919.
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However, some provincial regulations still remained in force, and augmented

Prohibition laws, such as the Ontario plebiscite of 1921 which ended the impOltation of
liquor into the province but not its manufacture and export,44 and then the Sandy Act
which mandated export via governmental licence only.45

The inconsistency in breadth and length of Prohibition in Canada only enabled
bootleggers in their schemes to smuggle to the United States, and furthered disrespect for
the law. Illicit stills, "moonshine", illegal drinking establishments, bootlegging, and
smuggling, increased dramatically.46 Federal prohibition of the manufacture, sale and
consumption of alcoholic beverages was ratified by January 1919 in the United States. 47
The jurisdictional inconsistency and piecemeal, uncoordinated application of Prohibition
laws in America mirrored the situation in Canada, although the severity of Prohibition
laws in the United States exceeded those in Canada. The sale of alcoholic beverages
Ibid. at 37; and Booze: A Distilled Histol)', supra note 3 at 237.
Booze: A Distilled HistOl)', supra note 3 at 246-47; and Rumrunning and Ihe Roaring Twenties:
Prohibition onlhe Michigan-Onlario TValenvoy, supra note 9 at 38.
42 Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 37; and Last Call: The Rise and
Fall of Prohibition. supra note 19 at 342 and 344. The Canadian expoI'I Act of 1930 outlawed the export

40
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of liquor to the United States, but was quickly and easily circumvented by bootleggers.
Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 37.
44 Ibid. at 4 J.
45 Ibid. at 42.
46 "Prohibition", supra note 1 at I.
43

RlIInrunning and the Roaring Twenlies: Prohibition on Ihe Michigan-Ontario Walenvay, supra note 9 at
35.

47
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with an alcoholic content of more than 0.5 per cent were prohibited, unless accompanied
by a medical prescription, and distilleries could not produce for interprovincial expOlt.
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Further, the Volstead Act of 1920 prohibited the importation of Canadian liquor. 49 The
stringent prohibitions on manufacturing and impOltation spawned the creation of illegal
distilleries by organized crime groups. 50 These distilleries were unsanitary, and their
products contained toxic chemicals and lethal alcohol. 5 !

The fine lines, and oscillating moral and legal boundaries surrounding the definitions of
criminal 52 liquor-related activities contributed to a lack of support for Prohibition from a
significant segment of the Canadian population. Further, the law was not seen as lasting,
nor bootlegging as criminal in comparison to drug smuggling. 53 Rumrunner Johnny
Schnarr explains his involvement:
I couldn't see anything wrong with hauling liquor. It seemed like
everyone knew that the law would be changed eventually. And the rumrunning
seemed like a much smarter idea than moonshining. 54
Schnarr exemplified a conventional societal member who violated Prohibition laws
rather than an organized crime anti-Prohibitionist. Temporary measures that do not have
overwhelming SUppOlt of society may indeed generate a lack respect for the law.

This lack of respect is further demonstrated by public support of many bootleggers and
the involvement of conventional societal members in facilitation of bootlegging
activities. Seemingly law-abiding fishermen and their families provided free food and

Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 90; and Booze: A Distilled
RistO/y, supra note 3 at 180.
49 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 77-78.
48

Ibid at 90-91.
Ibid.
52 Although infi'actions of Prohibition laws were met with bail hearings, trials in criminal com1s, and
punitive sanctions such as fines and imprisonment, the criminal nature of the offences was unclear to at
least one coroner and the Ontario Ministry of Attorney General in relation to the death of smuggler John
Gogo in 1923. This coroner and Crown office opined that the breach ofthe Ontario Temperance Act as a
provincial statute was not a criminal offence, as per Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!,
supra note 11 at 56.
53 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJolmny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 218. Schnarr says that he declined
offers of$25 000 to transport drugs into the United States because he did not view drug smuggling as the
same as liquor smuggling at all.
54 Ibid at 47.

50
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lodging for bootleggers, 55 or operated small businesses to feed and house them during
their smuggling mns. 56 In New Brunswick, neighbours would fire warning shots in order
to alert bootleggers mnning illegal stills of potential law enforcement searches, and in
one instance, an angry mob and their dogs attacked police. 57 Fm1her, the middle classes
facilitated bootlegging by purchasing liquor from bootleggers when the federal and then
Ontario government terminated mail orders from Quebec. 58 The power of bootleggers to
satisry the vices of segments of society during Prohibition provided these outlaws whether temporary outlaws or permanent outlaws who would be organized crime outlaws
- with social status. 59 FU11her, societal conceptions of criminals at the time of
Prohibition focused on the useless scourges of society, and did not include individuals
who could amass wealth and influence. 6o

2.2.3

The Attributes and Means of Anti-Prohibitionist Bootleggers

Anti-Prohibitionists came from a variety of backgrounds, but most likely had some
means oftransport and skills to employ when they entered this criminal arena. The
diversity of anti-Prohibitionists highlights the fact that both criminal outlaws and lawabiding citizens engaged in and could engage in anti-Prohibitionist activities. This aspect
of anti-Prohibitionists differs from other organized crime outlaws who are "invited" into
or who become pm1 of an organized crime outlaw group by agreement of the group.

Anti-Prohibitionists included farmers in the Prairies and rural Quebec who had
mechanical knowledge that assisted in the maintenance of vehicles during long
smuggling runs. 61 Sailors and fishermen had various vessels and the skill to operate
them to transport liquor products along the Pacific coast62 as well as on along the

Booze. Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!. supra note 11 at 25. Hunt asselts that fishermen on
Main Duck Island on Lake Ontario would provide food and lodging for smugglers who would in tum
provide illegal drink.
56 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Sc/1I1al"l~ supra note 18 at 69.
57 Booze: A Distilled His/OJ)', supra note 3 at 261.
" Booze. Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!. supra note II at 42.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. at 49.
61 Ibid. at 23.
62 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr. supra note 18 at 4-5. Schnarr attributes his success
in smuggling for 13 years to his skill with motors; his use of the fastest boats possible; and luck.
55
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Maritime coast from Boston to New York City - a strip known as Rum Row. 63
Dockworkers and fishermen along the Detroit River in Ontario had fast motorboats,
experience navigating and handling the waters, and access to government-licenced
piers. 64 Pre-existing American organized crime groups engaged in bootlegging as well. 65
They had organizational experience, political connections and financial power, and took
the opportunity to use their skills to make large profits. While the bootleggers of
Prohibition came from a variety of occupations and social classes, and would violently
compete for ten'itory and markets, they came to share a common criminal profession at
the time. 66

Anti-Prohibitionists developed techniques to avoid capture of their railway and airplane
cargos,67 boats, and vehicles, and thus, the seizure of their product. The development
and employment of elaborate evasive techniques may serve to distinguish antiProhibitionist outlaws from opportunistic otherwise-law-abiding citizens. On land, drops
for vehicles would take place at varying locations and at night. 68 The vehicles would
have their back seats removed,69 secret compartments underneath the floor boards/o
extra heavy springs or shocks in the rear in order to absorb the weight,71 and sometimes
two separate tanks - one for gas and one for whiskey.72 Many had thick chains attached
to their rear bumpers in order to create dust on dirt roads in order to enable drivers to
escape from law enforcement. 73 On water, some used cardboard cases with holes to
transpOlt lead-wrapped liquor bottles so that smugglers could sink the load if caught by

63
64

65

Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 23.
Ibid at 23-24.
Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Wateni'D)', supra note 9 at

17.
66

67

Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 25.
Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Watenl'a)" supra note 9 at

44. Mason asserts that smugglers used airplanes in the late 1920s, and transported liquor via thousands of
railroad cars.
6S Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, supra note 19 at 150.
69 Ibid at 150.
70 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Watel1t a)\ supra note 9 at
17.
71 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnn)' Selman; supra note 18 at 73.
72 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway, supra note 9 at
17.
73 Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, supra note 19 at 150.
1
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the coast guard. 74 Fish boats were painted a dull grey or black to render them almost
invisible at night, and would turn off their running lights in American waters. 75 Some
boats had devices that diverted exhaust under the water in order to muffle engine noise.

76

Others were particularly fast to outrun the coast guard. 77 Indeed, powerboats allowed
rumrunners on the Detroit River to rush across all day and all night 10ng. 78 One
rumrunner preferred to run in weather that no other seaman would dare operate. 79 An
electrically controlled torpedo was even used to project whiskey across the Detroit
River. 80 In winter, convoys of vehicles would pull sleds of liquor across the ice of the
Detroit River in order to distribute the weight over a greater surface area. 8! Adaptation
of criminal techniques, and sometimes luck, allowed the best anti-Prohibitionist
bootleggers to evade capture and become prolific. These anti-Prohibitionist outlaws
learned to live outside of the law, and their ability to evade enforcement may have further
engendered disrespect for the law.

One of the most successful bootlegging groups, Harry and Herb Hatch of the Gooderham
and W Olis distillery, loaded liquor bottles into fishing nets that were slung in the water
on either side of extremely powerful fast boats in order to reduce the weight of the load.
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Skippers could quickly cut the nets should the boat be captured by the coast guard. 83 The
loads were subsequently retrieved by using buoys that later floated to the surface only
after the salt lick they were attached to had sufficiently dissolved. 84 Like the Hatch
group, American organized crime groups implemented more sophisticated smuggling
techniques than independent or loosely organized anti-Prohibitionists, 85 and had local,

" Booze, Boots and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 98-99.
75 Ibid at 99; and Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 69.
76 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 99.
17 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schna/'l~ supra note 18 at 4, 108, 163 and 178.
78 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway, supra note 9 at
41.
79 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 123.
80 RU/nrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Watenvay, supra note 9 at

43.
Ibid at 42.
Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 141-42.
83 Ibid at 142.
84 Ibid at 142.
85 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Watenl'D)', supra note 9 at
81

82

17.
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state and federal law enforcement and public officials on their payrolls. 86 Eventually,
these pre-existing organized crime anti-Prohibitionists and newly organized powerful
bootlegging groups, such as the Hatch group, would seize a greater share of the
bootlegging market. The development of these powerful bootlegging groups over time is
what distinguishes organized crime outlaw anti-Prohibitionists from conventional
societal members who violated Prohibition laws for a period of time.

2.2.4

Unsuccessful Efforts to Enforce Prohibition Laws

The participation in anti-Prohibitionist activities by outlaws and law-abiding citizens
alike resulted in part from, or was encouraged by, the lack of adequate enforcement of
the law. The law, that is to say law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the coutis, and
political administrators, failed to effectively enforce and sometimes even abide by
Prohibition laws, and in so doing, generated a lack of respect for the law, and facilitated
and entrenched bootlegging in Canada. Law enforcement agencies - police, customs and
the coast guard - turned a blind eye to bootleggers or had their own hands greased.
Officers often had "little enthusiasm" for upholding Prohibition laws because many of
them imbibed themselves. 87 Bootlegging operations often depended on the assistance of
corrupt public officials. 88 A number of American coast guard employees89 and American
customs officers at the seaside docks would accept bribes from Canadian smugglers. 9o
Canadian customs and excise officers had also been in collusion with smugglers, and had
personally benefitted from the illegal liquor trade. 9 ! Local and state police forces often

Ibid. at 42.
Booze: A Distilled History, supra note 3 at 256.
88 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!. supra note II at 101; and Rumrunner: The Life
and Times ofJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 82.
86

87

Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway, supra note 9 at
107. Mason asserts that between 1920 and 1926,750 coast guard employees were dismissed of
"misconduct and delinquency" in relation to smuggling, and in following two year, 550 more were charged
89

with "extortion, bribery, solicitation of money, illegal disposition of liquor, and making false reports of
theft."
90 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 100. Hunt records a story of Joe
Largo who advised that in 1927 the bootlegging group of which he was a part, repeatedly smuggled liquor
by giving $20 to the customs officer at the guardhouse in order for the officer to leave his post and "get a
haircut." The officer would switch on the guardhouse light which only faced directly toward the sea, to
signal the smugglers to bring the shipment in to an awaiting truck.
91 Ibid. at 202-03.
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protected illegal drinking establislunents also known as "speakeasies" or "blind-pigs",92
or advised bootleggers in advance of raids by Prohibition agencies. 93 Prohibition, after
all, remained within the jurisdiction ofthe federal government. 94 However, federal
agencies lacked adequate resources on the East coast,95 and the West coast. 96

In addition to a lack of cooperation among law enforcement agencies due to
jurisdictional issues,97 such agencies in Canada and the United States, particularly during
the first few years of Prohibition, did not have sufficient manpower98 or effective
weapons to combat bootlegging. The coast guard stations of New York State had few
boats, and the boats that they had lacked power.99 The coast guard on the Pacific coast
also did not have sufficient resources. IOO Law enforcement posed no serious threat in
smaller centres, such as Oswego, New York where illegal drinking establishments
thrived for all ofthe 14 years of American Prohibition. 101 Indeed, hijacking posed a
greater threat in some areas than apprehension by the coast guard, and weeded out the
serious smugglers from the non-serious or faint at heart. '02

In April of 1924, the tides turned in favour of law enforcement when the United States
Congress significantly increased funding for the coast guard, and as a result significantly
increased the number and types of boats in the Atlantic and the Great Lakes used to
intercept bootleggers. '03 By the late 1920s, the coast guard and the federal government

Ibid. at 21. Hunt refers to incidences across Lakes Ontario and Erie in New York State.
Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJolmny Sehna,.,; supra note 18 at 79.
94 Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 21.
95 Ibid. at 95.
96 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 68.
97 Booze: A Distilled HisIOJY, supra note 3 at 255.
98 Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 21; and Booze: A Dislilled
HisIOJY, supra note 3 at 258. Hunt states that only 200 federal prohibition agents existed to patrol New
York State, and thus, primarily focused on major cities.
99 Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 95. For instance, near the Coast
Guard for Oswego, New York had only a few surfboats and one motor lifeboat for the first five years of
Prohibition.
100 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Sehnarr, supra note 18 at 68.
101 Booze. Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 21-22.
102 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Sehnarr, supra note 18 at 70. Schnarr asselis that too many
people eventually went in to smuggling, and the threat of violence allowed serious smugglers to benefit
economically.
103 Booze, Boals and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 128-29.
92

93

49

had also increased enforcement on the Pacific coast. 104 In addition, the United States and
Britain signed a treaty in 1924 to increase the distance of the international waters limit
from shore in order to provide law enforcement with more time to catch a bootlegging
boat.

105

Fut1her, the Navy provided destroyers and mine sweepers to assist the coast

guard. I 06 The early to mid-1920s in Canada also saw an increase in law enforcement
resources. For instance, in 1923, the Alberta Provincial Police obtained six new
motorcycles equipped with machine guns or submachine guns. 107 In 1925, the Ontario
Provincial Police also augmented law enforcement and increased the number of charges
and fines by using criminal intelligence; increasing the number of liquor licence
inspectors; modernizing methods of dealing with criminal records and fingerprints;
establishing a motorcycle squad for highways; and creating a policing radio network. lOS

At times, pat1icularly during the first few years of Prohibition, when law enforcement did
succeed in capturing smugglers, prosecutions failed, and on at least one occasion even
resulted in charges being laid against officers using fireatms to apprehend bootleggers. 109
In 1925, the United States Department of Justice stopped prosecuting offenders using the

Volstead Act which declared smuggling to be a misdemeanor, and began prosecuting
smugglers under the TariffAct which declared the activity to be an indictable offence
with sentences of lengthy imprisonment or fines up to $5 000. 110 The American federal
government had much greater success in prosecuting violations of Prohibition laws, but
local prosecutions paled in comparison. I I I However, generally speaking, the criminal
justice system overall did not favour the enforcement of Prohibition laws.

Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 132.
Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 129.
100 Ibid
107 Booze: A Distilled HistOlY, supra note 3 at 178.
108 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 169.
109 Ibid at 55-56. After police officers apprehended four bootleggers, including renowned Rocco Perri,
10'
105

four police officers showered the smugglers' boat with bullets and killed one of the occupants, John Gogo.
The coronel' and the Crown opined that the smugglers' acts were not criminal offences, and thus, these
officers had commit manslaughter. The trial resulted in a hung jury.
110 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 133.
111 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario lVateJ11'ay, supra note 9
at 112. Mason states that in 1928, federal prosecutors obtained 48 820 convictions out of more than 50 000
prosecutions. Between 1918 to 1928, the city of Detroit succeeded in obtaining convictions in relation to
only about 25 per cent of their prosecutions. However, one must consider that enforcement in the early
PaJts of Prohibition was more problematic, and thus, may skew this data against local prosecution results.
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In spite of increased law enforcement and increased prosecutions for more serious
offences, courts continued to impose sentences and fines so minimal as to not deter or
affect business operations. Many judges remained unsympathetic to Prohibition laws. I 12
Usually, they released offenders, and did so on easily achievable monetary sureties. I 13
Fmiher, year-long delays in matters coming to trial I 14 meant that bootleggers were free to
continue their criminal activities. Judges expanded the common law to accommodate
defences to Prohibition statutes, and in so doing, discouraged law enforcement efforts. 115
They rarely imposed imprisonment, and if they did, the sentences were not lengthy.116
They imposed fines that became simply a cost of doing business l17 if any fines were
imposed at all. 118 At least one rumrunner pled guilty to violating Prohibition laws, and
incurred a fine not because he had no defence to the charge, but just to return to work. I 19
The proper administration of justice suffered. In the latter pali of Prohibition, although
an increasing number of bootleggers were apprehended and some jailed, the demand for
illegal liquor did not decrease, and did not deter other bootleggers from continuing the
trade. 120

112 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note I I at 148 and 188. Hunt asserts, ibid
at 15 I, that Judge Cooper of the Northern District Court of New York " ... harboured doubts as to the
wisdom of the Volstead Act. .. ", but that he increased fines and jail terms in relation to Prohibition offences
due to the open and blatant disdain ofbootJeggers for the law.
113 Ibid at 106 and 260.
114 Ibid at 148.
115 Ibid at 33. Hunt refers to an Ontario Supreme Court case in which the magistrate held that a person
could have more than one residence in order to house his "cellar supply" - the liquor received through mail
order and housed in one's residence. Notably, this defence later became invalid.
116 Ibid at 259.
117 Ibid. at 106, 148 and 259; and Booze: A Distilled HistOl)" supra note 3 at 259.
lIS Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Wate"vay, supra note 9
at 19. Mason asserts that 90 per cent of smugglers convicted easily paid their fines which were about $20,
and many smugglers did not even receive a fine.
119 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ojJO!111ny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 83. After the impoundment of his
boat by customs after it had been shot by law enforcement during a liquor run, Schnarr describes his
decision:
On the evidence of that slug [head customs officer George] Norris impounded the
Moonbeam. I argued that the bullet could have come from a .22 rifle or something that had
ricocheted off the water, but old George would have none of that. I let them keep the boat for a
couple of weeks because it was a period of the full moon and the nights were too bright for
hauling anyway. I knew that I could beat the charge. They would never have been able to get a
conviction on that little evidence, but it could have kept the boat tied up for several months at
least. So, after a couple of weeks when the orders started to come in again, it was simpler just to
pay the $500 fine and go back to work.
120 Ibid at 100.
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According to Craig Heron, mass civil disobedience of Canadians in the support of the
underground economy of bootlegging, 121 rather than a lack of effective formal social
controls, lead to the demise of Prohibition laws.
In the end, prohibition did not fail simply because the police were
ineffective, incompetent, or conupt. In essence, the tule of law broke down.
Large numbers of Canadians refused to accept the legitimacy of either the idea of
clamping down on alcohol consumption or the heavy-handed administration of
the law, and many saw an economic opportunity in subverting the state
measures. 122
For bootleggers who smuggled via land, such as bootleggers in the Canadian Prairies and
in Quebec, and bootleggers who smuggled offthe Pacific coast, what little danger the
law often posed remained insignificant in comparison to the threat of violence and death,
and the theft of product and transportation by other smugglers. 123 In Ontario along the
Detroit River, smugglers paid protection money to various officials in order to make their
tuns without incident. 124 However, lawlessness in the area led to shootings and
woundings by the coast guard,125 and murders and violence among bootlegger gangs and
hi-jackers. 126 Violence only increased with the involvement of organized crime antiProhibitionists, such as Al Capone.
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Booze: A Distilled HistOlJ', supra note 3 at 266.
Ibid. at 261.
l23 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 23; and Rumrunner: The Life and
Times ojJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 91. Schnarr states: "In the spring of 1924 hijacking probably
p:osed more ofa threat to the rum trade than did the Coast Guard."
" Booze. Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 45. Hunt cites the evidence of a
Windsor taxi driver who testified in 1921 that he had paid out $96 000 in the two years prior.
125 Ibid. at 47-48; and Rumrunner: The Life and Times ojJohnny Schnarr, supra note 18 at 82-83, 90, J02,
131 and 134. Hunt states in Booze, Boats and Billions: .Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 48:
III

l22

... On the river itself, running gun battles between rum-runners and pursuing coastguardsmen
became a common place disruption of area residents' sleep. Even more disturbing to these
waterfront residents were the number of stray bullets that shattered their windows or lodged in
their walls.
126 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 91-92.
127 Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario JVaferway, supra note 9
at 146. For example, Mason refers to the st. Valentine's Day Massacre in February 1929 in Chicago
during which murders occurred in response to a hijacking of Canadian whiskey en route to Al Capone's
"criminal empire" in lIlinois. Violence worsened during "Bloody July" in 1930 in Detroit.
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2.2.5

The Rise of Organized Crime Outlaws During Prohibition

Although organized criminal activities had existed prior to Prohibition, they became
more centralized, more organized, and more commercialized as a result. 128 The
complicated nature of bootlegging, the vast and interregional distribution networks, 129
and the involvement of many parties from distillation to delivery, meant the operations
had to be, and were, elaborately organized. 130 Conveniently, the organizational skills and
techniques of American mobsters, such as John Torrio and his young associate Al
Capone, in brothel and gambling enterprises easily transferred to the illegal liquor
trade,131 and became more developed and became refined. " ... Prohibition offered a
graduate course for training in the crime industry.,,132 Further, the association of antiProhibitionists in outlaw groups, and the identification with the values and norms of
these groups led some anti-Prohibitionists to become organized crime outlaws.

The expansion of the coast guard in the Atlantic and on the Great Lakes, and the
subsequent increase in enforcement of Prohibition laws, not only forced bootleggers to
develop new smuggling techniques but also required that they sometimes to cooperate
with one another. 133
These [bootlegging] alliances were the first manifestations of a crime
syndicate operating on a national scale. In time they became the foundation of
multilateral "peace conferences," such as the 1929 meeting in the Hotel President
in Atlantic City, when mobsters from Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Newark,
and New York granted each other territorial exclusivity, enabling them to
operated unencumbered in their respective cities. Eventually this sort of
Last Call: The Rise and Fall ofProhibition, supra note 19 at 272.
Ibid.
130 Booze: A Distilled HistOlY, supra note 3 at 249; and Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnny
Schnarr, supra note 18 at 194. Johnny Schnarr describes the complexity ofthe operation that the
organization Consolidated Exporters orchestrated on one occasion:
The liquor would be hauled down to a point off the mouth of the river by a purse seiner.
The buyer would send a man up to Vancouver to ride down with the shipment and show us where
to make the landing up the river. Somehow 01' other, the liquor for that deal was shipped right out
of the harbour in Vancouver. How they did it, I don't know; I did not concern myself with that
end ofthe business. All I planned for was my part in the operation, the delivery ofthe load.
131 Last Call: The Rise and Fall ofProhibition, supra note 19 at 272.
132 Ibid"
133 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 250-51; and Last Call: The Rise
and Fall ofProhibition, supra note 19 at 273. For instance, Okrent points to alliances among John Torrio
and AI Capone in Chicago with Detroit's Purple Gang, and Sam Bronfman's use of Moe Dalitz's planes
and boats to transpOlt goods across Lake Erie into the hands of Ohio and Pennsylvania affiliates and Meyer
Lansky's New York operation.
128

129

53

arrangement would harden into formal pmtnerships, such as the cartel established
by Lansky and his fellow New Yorker Lucky Luciano, Abner "Longy" Zwillman
of Newark, Charles "King" Solomon of Boston, Daniel Walsh of Providence, and
a few others who together would control the entire bootleg business from Boston
to Philadelphia. They fixed prices tlu-oughout their ten'i!ory, struck an exclusive
distribution deal with their Canadian suppliers, and rewarded John Torrio for
brokering the arrangement by granting him a fungible inventory of five thousand
cases ofliquor a month. 134
Thus, it furthered the prosperity and power of organized bootlegging groups over
individual bootleggers, and led to establishment and domination of some organizations
over others.

In Canada, a similar cooperation appeared among anti-Prohibitionist organized crime
outlaws and anti-Prohibitionists who were usually law-abiding conventional members of
society. Although small-scale bootlegging enterprises flourished before and after World
War I,135 the presidents and owners of larger breweries and distilleries organized
complex liquor smuggling operations employing a number of individuals, 136 and these
more powerful operators slowly suffocated many smaller enterprises in the competition
for territory. 137 Arguably, these presidents and owners may have fallen within the
category of white-collar criminals to some degree, but their disrespect for Prohibition
laws ensnares them within the category of anti-Prohibition outlaw as well.

Individuals who were or became organized crime outlaws after the end of Prohibition,
worked with or for presidents and owners of liquor businesses during Prohibition:
... [A]s the coast guard fleet expanded to a veritable armada, many independent
operators decided the route to survival lay in joining [Harry] Hatch's Navy. In
return for protection they agreed to carry only what they were told.
One of the largest independents to come to this decision was Rocco Perri.
He had moved into the liquor expOlt business in 1921, putting his bootlegging
'" Last Call: The Rise and Fall oj Prohibition, supra note 19 at 273.
m Booze: A Distilled Hist01)" supra note

3 at 241.

Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 186; and Booze: A Distilled
Hist01)" supra note 3 at 243. Hunt in Booze, Boats and Billiol1S: Smuggling Liquid Gold! obtains this
13.

information from the 1927 Royal Commission on Customs and Excise.
137 Last Call: The Rise and Fall oj Prohibition, supra note 19 at 358. Gkrent states that although 1345
beer brewers operated in 1915, only 31 existed after beer was again legalized due to the fact that big
breweries had produced other products to survive during Prohibition, and used their strength to then
consolidate the market afterward.
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operations into the capable hands of Bessi Starkman while he developed the
export business. Much of Rocco's fleet of fifty fishing boats operated on Lake
Erie and were used to run booze both to the States and also back into Canada.
Once Rocco had put his boats under Hatch's control they were sent to the Heyden
Boat Works to be refitted with Packard Motors and a mastercruiser was made
available to protect them. The addition of Rocco's fleet gave Hatch's Navy
domination of the lakes.
If Sam Bronfman, president of Seagrams, wanted to ship booze on the
Great Lakes in large quantities, he had to rely on Hatch's Navy. The
independents were simply unable to guarantee delivery oflarge quantities.
Moreover, Sam Bronfman, despite his reputation for a terrible temper, was
somewhat in awe of the tough, hard-driving Harry Hatch, who made it clear that
Bronfman could not operate in Ontario without his approval. Neither man had
much love for the other, but neither was capable on his own of supplying the
demand from the huge American market to the south. Consequently, a celiain
amount of cooperation was to the advantage of both. l38
These clever and economically powerful anti-Prohibitionists gained control of the
bootlegging operations. Increased law enforcement acted as a double-edged sword in
that it presented a great threat to individual bootleggers, but simultaneously separated the
wheat from the chaff, and developed the prowess and power of bootlegging outlaws.
Indeed, Philip J. Mason asserts that by 1923, organized crime gangs that had started
bootlegging during Prohibition, had taken control of smuggling and the operation of
distilleries and "speakeasies" in Canada and the United States along the Detroit River,
and made millions of dollars as a result. l39 Several Italian Mafia families had also
participated extensively in smuggling, and obtained controlling interest in Canadian
breweries and distilleries. 140 The increasing and unlimited financial resources of such
organized crime anti-Prohibitionists facilitated their bribery of public officials, and
enabled them to take over some local American governments. 141

This discussion of the increased organization of liquor distribution during Prohibition
shows that anti-Prohibitionists who would become organized crime outlaws after the end
of Prohibition, such as Rocci Perri, were heavily involved in distributing liquor and

Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note II at 143-44.
Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario Waterway, supra note 9
at 109.
140 Ibid. Mason refers to the Licavoli, Vitalie and Giannolos families.
141 Ibid. at 110.
138

139
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would continue with other organized crime activities. However, other antiProhibitionists who owned and operated large breweries and distilleries, seemingly did
not continue to participate in organized crime groups after the repeal of Prohibition laws.
This distinction demonstrates the fine line between anti-Prohibitionist organized crime
outlaws and anti-Prohibitionists who were usually law-abiding (though 0ppOltunistic)
conventional societal members. Some of the latter group crossed over into the organized
crime group after Prohibition. However, both groups had disdain, disrespect, or even
contempt for Prohibition laws.

2.2.6

The End and Consequences of Prohibition

Eventually, Prohibition in Canada ended in fits and starts just as it had began. 142
American Prohibition had lasted longer, and ended on December 5, 1933. 143 Whether it
made Americans and Canadians generally drink less during its term and in the ensuing
decades l44 remains arguable. However, it failed to rid society of the scourge of alcohol,
and empowered, if not created, organized crime groups.145 As the illegal liquor trade

142 Booze: A Distilled HistDlY, supra note 3 at 277. By 1930, govenllllent liquor stores dominated
Canadian landscapes and contributed millions of dollars to state treasuries, and some provinces allowed
licenced public drinking establishments. Eight of nine provinces, the Yukon and the Dominion of
Newfoundland had state liquor stores which yielded over $30 million dollars annually. Public drinking
establishments would slowly continue to extend to the Maritimes, and eventually return to Nova Scotia in
1948, to New Brunswick in 1961, and to Prince Edward Island in 1964.
143 Rumrunnillg and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition all the Michigan-Ontario Watenvay, supra note 9
at ISO. However, the federal legislature did not approve the manufacture and sale of whiskey in state
li~uor stores until December 30, 1933.
14 Last Call: The Rise alld Fall of Prohibition. supra note 19 at 373. Okrent asseIts that Prohibition did
make Americans drink less. However, many other social and economic forces occurred during Prohibition
and thereafter which may have had such an impact if any indeed took place, such as the reduction of
immigration in comparison to the late I800s and thus fewer Europeans whose attitudes more greatly
favoured alcohol consumption, and the impact ofthe Great Depression on household incomes and the
ability to purchase non-essential items.
145 Organized Crime, supra note 2 at 54. Abadinsky argues:
Until Prohibition, gangsters were merely errand boys for the politicians and the
gamblers; they were at the bottom of a highly stratified social milieu. The gamblers were under
the politicians, who were "kings" (Katcher 1959). Prohibition changed the relationship among the
politicians, vice entrepreneurs, and gang leaders. Before 1920, the political boss acted as a patron
for the vice entrepreneurs and gangs: He protected them ITom law enforcement, and they gave
him financial and electoral support. The onset of Prohibition, however, unleashed an unsurpassed
level of criminal violence, and violence is the specialty of the gangs. Physical protection from
rival organizations and armed robbers was suddenly more important than was protection from law
enforcement. Prohibition turned gangs into empires (Logan 1970). With Prohibition "pumping
money into mob pockets, power shifted from men with votes to men with money and guns"
(Pietrusza 2003: 302).
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declined and profits became pmi of state treasuries, organized crime anti-Prohibitionists
turned to other illegal ventures, such as gambling, prostitution, and drugs. 146 However,
what remains clear is that organized crime had entered Canada through illegal
bootlegging.

147

While some bootleggers who were usually conventional law-abiding

citizens took the opportunity to earn significant sums of money by violating Prohibition
laws, most would return to non-criminal employment, such as Johnny Schnan·. 148 Other
anti-Prohibitionists, such as the presidents and owners of large breweries and distilleries,
would have generated a significant presence in the liquor industry, and would continue to
manufacture and sell liquor. Others - the organized crime outlaws - would continue to
work within the criminal milieu and in organized crime. 149 The refinement of criminal
techniques and skills during Prohibition, as well as the creation of a national structure of
mob bosses in the United States, entrenched organized crime outlawry in Canada and the
United States.

Although America had OC [organized crime1before Prohibition, it "was intimately
associated with shabby local politics and corrupt police forces"; there was no organized-crime
activity "in the syndicate style" (King 1969: 23). The "Great Experiment" was a catalyst that
caused OC, especially violent forms, to blossom into an impOltant force in American society.
Prohibition mobilized criminal elements in an unprecedented manner. Pre-Prohibition crime,
insofar as it was organized, centered around corrupt political machines, vice entrepreneurs, and, at
the bottom, gangs. The competitive violence of Prohibition turned the power structure upside
down. It also led to a new level of criminal organization.
146 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 200. Hunt uses Ontario as an
example.
147 Ibid at 194; and Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, supra note 19 at 345. Okrent in Last
Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition asselts that Prohibition transformed neighbourhood gangs into
organized criminal corporations.
148 Rumrunner: The Life and Times ofJohnn)' Schnan; supra note 18 at 220; and Organized Crime, supra
note 2 at 55. SchnalT returned to logging and commercial fishing until he retired in 1969.
149 Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, supra note 11 at 200; and Organized Crime, supra
note 2 at 55-56.
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2.3

2.3.1

NORTH AMERICAN MAFIA OR LA COSA NOSTRA

Overview

Some social scientists, authors, police, and Italian associations in the 1960s to 1980s
disputed that the Italian Mafia existed at alii or existed as an organization rather than
individuals. 2 However, the emergence of more than 500 defecting members and
evidence from judicial inquiries in the United States confirm the existence offormal
organized crime Mafiosi groupS. 3 In Canada, wiretap evidence in the 1970s proved the
existence of Mafiosi groups, and their connections with Mafiosi Families in the United
States, such as the Bonanno Family in New York City.4
Four main Mafia-type organized crime groups exist in Italy: the 'ndrangheta in
Calabria, the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra, the Camorm in Campania, and the Sacra
Corona Unita in Puglia. 5 Although these organizations began as regional enterprises,
they eventually spread to all of Italy and abroad. 6 La Cosa Nostra in the United States

1 Letizia Paoli, "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises" (2004) 6 Global
Crime 19 ["Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises"] at 19; and James
Dubro, Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985) [Mob Rule: Inside
the Canadian Mafia] at 10-11. Paoli refers to assertions by Pin a Arlacchi in Pino Arlacchi, Mafia
Business. trans. by Martin Ryle (London: Verso, 1987) at 3-4 that the Mafia as a form of criminal
organization, rather than a type of behaviour and power, does not exis!. Giovanni Ermenegildo Schiavo in
The Trlllh Abollt Ihe Mafia and Organized Crime ill America (New York: Vigo Press, 1962) at II and 86
also asserts the Mafia in Italy is dead and does not exist in the United States. Dubro refers to assertions in
the 1970s by an Ontario intelligence officer who opined:
... There is no 'Mafia' in Toronto, just well-connected organized criminals of Italian descent who
effectively use the 'myth' of the Mafia to enhance their own positions in the criminal world.
2 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 19. Paoli refers
to Henner Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi: The Slruclure oj Power (Lexington: Saxon House, 1973); Anton
Blok, The Mafia oj a Sicilian Village. 1860-1960: A Study oJ Violent Peasant EII/repreneurs (Cambridge:
Polity Press 1988); and Jane Schneider & Peter T. Schneider, Culture and Polilical Ecollomy in Western
Sicily (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
3 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 20.
4 Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia, SlIpl'O note I at 5-6. This wire tap evidence was brought to light
in the Quebec Commission on Organized Crime Commission as well as the Ontario Royal Commission
into Certain Sectors of the Construction Industry or Waisberg Commission; and by Canadian court cases in
the mid-1970s, such as the trial ofCalabrian Mafia member Francesco Caccamo who had documents
outlining the bloody indoctrination rituals and formation of the Honoured Society or "Siderno group" and
its use of punishment and violent death, ibid at 114, and the sentencing of members of the Calabrian
Honoured Society or 'lldrallghela which revealed threats of a territorial war in Mafia, interconnections
with the United States Mafia leaders, and discussions about the structure and rules of the group.
S Stefano Maffei & Isabella Merzagora Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and
Modernity in a Troubled Country" (2007) 4 European J. of Criminology 461 ["Crime and Criminal Policy
in Italy: Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled Country"] at 470.

"Ibid
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and Canada can trace the seeds of its origins to Italian Mafiosi groups. The rich and
expansive history of these Mafiosi groups, and their influence on La Cosa Nostra
necessitates a review of the four main types of Mafia.

These origins of Italian Mafiosi groups and La Cosa Nostra in North America
demonstrate the importance of identity within an outlaw group, generating that identity,
and maintaining that identity. Use or display of this identity to perpetuate and reinforce
the power of the group was likely subtle and did not take the usual form of other
organized crime outlaws who wear ovett paraphernalia and insignia. Mafiosi groups and
La Cosa Nostra also remain somewhat distinct from other organized crime outlaws due
to the familial bonds of their members - either by blood or ritual- but these bonds
evince one method of reinforcing and perpetuating their anti-social values and norms, as
well as their identity. These bonds also demonstrate the exclusivity of membership.
Further, these groups differ fi'om other organized crime outlaws due to their political
influence in the government and in the community.7 However, the extreme violence and
criminality of these groups as well as the power of their reputation and identity make
them similar to other organized crime outlaws: " ... [T]he Mafia's lifeline is its ability to
instill fear in people - to make victims and potential victims fear what they can do .... ,,8

The law has largely left this power unchecked due to a lack of investigative tools, late
effotts at enforcement, investigative hindrances, as well as criminal justice delays and
manipulations. The power of the Mafia ebbs and flows from infighting within and
among Families, and from competition posed by other organized crime outlaw groups.

7 Ibid. at 470; and "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I
at 24. Maffei and Betsos in "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled

Country" state:
Mafia-type organizations are characterized by their viciousness and the similarity of their

structure, which is based on a network of secret associations of 'men of honour' governed by the
code of silence [or Omert.). One of the most significant features of these organizations has
always been their aptitude for infiltrating public offices and exerting political influence .....
8 Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia, supra note I at 54. Ibid. at 119, an informer of the Siderno Mafia
group stated the reasons for Mafia power:
... Just for fear itself. They [people] know what they [the Siderno Mafia] are capable of doing,
what they have done in the past and what they can do.
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However, their presence remains a significant force in contemporary society, and reveals
some ofthe ways in which organized crime outlaws form and perpetuate.

2.3.2

The History of La Cosa Nostra: Italian Mafiosi Groups

2.3.2.1

The Sicilian Mafia or Cos a Nostra, and the Calabrian

'Ndrangheta
The existence and persistence of the Sicilian Mafia stems from the history of continual
repressive foreign occupation in Sicily for over 2000 years,9 and from the fight against
these systems of perceived illegitimate and unjust foreign state action. In the l8 th
century, various foreign governments in Sicily used noble families to manage public
affairs and collect taxes. These families were perceived as unjust by lower ranks within
society, and thus, the families maintained mmies called campieri lo to "protect their fields
and police the peasants.,,11 These armies became the Mafia, and their origins occUlTed
much earlier than the unification of Sicily with Italy in 1860. 12 As the foreign invaders
left, the Mafia assumed control by offering to protect the peasants, and simultaneously
controlling them for the landowners. 13 They were an informal, unelected and powerful
group of Sicilian men who remained to lUle within society alongside weak governments
and inadequate legal systems. 14
Sicilians,.who've seen their island invaded almost continuously for
centuries, have nurtured a strong sense of personal worth, group loyalty, and
family protection. Faced with invaders from several countries, it's only natural
that any resistance will form around the most capable, the strongest, and the most
9 Oaia Servadio, Mafioso: A HistOlY a/the Mafiafi'om its Origins to the Present Day (New York: Stein
and Day, 1976) [Mafioso: A HistOlY a/the Mafiafi'om its Origins to the Presellt Day] at 3.
10 Ibid at 10. The campieri became 110m;; di rispelfll or men of respect due to their violenl methods which
included terror and murder.
11 Antonio Nicaso & Lee Lamothe, Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global
Crime Empires (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2005) [Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists:
The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires] at 35.
12 Mafioso: A HistolY o/the Mafiafi'om its Origins to the Present Day, sllpra note 9 at 17.
13 Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, sllpra note 11 at
36. Nicaso and Lamothe state:
This is what 's called the "excellent Mafia position": inserting themselves and their power
between opposing parties and benefiting from both sides.
" Ibid at 35; and Louis 1. Shelley, in "Mafia and the Italian State: The Historical Roots of the Current
Crisis", Book Reviews of Men a/Respect: A Social HistOlY a/the Sicilian Mafia by Raimondo Catanzaro,
The Sicilian Mafia: The Bllsiness 0/ Private Protection by Diego Gambetta, and Mafia Isslles Analyses
and Proposals/or Combatting the Mafia Today by Ernesto U. Savona, ed. (1994) 9 Sociological Forum
661 at 667.
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violent. And if those people are already committed to an organization, the
perceived strength is magnified. Where government collects taxes but doesn't
provide adequate law enforcement and judicial and social services, the
downtrodden and slighted will turn to a mafia-like group for frotection; this
allows the Mafiosi to accumulate power, wealth, and respect. S
In spite of the establishment of a constitutional State in 1860 and an elected parliament,
" ... the old wine was poured into new bottles .. ",,16 These origins of the Sicilian Mafia
echo the societal circumstances that gave rise to other outlaws who rebelled against the
socio-economic disenfranchisement, 01' against the perceived legal 01' political injustice
of a ruling authority.

'Ndrangheta is a Greek work meaning manliness and heroism. 17 The 'ndrangheta exist
in the remote villages and towns of Calabria, the southernmost province of the Italian
mainland,18 where government interest and power is low and strong men control the
activities of citizens. 19 The town of San Luca is the casa madre or mother home of this
Honoured Society ofCalabria. 2o However, the power of the 'ndrangheta travels much
fmther than one Italian province. It connects itself to Colombian, Turkish, German,
21
Dutch, Belgium, and French criminal organizations. The cohesion within the

'ndrangheta in comparison to other outlaws, and even some other Mafia-type groups,
deserves mention:
... Virtually every city, town, and village in Calabria had a criminal clan that
controlled many facets of life. Unlike the Sicilian and American mafias, the
'ndrangheta was built upon the family nucleus of blood relatives and

IS Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, sllpra note 11 at
34-35.
16 Mafioso: A HistOlY a/the Mafioji'om its Origins to the Present Day, supra note 9 at 17.
17 Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, sllpra note 11 at 9.
is Pierre de Champlain, Mobsters, Gangsters and Men 0/ Honollr: Cracking the Mafia Code (Toronto:
HarperColiins, 2004) at 36; and Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global
Crime Empires, supra note 11 at 9-10. De Champlain asserts, ibid. at 36 and 74, that several cells ofthe
'ndrangheta exist in Canada - particularly in Toronto and Hamilton - as evidenced by documents found in
August 1971 in the residence of a 'ndrangheta member, Frank Caccamo. The documents set forth the
rules, regulation, procedures and induction rituals of the organization.
19 Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace o/Global Crime Empires, sllpro note II at 910.
2. [bid. at 10.
21 Ibid. at 29. Nicaso and Lamothe state that in approximately 2005, the 'ndrangheta sold more than $45
million in drugs per day in the district of Brussels; that 'ndrangheta members owned or controlled more
than 300 pizzerias in Germany; and that in Rome the 'ndrangheta owed real estate wOl1h millions of euro.
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intermarriages It was, as a result, almost impenetrable; for a brother to inform on
a brother would be infamy.22
This interrelation among inhabitants through blood or marriage negates the existence of
informants23 and thus renders impossible many of the usual law enforcement initiatives
in'relation to the organized crime ofthe 'ndrangheta.

The Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian 'ndrangheta share common cultural codes, as
well as authoritarian organized structures in which the most important family chiefs
comprise a commission which unites the two groups.24 Both organized crime outlaw
groups initiate new members into the mafia cosca or group by requiring the individual to
permanently assume a new identity - that of a "man of honour. ,,25 This identity is not
only mandatory, but has paramountcy over everything else, including the member's
life. 26 The ruling bodies of the Sicilian Mafia and the 'ndrangheta have absolute power
over every part of their members' lives. 27 Further, members are brothers.
The ceremony of affiliation additionally creates ritual ties of brotherhood
among the members of a mafia family: the 'status contract' is simultaneously an
act of fraternization. The new recruits become 'brothers' to all members and
share what anthropologists call a regime of generalised reciprocity: this
presupposes altruistic behaviour without expecting any short-telm reward. As F.
Lestingi, chief prosecutor for the king, pointed out in 1884, mafia groups
constitute brotherhoods whose 'essential character' lies in 'mutual aid without
limits and without measure, and even in crimes.' Only thanks to the trust and
solidarity created by fraternization contracts does it become possible to achieve
28
specific goals and thus satisfy the instrumental needs of the single members.
Further, exclusivity in membership enables the group to preserve their identity. In
addition to fraternization obligations, "men of honour" are obliged to keep the
composition, activities and strategies of their group a secret, and have an absolute duty to

Ibid at 11.
Ibid. at 9, Nicaso and Lamothe use the town of Platl in the Aspromonte Mountain of Calabria as an
example.
24 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 20.
25 Ibid at 21.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. at 22.
28 Ibid. at 21.
22

23
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keep silent. 29 In these ways, the Sicilian Mafia and the 'ndrangheta mandate social
control of members and maintain internal cohesion.

The Sicilian Mafia has suffered, but never disappeared, from the effects of law
enforcement and infighting in the 1990s,JO as well as government and military
oppression. 3! The Mafia has rebuilt itself, and in its drug trafficking, money laundering,
migrant smuggling and military weapomy trade, it has formed new partnerships with the

'ndrangheta as well as other international criminal organizations in Europe, NOlth
America, the Caribbean, South America, South Africa and Eastern Europe. 32 However,
the severe nature oftheir membership and their strong collective identity have prevented
the Sicilian Mafia and the 'ndrangheta from admitting members outside Sicily or
Calabria, and thus, has limited entrepreneurial ties and expansion into foreign markets.3J
These Mafiosi groups have focused on their Italian territories, and increased their control
and collusion with political officials. 34

2.3.2.2

The Camorra

The name "Camorra" means "fight" or "quarrel" in Spanish,3s but for many outside
Italian communities, it is synonymous with "crime.,,36 Some claim that the organization
originated in the 1500s when Spain ruled Naples, and a criminal Spanish brotherhood,
the Garduna, brought to Italy its secret ceremonies, oaths, hand and sound
communication signals, a membership fund, and the requirement that prospective
members must commit a murder. 37 Others assert that the Camol1'a first surfaced in 1820
in Naples and the surrounding area.l

29
30

8

Ibid. at21.
Angels. Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace o/Global Crime Empires, supra note II at

33.
31 Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace o/Global Crime Empires. supra note II at
35.
32 Angels. Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires. supra note II at
33.
33 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 23.
34 Ibid. a127.
" Carl Sifakis, The Mafia Encyclopedia (New York: Facts On File, 1987) [The Mafia Encyclopedia] at 58.
36 Angels. Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note I I at
63.
37 Ibid. Nicaso and Lamothe describe some of the communication methods:
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Tens, even hundreds, of similar groups developed and became Camorra39 of all typesfrom sophisticated businesses to street-level gangs. 40 Unlike the Sicilian Mafia and the
Calabrian 'ndrangheta, some Camorra groups are not political and do not interfere with
govemmental activities. 41 However, the well-established Camona family businesses
claim to exert political control over their communities and within local govemments.

42

Even more than the Sicilian Mafia, the Camon'a had a very hierarchical structure,43 and
fed on the opportunity in Italian cities. 44 They often use century-old symbols and rituals
to strengthen their intemal cohesion. 45 However, their lack of overarching coordination
of Camorra groups in Campania, unlike the organization of the Sicilian Mafia and

'ndrangheta, has resulted in violent and murderous wars over tetTitory and criminal
markets. 46
The power of the Italian CamolTa was broken or weakened in the 19th century47 and early
20 th century, and although it resurfaced in the 1960s as a result of the expansion of drug
and tobacco smuggling, it did not re-establish or stabilize itself like the Sicilian Mafia
and 'ndrangheta have. 48 The Camorra in North America suffered as well after wars with

... When a policeman would arrive they mewed like cats; a rooster-like crowing meant that a

victim was in the area. A sigh meant "be silent," that there was someone nearby, listening.
The Mafia Encyclopedia, supra note 35 at 58.
Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note II at
63.
40 Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace o/Global Crime Empires, supra note II at
64; and "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 24.
41 Ibid. and ibid.
42 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 24.
43 The Mafia Encyclopedia, supra note 35 at 58.
44 Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace o/Glabal Crime Empires, supra note II at
64.
" "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 24.
46 Ibid. at 24-25. Paoli states, ibid. at 24, that the lack of stability and coordination has caused Campania to
have the highest murder rate and violent crime rate in Italy for over a decade.
47 The Mafia Encyclopedia, supra note 35 at 59. Sifakis asserts that the power of the Camorra in Italy has
either been broken or been weakened after the murder convictions of35 Camorra leaders, including the
Grand Master, in 1911, and efforts by Mussolini to eliminate the group in the 1920s.
48 "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 24.
38
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the Mafia in American cities such as New Orleans and New York. Most North American
Camorristas had joined Mafia groups by 1920. 49

2.3.2.3

The Sacra Corona Unita

The Sacra Corona Unita, or United Sacred Crown, of the Apulian region was borne out
of a quest for profit. 5o Mafia and Camorra groups developed in the Apulian region
during the 1970s when the region was a major import location for smuggled cigarettes. 5 I
In subsequent years, crime groups and gangs from the Apulian area formed. 52 Sacra
Corona Unita was one of those groups. It was founded in 1983, and was a coalition of
ten to fifteen criminal groups and gangs from Southern Apulia.53
The Sacra Corona Unita imitates the structure and rituals of the 'ndrangheta although it
lacks great cohesion and stability. 54 It employs religious mysticism like the Camorra. 55
It is hierarchical, and has formed alliances with other Italian Mafiosi groups as well as
Balkan, Columbian, Asian, and Eastern European criminal groups. 56
As a result of law enforcement efforts and the defection of members, the Sacra Corona
Unita " ... no longer exists as a single viable organisation.,,57 However, other Apulian
organized crime groups continue to engage in illegal business endeavours. 58

2.3.3

The Evolution of La Cosa Nostra in Canada
Italian immigrants did not create organized crime in America. 59 Organized crime already
existed. 6o However, some Italian immigrants did create or replicate the Mafia in

49

The Mafia Encyclopedia, supra note 35 at 64.

note II at
70.
" "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at25.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
55 Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note I I at
70.
,. Ibid. at 71.
" "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note I at 25.
" Ibid.
,0 Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra
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America. The strangeness and socio-economic problems within their new world and the
desire to preserve cultural values and institutions led immigrants generally, including
Italian immigrants, to band together and interact with individuals from their own family,
ethnicity, region, and histOl'y.61 Essentially, like other immigrants, they sought to
preserve their identity. Ethnic groups in New YOl'k had distinct territories, as did Mafia
Families, and the larger the territory, the more status in the Mafia fraternity.62
The origins of the Mafia groups in America stemmed from the immigration of some four
million Italians who, between 1891 and 1921, came primarily from the Mezzogiorno area
which includes Sicily, the area of Campania, and the province of Calabria63 - the places
south of Rome where Italian Mafia-type organized crime groups resided. The Mafia in
Canada originally mostly came from Calabria. 64 Some ofthese North American
immigrants brought with them not only their language and culture, but also a way oflife.

59

Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note II at

48.
60 Ibid; and Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Majia, supra note I at 2. Nicaso and Lamothe provide
examples of organized crime before La Cosa Nostra - namely, slave traders, pirates, extortionists, horse
thieves, can men, pimps and prostitutes, Wild West bank robbers, and cattle rustlers. Dubro assel1s that
Chinese secret societies from Hong Kong and China also existed .
• , David Critchley, The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The Nell' York City Majia. 1891-1931
(New York: Routledge, 2009) [The Origin 0/ Organized Crime in America: The New York City Majia,
1891-1931] at 14 and 16; and Angels, Mobsters & Narco- Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime
Empires, supra note 11 at 48-49. Nicaso and Lamothe assert:
It was in the cities of the East, as urban centers developed, that criminal initiatives
became organized. As immigrants arrived in America from disparate countries of the world, they
often ghettoized and kept to themselves, both replicating their compact and frequently isolated
towns and communities at home and banding together for comfort and protection in places where
customs and language were unfamiliar and impenetrable....
62 The Origin a/Organized Crime in Alllerica: The New York City Majia, 1891-1931, supra note 61 at 9.
63 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crillle, 8'h ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) [Organized
Crime] at 70; and The Origin a/Organized Crillle in Alllerica: The New York City Majia, 1891-1931,
supra note 61 at 14. Critchley assel1s that over 80 per cent oflbe 2. I million Italians who immigrated to
the United States between 1900 and 1910 were ITom southern Italy where secret criminal societies existed.
He also asserts, ibid at 4, that prior to World War I, New York had more Italians than Florence, Venice,
and Genoa together.
... Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Risillg Mellace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note I I at
18- I9; and Stephen Schneider, Iced: The StOlY of Organized Crime in COllado (Mississauga: John Wiley
& Sons Canada, 2009) [iced: The StOlY o/Organized Crime in Canada] at 227. Schneider asserts, ibid at
532-33, that Calabrian leadership ended by the early 1980s when the Rizzuto Family or "Sixth Family",led
by Nicolo and then Vito Rizzuto, took control over the mafia in Montreal.
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Italian immigrants imported ''' ... a ritual brotherhood consisting of loosely linked but
otherwise independent and uncoordinated 'families' organized hierarchically. ",65
Sicilian organizational forms and internal practices predominantly influenced American
Mafia Families, such as those in New York City.66 For instance, at a micro level, the
Sicilian cosche or cosca which is a series of connections of sets of brothers, such as
fathers, sons, brothers, brothers-in-law and god-parents, was used as the core of each
organization. 67 Sicilian cosca in the 19th century usually had up to ten men. 68 Associates
beyond kin comprised the outer part of the cosca. 69 At a macro level, the Sicilian

caporegime, which provides rules and practices to elect a boss and councilmen within a
Family, was used in America. 7o And, until the late I 920s, only Sicilians could be
members ofthe Mafia in New York City.7t

These imported brotherhoods contained initiation ceremonies, passwords, rituals,
membership rules, loyalty, and codes of conduct, and fostered a shared identity.72 The
rituals or ceremonies by Mafia Families in various cities in America and Canada
resembled those of the Sicilian Mafia73 and in some areas the Camorra. 74 Members of
various Mafiosi groups in Canada came from Mafiosi groups in Italy. 7S The presence of
these Mafiosi characteristics in America, and the fact that until 1931 membership in
some Mafia groups, such as the Sicilian Mafia, provided immigrants with membership in
Organized Crime, supra note 63 at 71. Abadinsky refers to research by Eric Hobsbawm in 1969.
Abadinsky asserts, ibid. at 73-85, that after the Castellammarese war in 1931, five Italian American crime
families with distinct identities emerged: the Luciano/Genovese Family; the Mineo/Gambino Family; the
Reina/Lucchese Family; the ProfacilColombo Family; and the Bonanno Family.
66 The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931, supra note 61 at 61.
67 Ibid. at 62.
68 Ibid. at 51.
., Ibid. at 62.
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Ibid.
Ibid. at 132.
72 Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note II at
12; Organized Crime, supra note 63 at 71 ; and Iced: The StOI)' 0/ Organized Crime in Canada, supra note
64 at 228. David Critchley in The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Majia,
1891-1931, supra note 61 at 64 notes that by the I920s, passwords both in Italy and America were replaced
70
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by third-party introductions.
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The Origin a/Organized Crillle ill Alllerica: The New York City Majia, 1891-1931, supra note 61 at 63.
Ibid. at 119-20; and Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Majia, supra note I at 114. The Camorra in

Brooklyn had ritualistic bloodletting practices similar to the Sicilians.
" Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Majia, supra note I at 177. For instance, Remo "Rocco" Commisso

and Cosimo Commisso of the Siderno Mafia group in Ontario immigrated to Canada in 1961 from Calabria
where their father had been a Mafia "don" until the 1940s when he was gunned down in a Mafia feud.
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America/ 6 do not mean, however, that the American Mafia organizations were simply
extensions of or controlled by Italian Mafiosi organizations. 77 While the link to Sicily
was significant, it would gradually be severed. 78 The American Mafia would adapt or
acculturate the Italian organizational forms and internal practices to the new country/9
and the first generation of Italian-born bosses would die. 8o As a result, La Cosa Nostra
emerged.

The importation of the Mafia way of life did not occur simply due to cultural norms. La
Cosa Nostra occUlTed as a result of the social and economic difficulties. 8! It also
occurred as a result of ethnic prejudices that Italian Americans faced in a laissez-faire
white Anglo-Saxon society.82 Individuals ofItalian ancestry were prevalent in American
organized crime not because of a predisposition toward crime, but rather the need to
survive through security in numbers. 83 However, with some Italian Mafiosi men came
their criminal records,84 and thus, their criminal knowledge and perhaps criminal
propensities.

In Canada, by 1934 and for the next 50 years approximately, La Cosa Nostra would
become "the single-most dominant organized crime force ... ,,85 due to their
organizational structure and ambitious visionary leadership.86 Prohibition had provided

The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931, supra note 61 at 62
and 70. A telegram or "letter of consent" fi'om the Sicilian Mafia would enable members to have dual
membership in both the American and Sicilian Mafia. This practice changed around 1931 after the
Castellammare War in order to prevent uncontrollable growth of American Families.
77 Ibid at 60-61 and 71.
" Ibid at 233. The Castellammare War of 1930 and 1931, a mass war among American Families,
terminated dual membership in the Italian and American Mafia organizations. That it was a war to purge
the older conservative Mafiosi and make way for the new more Americanized Mafia members, according
to the "Purge thesis", has been discredited, ibid at 199.
79 Ibid at 61 and 233.
80 Ibid at 233.
81 Organized Crime, supra note 63 at 70.
76

Ibid.
Ibid at 71.
84 The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931, supra note 61 at
82

83

120. Critchley notes that several of the Camorristi of Brooklyn had criminal records in Italy, and those that
did not acquired their criminal expeltise on the streets in America.
85 iced: The StOlY 0/ Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 64 at 227. Schneider asselts the same for
the United States.
86 Ibid. at 227-28.
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these organized crime groups with substantial financial profits, and taught them how to
control the manufacture and sale of goods and to monopolize a market or territory.87 The
familial bonds and code of omerta -loyalty, discipline and silence - ensured exclusivity
ofmembership.88 Most of the La Cosa Nostra groups that arose in Canada were
influenced by 'ndrangheta. 89 The use of family as the centre of each La Cosa Nostra
group ensured, and" ... promoted shared bonds, values, and goals within each crime
family ... .',90 Exclusivity and loyalty was also established through the recruitment of
members from Mafia strongholds in Sicily and Calabria:
The steady stream ofItalian immigrants into Canada and the United States
also meant there was an abundance of prospects from which to recruit members.
Most of these immigrants came from the mafia strongholds of Sicily and
Calabrian and, although only a small fraction were made members of the mafia or
'Ndrangheta, an intensive police crackdown on organized crime in Italy during
the postwar years did result in an exodus of experienced mafiosi who would be
influential in establishing the traditions of the secret societies in their adopted
countries. 9 !
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, some American Mafia Families had infiltrated
Canada. 92 These Families established alliances with Canadian Family bosses in Canada,
and also took over non-Mafiosi criminal operations as well. 93 This American connection
seemingly entrenched La Cosa Nostra in Canada, and empowered the empire of this
organized crime group. Steve Schneider described this phenomenon:
If anyone individual can take credit for the Cosa Nostra's invasion of
Canada, it was Charles Luciano,94 the far-sighted and highly ambitious American
mobster who has been widely cited as the father of modern organized crime.
Inspired by the Roman Empire, Lucky Luciano sought a comparable criminal
dynasty and in 1933 even created a governing Mafia Commission in the U.S ....
Luciano's grand vision also resulted in the partitioning of the United States and
Canada into twenty-four separate regions, each of which would be under the
S7
88

Ibid. at 228.
Ibid. This exclusivity of membership was described above in subsection one "The Sicilian Mafia or

Cosa Nostra, and the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta" of section two "The History of La Cosa Nostra: Italian
Mafiosi Groups" in this Chapter.
89 Ibid. at 227.
90 Ibid. at 228.
91
92
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Ibid.
Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia, supra note I at 43-44.
Iced: The StOlY aJOrganized Crime in Canada, supra note 64 at 228-29.

Salvatores Luciania also known as Charles "Lucky" Luciano was bom in Sicily, and emerged as a leader
in the Masseria crime Famly, later to become the Luciano/Genovese Family: Organized Crime, supra note
63 at 73.
94
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jurisdiction of a particular mafia family. The implication for Canada was that it
would be treated as a protectorate of the Cosa Nostra. As a result, the Montreal
mafia became a wing of New York's Bonanno Family, southwestern Ontario fell
under the influence of the Detroit mob, while the rest of the Ontario's underworld
became the fiefdom of Buffalo's mafia boss Stefano Magaddino. 95
Indeed, other authors writing about La Cosa Nostra also noted the connection between
Families in the United States and Canada. For instance, the Bonanno Family of New
York City initially established close ties with Vic Cotroni who founded the Mafia in
Montreal, Quebec,96 and later, established ties with Canadian-born Paul Volpe who
abandoned pursuits of a legitimate career to establish his own criminal identity97 and was
eventually initiated into the Mafia in Hamilton, Ontario. 98 The Magaddino Family of
Buffalo and n0l1hern New York State established an alliance with Johnny "Pops" Papalia
of Hamilton, Ontario. 99 Canadian connections were seemingly not exclusive and would
evolve with changes in the power of Families. Papalia also established connections with
an underboss in the Bonanno Family in order to run an international heroin importation
ring, 100 and later, Volpe would have the support ofthe Magaddino Family.101

2.3.4

The Reputation for Violence and Intimidation: Part of the

Identity of Mafiosi and La Cos a Nostra Outlaws
La Cosa Nostra pal1icipated in a number of different types of crimes _ counterfeiting; I 02
racketeering in various enterprises, such as the poultry market in New York City; 103 and
bootlegging during Prohibition. 104 However, it is the ways, means and mindset of
Mafiosi and La Cosa Nostra groups and the identity afforded their members within a
Family or casca, rather than the specific crimes that the group commits, that
characterizes it as an organized crime outlaw group or criminal organization. This

Iced: The StOlY a/Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 64 at 228-29.
Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia, supra note 1 at 44.
97 Ibid at 29.
98 Ibid at 48-49.
99 Ibid at 44.
100 Ibid. at 44-45.
101 [bid. at 85.
102 The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 189[-1931, supra note 61 at 3839.
103 [bid at 75.
104 Organized Crime, supra note 63 at 72.
95

96
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organized crime outlaw group uses the power of this group identity not only to gain
economic benefits or advantages, like other organized crime outlaws, but historically,
Mafiosi and La Cosa Nostra groups sought political and legal power. Their power was
extensive and multi-faceted. The power rested on a on the reputation of a Family or

cosca within the community for violence and intimidation, and acts of its members
perpetuate and reinforce this reputation.
A reputation for violence and intimidation is one attribute or defining feature of an
organized crime group - it is part of the group's identity. The power ofthis reputation
must be built and maintained by its members, and the use of this reputation must be
exclusive to these members in order to preserve the identity of the group. This section
will review the power and use of a reputation for violence and intimidation within the
activities of Mafiosi groups, and La Cosa Nostra. This review will demonstrate how this
reputation contributes to defining who these organized crime outlaws are.
Raimondo Catanzaro distinguishes the Italian Mafia from ordinary criminals and
criminal conspiracies, but he also distinguishes them from his concept of organized
crime. He asselts that although aspects of Mafioso behaviour have links to "common
organized crime", 105 and although the Mafia has been confused with "free-lance
bandits", 106 it remains distinct from these groups as well as fi'om common criminality
due to the cumulative nature of its ideology or mindset, socio-political power, and
organization of its activities. The Mafia does not identify with the common criminal or
group of common criminals. 107 It has a unique cultural and socio-political background:
its historical roots in Sicilian society; its existence requires organization; its activities
comprise part of the normal economic system; and it exerts political pressure and social

lOS Raimondo Catanzaro, Men of Respect: A Social HistDl), ofthe Sicilian Majia, trans. by Raymond
Rosenthal (Don Mills: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, Inc., (992) [Men ofRespect: A Social Histol)' oflhe
Sicilian Majia] at 3.
106 Ibid at 4.
107 Ibid at 17.
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control. 108 It uses political alliances with trade unions, the judiciary, the police,
administrative bodies, and political groups, to effect its crimes. 109

Catanzaro asserts that the Sicilian Mafia has been defined in the 1800s and 1900s based
on a unique mental or psychological state or spirit that transcends criminality and focuses
on a moral (01' amoral) code involving violence, intimidation, loyalty, solidarity, silence
and respect. I 10 However, the Mafia is more. It is a management group with a strategy
for criminal activities. I I I
We can therefore .. .think of the Mafia in a variety of ways: in terms of the
goals it tries to achieve- economical and political dominance; in terms of its
structure-not a formal organization but rather a collection of groups, or cosche;
in terms of its culture- its psychology of respect; and finally in terms of the
means it employs to achieve its ends-violence or the threat of it. I 12
Like organized crime and unlike free-lance bandits, Mafiosi obtain payoffs for
protection; establish commercial businesses; and form associations in order to extort,
obtain kickbacks, or monopolize enterprises. l13 However, they do not spend their entire
lives conducting routine crimes, such as robberies, extortions and kidnappings. They
may do so at first, and then, become mandators or higher level operators. 114 The types of
criminal activities of North American Mafia have varied and have become more
complicated as the organizations grew and their territories expanded. However, the
attributes accorded to the Mafia by Catanzaro - economic and political power by a
collection of groups that operate in terms of respect and employ violence and
intimidation to achieve their ends - are also seen in ways and means of La Cosa Nostra.

Diego Gambetta argues that the Sicilian Mafia is " ... a specific economic enterprise, an
industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection." I I 5 He argues that
Ibid at II.
Ibid at 17.
110 Ibid at 5-7 and 12.
III Ibid at 17.
112 Ibid al 18.
" ' Ibid at 3-4.
"' Ibid at 3.
I" Diego Gambelta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Busilless of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993) [The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection] at I. Gambetta states,
ibid at 53, that " ... the mafia is best underslood as a set affirms specializing in the supply ofprotectian .... "
108

109
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violeuce is a means used by the Mafia, and not the main attribute or way to characterize
the Mafia. 116 Protection is a commodity, and facilitates or encourages economic
exchange. JI7 The market for protection is created when the state criminalizes acts or
commodities. 118 Gambetta uses a description of a transaction to illustrate the role of the
Mafia in economic exchanges both in modern day and after 1860. 119 When a buyer seeks
product, he wishes to underpay or cheat the seller, and the seller seeks to overcharge or
cheat the buyer. The Mafia or a Mafioso acts as mediator to ensure that both parties
receive a fair deal, and receives a percentage of the transaction. 120 Further, a Mafioso
may provide protection against competition by directing business to a patticular seller. 121
Generally, a Mafioso will guarantee only a limited number of sellers. 122 This
relationship only works or is necessary in socio-economic settings, such as the criminal
milieu, where no formal and accepted rules, such as laws and regulations, exist to govern
exchanges. Where just, fair, and effective laws exist in conventional society, no such
intervention is required. Where no laws or no conventional laws exist, then a non-state
agent who has the power to enforce rules within a subculture of violence is required.
The attribute or defining feature of violence and intimidation has been transmitted to La
Cosa Nostra. By the 1920s during Prohibition, all the five Families in America i2J

Ibid. at 2.
1bid.
118 1bid. at 3. Gambetta states:
116

117

... [E]very time the state decrees a particular transaction 01' commodity illegal, a potential market
for private protection is created. Trading becomes by definition vulnerable, and illegal dealers
have an incentive to seek the protection of other agencies ....
119 Ibid. at 18.
120 Ibid. at 15. Gambelta describes the role of the Mafia in this way:
A vaccaro (cattle breeder) I interviewed in Palermo succinctly expressed the core
elements of the hypothesis I wish to present: "When the butcher comes to me to buy an animal,
he knows that I want to cheat him. But [ know that he wants to cheat me. Thus we need, say,
Peppe [that is, a third party] to make us agree. And lVe both pay Peppe a percentage ofthe deal."
This slatement has far-reaching theoretical consequences. There are mutual low-trust
expectations generating a demand for guarantees on both sides, and there is "Peppe," a man
capable of meeting this demand and trusted by both butcher and vaccaro to be capable of doing
so....
12 1 1bid. at 22.
Ibid.
The Origin a/Organized Crime ill America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931, slipra note 61 at 36,
154 and 160-61. Critchley lists these five Families as the Guiseppe "Joseph" Morello Family, the Nicolo

122
123

Schiro Family, and the Salvatore D'Aquila Family which existed at the tum of the 20th century, and the
Giuseppe "Joe the Boss" Masseria Family, and Joseph Profaci Family which arose during Prohibition.
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engaged in severe violence and murderous acts against one another over power and
territory.124 Violence accompanied efforts to secure the lucrative profits of bootlegging.
This use of violence continued, and evidence from the "Commission Case" in 1986
revealed that the New York Commission (a governing body for La Cosa Nostra Families
in New York) can authorize the execution of Family members. 12l The power and role of
this Commission and the national Commission for La Cosa Nostra Families is discussed
further in subsection four "Application of Concepts within Social Control and Bond
Theory to the Identity of Outlaws" in section four "Social Control and Bond Theory" in
Chapter Three.
In Canada, evidence of the nature and extent of violence within early Mafia groups and

La Cosa Nostra exists in the form of documentation as well as informer information. In
the 1950s and early I 960s, a Mafia group from Siderno in Reggio, Calabria with
extensive ties to the Calabrian Honoured Society or 'ndl'angheta in Italy and the United
States, came to Canada. 126 Its presence and its increased use of violence would fuel the
Mafiosi wars in N0I1h America in the early 1980s.127 Documents seized by Ontario
police from the Toronto home ofa member of the Siderno Mafia, Francesco Caccamo,
revealed the sacred rituals of the Society and its use of punishment and violent death. 128
Interviews in the late I 970s for a television program with an informer and former
member of the Siderno Mafia would confirm that the group engaged in counterfeit
money operations, ext0l1ion, narcotics, smuggling aliens, and the "occasional hit", and
that they existed in Italy, the United States, and Canada. 129 Severe violence still
124 Ibid. at 186. The Castellammare War of 1930 and 1931 exemplifies violence and murder among Mafia
Families. Critchley asserts that this War was not a defining point in American Mafia history, nor was it as
'bloody as portrayed. However, it does demonstrate the degree of power and violence within the American
Mafia at that time, on the basis of identification with a "familial" group.
'" Organized Crime, supra note 61 at 111-12. Abadinsky also refers to the "Commission Case" as United
Slales v. Salemo. The accused, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were members of the Genovese
Family, and charged with various offences, including violations under the Racketeer Inflnenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. Related citations that describe various aspects of the case, but not the evidence
ofthe role of the Commission, are UniledSlales v. Salerno, 85 c.r. 139 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) and 481 U.S. 739
(1987).
126 Mob Rille: Inside Ihe Canadian Mafia, supra note I at 112.
127 Ibid. at 113.
12. Ibid. at 114. These documents came to be known as the "Caccamo Papers." Caccamo would later be
convicted of counterfeiting and illegal possession of a firearm.
129 Ibid. at 117-19.
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characterizes Mafiosi groups in Italy, 130 and in North America, violence increased by the
1980s as La Cosa Nostra members relied less on old Italian Mafia traditions and values
in favour of brute force and intimidation. 13I

Informant Cecil Kirby provided evidence of the various' acts that he committed for the
Siderno Mafia in Canada. He had been an outlaw motorcycle gang member of the
Satan's Choice gang which later became the Hells Angels, and his connections
introduced him to the Commisso Mafia group for whom he would do enforcement
work.

132

The extensive nature of these acts of a hired criminal-hand in a four-year period

demonstrates the significance of engaging in violence in conducting Mafiosi enterprises
and industries. It shows a penchant for violence that defines them, and how they conduct
their affairs.

That Mafiosi groups in Italy and La Cos a Nostra in North America use familial ties to
ensure loyalty to the group, and that they employ violence, are attributes or defining
features ofthis organized crime group. However, the use of violence and intimidation

130 "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled Country", supra note 5 at
467. Although the population of Mafia areas - that is to say, Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicilycontain less than 30 per cent of the Italian population, but account for more murders. For example, in
2004, 51 per cent of all murders in Italy took place in those four southern regions. Since 1880, Sicily has
had double the murder rates of Italy.
131 Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Majia, supra note I at 10.
132/bid at 198. In Fall of 1976 he blew up a vehicle of salesman employed by a beverage company tbat
was in competition with a Siderno family beverage company, ibid at 186. In November 1976, he
threatened a man in the construction industry in order to pay a bill, ibid at 187. In December 1976, he was
asked to kill, and attempted to kill, an informant who was to testifY against a Commisso associate, ibid In
May 1977, he bombed the restaurant ofa local gambling organizer whom the Commissos were ext011ing,
and in so doing, accidentally killed an untargeted victim, ibid at 188. In February 1978, he bombed the
house ofa construction worker who owed money to a contractor who had hired the Commissos to assist,
ibid at 189. In May 1978, he extorted a developer who owed money to a Commisso associate, ibid In
early 1978, he blew up an apartment building that was owned by two brothers who owed money to a
Commisso associate, ibid In July 1978, he was set fire to a tavern, ibid at 190. In August 1978, he was
asked to blow up a restaurant, but turned down the job which another arsonist executed, ibid. In 1978 he
attempted to ext011 the owner ofa company, but beat up the wrong person, ibid In 1979, he set fire to a
house because the tenant would not leave, ibid at 190-91. In 1979, he lVas asked to burn down a hotel for
insurance fraud, but after he set his price, another arsonist was contacted and executed the job, ibid at 19192. In April or May of 1980, he was hired to murder someone for insurance fraud, but his attempts failed
and he targeted the wrong person, ibid at 192. In May 1980, he bombed a restaurant after Cosimo
Commisso was insulted by an employee, ibid. In July 1980, he was hired to bomb the house of a debtor,
but bombed it at the wrong time, ibid at 193. Between August and October 1980, he was hired to break
the arms OJ' the legs of a construction company owner who olVed money to a Commisso associate, but he
declined, ibid
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does not wholly or mostly capture who they are. This distinction remain significant
when one considers attempts to define "organized crime" and "criminal organizations."
The definition in the Canadian Crimina! Code indeed requires proof that the criminal
organization has " ... as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or
commission of one or more serious offences .... ,,133 The only other element of the
definition of a criminal organization is that it is composed of three or more persons. 134
These "serious offences" in the definition of "criminal organization" are not offences that
conjure images of violence. 135 However, violent acts are often common in conjunction
with the maintenance of these activities. Further, the Criminal Code criminalizes
specific acts that are done in connection with a criminal organization, and proscribes
more severe sentences for those acts. All of those specially mentioned acts are all crimes
of explicit or implicit societal violence. 136 Thus, Canada may be subtly defining a
criminal organization by a feature of violence. The use of violence and intimidation
plays a role in the criminal enterprises or industries of most organized crime outlaws, and
may be the characteristic that severs their ties to conventional society and demands the
attention of law enforcement in controlling their outlaw behaviour. However, as the
complex, multi-faceted nature of Mafiosi and La Cosa Nostra identities reveals, the use
of violence and intimidation alone cannot capture the essence of the identity of an
organized crime outlaw or organized crime outlaw group.

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] at s. 467.I(I)(b).
Ibid at s. 467. I(I)(a).
135 Ibid at s. 467.1 defines "serious offence":
"serious offence" means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for which
the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, or another offence that is
prescribed by regulation.
This definition has now been amended pursuant to Regulations Prescribing Certain Offences to be Serious
Offences, S.O.R.!2010-161 July 13,2010, s. I, online: Canada Gazette <http://canadagazette.gc.cairppr/p2/20 I 0120 I 0-08-04/htmllsor-dors161-eng.html>. "Serious offence" under section 467.1 willnolV
include:
(a) keeping a common gaming or betting house (subsection 20 I(I) and paragraph 20 I(2)(b));
(b) betting, pool-selling and book-making (section 202);
(c) committing offences in relation to lotteries and games of chance (section 206);
(d) keeping a common bawdy-house (subsection 210(1) and paragraph 210(2)(c)) ..
136 Criminal Code, supra note 133 at s. 82(2) the possession of explosive substances in connection with a
criminal organization; s. 231 murder to be in the first degree regardless of whether it was planned and
deliberate, if the killing was done in connection with a criminal organization, or if it was done while
committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence in connection with a criminal organization; s.
244.2 drive-by shootings in connection with a criminal organization.
\3J
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2.4

2.4.1

OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS

The Origins of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Canada

The first bikers in North American were "disoriented and disillusioned WWII veterans,
functioning alcoholics, unemployed factory workers, and a few rebellious teenagers.,,1
From these individuals and their social circumstances, developed the biker persona.
Some of these bikers - one per cent of them - became outlaws within outlaw motorcycle
clubs that rejected society's laws. 2
Motorcycle clubs had existed in one form or another since the early 1920s.
Most were benign, involved in touring and several forms of motor sports like track
racing and hill climbing. But a tiny percentage had assumed a darker image.
Embittered and disillusioned by tile American dream during the Depression, gangs
formed up, mainly in the grungy industrial districts of Southern California, to ride
and drink together, subsisting on menial jobs and dealing in stolen motorcycle
pUliS. Because Harley-Davidson was the most abundant and popular motorcycle,
it was obvious that it would be the brand of choice, both as a possession and a
source of stolen income.
Following World War II, thousands of veterans spilled out of the armed
forces, disoriented and disenfranchised. Although the GI Bill of Rights offered
the most liberal safety net for ex -soldiers in history, inevitably some drifted
toward the fringes of society, unable to make the transition from the intensity of
warfare to the comparatively pallid pace of civilian life. They, like the men who
had returned from the Civil War and headed toward the great western frontier, or
the World War I veterans who formed the so-called Lost Generation, were altered
forever, inured to violence and incapable of coping with the strictures of
orgUllized society.)
The first anti-social or outlaw motorcycle bike club was formed shortly after World War
II by a group of war veterans who called themselves the Pissed Off Bastards of
Bloomington or POBOB from San Bernardino, California. 4 The entrenchment of the
outlaw biker identity occurred ShOlily thereafter.

I
2

Brock Yates, Ollilml' Machine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999) [OllllllW Machine] at 7-8.
R. v. Lindsay. 2005 CanLll24240, [2005] 0.1. No. 2870 (Ont. S.C.J.) [R. v. Lindsay trial decision] at para.

205. Then-Staff Sergeant Jacques Lemieux opined that a "one percenter" is a motorcycle club that is a
criminal organization. Essentially, one percent of bikers are outlaw bikers.
3 Olltlmv Machine, sllpra note 1 at 13-14.
, Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 8" ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) [Organized Crime]
at210.
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On July 41h weekend in 1947, thousands of bikers attended a convention in Hollister,
California. s Some of the bikers became unruly - drinking, racing, and causing damage in
the town, and the small local police force could not control the disorder until additional
police came to assist much later 6 On July 21, 1947, Life magazine depicted a biker
waving a beer bottle while dozens of empties lay at his feet. 7 Thus, the creation of the
evil image of outlaw motorcycle gangs, and their corresponding reputation began.
Bikers, as well as their bikes, came to induce fear and loathing:
With that single black-and-white photograph in America's most popular
and respected newsmagazine, the images of motorcycling and of Harley-Davidson
were altered forever. From that moment on, motorcycles would be tinged with
evil: predatory machines ridden by raging barbarians. This legend would be
enhanced in years hence by magazine stories, songs, and a spate of motion
•
8
pIctures ....
The Life photograph produced public outrage. 9 In the wake of public concern about
incidents at Hollister, in 1948, the first chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club was
formed in San Bernardino, California - an offshoot of some of the outlaws from the
Pissed Off Bastards of Bloomington. I 0 This outlaw motorcycle gang would not only
incite public outrage, but eventually, in some areas of the United States and Canada, it
would cause terror. It remains, a force to be reckoned with.

Outlaw motorcycle gangs have a characteristic within their identity that renders them
unique in comparison to the other organized crime outlaws in this Chapter: they wear
their identity on their backs in the form of club patches, and directly on their skin by
The estimates regarding the number and nature of the motorcyclists differ. Brock Yates in Out/mv
Machille, supra note I at II asserts that 4000 members of a motorcycle club, the Salinas (California)
Ramblers Motorcycle Club. Howard Abadinsky in Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 210-1 I refers to
Hunter S. Thompson's assertions that 3000 cyclists attended Hollister for an American Motorcycle
Association event; and to Daniel Wolfs assertions that at an American Motorcycle Association event, 500
unaffiliated bikers disrupted the event with their unruly behaviour.
6 Organized Crime, sllpra note 4 at 210·1 I.
7 Ollt/aw Machine, supra note I at II . Yates refers to an issue of Life magazine from July 21 , 1947 at page
31.
8 Ibid at 12. Motion pictures included The Wild Olle, Rebel Withollt a Cause, and The Enthusiast: Ibid at
31-33, and later, Bol'1l Losers, The GlOIy Siompel's, The Savage Sevell, Devil 's Allgels, Cycle Savages,
Angelsfrom Hell, Hell's Allgels on Wheels, Run, Angel, RIIIII, Angel Ullchained, Hell's Chosell Few, Rebel
ROllsers, Naked Angels, and Angels Die Hard: Ibid at 53, and eventually, Hells Angels Forever which the
club produced itself in 1983, and Easy Rider: Ibid at 54-55.
9 Ibid at 19.
\0 Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 211.
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tattoos. Somewhat unique are the extensive written and unwritten 11l1es of these groups
define who members must be - these 11l1es define their identity. And, a lengthy and
exclusive initiation or induction process educates members as to the values and norms of
the club, and protects the group from infiltration by law enforcement. Their reputation
for violence and intimidation is well known within criminal subcultures as well as
conventional society.

2.4.2

The Hells Angels Motorcycle Club in Canada

The st11lcture and attributes of the Hells Angels are representative of many outlaw
motorcycle gangs, and their proliferation and dominance within the outlaw biker subculture as well as within the criminal milieu, makes their history worth relating. In 1957,
Ralph Hubert "Sonny" Barger formed the third and what would become the "mother"
chapter of the Hells Angels in Oakland, Cal ifornia. II Barger became President of the
Hells Angels,12 and remains one of the most iconic and influential members of the club.
He contributed greatly to the expansion and organization of the club, and had the club
colours or insignia trade-marked. 13 The colours or patch of a full member of the Hells
Angels consists of a three-piece patch sewn onto a leather or jean vest. 14 The protection
of the name and insignia of the Club would prove to be very important in protecting Hells
Angels property, power, and reputation for violence.
The Hells Angels formed their first chapter in Canada in 1977 when the Canadian
Popeyes gang "patched over" or became the Hells Angels Montreal chapter. IS They also
formed another chapter in Laval, Quebec. 16 At this time, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club
had been the only major outlaw motorcycle gang in Canada, 17 and the Hells Angels

11 U.S. Department of Justice, "Hells Angels Motorcycle Club" in National Drug Intelligence Center, Drugs
and Crime: Oul/ow Motorcycle Gang Profile (October 2002) at 1; and R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra
note 2 at para. 202.
12 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at para. 205. Then-Staff Sergeant Jacques Lemieux testified that
Barger is the unofficial world president of the Hells Angels.
13 Outlml' Machine, supra note 1 at 34.
14 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at para. 235.
15 Ibid. at para. 209; and Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 216.
16 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 4 at paras. 209.
17 Ibid.

79

immediately began warring with the Outlaws. IS Within a few years the Hells Angels had
expanded across the countryl9 obliterating rival biker groups such as the Outlaws and
Bandidos, as well as other organized crime groups, through violence or absorption in
order to control the drug trade. 2o Today, the organization is the largest and most powerful
club in Canada. 21 In American they are considered one of the "big four" outlaw
motorcycle gangs - the other three being the Pagans founded in 1959, the Bandidos
founded in 1966, and Outlaws in 1935,z2 They have chapters all over the world. 23

In 1983, the Hells Angels opened a chapter first in Vancouver, and then opened more
chapters in British Columbia 24 In 1984, they created chapters in Sherbrooke, Quebec and
Halifax, Nova Scotia,zs These two chapters, together with the Montreal chapter, would
murder members from Laval who had attracted police attention due to rampant drug
use,26 and the Montreal and Sherbrooke chapters would absorb the Laval chapter. 27 As a
result of killings followed by police raids in Nova Scotia, the Hells Angel chapter in
Halifax would eventually close in August 2003. 28

Further law enforcement efforts in Operation SHARQC, with the assistance of evidence
from a past Hells Angels "Sergeant-at-Arms" turned informant, would result in the arrest
of more than 123 people in Quebec, New Brunswick, the Dominican Republic and France

" Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 216.
19 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at paras. 209-10; and Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 216.
20 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at paras. 208.
2J Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 216.
22 Ibid at 214-15. The other three of the "big four" include the Pagans founded in 1959, the Bandidos
founded in 1966, and Outlaws in 1935.
2) R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at paras. 213; and Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 212 and
215.
24 Ibid at paras. 210.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid; Organized Crime, sllpra note 4 at 216; and James Dubro, Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985) at 257. Dubro states that as the result of a police raid of Hells
Angels clubhouses throughout Quebec and Halifax, Nova Scotia on April II, 1985, over 80 members were
arrested only seven were charged with criminal offences. Police believed the bodies of six Hells Angels
were buried near one of the clubhouses, but only five bodies were recovered in June 1985. The bodies
showed evidence of having been shot, and they had chains around them, concrete blocks attached to their
feet, and were stuffed in sleeping bags.
27 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at paras. 210.
28 Dan Arsenault, "Outlaw Bikers Ogle N.S." (17 November 20 I0) The Chronicle Herald online:
<http://thechronicieherald.calFrontJI212342.htll1l> ["Outlaw Bikers Ogle N.S."].
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in April 2009. 29 One hundred and eleven of those arrested were full-patch members in.
the Quebec chapter of the Hells Angels,30 and were charged with offences, such as
murder, offences in connection with a criminal organization, extortion, drug trafficking,
and conspiracy to commit murder and dlUg trafficking31 that were committed from 1992
to 2009 during wars between the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine motorcycle gangs. 32
However, 31 of those charges against members of the Hells Angels have been stayed base
due to unreasonable delay in trial proceedings that would prevent the accused from
having fair trials. 33
The weakening of the Quebec chapters has enticed outlaw motorcycle gang rivals ofthe
Hells Angels to become active in Nova Scotia where only Hells Angels suppol1 clubs,
such as Bacchus and the Darksiders, have existed since the closure of the Halifax
chapter. 34 This phenomenon remains significant: lost or unprotected territory opens a
niche of social vices to be filled by other outlaw groupS.35 A mere connection of support
clubs with the Hells Angels serves to protect a region such as Nova Scotia from
infiltration by other outlaws, and thus, demonstrates the power of an outlaw motorcycle
gang name and reputation within the criminal milieu. Thus, whether this latest

CBC News Online, "Top Hells Angel Arrested in Montreal" (I November 2010) online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.calcanadaimontreaVstoryI2010/l1/01 /helis-angels-arrested.html> ["Top Hells Angel
Arrested in Montreal"); and Paul Cherry, "SharQC Takes Bite Out of Hells Angels" (17 April 2009) The
Gazelle online:
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/SharQc+takes+bite+Hells+Angels/1498885/story.html> ["SharQC
Takes Bite Out of Hells Angels"). SHARQC is an acronym for Strategie Hells Angels Region Quebec.
30 "Top Hells Angel AlTested in Montreal", slIpra note 29; and "SharQC Takes Bite Out of Hells Angels",
slIpra note 29.
31 Anne Sutherland "Fugitive Hells Angel Captured in Montreal" (I November 2010) The Gazelle online:
Montreal Gazette
<http://www.montrealgazette.comfnews/Suret6+Quebec+arrests+Hells+Angels+Ouimet+taxi/3 761 062/stor
html>.
2 Max Harrold & Paul CheIry, "Major Police Operation Against Hells Angels" (15 April 2009) The
Gazelle online: Montreal Gazette
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/newslMajor+police+operation+against+Hells+AngelslI498587/story.ht
ml>.
33 CBC News Online, "Quebec to appeal release of31 accused bikers" (01 June 20 II) eBe News online:
cbc.ca <http://www.cbc.ca/newslcanada/mon treaI/stor),120 11/06/0 I/quebec-sharqc-sta),-proceedingsal'peal.html>.
3 "Outlaw Bikers Ogle N.S.", sllpra note 28.
" This phenomenon will be discussed further in subsection four "Expanded Law Enforcement Personnel
and Law Enforcement Powers" of section two "Requisite One for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" in
Chapter Four of this thesis.
29

r
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enforcement effort has ended the Quebec chapters of the Hells Angels remains to be
seen. 36

2.4.3

Organizational Structure of the Hells Angels

Like other outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Bandidos and the Outlaws,37 the Hells
Angels have a hierarchical structure38 and many rules and regulations. 39 The
organizational structure of outlaw motorcycle gangs renders them similar to other and
"traditional" organized crime groups, such as the Italian Mafia and North American La
Cosa Nostra. For instance, author and journalist Yves Lavigne asselts:
The Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club is well suited to operate as a criminal
organization, whether it's selling crank [methamphetamine] or corpses. Angels
are committed to live outside the law. They are a close-knit group sworn to
secrecy under threat of death ....
The Hell 's Angels Motorcycle Club is organized to insulate its leadership
from prosecution. The club is hierarchically structured and well disciplined so it
can function even after the arrest of members. It enforces its code of silence with
death and camouflages orders through layers of bosses who protect themselves
with graft and cOl'luption. The Hell's Angels organization chart resembles that of
traditional organized crime, with which the club slowly aligns itself during the
1970s and J980s. The club's East Coast and West Coast officers carry out the
same duties that traditional organized crime's Commission [the body comprised
only of the bosses or heads of American Mafia groups or Families 4o] does when
they regulate and oversee club business such as the creation of new chapters. The
chapter president is equivalent to the family boss. The secretary-treasurer is
sometimes the most logical inember and offers advice like consigliere; a lawyer
who is a club associate also may act in this capacity. The vice:president is like a
Mafia underboss. The sergeant-at-arms and road captain are like caporegima, or
lieutenants. And members are soldiers.
The Hell's Angels and traditional organized crime operate the same way.
They control the area where they commit crimes. They corrupt police and public
officials to insulate themselves from prosecution. They use associates and fronts
to manipulate and influence people. 4

William Marsden, "Police Wipe Hells Angels Off Quebec Map" (15 April 2009) The Gazelle online:
Montreal Gazette
<http://www. montrealgazette.com/news/Police+wipe+Hells+Angels+Quebec/ 1500021 /story.html>.
37 Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 217. While Hells Angels rules require each chapter to have at least 6
members, their numbers nationally and internationally may not end all the chapters in Quebec.
J8 R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at paras. 230-33.
39 Ibid at paras. 253-62.
40 Organized Crime, supra note 4 at 112.
41 Yves Lavigne, Hel/'s Angels: Taking Care a/Business (USA: Seal Books, 1987) at 62-63.
36
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Thus, the Hells Angels conunit crime by protecting themselves against law enforcement,
and by using their insular and hierarchical structure to indoctrinate want-to-be-membersthat is to say, by teaching newcomers the values and norms of the club. Only a chosen
few may join. This exclusivity of membership also serves to reinforce the identity of the
group: only those who will act in accordance with the values and norms of the club - that
is to say, those who can uphold the reputation for violence and intimidation - are selected
and allowed to be pali of this group.

At a macro-level, the Hells Angels has a chalier or chapter located in a specific
geographic area that serves as its territory to conduct business,42 except for each
provincial Nomads chapter which has not specific territory and whose influential
members conduct extensive business. 43 All and only full-patch members of each chapter
must meet once a week44 at the chapter ciubhouse45 for "church.,,46 The Nomads usually
do not have a clubhouse, however, they may have one in British Columbia. Individuals
who wish to get "on the program" and become members usually must be known by the
organization for five years, and must be sponsored by a full-patch member. 47 Countries
are divided in to l'egions,48 and regional meetings are held once a month. 49 Multiple
chapters exist within a province and country, 50 and national meetings are held four times
a year in Canada.51 In Canada, all chapters abide by the same rules, and have a president,
vice-president, sergeant-at-arms, secretary and treasurer. 52 Twice a year, representatives
fi'om each country meet at world meetings in order to deal with issues regarding the Hells
Angels organization as a whole. 53 This degree of organization, and the complex and
lengthy process of becoming a member of outlaw motorcycle gangs, shields these gangs

" R. v. Lindsay Idal decision, supra nole 2 at paras. 214.
" Ibid. al paras. 224.
"Ibid at paras. 214.
" Ibid at paras. 227.
,. Ibid at paras. 234.
47 Ibid al paras. 230.
"Ibid alparas. 215.
,. Ibid al paras. 217.
so Ibid al paras. 215.
" Ibid al paras. 218.
" Ibid al paras. 214.
53 Ibid al paras. 219.
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from infiltration by law enforcement. Members take great care to know whom they are
inducting into their group, and to ensure their loyalty.

At a micro-level, each chapter has a hierarchy as well consisting of full-patch members,
prospects, hangarounds, and official friends. In order to become an official friend, an
individual ingratiates himself to members of the club. At church, this individual may be
called in to advise full-patch members as to why he seeks to become a member, and if
there is consensus by all members, that individual will be "on the program" and become
an official friend. A photograph of that individual is taken, and sent to Hells Angels
chapters across the country in order to ensure that the individual is known54 and tbat no
other Hells Angels member or person on the program has a problem with that individual.
No individuals who are or have been members of law enforcement can associate or be
members ofthe Hells Angels. Official friends do menial tasks - sometimes criminal
tasks - and must demonstrate their loyalty and worthiness to the club. 55 They cannot use
the Hells Angels name, and can only wear SUppOlt gear which is clothing that has no
patches or logos, but says "Support Big Red Machine" or "Support Red and White."

After six months to one year, full-patch members by consensus may allow him to become
a hangaround. 56 A hangaround wears a small patch on the fl:ont of a leather vest with the
name of his chapter and the label "hangaround.,,57 After one year, a hangaround may
become a prospect. 58

Prospects receive a bottom rocker with the name of his territory on the back of his vest,
such as his province in Canada, and a small patch on the front of his vest with the label
"prospect.,,59 After the minimum of another year, a prospect may become a full
member60 with consensus of the full-patch members of the chapter.

"
"
"
"
"
"

Ibid at paras. 233 .
Ibidat paras. 231.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras. 236.
Ibid at paras. 231.
Ibid at paras. 236.
60 Ibid at paras. 231.
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Full-patch members wear full colours - a three-piece patch sewn onto a vest. The top
rocker has the name Hells Angels. The middle patch has the death head symbol and
"Me" for Motorcycle Club. The bottom rocker has the territory. On the fi'ont of his vest

is the name of his chapter. 61 Only full-patch members of the club may use or weal' the
Hells Angels name and the death head symbol. Members sign licensing agreements with
the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club corporation in order to pledge to use the trademarks in
accordance with the rule and policies of the Club. 62
On retirement, a member must put the retirement date on any Hells Angel tattoo, and
must return all Hells Angels paraphernalia. 63 Ifkicked out of the club, the photograph of
the ex-Hells Angels member is circulated worldwide, and he must return all Hells Angels
paraphernalia and remove Hells Angels and death head tattoos. 64 Only members may use
the name of the club, and members viciously defend the right to use the name and
insignia of the club. 65 Not only do these rules insulate members and associates of the
Hells Angel from conventional law-abiding outsiders, the structure and internal social
controls of the Hells Angels maintain and perpetuate the outlaw identity of tile club.

6' Ibid at paras. 235.
Ibid
Ibid
., Ibid
6' R. v.

at paras. 269.
at paras. 264-65 .
at paras. 264.
Violette, 2009 SCSC 1557, [2009] S.C.J. No. 2262 (Q.L.) [R. v. Violette] at paras. 79-80 and 97102; and R. v. Lindsay trial decision, Slipra note 2 at paras. 264-68. In R. v. Violette, full patch Hells Angels
member Jean Violette extorted non-member Glen Louie by beating him in order to prevent Louie fl'om
wearing a Hells Angels belt buckle and using the Hells Angels name during drug deals. In R. v. Lindsay,
then-Staff Sergeant Jacques Lemieux opined:
266 Staff Sergeant Lemieux testified that the Hells Angels go to great lengths to make sure that
only members wear the club's colours or "patch". The patch signifies that the wearer is part of a

62

63

sophisticated organized crime group, alld anyone who deals with the wearer deals with the whole
organization. The Hells Angels do not want the intimidation value ofthe patch to be diminished by
lIoll-members wearing it.

267 Prospects are not permitted to use the name Hells Angels.
268 Staff Sergeant Lemieux was referred to and commented on minutes of meetings entered as
exhibits in these proceedings. They indicated concern about the return of colours confiscated by
law enforcement, other clubs having logos resembling that of the Hells Angels, and non-members
having paraphernalia bearing the naille Hells Angels. StajJSergeallt Lemiellx testified that the

Hells Angels go to extreme lengths to make sllre only its members weal' its name and logo. They do
not want outsiders portraying themselves as members ofthe organization and diminishing its
reputation. As well, a trademark must be monitored by its owner to protect against its loss. The
Hells Angels protect their name and logo in the saille way around the world. [Emphasis added].
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2.4.4

The Power of the Patch: Symbolization of the Reputation

for Violence and Intimidation
The "power of the patch" refers to the power of the reputation of a gang. The "patch"
refers to gang names and emblems that adorn clothing and accessories worn by gang
members, and to a more limited degree, worn by gang associates. It signifies the adoption
and declaration of the outlaw identity by the member, and decries the fearsome and
violent reputation of the club. A patch has power if it affects the behaviour of others to
the benefit of the gang 01' gang member.66 For instance, simply wearing the patch of a
full-patch member of an outlaw motorcycle gang, such as that of the Hells Angels, is
sufficient to intimidate most people.67 This power enables a gang to effect its purposes
through intimidation and violence. Some "untraditional,,68 outlaw motorcycle gangs did
not have patches, but patches are commonly used by outlaw motorcycle gangs, and are
used by all of the "big foul''' in NOith America.

The power of the patch has been long recognized within the criminal milieu and law
enforcement circles, and more recently, has been acknowledged by courts of law across
Canada. 69 For instance, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Regina v Wagner, 70
accepted the evidence of police agent Steven Gault who described the power of the patch

in relation to the Hells Angels:
32 In viewing Mr. Gault's evidence, when Mr. Gault was asked under oath on
October 21 , 2005, whether the current Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club of Canada
was what the members tried to portray themselves as - simply a bunch of old
guys riding motorcycles - Gault replied as follows:
That couldn't be farther from the truth. There's very - I can't even think of
one, uh, that doesn't break the law in some way, shape, or form. Whether
it's on a low level 01' a higher one. As with Niagara, they have complete
control of the coke dealing in the whole Niagara region. Anyone steps in
there, they'll kill him point blank. You don't play with their game. So
they're - all their lives are built upon drug dealing. Guys like Mr. BillR, v, Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at pams, 450.
R, v, Grant, 2007 MBQB 135, [2007] M.J, No. 193 (Q.L.), aII'd 2009 MBCA 9, [2009] MJ. No, 9 (Q.L.)
lR. v, Grant] at para. 10.
.
• R. v, Leclerc, [200 I] RJ.Q, 747, [2001] Q.J. No, 426 (Q,L.)(Que, Ct. (Crim, and Pen, Div,» at para, 49,
69 R, v, Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at pams, 450 and 922; and Regina v, Wagner, 2008 CarsweliOnt
5093 (ant. S,C'},) [Regina v Wagner] at paras, 32-34; Regina v, Grant, supra note 67 at para, 10; and
Regina v, Violefle, supra note 65 at para. 153,
70 Regina v, Wagner, supra note 69,
66

67
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" and in the evidence before me, a Hell's Angel member from Oshawa " as well, do take bikes and dlUg dealing. The patch is used non-stop for,
like, extorting people out of their bikes. I've seen lots ofguys there. Things
to get people in debt. A little bit of coke and they take their bike. Anything
you can. The patch - "referring to the Hell's Angels patch" - is muscle
and evelybody backs it."
33 In a follow-up question he was asked: "Why would someone want to join the
Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club today?" His answer was as follows:
Because you'd have the power with the patch. You might be a low-level
drug dealer and don't want to be juiced anymore by the Club and have to
pay them. You might have just made afew enemies andyou want some
backing. I'd say most of it's money. That once you have the patch, you're
fi'ee pretty well to do anything you want. Anybody will back you.
34 As I have indicated, I accept Mr. Gault's evidence on these points and find
as afact that membership in the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club allows the
individual, as a full-patch membel~ to commit criminal acts for profit with the full
backing and benefit of the Club. Both the individual member and the Club share
in the benefits. Membership gives you the power of the patch. As MI'. Gault says, it
gives you the power to extort people and to deal drugs. Both types of these
offences are serious and the maximum penalty for such offences would be more
than five years. [Emphasis added]. 71
The evidence of Steven Gault not only explains the essence of the power of the patch that the power of the reputation ofthe Hells Angels organization enables members to
effect their criminal purposes through intimidation and violence. His evidence also
reveals the significant role that gang insignia plays in conducting criminal enterprises.
The power of the patch enhances the ability of gangs to commit criminal offences, and
over time, this power allows gangs to monopolize ten·itories and trades. For these
reasons, gangs often have very strict IUles regarding who can use and wear the gang name
and insignia. They recognize that use by non-members can dilute the power of the patch.
Thus, some outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Hells Angels, have IUles and policies
regarding their use.72 Further, members administer physical punishment to individuals
who are not members and who use the name and insignia.
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The relationship between the patch and the gang member is reciprocal. The patch is
synonymous with the gang and its reputation. Consequently, gang members who wear

Ibid at paras. 32-34.
R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 2 at para. 237 and 269.
73 R. v. Violette, supra note 65 at 79-80.
71

72
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the "patch" need not verbally identify themselves to others as a gang member in order to
receive the power ascribed by the reputation of the gang. 74 However, when gang
members wear the "patch" during criminal activities or during violent and intimidating
activities, the acts of the member perpetuate the fearsome reputation of the gang.
Violence and intimidation seep into the patch. Thus, the patch intertwines the identity of
the gang to the identity of the member.

74

R. v. Lilldsay trial decision, supra note 2 at para. 450.
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2.5

2.5.1

ABORIGINAL STREET GANGS

The Promise of Identity in Recruitment and Membership in

Aboriginal Street Gangs
The unique nature of Aboriginal street gang outlaws lies in the influence of their socioeconomic circumstances in society - both historically and contemporarily - on their
adoption and internalization of the values and norms of Aboriginal street gang groups.
Over-incarceration and poor social, economic, political and educational opportunities
mark members of Aboriginal street gangs. The severance of ties with conventional
society and lack of pro-social interactions, and the presence and pressure of anti-social
values and norms to substitute therefore, have led many Aboriginal youth and young
adults to join Aboriginal street gangs. This section will reveal some of the reasons for
adopting and internalizing an Aboriginal street gang outlaw identity, and what sort of
anti-organized crime measures can successfully target their outlawry.
The ovelTepresentation of Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian prison system has led to the
increase of Aboriginal street gangs.' Indeed, Aboriginal prison gangs serve as recmiters
for Aboriginal street gangs,2 and some gangs were formed or created in prisons 3 and
I "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile" (2006) online: Insideprisoncom
<http://www. insideprison.com/prison.Jlangyrofile_ lP.asp>; Jana Marie Grekul & Patti LnBoucaneBenson, An Investigation into the Formation and Recl'lIitment of Aboriginal Gongs ill Westel'll Canada
(Ottawa: Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada, 2006) (All Investigation into the
Formation and Recruitmellt ofAboriginal Gangs Iii Westem Canada] at 5; and Catherine Bainbridge,
Katherine Cisek & CBC Newsworld, Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang TerritOlY VHS (Montreal:
Wild Heart Productions Inc., 1998) [Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territol)'] at 21: 18. According
to Bainbridge, Cisek and CBC Newsworld, 70 per cent of inmates in Manitoba's provincial prisons are
Native. Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson cite research by Ovide W. Mercredi, Aboriginal Gangs: A Report

to the Correctional Service ofCanada 011 Aboriginal Youth Gang Members in the Federal Corrections
System (October 2000) online: <http://www.csgv.calcounselor/assets/AboriginalGangs. pd t>.
2 Alllnvesligatiol1 into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Callada, supra note
2 at 21; "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2; HManitoba Warriors: Prison Gang Profile"
(2006) online: insideprison.com <http://www.insideprison.comlPRlSON_GANGYROFILE_ MW.ASP>
("Manitoba Warriors: Prison Gang Profile"]; and "Albelta Warriors: Prison Gang Profile" (2006) online:
Insideprison.com <http://www.insideprison.comiPRISON_GANGYROFILE_AW.ASP> ("Alberta
Warriors: Prison Gang Profile"]. The Indian Posse has members in prison and on the street. The Manitoba
Warriors has members in prison and on the streel.
J Anlnvesligalion into the Formation alld Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Westel'll Canada, slIpra note
2 al21. According to "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", sllpra note 2, the Indian Posse formed in 1988
in Stony Mountain Institution. According to "Native Syndicate: Prison Gang Profile" (2006) online:
Insideprison.com <http://www.insideprison.com/PRISON_GANG_PROFILE_NS.ASP>, the Native
Syndicate probably formed in the Saskatchewan Penitentiary and Regina Correctional Centre. Accordi ng to
"Alberta Warriors: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 3, the Albelta Warriors began in 1997 after
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continue inside prisons. A gang within the prison offers support and protection to new
inmates who many need that to function and survive. 4
The recruitment process of Aboriginal street gangs is more violent than other gangs. 5
For example, on the street and outside prison, the Indian Posse initiates a new member by
other members "jumping" him or attacking him. 6 Five guys will jump in a circle and the
recruit has to "take [hisJlickin' for a couple minutes" and then get up - if he gets up and he is given his "rag" which is the coloured bandana identifying what gang he is in. 7
Recruitment is "aggressively sought,,;8 there is a lot of pressure to join the gang9 and to
receive a tattoo with the letters "]P."IO
Aboriginal street gangs generally recruit aboriginal youth II from impoverished and
dysfunctional families,12 and in comparison to non-Aboriginal people, urban Aboriginal
people are more mobile, less well-educated, less employed, and poorer. 13 Thus, the pool

Correctional Services Canada dispersed members ofthe Manitoba Warriors from Stony Mountain
Institution in Manitoba to the Edmonton Institution in Alberta.
4 An Investigation illlo the Formation and Recruitment ojAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra note
2 at 28.
S Ibid at 2-3 and 20.
6 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territory, supra note 2 at 12:20.
7 Ibid at 12:27; and "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2. Gang member Trevor Lacasse
described recruitment in Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territo/y.
8

"Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2.

9

Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territory, supra note 2 at 12:42.

10

"Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2.

Mike McIntyre, "Indian Posse Founder Killed: Gang Leader Stabbed to Death During a Brawl in
Penitentiary" Winnipeg Free Press (6 January 2010) online: Winnipeg Free Press
<http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/locallindian-posse-founder-ki Iled-80776572.honl> ["I ndian Posse
Founder Killed: Gang Leader Stabbed to Death During a Brawl in Penitentiary"]; and Indian Posse: Life
in Aboriginal Gang Territo!)', supra note 2. For instance, according to McIntyre, the Indian Posse is
comprised entirely of Aboriginal members, and exists in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba. However,
11

according to "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2, the Indian Posse has "white" and "black"
members as well as Aboriginal members.
12 An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment oj Aboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra
note 2 at 21.
" E.J. Dickson-Gilmore & Chris Whitehead, "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a
Typology for Understanding and Strategizing Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3
["Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a Typology for Understanding and Strategizing
Responses"] at 13.
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of candidates for Aboriginal street gangs is substantial 14 - particularly in the Canadian
Prairies. 15

The circumstances of a number of members of Aboriginal gangs, some high-ranking,
demonstrate the kinds of backgrounds common to these outlaws. For example, four
members of the Manitoba Warriors sentenced in R. v. Pangman,16 came from poverty,
hardship, or abuse of some kind. Vice-President Isadore Vermette lost his mother when
he was four, moved from hotel to hotel, frequently changed schools, and developed a
drug abuse problem. 17 Sergeant-At-Arms Garrett Courchene was abandoned by his father
at the age of six or seven, moved from hotel to hotel with his mother who drank heavily,
and was impoverished and hungry as a child. IS Full patch member Shane Myran was
raised from the age of ten by his mother after she divorced his father, and one of his
brothers was killed in Stony Mountain Penitentiary which event caused Myran to
associate with the Manitoba Warriors. 19 Apprentice and then full patch member Kevin
Cook resided with his mother after his alcoholic father left the family, but was later
apprehended as a result of his mother's alcoholism and then eventually returned to her
care.

20

While Cook was incarcerated his son was killed by a member of the Indian Posse

street gang, and Cook turned to the Manitoba Warriors in the correctional centre for
support? I Indian Posse member Trevor Lacasse was born from an extramarital affair,
and later found his father who had left when Lacasse was born.

22

His father's

abandonment was the greatest source of Lacasse's continuing inexpressible anger?3 He

14 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang TerritO/y. supra note 2 at 00:53, in 1997,50000 Aboriginal
persons resided in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and, ibid. at 00:17, of the 2000 gang members, most of whom were
Aboriginal.
IS "Aborigina[ Organized Crime in Canada: Deve[oping a Typo[ogy for Understanding and Strategizing
Responses", supra note [4 at 14. This phenomenon of being less well-educated, more mobile, less
employed, and poorer than non-Aboriginal persons, exists more so for Aboriginal persons in Prairie cities,
such as Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Regina, as well as the Ontario city of Thunder Bay, than in eastern cities,
such as Halifax, Montrea! and Toronto.
16 2001 MBCA 64, [200!] MJ. No. 217 (Q.L.) [R. v. Pangman].
17 Ibid. at paras. 9-12.
18 Ibid. at paras. 14-17.
19 Ibid. at paras. 22-24.
20 Ibid. at paras. 26 and 3!
21 Ibid. at para. 27.
22 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang TerritO/y, supra note 2 at 24:25.
23 Ibid.

91

saw his mom drunk, coming home with beer, and there was no food in the fridge. 24
Trevor experienced being in a drive-by shooting during which his cousin Joseph "Beeper"
Spence, mistaken as a gang member, was killed by another kid?S He has been in and out
of jail since age 12.

26

Co-founder of the Indian Posse, Daniel Richard Wolfe, grew up on
the streets of Winnipeg, and had been in many foster care homes during his youth. 27 He

" ... turned to gangs for a sense of family and protection.,,28 He adopted the lifestyle and
identity of a criminal outlaw. 29

Not all Aboriginal persons who suffer or endure significant hardships, such as entrenched
and severe poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, low educational opportunities, ill health
including mental health, state institutionalization, sexual abuse, and high rates of violence
in the early part of their lives, become Aboriginal street gang members. Indeed, most
Aboriginal young people who grow up in high risk environment do not affiliate with
gangs. 30 However, most Aboriginal street gang members have had such experiences? I

Membership in Aboriginal gangs results in, and results from, a severance of ties with their
conventional and familial communities, and a cOlTesponding loss of their cultural
identities in non-criminal subcultures.
For Aboriginal families specifically in the Prairie Provinces, the gang issue
is a growing phenomenon. Youth are being recruited into this lifestyle both on the
street and in prisons, leaving school and family behind to take on the gangster
identity. This criminal and violent lifestyle increases risk of victimization,
criminal records and prison time, serious injury, and death. Further, when
Aboriginal men choose to take on a persona generated by African American gangs
[whom some Aboriginal gangs emulate], they lose their connection to their people
and their identity as a Cree, Blackfoot, Lakota, Dene, or Metis etc. This migration
" Ibid..
" Ibid. at 26: 12.
"Ibid. at09:18.

"Indian Posse Founder Killed: Gang Leader Stabbed to Death During a Brawl in Penitentiary", supra
note 12. Mcintyre repOJ1s comments that had been made by Wolfe's lawyer.
28 Ibid. Mcintyre reports that co-founder of the Indian Posse street gang, Daniel Richard Wolfe, died as the
result ofa prison stabbing in the Saskatchewan Penitentiary.
29 Ibid. Mcintyre reports comments that Wolfe had made regarding the sentence that put him in prison:
"They're going to give me 25 to life ... That's the life ofa gangster."
30 Mark Totten, "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada" (2009) 3 Institute for the
Prevention of Crime Review 135 ["Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada"] at 13727

38.
31 Ibid. at 140-42.
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to gang lifestyles by young men and women, therefore, can have serious
consequences for the individual, family and entire communities?2
Membership in aboriginal street gangs gives its members" ... an identity, empowerment
and a sense of belonging and acceptance. ,,33 The adoption of this criminal outlaw identity
satisfies a lack of, or a previous denial of, familial, national, or community connection.
... The gang can be a source of both self-esteem and identity for "lost" youth. For
these reasons, it is likely that the gang has an appeal to youth coming from broken
homes, single parent families, and abusive situations. The gang becomes a
surrogate family for these disenfranchised young people. In addition to this, the
gang can also serve as an economic organization, providing money to its
members. As a social organization, the gang unit is a source of pro-criminal
entertainment, status, excitement, camaraderie, prestige, and protection.
However, the gang can also be a source of punishment, pain, assignment of
criminal tasks, and can plague individuals with the constant threat oflost
membership.34
Aboriginal street gangs maintain a sense of unity and identity in a variety of ways. They
35
use hand symbols or signs to communicate; their territories are marked by graffiti or in
other ways;36 and they employ identifiers such as tattoos, clothing, paraphernalia like
bandannas, and symbols. 37 They publicly display gang-like attributes, such as clothing
and tattoos. 38

Gang membership may also keep Aboriginal gang members insulated from conventional
law-abiding segments of society. Racial stereotypes imposed on Aboriginal people
generally are also imposed on Aboriginal gang members and may increase the barriers for
Aboriginal gang members who seek to move away or "desist" from a criminal or gang

32

An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in /Vestem Canada. supra

note 2 at2.
33

34

R. v. Pangman, supra note 17 at para. 55.
An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in /Vestem Canada, supra

note 2 at 28.
Ibid. at 20.

35

Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang TerritO/y, supra note 2 at 01 :00 and 20:38. Indian Posse gang
territory is in north end of Winnipeg and is separated from the rest of the city by railway tracks. Across the
tracks is Dellce, a rival Native Gang. According to and "Indian Posse: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 2,
the Indian Posse and Redd Alert claim their territories based on Indian Reserve boundaries.

36

37

An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in /Vestem Canada, supra

note 2 at 20; and Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territo/y, supra note 2 at 12:27.
38 "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada", supra note 31 at 136,
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identity form a new law-abiding identity.39 However, the negative aspects of being a
gang member may not detract individuals from joining or encourage members to leave.
Indian Posse member Trevor Lacasse did not have a family growing up. " .. .I wanted a
family growing up. I left my own family for ... to start a new family and that was IP I
started .. .Indian Posse. Brothers ... brothers ... and uh stuff.. .. ,,40 Even if an Aboriginal
street gang member wanted to leave the family that he never had, many Aboriginal street
gangs do not simply allow members to leave. 41

2.5.2

The Reputation for Violence and Intimidation: Part of the

Identity of Aboriginal Street Gang Outlaw Groups
Many Aboriginal street gangs comprised of youth participate in non-prestigious
inconspicuous crimes such as vandalism, automobile thefts, robberies, and muggings.

42

Larger adult Aboriginal street gangs, such as the Manitoba Warriors, engage in gunsmuggling, drug trafficking, and prostitution. 43 While many of these types of criminal
activities involve acts of violence or intimidation, these offences do not solely or wholly
define this outlaw group. Rather, their common identity, and their significant sense of
cohesion and belonging accorded with this identity, define them as an organized crime
outlaw group. The presence and use of violence and intimidation to commit criminal
activities, and simultaneously to perpetuate the power of their reputation, contribute to
this identity, and thus, contribute to defining them as an organized crime outlaw group.

The violence of recruitment continues within the membership of Aboriginal street gangs.
Aboriginal street gangs engage in serious violence both on the street as well as within

39 Lawrence Deane, Denis C. Bracken & Larry Morrissette, "Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang"
(2007) 54 Probation Journal 125 at 136.
40 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territol)', supra note 2 at 34: 13.
41 Ibid at 16:48. The partner of Indian Posse member Trevor Lacasse and mother of his child, says that
although Trevor has told her he Is not In the gang, he still hangs out with the gang, and that when you're In
a gang, the gang doesn't let you leave that freely.
42 "A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs In Canada: Well-Known Gangs, Membership, Offences,
Risk, and Reconviction" (2006) online: Insldeprlson.com <http://wwlV.Insldeprison.comlprlson-gangscanada.asp>.
43

Ibid.
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penitentiaries and correctional centres. 44 Membership in these gangs may not produce
unity across regions. Conflict and violence may occur between or among the same gang
of a different region. 45
Generally, Aboriginal street gangs are hierarchica1. 46 They have different terms for the
positions in their hierarchical sltuctures. 47 Leaders, King Pins, Bosses, Presidents, or
Captains actively promote and engage in serious criminal activity.48 Veterans, Heavies,
or Higher-Ups are loyal to the gang, handle internal conflicts, and decide criminal
activities for the gang. 49 Core members or Regular Members, Associates, or Affiliates are
experienced and proven members who usually have been members since the beginning of
the gang. 50 Recruits require sponsorship, and must satisfy gang criteria, perform serious
crimes of violence, and often are good earners for the gang.

51

Strikers or Soldiers are

highly likely to commit serious acts of violence. 52

2.5.3

Aboriginal Street Gangs as Organized Crime Outlaw Groups

Disagreement exists as to whether Aboriginal street gangs amount to criminal
organizations, and as to the motivations for their formation. Michael C. Chettleburgh, a
former member of a gang in Canada, asselts that street gangs generally are less
sophisticated than organized crime groups in their organizational structure, their rules for
members, and the nature of their criminal activities. 53 Notably, sophistication is not a
"Indian Posse Founder Killed: Gang Leader Slabbed to Death During a Brawl in Penitentiary", supra
note 12. Mcintyre reports that co-founder of the Indian Posse street gang, Daniel Richard Wolfe, died as
the result of a prison stabbing in the Saskatchewan Penitentiary.
"Ibid. McIntyre repotts that the slabbing of Daniel Richard Wolfe occurred due to tensions between
Manitoba and Saskatchewan members of the Indian Posse.
44

46

An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ojAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra

note 2 at 20.
47 "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada", supra note 3 I at 136.
48 Ibid. According to Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territory, supra note 2 at 13:05 and 13: 14, in
the Indian Posse, the Seniors and O.G.'s (Original Gangsters) are founding members and leaders ofa gang,
and when they tell other members what to do, they have to do it or else will face violent consequences.
49 "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada", supra note at 136.
S. Ibid. at 136-37.
" Ibid. at 137.
52 Ibid. According to Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territo/Y, supra note 2 at 13 :05; and
"Manitoba Wan'iors: Prison Gang Profile", supra note 3, in the Indian Posse and Manitoba Warriors, the
Strikers are errand boys.
" Michael C. Chett/eburgh, Young Thugs: Inside the Dangerous World ojCanadian Street Gangs
(Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007) at 19-20.
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requirement in this thesis' definition of organized crime outlaw or organized crime outlaw
group.

Jana Grekul and Patti LaBoucane-Benson, in their investigation into the formation of
Aboriginal gangs in Western Canada, make similar assertions. They applied a typology
of youth groups created by Robert M. Gordon in 1995 54

-

and not specifically Aboriginal

youth or Aboriginal gang-groups - to Aboriginal youth and Aboriginal gangs. Grekul
and LaBoucane-Benson opine that although some Aboriginal gangs may have
cOlmections with criminal organizations, criminal organizations are rare within
Aboriginal gangs. 55
Itwe look at some of the Aboriginal street gangs in existence in the prairie
region, it also becomes clear that groups such as the Redd Alert, Indian Posse,
Alberta Warriors, and the Native Syndicate fit Gordon's description of a street
gang. Crime for profit (though less organized than criminal organizations) and
violence characterize these street gangs. For example, the Indian Posse originally
organized in Winnipeg in the late 1980s and early 1990s was unorganized initially
but became more organized over time. This gang is involved in low level
organized street crime, including drug trafficking, assaults and break and enters.
Dependent on more structmed criminal organizations for their drugs, Indian Posse
members are involved in street level dealing. As is characteristic of most
Aborginal street gangs, the Indian Posse is very active in cOIl"ectional institutions,
using fear, violence and intimidation to recruit non-members and exercise control.
The Manitoba Wan'iors and the offshoot Alberta Waniors both are
considered street gangs, although their strength appears to come primarily from
their activities and recruitment in prisons. Both touted as being on the more

organized end of the street gang continuum, these groups which started offas
Aboriginal political grollps, have ties to more organized criminal organizations
sllch as outlaw motorcycle groups. The Redd Alert, according to some reports,
originated in Edmonton as an offshoot of the notorious Edmonton NOlihside Boys.
Very active in correctional institutions, the Redd AleJt developed in response to
" Robelt M. Gordon, "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and "Wanna-Be" Groups: A
Vancouver Perspective" (2000) 42 Canadian 10urnal of Criminology 39 ["Criminal Business Organization,
Street Gangs and "Wanna-Be" Groups: A Vancouver Perspective"] at 45,46 and 5 J. In his Greater
Vancouver Gang Study in 1995, Gordon studied adults and youth in gangs in the Greater Vancouver area.
His work has limited application to aboriginal street gangs because his study did not differentiate between
gang members, peripheral or "wanna·be" members, or associates. Further, his subjects included a great

variety of ethnicities, but did not include any Aboriginal subjects. Gordon found that of the 35 street gang
"members" in his study, 60 per cent were born in Canada, and 85 per cent were visible ethnic minorities of
Indo-Canadian (Fijian), Hispanic, [ranian, Chinese, and Vietnamese descent.
ss An Investigation into the Formation and Recrllilment of Aboriginal Gangs ill Western Canada, supra
note 2 at 18. The authors refer to Robelt M. Gordon, "Street Gangs in Vancouver" in 1. Greechan and R.
Silverman, eds., Canadian Delinquency (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995); and "Criminal Business
Organization, Street Gangs and "Wanna·Be" Groups: A Vancouver Perspective", supra note 55.
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aggressive institutional recruitment by gangs such as the Indian Posse and the
Manitoba and Albelia Warriors. Aboriginal inmates formed the Redd Aleli as an
alternative to being forcefully recruited into these other groups.
Gordon's third group, criminal organizations are currently relatively rare
in the Aboriginal community in the Prairie provinces. Though some of the street
gangs, through their drug trafficking activities and connections with more
organized groups, might be moving in this direction, as it now stands criminal
organizations don't fit the profile ofthe bulk of Aboriginal gangs. ... [N]ot only
with the "legitimate" world of work, but also within the world of crime,
Aboriginal youth are relegated to the more disorganized, less lucrative criminal
opportunities because of a variety ofreasons, including structural inequality,
poverty, discrimination and other factors. They do not make up the bulk of the
criminal business organization, but rather are more likely to be found in the street
level groups and the "wanna-bes" groups.56 [Emphasis added].
These assertions seem to imply that "low level" crime, or less sophisticated organization
and structure, excludes Aboriginal street gangs from being criminal organizations. The
authors rely on non-legal categories formulated by Gordon - namely, "criminal business
organization", "street gang" and '''wanna-be' groupS."S7 However, the definition of
"criminal business organization" does not necessarily exclude Aboriginal street gangs.
The definition requires a "formal structure" and "high degree of sophistication", but these
,. An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Westel'll Canada, supra
note 2 at 17-18.
57 "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and "\Vanna-Be" Groups: A Vancouver Perspective",
sllpro note 55 at 48-49. Gordon defines these three types of gangs as follows:
Criminal business organizations are organized groups that exhibit a formal structure and a
high degree of sophistication. Organizations are comprised primarily of adults, including older
adults. They engage in criminal activity primarily for economic reasons and almost invariable
maintain a low profile, which is a characteristic that distinguishes them most cleal'iy from street
gangs. Organizations may have a name ....
Street gangs are groups of young people, mainly young adults, who band together to form
a semi-structured organization the primary purpose of which is to engage in planned and profitable
criminal behaviour or organized violence against rival street gangs. They can be distinguished
from other groups (especially wanna-be groups) by a self-perception ofthe group as a gang: a
name selected and used by gang members; and some king of identifying marks such as clothing
and colours. The members will openly acknowledge gang membership because they want to be
seen as gang members by others. Street gangs will tend to be less visible but more structured,
better organized, and more pennanent than wanna-be groups. . ..
Wanna-be groups are clusters of young people who band together in a loosely structured
group to engage in spontaneous social activity and exciting, impulsive, criminal activity including
collective violence against other groups of youths. A wanna-be group will be highly visible and its
members will openly acknowledge their "gang" involvement because they want to be seen by
others as gang members. The group will have a local gathering area and a name, selected and used
by its members, which may be a modified version of the name of either a local or an American
street gang. The group may use clothing, colours, or some other kind of identifying marks. The
group's name, meeting ground, and colours may fluctuate .....
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terms are not clear, and notably, organization and hierarchy are indeed present in many of
the more notorious Aboriginal street gangs, as evidenced by the existence of presidents,
vice-presidents, sergeants-at-arms, full patch members, and apprentices in the Manitoba
Warriors. 58 Also of concern is that Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson specifically apply the
criminal organization provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code, and do not address the
findings of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench inR. v. Pangman which, in the context
of a jury trial, has applied the Canadian criminal organization legislation to one of these
Aboriginal street gangs - namely, the Manitoba Warriors. 59

Dickson-Gilmore and Whitehead discuss the motivation of Aboriginal gangs. They assert
that much, if not all, of "Aboriginal organized crime" stems fi'om political activism and
nationalism as a conscious and unconscious response to societal oppression both
historically and contemporarily.60
... To say that many aboriginal people, especially youth, are estranged from
Canadian society and authority is an understatement, and when this is coupled
with poverty and blocked opportunity, engagement in organized criminal activity
may well become a rational choice. In some measure, too, it may become a fmm
of political protest. 61
Conscious or subconscious politics or lack of attachment to pro-social groups may not be
the only forces that lead individuals to join Aboriginal street gangs, however. The need
to belong and have an identity may offer Aboriginal individuals the oppmiunity to fulfill
a sense of disconnect, and an opportunity to benefit economically and socially. But
notably, the definition of organized crime outlaw group includes using the power of the
group identity in order to gain some personal or group benefit or advantage whether this
benefit or advantage be economic, social, political, or (il)legal.
R. v. Pangman, supra note 17.
R. v. Pangman, supra note 17; and Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench decisions in R. v. Pangman,
(1999),143 Man. R. (2d) 161, [1999] M.J. No. 396 (Q.L.); (1999),141 Man. R. (2d) 143, [1999] MJ. No
475 (Q.L.); (2000), 141 Man. R. (2d) 200, [2000] M.J. No.5; [2000] M.J. No. 31 (Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B.
(2d) 155; [2000] MJ. No. 51 (Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B. (2d) 56; (2000), 144 Man. R. (2d) 144, [2000] MJ.
No. 60 (Q.L.); (2000), 144 Man. R. (2d) 192, [2000] M.J. No. 123 (Q.L.); (2000), 32 C.R.(5 th ) 272, [2000]
M.J. No. 125 (Q.L.); 2000 MBQB 47, [2001] M.J. No. 235 (Q.L.); 2000 MBQB 85, [2000] MJ. No. 300
(Q.L.). This case dealt with the criminal organization provisions as they existed in 1997 prim' to the
amendments in 200 I.
60 "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a Typology for Understanding and Strategizing
58

59

Responses", supra note 14 at 7.
Ibid. at II.

61
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Mark Totten discusses both level of organization and motivation of "Aboriginal youth
gangs.,,62 Unlike Chettleburgh, and Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson, Totten does not
discount the existence of seriousness and sophistication of organization in these groupS.63
He states, "Aboriginal youth gangs are visible groups that come together for profit-driven
criminal activity and severe violence.,,64 The engagement in violence also motivates
members as it provides them with a sense of honour, self-respect, and self-esteem. 65
Indeed, as discussed in the prior section on defining organized crime outlaws, Beare has
noted, but overemphasized, the motive of profit in her definition of organized crime.

While many Aboriginal street gang members seek economic benefit through participation
in gang activities, profit or economic benefit alone does not account for participation in
an organized crime group, and its over-emphasis or employment as a defining factor
ignores other criminal activities of organized crime outlaws that relate to their group. For
instance, while some criminal activities by members may involve economic benefit or
advantage such as drug trafficking or extortion for money, other criminal activities relate
to the infliction of violence to protect members and associates of the group as well as the
reputation of the group. Further, a definition of organized crime rather than a definition
of the individuals and groups that commit criminal acts, fails to capture the essence of
organized crime outlaws. These outlaws commit criminal acts. It is who they are that
distinguishes them from other criminals.

"Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada", supra note 31 at 136. While Totten's
research pertains to "Aboriginal youth", he employs this term to include Aboriginal individuals between the
ages of 12 and 30 years.
63 Ibid. Totten at first says, "".there is a lack of organization and structure",," A few sentences later, he
states that the organization varies in terms of structure, sophistication and permanence.

62

64

65

Ibid.
Ibid at 140.
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CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

RELEVANT TO ORGANIZED CRIME OUTLAWS

3.1

INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

This Chapter of this thesis will use various concepts and assertions within criminological,
sociological and psychological theories to explain the formation and perpetuation of
organized crime outlaw identities and outlawry. It will outline the tenets of each theory
and apply it to some of the four organized crime outlaw groups described in Chapter Two
in an effort to exemplify the origins and workings of outlawry. Insights from the
application of these theoretical explanations will produce a list of causes 01' reasons for
the existence of organized crime. Based on this application and these causes or reasons,
at the end of each section in this Chapter, this thesis will set forth the main requisites for
anti-organized crime measures - that is to say, what anti-organized crime measure should
do.

This thesis does not intend to explain why all individuals become criminals, but rather, it
seeks to explain why some individuals, 01' some individuals who are criminals, become

organized crime outlaws. There does not exist anyone or any group of causes 01' reasons
for all organized crime outlaws. However, there are similar reasons for some, different
reasons for others, and sometimes overlapping reasons.

This Chapter of the thesis will discuss social constructionism; social control and bond
theory; deviance and labelling theory; and differential association or social learning and
the concept of subculture. It will draw from concepts of degradation and display from
social psychology in order to elaborate on aspects of the labelling theory. However, it
will not directly and wholly apply the theory of social psychology to organized crime
outlaws.

This Chapter will begin its theoretical analysis with an analysis of social constructionism
in section two. Social constructionism does not assert that "organized crime" or "criminal
organizations" are accurate and real, so much as they are socially constructed. Thus,
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social constructionism cannot explain the processes behind the formation of organized
crime outlaw identities. Rather, social constructionism will explain how societies
perceive, believe, and construct organized crime as a social problem. Social
constructionism can also explain the reasons for state reactions to this problem through
the implementation of criminal laws. Further, it will explain the role of the media and
popular culture in the creation, maintenance, and dismantling of outlaw identities.
Section three will analyse social control theory and bond theory, as a subset within social
control theory, in order to determine why individuals obey the rules of society. The lack
of social control mechanisms can produce disorder and non-conformity, and anarchy and
the lack of informal social controls may act as precursors not only to criminality, but also
to outlawry. In turn, outlawry can resist and hinder later efforts at imposing conventional
social norms and laws.
Section four will examine the nature of social identity formation through differential
association or social learning within subcultures. Criminal behaviour is learned from
interaction or association with individuals who commit crimes, and subcultures of
criminals, such as organized crime outlaws, provide a fertile environment for learning
anti-social behaviours. Once outlaw groups or subcultures are formed, all members learn
the values and normative behaviour of that subculture or group, and reinforce them with
each other. Theoretically, this phenomenon would entrench organized crime outlaw
identities, and their outlaw behaviour. While research regarding differential association
has focused on youth gangs and youth deviance, the lessons learned from youth outlaws
may also apply to adult outlaws.
Section five will examine the theory of deviance and labelling to explain the creation or
recognition of the criminally deviant, and the process of socially casting out individuals
fi'om society. Of particular importance is the concept of secondary deviance which
explains the process of internalization of a deviant or criminal identity, and arguably an
outlaw identity.

101

Section six in this Chapter will not examine the entire theory of social psychology, but it
will refer to two concepts within social psychology - those of degradation and displayin its attempt to explain the labelling process, and the process of internalization of
identity.
Examination of insights from the theoretical concepts in sections two to six will reveal
that some aspects of deviance and labelling; differential association or social learning and
the concept of subculture; social control; and social constructionism, are velY divergent
and distinct, and thus, may account for many different causes or reasons for the formation
of outlaw identities, and explain the processes of acquiring and removing the power
within outlawry generally. In other respects, many concepts within these theories overlap
and are compatible - palticularly in relation to the creation and maintenance of identity,
social cohesion, and social order. This mix of compatibility and divergence contributes to
a rubric for evaluation of anti-organized crime legislation in Canada, and suggestions for
amendments and non-criminal as well as non-legal approaches. Thus, section seven of
this Chapter will summarize a number of insights for anti-organized crime measures
based on these theoretical analyses of organized crime outlaws in order to determine
whether criminal organization legislation in Canada can disarm organized crime outlaws.

102

3.2

3.2.1

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

Overview

Social constructionism postulates how" ... subjective meanings become objective
facticities ... ", I or how human activity produces things. 2 It explains the construction and
perpetuation of reality, and it asserts that once constructed, de-construction and change to
this reality becomes difficult even with the existence of alternative competing realities. 3
The analysis of how something came to be an "objective facticity" or part of reality is
essential to an examination of whether this facticity accurately and genuinely reflects the
entity that it claims to reflect.
This analysis in relation to crime generally illuminates how criminal conceptions and
definitions come to be; how they are applied; and how behaviour patterns develop or are
noted in relation to these definitions.4 This analysis in relation to organized crime
outlaws and outlawry will illuminate whether the criminal organization legislation in
Canada accurately and genuinely captures what has come to be perceived and labelled as
organized crime or criminal organizations. This is one of two ways in which social
constructionism has particular relevance to organized crime outlaws.
The second way in which social constructionism remains relevant is in examining the
internalization of identity, and in describing social interaction processes that maintain
roles and identities. It allows for analysis of how a reality of organized crime groups and
"criminal organizations" came to be, and an analysis of how organized crime identities
may be formed and perpetuated.

1Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction 0/Reality, I" ed. (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1966) [The Social Construction 0/Reality] at 17 [emphasis original].
Ibid.
Ibid. at 23. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann state:
The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional
verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling
facticity. I knoll' that it is real. While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its reality, I am
obliged to suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday life. This suspension of doubt is so
firm that to abandon it, as I might want to do, say, in theoretical or religious contemplation, I have
to make an extreme transition. The world of everyday life proclaims itself and, when I want to
challenge the proclamation, I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy effort. ... [Emphasis
original].
, Richard Quinney, The Social Reality a/Crime (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970) [The Social
Reality a/Crime] at v.
2

3
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This section ofthis Chapter wi II review aspects of social constructionism that relate to
these two areas - the construction or definition of organized crime or criminal
organizations, and the social construction of identity. It will also analyse the effect of
media on the social construction of crime. It will use these aspects of social
constructionism to explain how the social construction of organized crime identities has
occurred, and the role of the law in constructing organized crime and remedying
organized crime.

As examination of social constructionism in this section will reveal the following:
Insight 1.
Anti-organized crime measures should calm moral panic and reestablish or maintain social order with substantive rather than hollow criminal
measures that legitimize the state.
a.
These measures should be useful to law enforcement and prosecutions;
they must not be overly complex in relation to evidentiary and procedural
issues.
b.
These measures should either socially construct a legal definition that
applies to all organized crime outlaw groups without capturing more than
the intended groups, or they must simply proscribe that certain organized
crime groups are "criminal organizations" according to the Criminal Code.
Insight 2.
Anti-organized crime measures should fairly restrain or use media,
in accordance with principles of freedom of expression, in their public
dissemination of information.
a.
These measures should prevent stigmatization, ostracization, and
sensationalizing organized crime outlaws.
b.
These measures should not incite moral panic that glorifies gang lifestyles,
that increases the power of their reputations, and that bolsters gang
identities.
c.
These measures should use media to launch anti-gang advertising
campaigns in order to discourage gang membership; to create new noncriminal identities for these offenders if the offender has a willingness to
change; and to sensationalize the powers and victories of law enforcement
in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry.
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3.2.2

Social Constructionism

3.2.2.1

Social Construction of Identity

Social construction asserts that the internalization of reality occurs simultaneously with
the development of identity.s One's identity depends on or is determined by one's
reality. 6 Reality may be conventional, and it may be deviant or non-conventional. Thus,
one's identity may derive from a deviant or non-conventional reality.
Social interaction processes explained by social constructionism have marked similarity
to those posited by differential association and social learning theory, and the negative
interaction processes explained by labelling theory. Social constructionism posits that
members of society construct their own reality as they interact in the world and access
shared meanings. 7 They communicate the meaning of reality via face-to-face interactions
or via a " ... continuous reciprocity of expressive acts .... ,,8 These interactions or
"typifications" are based on past experience, knowledge, and belief, about the individual
with whom one interacts or communicates. 9 The phenomenon of typification and the
"continuum oftypifications"lo as posited by social constructionism describes the
development of stereotypes and assignment oflabels, as well as identity.
Social constructionism posits that leaming criminal behaviour not only includes
association with other individuals, II but also extends beyond. It becomes differential
identification. 12 Identity is formed by social processes, and maintained, modified and
reshaped by social relations. 13 Behaviour patterns develop and become established by
groups 01' segments of society, and provide a "framework for personal action.,,14 Within

, The Social Construction o/Reality, supra note I at 123.
Ibid. at 160.
7 The Social Reality a/Crime, supra note 4 at 239.
, The Social Constmction 0/ Reality, supra note 1 at 28. At ibid. 15, Berger and Luckmann state that their

6

asserlions were greatly influenced by George Herbert Mead and the development ofhis work by symbolicinteractionist theorists.

Ibid. at 29-30.
ibid. at 32.
II The Social Reality a/Crime, supra note 4 at 24 1.
12 Ibid.
13 The Social Construction o/Reality, supra note 1 at 159.
" The Social Reality a/Crime, supra note 4 at 234.

9

10
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this context, individuals construct their own personal action patterns lS which provide a
source of personal identity and a frame of reference for future behaviour. 16
The division of criminally defined behavior into types of behavior systems
is based on various aspects of the person and his behavior. The characteristics of
behavior systems ... are the career of the person in regard to criminally defined
activity and the group supporl he receives from his actions. The career of the
offender consists of the extent to which criminally defined behavior is a part of his
life organization. Also included are his conception of self, his identification with
crime, and his progression in activities that may be defined as criminal. Group
support consists ofthe extent to which the person's criminally defined behavior is
supported by the norms of the group or groups to which he belongs. Included are
the differential association of the person with behavior patterns that have varying
probabilities of being defined as criminal, his social roles, and his integration into
various social groups. 17 [Emphasis original].
Notably, social constructionism asserts that an individual's self-conception is formed and
is continuously in process of formation. IS These assertions could explain the formation of
identity and modification to identity not only during adolescence, but also during
adulthood. The construct of identity through social relations is not always positive.
Some Aboriginal youth exemplify this negative effect of social constructionism. They
receive negative social reactions without actually being gang members, and must prove
that they are not gang members in order to receive trust, education, employment, and
social relationships.19 Some Aboriginal youth succumbed to this stereotyping or false
labelling, and become what others in society have constructed them as being - gang
members. 2o

[bid at 236-37.
Ibid at 234.
17 [bid. at 248.
,. Ibid at 235. Quinney states:

'5
'6

A person's self-conception, as an image of what he means to himself and how he acts
with reference to himself, is always in a process of formation. In this process, persons place
themselves into categories with which they can identity, such as age, sex, occupation, ethnic
group, and social class. Moreover, actions themselves give an identity to a person. On the basis of
his own constructions and decisions, man is ever becoming.
19 Jana Marie Grekul & Patti LaBoucane-Benson, An [nvestigation into the Formation and Recruitment of
Aboriginal Gangs in Westem Canada (Ottawa: Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada,
2006) [An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment of Aboriginal Gallgs ill Western Canada] at
27.
20 [bid at 42. Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson use labelling theory in this context, and assert that some
Aboriginal youth who have been labelled as gang members by authorities have lost the battle against false
labels.
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3.2.2.2

The Use of Symbolism to Communicate Identity

Language influences social interactions and socialization, and thus, influences the
formation and reinforcement of identity. In social constructionism, language " translates"
unusual experiences into the reality of everyday experiences,21 and deposits them into a
"social stock ofknowledge.,,22 It crystallizes and stabilizes subjective meanings into
objective facticities, reintroduces their presence after they have occurred,23 and thus,
perpetuates them .
... [L]anguage is capable of becoming the objective repository of vast
accumulations of meaning and ex~erience, which it can then preserve in time and
transmit to following generations. 4
Language does not only define entities and individuals within society. It also prescribes
knowledge available to individuals. The role that an individual plays in society specifies
the relevant "areas of socially objectivated knowledge" to which he will be privy and
utilize,zs For instance, ajudge or lawyer has a set of knowledge relevant to their
occupations, and an organized crime outlaw has a knowledge set relevant to the
commission of organized crime outlawry. This knowledge set may even be more specific
to a particular organized crime outlaw group, and thus, assists in the socialization of
members within an organize crime outlaw group. Accordingly, it also reinforces the
social cohesion of the group, and its identity.

Language also constructs symbols which similarly entrench meaning into perceived
reality, and which are stored in the "social stock of knowledge. "
Any significative theme that thus spans spheres of reality may be defined
as a symbol, and the linguistic mode by which such transcendence is achieved
may be called symbolic language. On the level of symbolism, then, linguistic
signification attains the maximum detachment from the "here and now" of
everyday life, and language soars into regions that are not only de facto but a
priori unavailable to everyday experience. Language now constructs immense
edifices of symbolic representations that appear to tower over the reality of
everyday life like gigantic presences from another world. Religion, philosophy,
The Social Cons/ruction ofReality, slIpra note I at 25. Ibid. at 65, Berger and Luckmann describe
language in its translation of experiences as a "large aggregate of collective sedimentations."
22 Ibid. at 40.
23 Ibid. a136.
" Ibid.
" Ibid. at71 and 73.
21
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art, and science are the historically most important symbol systems of this kind.
To name these is already to say that, despite the maximal detachment from
everyday experience that the construction of these systems requires, they can be of
very great importance indeed for the reality of everyday life. Language is capable
not only of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from every day
experience, but also of "bringing back" these symbols and appresenting them as
objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and
symbolic language become essential constituents of the reality of everyday life
and of the commonsense apprehension of this reality. I live a world of signs and
symbols every day. 26 [Emphasis original].
These symbols put history into order for societal members to access it, share it, and base
future actions on it.

The power of symbolism has particular relevance within the criminal milieu where gangs
use names and insignia to convey meaning based on reputation developed over time,
maintained, and repeatedly reinforced. Like any symbol, the origins and history of gang
names and insignia can become forgotten, but their reputation and significance produce
reactions and interactions that stem from past knowledge and experience, and
perpetuation of this knowledge and experience whether or not it remains CUll'ently
accurate or a true reflection of present reality.

3.2.2.3

Social Reality of Crime
'''Crime' exists within that society where there are at least two sets of
normative ideologies that conflict with one another and where one social group has
the power to enforce its ideology over other groups.,,27

Berger and Luckmann posit that social order does not naturally occur, but rather, humans
construct it. 2s Similarly, Richard Quinney began his social constructionism analysis of

26

Ibid at 38.

Lisa Chartrand & Cora Weber-Pi1lwax, "Pimatsawin Weyasowewina: Our Lives, Others' Laws" in Janet
Mosher & Joan Brockman, eds., Constrllcting Crime: Contemporary Processes ojCl'iminalization
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 122.
28 The Social COflstl'llCtiOfl of Reality, supra note 1 at 49-50. Berger and Luckmann explain:
... One may ask in what manner social order itself arises.
The most general answer to this question is that social order is a human product, or, more
precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produce by man in the course of his ongoing
externalization. Social order is not biologically given or derived from any biological data in its
empirical manifestations. Social order, needless to add, is also not given in man's natural
environment, though pat1icular features ofthis may be factors in determining certain features of a
social order (for example, its economic or technological arrangements). Social order is not part of
27
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crime by asserting that" ... a thing exists only when it is given a name; any phenomenon is
real to us only when we can imagine it.,,19 He based his analysis on six propositions, and
in so doing, elaborated on social constructionism as set fOlih by Berger and Luckmann
and applied it directly to the concept of crime. Propositions one, two and three deal with
the social construction of crime, and relate to how organized crime and organized crime
outlaw groups come to be defined. Proposition four relates to an analyses of the impact
of identity on these groups. Proposition five relates to the use of media.
PROPOSITION 1 (DEFINITION OF CRIME): Crime is a definition o/human
conduct that is created by authorized agents in a politically organized society. 30

Authorized agents of the law, such as legislators, police, prosecutors and judges,
formulate and administer the criminal law, and in so doing, define crime or make it real. 3l
For instance, the police target and atTest organized crime outlaws based on their political
mandates and their application of organized crime laws. 32 Prosecutors lay charges and
provide evidence at trial in accordance with the "criminal organization" definition, and
judges determine whether the adequacy of this proof, and sometimes the justness ofthe
law. These judgments about the actions and characteristics of others define who is
criminal and what actions or behaviours are criminal,33 and thus, who are organized crime
outlaws.
PROPOSITION 2 (FORMULATION OF CRIMINAL DEFINITIONS): Criminal
definitions describe behaviors that conflict with the interests of segments of
society that have the power to shape public policy. 34
.

Society is not homogenous with one value system- there exists a "we" and a paradoxical
"they.,,35 Criminal definitions occur as the result of conflict between the powerful and

2.
30

the "nature of things," and it cannot be derived from the "laws of nature." Social order exists ollly
as a product of human activity. No other ontological status may be ascribed to it without
hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations. Both in its genesis (social order is the result
of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar
as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product. [Emphasis original].
The Social Reality a/Crime, supra note 4 at v.
Ibid. at 15.

Ibid.
Ibid. at 101.
3l Ibid. at 16.
l4 Ibid.
3\

J2
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other individuals or groupS.36 The greater the conflict (or social problem), the greater the
probability of declaring certain behaviour as criminal. 37 Essentially, organized crime
outlaws are defined by those in society who have the power to implement or create this
definition. It is against the values and norms of this powerful group that the organized
crime outlaw group conflicts.

PROPOSITION 3 (APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL DEFINITIONS): Criminal

definitions are applied by the segments ofsociety that have the power to shape the
enforcement and administration of criminal law. 38
This proposition relates to Quinney's first and second propositions. Essentially, the less
powerful and more offensive organized crime outlaw groups are to society, the more
individuals within and who influence law enforcement and administration will seek to
target and contro I them.

PROPOSITION 4 (DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR PATTERNS IN RELATION TO
CRIMINAL DEFINITIONS): Behavior patterns are structured in segmentally

organized society in relation to criminal definitions, and within this context
persons engage in actions that have relative probabilities of being defined as
criminal. 39
Quinney based this fOUlth proposition on the premise derived from differential
association and social learning theories that individuals in society" ... act according to
normative systems learned in relative social and cultural settings. ,,40 Further, he melded
social constructionism with labelling theory by asserting that " .. .it is not the quality of the
behavior but the action taken against the behavior that makes it criminal .... ,,41 Thus, the
behaviour patterns of the non-powerful in society are more likely to fall within a

Ibid. at 209.
Ibid. at 16-17.
37 Ibid. at 17.
38 Ibid at 18.
3. Ibid at 20.
4. Ibid [emphasis original]. Quinney cites Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles a/Criminology. 4'" ed.
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1947); and Melvin L. De Fleur & Richard Quinney, "A Reformulation of
Sutherland's Differential Association Theory and a Strategy for Empirical Verification" (1966) 3 Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency I.
41 Ibid at 20-21.
35

36
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definition of criminal, than the behaviour patterns of the powerful- patticularly since the
latter group formulates and applies the deftnition of criminal.

42

Qui1111ey integrated social constructionism with primary and secondary deviation in
deviance and labelling theory as well as with differential association and social learning
theories when he described how individuals create patterns of behavior, such as deviant or
criminal patterns of behaviour.
Man constructs his own patterns of action in participating with others. It
follows, then, that the probability that a person will develop action patterns that
have a high potential of being defined as criminal depends on the relative
substance of(l) struclllred opportunities, (2) learning experiences, (3)
inlelpersonal associations and identifications, and (4) self-conceptions.
Throughout his experiences, each person creates a conception of himself as a
social being. Thus prepared, he behaves according to the anticipated
consequences of his actions.
During experiences shared by the criminal definers and the criminally
defined, personal action patterns develop among the criminally defined because
they are so defined. After such persons have had continued experience in being
criminally defined, they Jearn to manipulate the application of criminal
definitions.
Furthermore, those who have been defined as criminal begin 10 conceive
of themselves as criminal; as they adjust to the definitions imposed upon them,
they learn to play the role of the criminal. Because of others' reactions, therefore,
persons may develop personal action patterns that increase the likelihood of their
being defined as criminal in the fUlure. That is, increased experience with '
criminal definitions increases the probability ofdeveloping actions that may be
subsequently defined as criminal.
Thus, both the criminal definers and the criminally defined are involved in
reciprocal action patterns. The patterns of both the definers and the defined are
shaped by their common, continued, and related experiences. The fact of each is
bound to that of the other. 43 [Emphasis added].
This description ofthe conception and internalization of oneself as a criminal can equally
apply to the formation of an organized crime outlaw identity. Negative social interactions
between "criminal definers" and the "criminally defined" cause the latter to view himself
as criminal- or as an organized crime outlaw - and thus, only reinforce this imposed
definition as part of his identity.

42

43

Ibid at 21.
Ibid at 21-22.
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PROPOSITION 5 (CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL CONCEPTIONS):

Conceptions of crime are constructed and difji/sed in the segments ofsociety by
various means of communication. 44

This communication may be via media, and the more powerful segments in society (those
with the most critical concerns and conceptions of crime) will more likely have their
conceptions communicated. Thus, the Canadian government, police forces, and the
media as informed by these sources, will control much of the information disseminated to
the public about organized crime, and thus, will control the nature of the pOltrayal of
organized crime groups.
PROPOSITION 6 (THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME): The social reality of crime
is constructed by the forlllulation and application of criminal d~finilions, the
development of behavior pal/ems related to criminal definitions, and the
construction ofcriminal conceptions. 45

This last proposition is a composite of the second, third, fourth and fifth propositions,
using the definition in the first proposition. 46
These propositions espoused by Quinney demonstrate how the construction of criminal
conceptions develops from the perception and definition of a "social problem" in social
constructionism. Not every conflict, not every person, and not every alleged and labelled
"immoral", "wrong", "deviant", or "criminal" behaviour in society amounts to a social
problem in constructionism. Further, social problems do not exist or come into existence
by themselves. The "discovery" or declaration of social problems occurs when either a
"moral entrepreneur" or "single crusader", or when members of a segment of society or
group that have an interest, resources or legitimacy, launch a social movement or
campaign in order to define a social problem for the public. 47 However, the definers of
the social problem must have sufficient power in society to be heard, to facilitate moral

Ibid. at 22.
[bid. at 23.
46 [bid.
44

4S

Erich Goode & Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Cons/ruction of Deviance (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1994) at 92.

47
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panic, and to urge a response or remedial action. 48 In this way, social problems are
"constructed", "called into being" or "constituted.,,49

Just as social problems do not come into existence by themselves, they do not remedy
themselves. They require social institutions to correct them. State institutions, such as
the law, seek to maintain or re-establish social order in times of "social disorder" or
"moral panic." Through these institutions, governments maintain their legitimacy.
" ... No government can rule-practically or morally-without legitimacy. Power is
legitimate only when it is granted by the citizenry. . .. ,,50

The effectiveness, justness and fairness oflaws evince the legitimacy of the state. Thus,
in defining criminal behaviour, the state must demonstrate the existence of the need for its
laws, or it must respond to a social problem perceived by a powerful segment of the
public. The main goal of the societal segment that perceives a social problem is to solve
the social problem, and reinstate law-abiding normative behaviour. However, the main
goal of the state in light of a social problem is to maintain its legitimacy. These goals do
not necessarily overlap, and the state may initially seem legitimate by the nature of its
response. However, its response cannot be superficial. The phenomenon of the social
construction of crime and the paramount interest of the state in maintaining its legitimacy
provides a backdrop or structure against which to analyse how the state comes to define
criminal offences, such as "criminal organizations" in the Canadian Criminal Code.

" Ibid. at 88-89. Goode and Ben-Yehllda describe "social problem" in this way:
... [A] social problem exists when: (I) a group ofpeople recognize or regard something as wrong;
(2) they are concerned about it; and (3) they urge or take steps to corl'ect it. Thus a social problem
exist not only when substantial numbers of individuals in a society consider something wrong; it
must also be seen as a remediable cOlldition - something should be done to correct it. If the
members ofa society believe that nothing can be done about a condition - say, it is regarded as
their fate, an act of God, or the whim of nature - constructionists do not see it as a social problem.
But note: a condition may be objectively serious in that it kills 01' harms many members
ofa given society. To the constructionist, that still does not make it a social problem; wha/makes
a cOlldi/ion (collcrete or "putative '') a social problem is the degree offelt concern about that
condition, whether it is objectively serious or not. ... [Emphasis added].
49 Ibid. at 88.
50 The Social Reality ofCrime, sllpm note 4 at 325-26.
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3.2.3.4

Social Construction of Organized Crime Through Media

Media constructs and influences reality. Media is not a reflection of reality, but rather
" ... a prism, subtly bending and distOliing the view of the world it projects.,,51 People see
not only what they want to see, but what the media wants them to see or puts in front of
them.
Social constructionism posits that the conveyance of information about crime in society
constructs or affects the construction of "crime" and "criminals." It may reinforce
existing conceptions,52 but it also may alter or form conceptions. For instance, effects of
the media affect an individual's estimate about the frequency and amount of crime in an
area - that is to say, public opinion reflects the amount of crime news rather than the
actual crime rate. 53 As a conveyor or dilfuser of information, and although the effects of
mass communication may be socially mediated,54 the media indeed contributes to the
creation and amplification of outlaw identities, and it might be also be used to deconstruct outlaw identities.
What is put in front of consumers of media depends on the "newswOlihiness" or public
appeal of a media story, according to the judgments of journalists and editors. 55 It
depends on news values.56 For instance, the news value or threshold requires events to
meet a certain level of perceived importance or drama. 57 Unpredictability ascribes
novelty to a story, but predictability also has value in that it allows media organizations to

Yvonne Jewkes, Media alld Crime (London: Sage, 2004) [Media and Crime] at 37.
The Social Reality o/Crime, supra note 4 at 284-85. Quinney cites a study in F.J. Davis, "Crime News in
Colorado Newspapers" (1952) 57 American Journal of Sociology 325.
" Ibid at 281-82. Quinney cites a study in F.J. Davis, "Crime News in Colorado Newspapers" (1952) 57
American Journal of Sociology 325.
" Ibid at 284. Quinney cites the research of Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communicalion: An Upto-Date Report of an Hypothesis" (1957) 21 Public Opinion Quarterly 61; John W. Riley, Jr. & Mathilda
White Riley, "Mass Communications and the Social System" in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom &
Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., eds., Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959); and Everett M. Rogers,
DifjilSioll 0/flmovations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). Socially mediated means that the
effects of media communications aboul crime, that is to say the development of criminal conceptions, are
mediated by one's interpersonal networks and contact since media communications influence individuals
differently based on their past experiences and their present associations.
" Media Gnd Crime, supra note 51 at 37.
" Ibid.
51 Ibid at 41.
'1
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prepare coverage. 58 Events must be simplified in order to restrict the range of meanings
within a story, and make them understood quickly. Individualization personalizes stories
in order to provide them with a human element with which media consumers can relate
and empathize. 59 However, the effect of individualization may manifest in a "we" and
"they" mentality where consumers relate to a victim of crime and see the alleged offender
as dangerous or psychopathic. 6o Risk to the public safety imparts urgency and drama, and
attracts more media attention than crime avoidance, crime prevention, or personal
safety.61 Sex significantly increases the newsworthiness ofa story, and over-repOiting has
occurred as a result ofthis news value. 62 The presence of celebrity also increases the
likelihood of a story becoming news. 63 Geographical proximity makes a story near to the
audience, while cultural proximity makes a story relevant to a particular audience. 64 The
presence of violence and the drama it impOits into a story most affects a story's potential
for coverage. 65 Spectacle and graphic imagelY increases the dramatic visual appeal of a
story.66 The involvement of children, particularly in relation to violence and crime,
incorporates a moral element and elevates the value ofa story.67 Conservative ideology

and political diversion increases the newsworthiness of a story due to the "symbiotic
relationship" between media and politicians where in the media supports politics which
usually emphasize law and order68 and the legitimacy of the state, and in so doing, divert
attention away from problematic social issues, such as poverty and education. 69 The
impOltance of any of these news values varies with the media organization,1° and the
construction of any story depends on the application of the news values of the

at 42.
at 45.
at 46.
at 47.
at 48. Jewkes cites data from J. Ditton & J. DuffY "Bias in the Newspaper Reporting of Crime
News" (1983) 23 British Journal of Criminology 23, and states that a United Kingdom study in Strathclyde
in March 1981 showed that while only 2.4 per cent of crimes involved sex and violence, crimes of sex and
violence accounted from 45.8 per cent of newspaper alticles.
63 Ibid. at 49.
6-1 Ibid. at 51.
65 Ibid. at 53.
66 Ibid. at 55.
63 Ibid. at 56-57.
68 Ibid. at 58.
69 Ibid. at 60.
70 Ibid. at 39.
Ibid.
Ibid.
60 Ibid.
" Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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organization distributing it. One cannot paint all media organizations with the same
brush.
Organized crime stories satisfy many of these news values. The violence and spectacle
and graphic scenelY associated with organized crime acts meets the threshold of

importance and drama. The unpredictability ofthese acts, and the risk that they will
happen again,jeopardize the personal safety of the public. Inherent in the
individualization of these stories is a "we" and "they" mentality wherein law-abiding

citizens are scared and outraged by organized crime outlawry, and law enforcement is
sunm10ned to protect the public and enforce a "law and order" conservative ideology. 71
All the while, this perceived need to react to organized crime outlawry diverts attention
from the causes and roots of organized crime problem.
Indeed, for decades, the media has diffused the conception of organized crime to the
masses:
... Significantly, the Canadian media has always played a key role in the
propagation of information (sensationalized or not) about gangs in the country.
As Young (1993) found, gangs have been depicted in Canadian newspapers as a
subject of growing social concern and the product of an ailing society during
every wave of urban street gang activity since 1945 (Gordon, 2000: 41).72
However, the media often only captures the impressions of individuals within
"legitimate" social institutions such as those of police,1J rather than also capturing the
However, sometimes the media may have a social agenda that does not accord with the current political
laws and policies of the day, and may not distribute liberal propaganda, such as occurred during
Prohibition. Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall ofProhibition (New Yark: Scribner, 20 I0) at
276, describes this disconnect:
Although the papers made celebrities out of the gangsters, they did not rail to suggest the
causal relationship of the Prohibition laws and the bloodshed, not least because wet pape.·s realized
that linking the Volstead Act to murderous violence could help the wet cause.

71

n An Investigation into the Formation alld Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra
note 19 at 22. The authors refer to Robe.1 M: Gordon, "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and
"Wanna-Be" Groups: A Vancouver Perspective" (2000) 42 Canadian Journal of Criminology 39 [Criminal
Business Organization, Street Gangs and " Wanna-Be" Groups: A Vancouver Perspective"] at 41; and
Gordon refers to Michael G.Young, The HistOl), of Vancouver Youth Gangs, /900-/985 (M.A.
(Criminology) Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1993) [unpublished].
73 Gregg Barak, ''News making Criminology: Reflections on the Media, Intellectuals, and Crime" in Gregg
Barak, ed., Media, Process, and the Social COlls/ructioll ofCrime: Studies in Newsmaking Criminology
(New York: Garland, 1994) 237 ["Newsmaking Criminology: Reflections on the Media, [ntellectuals, and
Crime"] at 247-48; and Renee G. Kasinsky, "Patrolling the Facts: Media, Cops, and Crime" in Gregg
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opinions of individuals or groups who do not subscribe or belong to those institutions,
and perhaps who seek to undermine them, such as the organized crime outlaws
themselves. The media cannot capture all and every event surrounding an issue, and thus,
cannot portray social problems without bias and subjectivity. It cannot show the "social
reality of crime", but rather, only the "newsmaking reality of crime.,,74 As a result, and in
order to satisfy news values, media organizations often make "folk devils,,75 out of gangs
and criminal organizations. For instance, the Sydney Gazette coined the term
"bush ranger" through its definition of this typically Australian outlaw; 76 The Sopranos
portrayed the North American Mafia via its main character, Italian-American mobster
Tony Soprano;77 and the Life magazine depiction of the Hollister, California incident
solidified the social problem of bikers. 78 as referred to in subsection one "The Origins of
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Canada" in section four "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs" of
Chapter Two.
Ordinary individuals and legitimate consumers are attracted to the mystique of organized
crime,79 and may be affected by media attention surrounding organized crime groups.
Although almost impossible to quantify, 80 increased media attention focusing on a
particular violent crime group in society plays some role in the increase of the anxiety and
fear of individuals who are not part of that group.81 Indeed, Grekul and LaBoucane asselt
in their study that media representations and sensationalization of gang criminal activity
Barak, ed., Media, Process, alld the Social COlls/l'Uction a/Crime: Studies in NelVsmaking Crimillology
(New York: Garland, 1994) 203 at 207. Kasinsky states:
The pofice are the primary definers of crime and its control to the public: they delineate the
phenomena they subsequently control. They develop the system of classification concerning what
constitutes crime, crime rates, and case clearance. They account for their work in Ihese terms, both
within the law-euforcement system and to the pUblic. The police expend a considerable proportion
oflheir resources on knowledge control, to achieve accountability in the legal system and the

public culture .... "
""Media, Society and Criminology", supra note 73 at 6.
75 The term "folk devil" originates from Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils alld Moral Panics: The Creatioll a/the
Mods alld Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972).
7. Bruce Tranter & Jed Donoghue, "Bushrangers: Ned Kelly and Australian Identity" (2008) 44 J. of
Sociology 373 at 374.
77 The Sopranos, 1999-2007, (Home Box Office Canada).
78 Brock Yates, Ou/law Machine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999) [Ou/lml' Machine] at 11.
Yates refers to an issue of Life magazine from July 21, 1947 at page 31.
19 Howard Abadinsky, Orgallized Crime, 8'h ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) at 109.
80 Media and Crime, supra note 51 at 144.
81 ibid at 143 and 165.
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has fascinated Canadians, and terrified them. 82 Increased media attention may also
increase social control 83 by solidifYing social cohesion among law-abiding non-deviant
societal members - that is to say, by encouraging these individuals to avoid the deviant
"others", and to obey the law. In addition, it may negatively affect social interactions
between members of that group and non-members of that group, such as members of
conventional society, and thus, it can result in stigmatization and alienation of the
targeted group from conventional society.84 In this way, the media has the power to
develop "othemess",85 and augment or sensationalize criminal deviancy, such as
organized crime. Its construction of "othemess" can define and amplify who is deemed
deviant and criminal in society. Moral consensus or even a moral majority may not exist
in relation to whom societal members should feel threatened and what they should
condemn. 86 However, media organizations will imply such consensus. 87
The power of media in amplifying criminal deviance may also increase cohesion among
the "others" or the deviants, and thus, intensifY identities, such as organized crime outlaw
identities. Outlaws in the form of organized crime members, thus, may thrive on the
media pOlirayals as they advertise and increase their reputation for violence and
intimidation, and their power within the criminal milieu and mainstream society. Thus,
the media effectively acts as social constructor and labeler, and it enhances and
perpetuates group identities. For instance, after the Hollister weekend in 1947 as
described in subsection one "The Origins of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Canada" of
section four "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs" of Chapter Two, the American Motorcyclist
Association declared that one percent of motorcycle riders were the outlaw clubs giving
bike riding a bad name. As a result, Sonny Barger and other Hells Angels proudly

Aninvestigatioll into the Formatioll and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada. supra
note 19at9.
8J Media and Crime, supra note 51 at 143 .
... Ibid. at 69.
" Stualt Taylor. "Outside the Outsiders: Media Representations of Drug Use" (2008) 55 Probation Journal
369 at 374.
86 Media and Crime, supra note 51 at 70-71.
87 Ibid.
82
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adopted the name "One-Percenters", and tattooed their skin and wore patches with this
label. 88
To the contrary, his study of gangs in the Greater Vancouver Area in 1995, Robert
Gordon concluded that members of criminal and street gangs were not affected by media
representations of gangs in the news or entertaimnent. 89 However, Gordon relied on selfreporting rather than objective empirical testing, and whether his subjects had the
necessary introspection and insight to make such judgments remains questionable. If
non-outlaw conventional members of society are influenced by media, what would render
gang members immune from such influence?
The media may have the power not only to contribute to the construction of criminal
deviance in society, but also to contribute to the de-construction of deviant labels and
identities. Limitations on media portrayals of organized crime outlaws will not
sensationalize or glorify their power. Media may also be used to launch anti-gang
advertising campaigns in order to discourage gang membership.9o In addition, media
portrayals generally, not just portrayals relating to outlawry and crime, affect criminal
offenders, and may create new non-criminal identities for these offenders ifthe offender
has a willingness to change. 9l FUliher, the media may sensationalize the powers and
88 Ralph "Sonny" Barger, Keith Zimmerman & Kent Zimmerman, Hel/'s Angel: The Life and Times of
Sonny Barger and the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club (New York: HarperCollins, 2001) [Hell's Angel:
The Lifo and Times a/Sonny Barger and the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club] at 40-41. This enhancement

of identity is examined in detail in sub-subsection one "Application of Concepts within Deviance and
Labelling Theory to the Identity of Outlaws" of subsection three "Deviance and Labelling as Exemplified
by Organized Crime Outlaws" in section five "Deviance and Labelling Theory" of Chapter Three.
89 uCriminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and "Wanna-Be" GrouP1i: A Vancouver Perspective'"
supra note 72 at 54.
9<) Kristin M. Peterson, Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Focus Group Discussions with Gang Meinbers
and At-Risk Youth (M.A. Thesis, Greenspun School of Communication, University of Nevada, 1994)
[unpublished] [Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Focus Group Discussions with Gang Members and AtRisk Youlh] at 2. Peterson sought the opinions and responses of gangs and at-risk youth regarding aspects
of anti-gang advertising, and showed them several anti-gang television adveliisements. Her three focus
group members were age 12 to 17; they were in gangs or were highly predisposed to gang activity; they had
committed felony offenses which meant they were at risk of being removed from their homes and placed in
correctional institutions; and they were enrolled in non-punitive rehabilitative programs. Ibid. at 25.
91 Yvonne Jewkes, "The Use of Media in Constructing Identities in the Masculine Environment of Men's
Prisons" (2002) 17 European Journal of Communication 205 at 214-15. Jewkes provides an example of
Tim, a "Christian heavy metal biker" whose eluoyment of an interior design show caused him to internalize
meaning and values outside his pre-existing identity. Essentially, he developed an aspirational identity of
an interior designer that was very different from his own original identity.
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victories oflaw enforcement in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry. For
instance, in an effort to halt the heroization of gangsters such as AI Capone in the 1930s,
the governmental administration under American President Theodore Roosevelt engaged
in a war on crime, and specifically organized crime.92 This war was fought not only on
the streets and in Congress with the passage of bills enhancing the powers and jurisdiction
of law enforcement, but also in the media in an effOlt to end public tolerance and
romanticization of gangster crime. 93 The Federal Bureau ofInvestigation engaged in a
public relations campaign to sensationalize their own effOlts in order to counter and
diffuse the publicity and power of gangsters. 94 In these ways, the media may prove useful
in dismantling criminal identities and outlaw identities.

3.2.3

Social Construction of Legal Definitions of Organized Crime

Outlaws
Whatever term is used, the fact remains that organized crime outlaws and organized crime
outlaw groups exist in Canada. They have been referred to by descriptive names that
capture aspects of their groups. Even those names have been the subject of discussion.
For instance, the debate about the presence of Mafia or Mafiosi groups in Canada and the
United States that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s really focused on the proper social
construction of the reality rather than acknowledging that this reality existed:
By using the term "mob", it is possible to avoid the pitfalls ofthe
academic debate on the existence ofthe Mafia and the sensitivities of some
politicians and certain members ofthe Italian community about the use of the
word "Mafia". Still it is important to realize that once all is said and done, there is
a tightly knit group of Italian criminals operating in NOIth America, and this group
holds considerable sway in the underworld of criminallife. 95
The denial of Mafiosi groups in North America, as described in the overview of section
three "North American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra" in Chapter Two, may have arisen in
part from the lack of understanding and lack of agreement about the nature, ways and

Claire Valier, Theories o/Crime and Punishmenl (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2002) at 68. Valier cites
P. Hesnard, L 'anomie: ses usages el sesfimclions dOllS 10 discipline sociologique dept/Is Dllrkheim (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1987) at 65.
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•, James Dubro, Mob Rule: Illside Ihe Canadian Mafia (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985) at 10.
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means of the Italian Mafia. The power of the Mafia is not built from conventional
societal laws 01' democratic principles, but rather, from illegitimate "respect" generated
from fear and violence. 96
Conventional definitions and ideas do not fit well for entities within the criminal milieu.
This difficulty in determining by consensus a definition for "Mafia" or any organized
crime group, accords with the social construction of reality as per Berger and Luckmann
and the social reality of crime as per Quinney. Due to their different experiences,
interactions, perceptions, and biases, some entities in society may not be easily named
before they are deposited in the "social stock of knowledge" that is language. .
The differences between conventional societal values and norms as compared to criminal
values and norms, and the differences among criminal organizations themselves mean
that organized crime outlaws may not fit neatly into one legislated definition. Indeed,
much political and scholarly debate has focused on defining organized crime, and
consensus within Canada and at an international level remains as far away as the Eatlh
from the sun. Should lawmakers construct a definition of organized crime to fit a vast
array of organized crime outlaw groups? One definition to capture all organized crime
outlaw groups may not accurately reflect social reality. For instance, although antiProhibitionists, Mafiosi groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and Aboriginal street gangs
have a couple similar attributes related to the way in which they rely on their identity and
use their reputation for violence, their enterprises and acts do not have enough common
attributes to fit within a legal definition. The construction of a statutory definition may be
an attempt to force these groups to fit a patlicular mould, but an ill-fit just creates legal
problems. The alternative is to not socially construct one definition, but rather, to simply
outlaw the offensive groups - that is to say, to proscribe the existence of certain outlaw
groups and membership in those outlaw groups. Proscription, as opposed to definition,
will be discussed in subsection eight "Proscription as a Solution to Definitional,
Investigative, Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial Problems within Criminal Organization
Legislation" in section two of Chapter Four.
" Ibid at 15.
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3.2.4

Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw Identities

3.2.4.1

Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw Identities

via Declarations of Social Problems
The concept of "gangs" and the gang image illustrate this power oflanguage in social
construction. The term "gang" is fraught with preconceptions and typifications,97 and
herein lies its power. This power has positive and negative results for communities.
Communities with gangs most often deny that gangs exist, and thus, allow an
environment that lacks authoritarian control over gangs, and thus, that is suitable for
gangs to continue and increase their activities. 98 However, after some event or events
trigger moral panic, communities acknowledge their problem, and form policies or
initiatives to deal with gangs. 99 Some communities may over-emphasize a "gang"
problem in order to receive some benefit. Various groups employ or insert the "gang
metaphor" into discourse in order to bolster or legitimize their social problem, and thus,
influence the allocation of resources. 100 Other communities mistakenly believe that they
have a gang problem, and react accordingly. For instance, in Bloomington, Indiana, the
spread of stereotypes and drug-related gang infiltration by police located outside
Bloomington, contributed to increased law enforcement by local police.101 However,
social furor - public SUppOit for the alleged social problem - resulted not from the threat
of gang violence, but from the aggressiveness of police action. 102

The Social Construction ojReality, supra note I at 32. Berger and Luckmann state: "The social reality
ofevelyday life is thus apprehended in a continuum of typifications, which are progressively anonymous as
they are removed from the 'here and now' of the face-to-face situation."
98 Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) at 149. Tobin cites John M. Hagedorn, People and Folks: Gangs. Crime and the Underclass in
a Rustbeit City (Chicago: Lakeview, 1988); and C. Ronald HutT. " Denial. Oven-eaction, and
Misidentification: A Postscript on Public Policy" in C. Ronald Huff, ed., Gangs in America, I" ed.
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).
99 Ibid.
100 Ronald Burns, Carol Y. Thompson, & Robel1 L. Young, "Representing Gangs in the News: Media
Constructions of Criminal Gangs" (2000) 20 Sociological Spectrum 409 at 428-29.
101 Diane Schaefer, "Police Gang Intelligence Infiltrates a Small City" (2002) 39 Social Science Journal 95
at 99-101.
102 Ibid at 102-03.
97
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Kristin M. Peterson describes the development of gangs as a social problem, and then
corresponding real and imaginary barriers that result from the ways in which the gang
social problem develops:
... Gangs often initiate barriers to distinguish themselves from other groups of
"outsiders" and protect territory by using distinct names, colors, clothing,
symbols, graffiti, speech, and by using violence (Hutchinson 137; Monti 13). Yet,
some barriers are the result ofthe denial by officials to acknowledge a gang
problem exists in order to protect a city's image and economic development or
avoid dealing with sensitive issues of race and class (Huff 31 0; Miller 277). If the
gang problem worsens, this denial is inevitably followed with an overreaction by
law enforcement and media whose "sporadic panics" then define gang activity as
a criminal problem (Hagehorn 23; Huff312; Moore, "Gangs" 32). This
overreaction causes the general public to create erroneous perceptions of gangs
and harbor fear towards gang members in general (Hagehorn 160, 166). While
such fear may be justifiable at times, the public's failure to understand the
complexity of the gang problem exaggerates an "us against the world" mentality
within gangs which reinforces group solidarity and causes gang members to
construct artificial baniers against teachers and schools or other people and places
that they had once turned to for support (Monti).IOJ
The creation and perpetuation of these barriers results from tainted or affected social
interactions, and the entrenchment of criminal conceptions through experience or media
communication.

For instance, the origins of outlaw motorcycle gangs exemplify this phenomenon. The
Life magazine photo of a biker waving a beer bottle while dozens of empties lay at his
feet l04 portrayed the bikers at Hollister, California on the weekend of July 4,1947 as
unruly, uncontrollable, and fearsome. This image would taint motorcyclists generally,
and produce public outrage 105 and moral panic that stemmed from the perception that
bikers were a social problem. Perhaps, one per cent of these motorcyclists indeed were a
problem because the Hells Angels and other biker groups adopted this "One-Percenters"
labe1. 106 If they were not already a problem, they became one due to fact that Canadian
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s::fro note 90 at 21.
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and American governments did not respond quickly enough to the development of
organized outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Hells Angels. As a result, these outlaws
cemented their existence in North America.

The declaration of organized crime outlaws as a social problem, entrenches them within
the criminal subculture, and reinforces their identity with their group:
Progression into organized crime increasingly isolates the offender from
conventional society. Though there are variations according to the person's
location within the hierarchy, most organized offenders are committed to the
world of crime. Most of their activities are in continuous violation of the law.
But by a process of justification, based in part on a contempt for the rest of
society, they are able to maintain an appropriate self-image. Underworld leaders
may, however, choose to live segmented lives, retiring to the seclusion of pseudorespectability. Their commitment, nevertheless, remains with the world of crime,
where they receive their prestige, power, and are provided with a luxurious way of
life. 107
That organized crime members and associates are isolated from conventional society,
means that anti-organized crime measures must reduce isolation and seek to break the
associations and identifications of these individuals with the organized crime societal
segment, and integrate or reintegrate them into law-abiding conventional communities.

3.2.4.2

Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw Identities

Via Language
The social construction of organized crime outlaws has also stemmed from the power of
language both inside and outside the group. In relation to juvenile gangs, much prior to
the development of social constructionism, Frederic M. Thrasher found that the social
construction of knowledge occurs within gangs as they interpret events and develop their
own social stock of knowledge to draw upon, and to pass along to new members.
Thrasher noted that language affected group patterns of behaviour and morality:
In developing their own organization, gang boys call1lot go beyond their
experiences, and hence their codes and chosen activities must be studied with
reference to the moral codes and activities they meet in the communities where

107

The Social Reality ofCrime, supra note 4 at 268.
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they live. Gang morality develops from the interpretation or definition which the
gang, in the light of its previous experience, puts upon events. lOS
Gangs acquire their own languages based on words whose meanings depend on
experiences specific to the group,109 and may use words and names in order to confuse the
listener, such as the police. I 10

Further, Thrasher assetied that language that is used inside the gang develops the unity or
solidarity of a gang, as do the symbols and name of the group:
The unity of the group is further aided by the individual slogans, words,
traditions, and so on, which are developed by the gang and which symbolized in
common terms its objectives. The gang's planning must be carried on in terms of
the common meanings which these symbols make possible. The name ofthe gang
is of patiicular significance as a means of social control. It affords a common
stimulus or value to which all members of the gang may respond with common
sentiments. It is the rallying and unifying stimulus in a conflict situation. Since
each member of the group is more or less identified with the group name, it
becomes a matter of common pride to defend and exalt it. 111
This phenomenon also appears to have application and relevance to adult organized
crime. While it remains unproven by Thrasher's research, experts in criminal
organization cases in Canada have testified as to the significance of gang names and
symbols in the maintenance and perpetuation of the identity and reputation of an
organized crime outlaw group.

Language which is used outside an outlaw group and imposed on it, produces and
perpetuates stereotypes, and these stereotypes affect the construction of such outlaws or
gangs in two ways: either by not distinguishing between the different types and attributes
of organized crime outlaws, or by distinguishing on racial and ethnic grounds. I 12
Stereotyping generally results in conflagration of gangs, and in racial discrimination
against certain groups:
108 Frederic M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1.3 J3 Gangs ill Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1927) at 32.
109 Ibid at 266-67.
110 Ibid at 268.
III Ibid at 281.
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· .. Part ofthe "construction" of gangs in the media and by politicians is to resoli to
stereotyping by ethnic group. We read and hear of the "Asian" gang problem, the
problem of Jamaican Blacks in the east, and "Aboriginal gangs". We don't often
hear of "Caucasian" or "White" gangs. Racial and ethnic stereotyping leads to
processes such as racial profiling and creates increased misunderstanding,
labelling, mistrust and hostility between groups.
However, by lumping all these groups together and referring to them as
various components or pieces of 'one big gang problem' (i.e. whether Asian or
Aboriginal, society is faced with "ethnic" hoodlums wreaking havoc on
mainstream society), we conflate the uniqueness of each group we are dealing
with. It is entirely possible that the various "ethnic" gangs referred to, and the
"white" gangs we never hear of, are at base caused by different processes. While
more research is needed to ascertain whether this particular speculation has any
validity, if we for a moment consider this to be a possibility, then lumping all these
groups together, and attempting to deal with them all in the same way, might
prove futile.
For instance, Aboriginal gangs appear to have different causes and
characteristics than other gangs. Their recruitment processes are considerably
more violent than other gangs. Whereas other groups tend to "court" potential
members by buying them gifts and showing them how wonderful and lucrative
gang life can be, Aboriginal gangs subject new recruits to a "jumping in" process
where the recruit is beaten by many gang members for a set period of time.
Aboriginal gangs are more apt to follow the "standard" for gangs in the United
States, where tattoos, hand symbols, and strict chains of command define gang
membership and function. In this sense Aboriginal gangs are an anomaly on the
Canadian gang landscape. When we refer to Aboriginal gangs in the media as
'Just another example" of young people today being attracted to a criminal
lifestyle, and when the media and others construct all "ethnic" gangs in this
manner, we lose sight of what are likely very significant differences. This is not
to deny that there are many similarities among and between gangs, but it is the
existence of these differences that are obscured in the public discussions of the
problem. ll3 [Emphasis added].
Arguably, the above comments apply to any organized crime outlaw as most, fi'om a
social constructionist critique, develop from the historicity of language and its
stereotyping. The use of stereotyping to construct what is a gang or a what is a criminal
organization and thus who is a gang or who is organized crime member, leads to fUliher
stereotyping, and creates or maintains a sense of "otherness.,,1l4
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Fm1her, distorted social construction via stereotyping diverts, hides or removes from
consideration, the causes or origins of separate and distinct gangs or criminal
organizations. It will fail to consider the distinct and individual circumstances of gang
members, and the different degrees of entrenchment within the criminal milieu and
internalization of the gang identity. I IS In these ways, it prevents the tailoring of anti-gang
or anti-organized crime initiatives to the specific societal factors that give rise to the
problem, and the varying degrees of effect on outlaws. This social constructionist
analysis of gangs and organized crime, demonstrates the need for a state response that
does not simply employ the criminal law to cast a single net to snare and control all gang
or organized crime outlaws. The social problem of gangs or organized crime requires
more than one state response, since the law or laws themselves may not sufficiently
address the various roots of the problem.

3.2.4.3

Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw Identities

Via Media
Insights ii-om social constructionism illuminate the power and the problems with the
dissemination of information by the media. As exemplified by the Prohibitionist
movement, the use of advertising to sell social causes potentially serves as "a vehicle for
social change.,,116 In the early 1900s, proponents of the abolition, temperance, and
women's rights movements attempted to use education to inform the public about these
issues, and to generate reform. I 17 After little success in spite of extensive propaganda
campaigns, 118 Prohibitionists politicized the issue by seeking to mobilize the legislatures
to enact laws to address the problem, 119 and by sensationalizing it as a war effort. 120 After

115 Michael C. Chettleburgh, Young Thugs: Inside the Dangerous World of Canadian Street Gangs
(Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007) at 20-21. In his discussion about defining street gang members,
Chettleburgh asserts that not all street gang members are the same, and within the gang there are different
roles as well.
116 Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Focus Group Discussions with Gang Members and At-Risk Youth,
stl{"'a note 90 at 10-12. Peterson notes the use o[Smokey the Bear in order to prevent forest fires.
11 Ibid at 13.
118 Craig Heron, Booze: A Distilled HistOJ)' (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003) at 149. In the late 1800s,

the temperance movement distributed news-sheets, pamphlets, poster, songbooks, poetry, playlets and
recitations with their message.
119 Ibid at 131 and 150-51.
120 C. W. Hunt, Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold! (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1988) at36.
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the imposition of Prohibition, the media continued to contribute to the movement by
sensationalizing anti-Prohibitionist bootlegger activities l21 - particularly the violent acts
of organized crime anti-Prohibitionists as well as their corruption of law enforcement and
public officials. 122

The basic premise of advertising to sell social causes is that educating people may
influence the decisions that they make. 123 It uses persuasion to change their attitudes and
124
actions.
It can socially control individuals. Acceptance of a communication as a viable
method of reform or action, makes that communication no longer a control strategy.125 It
makes it a reality.

POllrayal of an event in the media can be the equivalent of advellising. Thus, media
pOllrayals of organized crime outlaws can persuade the public - both organized crime
outlaws and non-outlaws alike - to think a certain way about a social issue, and can
increase pressure on governments to react to it. One of the problems with these types of
media portrayals is the effect on justice - particularly in relation to individuals accused of
criminal organization offences. The effects of the media on the R. v. Pangman

l26

trial

involving some members ofthe Manitoba Warriors, reflects the significant and
potentially dangerous effects of the media:

27 The media hype and complexity escalated to such an extent that the Manitoba
government constructed a custom-built high security courthouse in an old
mustard-seed cleaning plant. The normal courts were said to be not large enough
nor sufficiently secure. One judge was designated to hear all applications for bail.
He dismissed them all. Review applications also failed. The new reverse onus bail
provision for organised crime may have contributed to this extraordinary
detention. The Remand Centre conditions were severe with contact visits tightly
limited.

Ibid at61.
Philip P. Mason, Rumrunning and the Roaring Twenties: Prohibition on the Michigan-Ontario
Watel1l'ay (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995) at 146. Mason asserts that in 1929 and 1930,
Detroit residents were provided a "steady diet of gang violence, murder, and other liquor-related crimes."
J23 Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Foclls Group Discussions with Gang Members and At-Risk Youth,
szrra note 90 at 14.
12 Ibid. at 17.
125 Ibid at 16.
126 R. v. Pangman, 2000 MBQB 85, [2000] J.1. No. 300 (Q.L.) (Man. Q.B.).
121

122

128

28 The security-driven design ofthe special coutihouse has to be seen to be
believed. The design is suitable for a trial of urban terrorists rather than a young
street gang. Nine inch metal walls separate lawyer's interview rooms from the
space occupied by the accused clients. In the courtroom, 35 boxes for accused are
in three rows separated from each other by thick glass and inaccessible to defence
lawyers. The accused were chained to the floor. The public were confined to 37
seats in an upstairs room behind glass in a gallery specifically located such that
there was no direct view ofthe witnesses or the jUly.

31 Only the most avid and self-congratulatory prosecutor could pronounce this
trial as a success and a vindication of the anti-gang measures. In terms of
organised crime this street gang was, as even the crown counsel put it, "in the
junior leagues." Having endured this extraordinary use of state power, the
Manitoba WatTiors has been given notoriety which may lead to a more cohesive
group in the future. As suggested by defence counsel Richard Peck, "[t]his has
given them identity, empowerment and a sense of belonging denied to them by
society at large." CutTent membership according to police figures is 1560 in 1999
as compat'ed to 1575 in 1997. 127
The pOlirayal or adveliisement of the power and reputation for violence of organized
crime outlaws, such as the accused in R. v. Pangman, widened the schism between
conventional society members and the accused, and in so doing, it increased the cohesion
of the outlaw group itself. In these ways, left unconstrained, the media increases the
organized crime problem in society.

3.2.5

Insights for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to

Social Constructionism
The application of social contructionism to organized crime outlaws prescribes a number
of requisites for criminal organization measures. The law must calm moral panic and reestablish or maintain social order with substantive rather than hollow criminal measures
that legitimize the state. That is to say, they must calm moral panic because they actually
address the social problem of organized crime, and not because they appear to remedy
the social problem. They must be useful to law enforcement and prosecutions. They
must not be overly complex in relation to evidentiary and procedural issues. The
difficulty in socially constructing one definition for all organized crime outlaw groups,
127 Don Stuali, "Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons
from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution" (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89 at paras. 27, 28 and 31.
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and the difficulty in constructing a definition that is provable in court, suggests that
proscription of the existence of certain outlaw groups and membership in those outlaw
groups may best reflect reality. Proscription may accurately reflect what governments are
attempting to do by passing legislation that targets organized crime.

In order to prevent stigmatization, ostracization, and sensationalizing organized crime
outlaws, criminal organization laws should fairly restrain media, in accordance with
principles of freedom of expression, in their public dissemination of information that
incites moral panic, that glorifies gang lifestyles and increase the power of their
reputations, and that bolsters gang identities. Criminal organization measures may also
seek to use media to launch anti-gang advertising campaigns in order to discourage gang
membership; to create new non-criminal identities for these offenders if the offender has
a willingness to change; and to sensationalize the powers and victories of law
enforcement in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry.

These insights will be examined in Chapter Four, section two "Requisite One for AntiOrganized Crime Measures", and section three "Requisite Two for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures. "
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3.3

3.3.1

SOCIAL CONTROL AND BOND THEORY

Overview

Social control and bond theory in this section provide some explanations for the reasons
that individuals obey the rules of society rather than deviate from them. This approach is
unique and paradoxical to some other theories which will be discussed in this Chapter,
such as differential association and deviance and labelling theory which seek to explain
why individuals commit crime. In showing what would make individuals not commit
crime, and not engage in outlawry, social control and bond theory illuminates reasons
why some outlaws have not obeyed the rules of society and what could change in order to
make them or make them want to obey the rules of society. This perspective facilitates a
postulation of ways in which criminal organization laws in Canada may prevent
individuals from becoming organized crime outlaws; impose social order and control on
organized crime outlaws; or maintain a sense of social order and control with the presence
of a certain level of organized crime outlawry in society.

This section of Chapter Three will review the essential tenets of social control and bond
theory, and specifically, some concepts that relate to the maintenance of social order or
equilibrium. It will demonstrate how lack of sufficient social control or lack of bonding
can give rise to acts that contribute to social disorder and outlaw identities. It will explain
how the concept of social order is a tenuous notion and perhaps an ideal goal, and suggest
the role of the law in maintaining social control and bonding, and thus, in pursuing social
order.

As examination of social control and bond theory in this section will reveal the following:
Anti-organized crime measures should foster bonds among societal
Insight 3.
members.
a.
These measures should foster bonds through attachment to conventional
others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in conventional
activities; and belief in a common and conventional value system.
b.
These measures should ensure the re-integration and rehabilitation of
organized crime offenders.
Insight 4.
Anti-organized crime measures should be effective, principled,just
and fair in order to secure belief and commitment to formal societal values.
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a.

3.3.2

These measures should secure obedience by punishing non-law-abiding
societal members, and deterring those who may potentially violate the law.

Social Control Theory

Social control is a function that perpetuates the life of society by maintaining
equilibrium.' Essentially, social controls seek to maintain this equilibrium by shaping
individuals to conform. Societal evolution occurs, but progress or change imposes itself
on social control mechanisms. This definitional perspective focuses the attention of
social control theorists on conformity rather than crime.

Social control theory reverses the usual question of why individuals commit crime, and
asks the Hobbesian question, '''Why do men obey the rules of society",?2 Social control
theory asselts that the "legal, social or moral codes" that "express the social will" of a
community, regulate conduct? These codes or social control mechanisms exist within
sympathy, sociability, a sense of justice, and resentment, and they form "a natural,
spontaneous social order" in which individuals compete, but also have common goals. 4
Common goals make societal individual conform, and thus, follow the normative
behaviour of others - that is to say, they obey.

I A number of definitions of " social control" exist. Edward Alsworth Ross in "Social Control. 1lI. Belief'
([896) 2 The American Journal of Sociology 96 at 106, asserted that beliefs, rather than laws of social
control, guide the actions or behavior of individuals. Social control theory developed from a series of
articles by Edward AlsW011h Ross. Other theorists have subsequently contributed or developed the idea in
their own way. According to Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humallistic Perspective (Garden
City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963) [/Ilvitationto Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective) at 68, social
control refers to " ... the various means used by a society to bring its recalcitrant members back into line."
According to Arthur Lewis Wood, Deviant Behavior alld Control Strategies (Toronto: Lexington Books,
1974) at 53, social control is " .. . the use ofpower with the illtention of influencing the behavior ofothers."
[Emphasis original]. According to Charles R. McCann, Jr., "Edward Alsworth Ross: The Need for Social
Control" (Paper presented to the 36th Annual Meeting ofthe History of Economics Society, University of
Colorado, Denver, 26-29 June 2009) [unpublished) ["Edward AlsW011h Ross: The Need for Social
Control") at 4, as interpreting Edward Alsworth Ross, "Social Control" (1896) I The American Journal of
Sociology 513 ["Social Control") at 520, social control " ... aims at eSlablishing social amity in an
association of individuals with conflicting interests by regulating conduct, setting boundaries as to
acceptable behavior and establishing means for the resolution of conflicts .... "
2 Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) [Callses of
Delinquency) at 4-5 and 10. Hirschi asserts that both bond theorists and social control theorists seek to
answer this question, and attributes the question to Thomas Hobbes, Levialhan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1957) at 195.
3 "Social Control", supra note I at 529.
4 "Edward Alsworth Ross: The Need for Social Control", slipra note I at 13, as interpreling Edward
Alsworth Ross, Social Conll'ol: A Survey oflhe Foundations ofOrder (New York: Macmillan, 1901) al
41.
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For control theorists, obedience occurs as the result of two types of restraints or controls.
Inlernal reslrainls ensure compliance to rules as one's self, tlu'ough moral beliefs or

conscience, enforces compliance. 5 External restraints involve others enforcing
compliance to the rules. 6 Control may be imposed directly or indirectly. Direct control
involves feeling of guilt or shame imposed by one's self, or formal sanctions imposed by
strict supervision or monitoring by others. 7 Indirect control is a by-product of
socialization or social relationships that secure compliance to rules because noncompliance could jeopardize commitments to and relationships with others, such as
family members. 8

In some ways, social control and social constructionism complement one another. Social
constructionists Peter 1. Berger and Thomas Luckmann also asserted that social control
forms as a result of human conduct, rather than from an imposition of rules on humans.
Their description of institutionalization and social control within their theory of social
constructionism accords with social control theory. They asserted that institutions, such
as the law, exist as a result of individuals following a pattern of conduct, and as a result,
they control behaviour. 9 Social control occurs as a result of institutionalization which

, Ray Paternoster & Ronet Bachman, "Controt Theories" in Eugene McLaughlin & Tim Newburn, The
SAGE Handbook of Criminological TheOlY (London: SAGE Publications, 20tO) ["Control Theories"] at
114 and 123. At ibid. 123, Paternoster and Bachman refer to H.G. Grasmick & R.J. Bursik, Jr.,
"Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model" 24 Law and
Society Review 837 in their description of internal control, as well as F.I. Nye, Family Relationships and
Devialll Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1958) in their description of indirect and direct controls.
6 "Control Theories", supra note 5 at 114.
7 Ibid.
'Ibid at 114-15.
9 Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, I" ed. (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1966) at 52. Berger and Luckmann state:
Institutions fUll her imply historicity and control. Reciprocal typifications of actions are
built up in the course ofa shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions
always have a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an institution
adequately without an understanding ofthe historical process in which it was produced.
Institutions also, by the velY fact oftheir existence, cOlllrol human conduct by setting lip
predefined pattems ofconduct, which channel it ill one direction as against the many other
directions that would theoretically be possible. It is importallt to stress that this controlling
character is inherent in institutionalization as such, prior 10 OJ' apart/rom any mechanisms of
sanctions specifically set up to support an institutioll. These mechanisms (the sum of which
constitute what is generally called a system of social control) do, of course, exist in many
institutions and in all the agglomerations of institutions that we call societies. Their controlling
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develops from the established or habitualized actions of societal members. 10 Only if
institutionalization has not completely developed or been constructed are additional social
control mechanisms or modifications required. II Thus, the law does not produce social
control, but rathel', social control tlU'ough patterns of conduct produces rules that societal
members follow.

3.3.3

Bond Theory

Bond theory, as a subset within social control theory, considers the same question to the
extent that it considers the bond of an individual to society in explaining the reasons that
individuals obey the rules of society. 12 According to this control or bond theory, an
individual commits delinquent or criminal acts when his ties or bond to the conventional
order or society have somehow been weakened or broken.,,1J The nature of this bond
reveals what anti-organized crime measures should ensure does not deteriorate or break,
and what needs reparation if it is weakened or broken.
Travis Hirschi, who developed bond theory,14 initially asserted that desistance in crime
occurs at times and at different rates for different offenders, but that crime declines with
age. 15 However, social control theorists now recognize that formerly law-abiding

efficacy, however, is of a secondary or supplementary kind. As we shall see again later, the
primary social control is given in the existence of an institution as such. To say that a segment of
human activity has been institutionalized is already to say that this segment of human activity has
been subsumed under social cono'o!' Additional control mechanisms are required only insofar as
the processes of institutionalization are less than completely successful. Thus. f or instance. the
Imv may provide that anyone who breaks the incest taboo will have his head chopped off. This
provision may be necessOl)' because there have been cases when individuals offended against the
taboo. It is unlikely that this sanction will have to be invoked continuously (unless the institution
delineated by the incest taboo is itself in the course of disintegration, a special case we need not
elaborate here). It makes lillie sense, therefore, to say that human sexuality is socially controlled
by beheading certain individuals. Rathel', human sexuality is socially controlled by its
institutionalization in the course of the particular hist01Y in question . ... [Emphasis added].
10 Ibid. at 51-52.
" Ibid. at 52.
12 Causes of Delinquency, supra note 2 at 16.
13 Ibid. at 3 and 16.
14 After developing bond theory, Hirschi developed a general theory of crime in M.R. Gottfredson & T.
Hirschi, A General The01Y afCrime (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). However, there remains
common ground (fOl' instance, regarding attachment) between the two regarding the importance of social
relationships and particularly the importance of those relationships early in life, according to Ray
Paternoster and Ronet Bachman in "Control Theories", supra note 5 at 114-15.
I' "Control Theories", supra note 5 at 126 and 128.
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individuals can become offenders in their adult years. 16 According to Hirschi, bonds
require attachment to others, such as parents, peers and school; commitment to obeying
societal rules; involvement in conventional activities; and belie.fin a common and
conventional value system. 17

Attachment of an individual to others leads to the internalization of norms, conscience, or
superego. IS A lack of attachment to others " ... is to be free from moral restraints ... ";19 to
be insensitive to the opinion of others; to be free from normative boundaries; and thus, to
be fi'ee to deviate. 2o For instance, if the bond of an individual to parents who are
members of conventional society weakens, then he is more likely to engage in deviant or
criminal behaviour. 21 If the bond of an individual to conventional parents is strengthened,
then he is less likely to engage in deviant or criminal behaviour. 22 Hirschi found the
opposite phenomenon for individuals in relation to their peers in delinquent gangs?3

Commitment refers to a rational part of conformity which leads individuals to obey
societal rules due to the presence of negative consequences. 24 The more time, energy and
part of himself that an individual invests into conventional activities, the higher the costs
of deviant behaviour - that is to say, the more he risks losing of his investment. 25
Commitment encompasses not only accumulation of investments, but also the

Ibid. at \32.
Causes ofDelinquency, supra note 2 at 16-23.
18 Ibid. at 18.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. at 88.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. at 161. Hirschi concludes fi'om his studies:
Ifmembers of delinquent gangs tend to have in common a low stake in conformity, if
their relations with each other tend to be cold and brittle, still the data presented here leave much
room for the operation of group processes in the production of delinquent acts. The boy with
delinquent friends is unusually likely to have committed delinquent acts, especially when his ties
to conventional society are weak to begin with. In fact, the present findings, as well as those of
past research on this topic, may be summarized as follows: (I) The child with little stake in
conformity is susceptible to prodelinquent influences in his environment; the child with a large
stake in conformity is relatively immune to these influences. (2) The greater the exposure to
"criminal influences," the greater the difference in delinquent activity between high- and low·stake
boys.
24 Ibid. at 20.
2S Ibid.
16

17

135

development of "ambition" and "aspiration" in regard to conventional actions so that an
individual conforms based on what he hopes to obtain?6 Attachments, or the lack of
attachments, also can affect the degree of commitment to conventional rules??

Involvement in conventional activities prevents an individual from thinking about and
spending time in deviant activities. 28 Involvement, it seems, can strengthen commitment.
This relationship would exist with respect to involvement in conventional activities or
involvement in deviant or criminal activities.
Belie/in a common value system within society exists among its members. 29 However,
variations exist in the extent to which societal members belief in the rules.)O An
individual who commits a deviant act believes less that he should obey the rules.)l The
more respect that an individual feels towards others to whom he has attachments, the
more likely he will accept and obey their rules. 32 The more weakened his beliefs in the
moral validity of societal norms, the more likely he will commit deviant acts?3 An
individual who commits a deviant act does not construct or adopt new beliefs that free
him to do so, and he does not construct a system of rationalizations to justify the deviant
act. 34
These tenets of bond theory seemingly differ from other concepts within deviance and
labelling theory and social psychology, particularly to the extent that bond theory does
not assert that an individual who engages in deviant 01' criminal acts internalizes new
beliefs within a new common value system of a new group. However, arguably, the
degradation or the acceptance of a deviant label and subsequent internalization of that
label, may not completely sever the individual's belief in the common value system of the
society within which he received his label. Rather, the individual may simply have a
21.
at 27.
at 22.
at 23.
at 26.

2. Ibid. at

Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
27

at 30.
at 26.
at 25.
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weakened belief in that value system. These distinctive ways of explaining how
individuals obey and disobey societal rules do not amount to irreconcilable differences in
the context of determining the reasons that individuals become organized crime outlaws
in order to evaluate anti-organized crime measures. Some organized crime outlaws may
indeed have only weakened bonds with society to the extent that their beliefs do not
restrain them ii-om committing criminal acts, but that they still believe in the common
societal value system. Other outlaws may have regular or non-weakened bonds with
society, and then incidences such as labelling or degradation occur so as to weaken or
sever those bonds. The importance of considering all these perspectives, whether
congruent or incongruent, lies in the need to explain various ways that various outlaws
may come to be and come to behave.

3.3.4

Application of Concepts within Social Control and Bond

Theory to the Identity of Outlaws
The consideration of why individuals obey the rules of society and do not engage in
organized criminal outlawry requires consideration of the nature of formal mechanisms
such as criminal law and punitive sanctions, informal mechanisms of social control within
conventional society, as well as formal and informal mechanisms of social control within
outlaw groups themselves.
The ultimate and, no doubt, the oldest means of social control is physical
violence. In the savage society of children it is still the major one. But even In
the politely operated societies of modern democracies the ultimate argument is
violence. No state can exist without a police force or its equivalent in armed
might. 35
In contemporary society, formal social control methods still include coercion through the
presence or the threat of official violence, and the actual use of violence against
individuals who engage innon-confOlmist behaviour. However, modern-day acceptable
methods of punitive measures and sanctions mandates consideration of social control
methods that not only have within their arsenal ways to inflict pain and negatively affect
libelty, but ways to facilitate, and not hinder, efforts to Ie-integrate and rehabilitate nOllconformists such as organized crime outlaws.
" Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective, supra note 1 at 69.
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Social control theory considers the reasons that formal and infOimal societal mechanisms
keep individuals conforming or propel them to choose socially conforming behaviour, as
opposed to non-conforming, deviant, or criminal behaviour. However, notably, outlaws
may develop their own societal mechanisms of social control, and maintain their own
sense of order in the criminal undelworld by regulating breaches of their criminal or
outlaw behaviour. Anti-Prohibitionist bootlegger Rocco Perri described the phenomenon
of social control from within the criminal milieu:
.. .If a man "squealed" on him [Rocco Perri], he said, "l would not kill him, 1
would punish him. That is the law of the Italians. We do not go to the police and
complain. That is useless. We take the law into our own hands. . .. We believe
we have the right to inflict our own penalties. 36 [Emphasis added].
The establishment of a national Commission for La Cosa Nostra in the United States in
the early 1930s exemplifies a very powerful internal method of social control for this
organized crime outlaw group. Families dealt with internal revolt on their own,37 and the
Commission maintains order through mediation among Families. 38 Its members consist
of only the bosses of the most powerful groups in New York, Chicago, Buffalo and
Philadelphia. 39
When conflict threatened the common weal, the Commission would
intervene if asked to, but only when the parties in dispute agreed to accept its
authority and reconunendations. 4o
New York also has its own Commission. 41 Its role includes promoting and facilitating
joint ventures between Families, regUlating criminal activities, resolving actual and
potential disputes between Families, approving the initiation of new members into the
Families, and authorizing the execution of Family members42
Craig Heron, Booze: A Distilled History (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003) at 262.
David Critchley, The Origin a/Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891-1931
(New York: Routledge, 2009) [The Origill o/Orgallized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia,
/891-1931] at 232. Critchley cites evidence provided by Joseph Bonanno at the Kefauver Inquiry.
38 Ibid. Critchley cites evidence provided b Joseph Bonanno at the Kefauver Inquiry.
39 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 8' ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) [OrganizedCrime[
at 112.
4. The Origill a/Organized Crime ill America: The New York City Mafia, /891-1931, supra note 37 at 232.
" Organized Crime, supra note 39 at 112.
42 Ibid. at 111-12. Related citations that describe various aspects of the case, but not the evidence of the
role of the Commission, are United States v. Salerno, 85 C.r. 139 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) and 481 U.S. 739
(1987). The power of execution was referred to in sub-subsection two "The Reputation for Violence and
36

37

6
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History has indicated that a lack of social control mechanisms may augment social
disorder, non-conformity, and anarchy, and thus, may encourage not only criminality but
also outlawry. The development of anti-Prohibitionist outlaws exemplifies circumstances
where a lack of social control mechanisms and a lack of enforcement of social control
mechanisms contributed to breeding outlawry as opposed to traditional rule-abiding
behaviour. And, this consistent lack of social control resulted in outlawry resisting and
hindering later efforts at imposing conventional social norms and laws.

A lack of institutional structure may playa role in bonding difficulties as well. Irving A.
Spergel, in his analysis of juvenile gang organization and function, asselted that gangs
form or develop from a lack of community provisions:
Gangs are created when established institutional and organizational
arrangements in a community are weak or break down. Gangs are collectives,
quasi-institutions, and are somewhat tribal or clanlike, with long-term viability, to
the extent that normal communal and economic arrangements for the social and
job development of youths are unsatisfactory or unavailable. Gang organization,
it can be argued, substitutes in distinctive ways for a palticular pattern of
inadequacy of existing community institutions and organizational
interrelationships.43
The lack of attachment to community and its social and economic provisions leaves
youth, and perhaps some adults, with limited connection to conventional identities and
inadequate social controls. The juvenile gang, particularly with its rules and codes of
conduct, provides structure and control, a sense of solidarity within a group, and a
corresponding identity.44 Spergel does not apply his findings to adult outlaw groups, but
does suggest that some gangs or subgroups of gangs probably integrate into adult criminal
organizations. 45 A significant number of gang youths become adult criminals, but the
number that become adult organized crime members depends on the definition of

Intimidation: Part ofthe Identity of Mafiosi and La Cosa Nostra Outlaws" in subsection three "The Nor1h
American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra" iu section three "North American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra" in Chapter
Two.
Irving A. Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) at 70.
'4 Ibid. at 81.
45 Ibid.
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organized crime. 46 However, his findings, coupled with some of the reasons for the
formation of Aboriginal street gangs, suggests that lack of community social control
mechanisms and pro-social provisions for adult outlaws may contribute to organized
crime membership and outlawry.

Prior to Spergel, Frederic M. Thrasher also had found that the unity or solidarity of a
juvenile gang also develops from internal social controls. These social controls reinforce
group norms and values by entrenching them in codes of conduct47 that proscribe punitive
48

sanctions as well as ridicule and derision49 for violations. However, as an "intimate
primary group", the gang controls behaviour not only through negative methods, but
positive methods of social control based on rapport, shared intimate experiences,
collective representations evidenced in language and symbols or identifying
characteristics, and a common social heritage. so Collectivity and commonality extinguish
individuality.sl Although not within the ambit of Thrasher's study, this phenomenon also
is evident in adult organized crime groups. Aboriginal street gang membership
demonstrates non-conforming, deviant, and criminal behaviour. Bond theory illuminates
some societal factors that have broken the ties between Aboriginal gang members and
conventional society, and which, consequently, have resulted in this non-conforming,
deviant, and criminal deviancy. The consideration of societal factors that have broken
these bonds reveals what anti-gang or anti-organized crime should target. It also
structures a critique of formal and informal social control mechanisms in society that seek
to propel individuals to choose conformity or to impose conformity on them.

Ibid at 129.
Frederic M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study oj 1,3 13 Gangs in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1927) at 284. For instance, ibid at 287, the IS-member Kluck Klan gang of Chicago had
approximately IS to 20 written rules, such as:
... (1) We are uot allowed to fight among ourselves or razz each other. (2) When you go out, do as
you are told. (3) [fyou get caught, don't squeal on the other guys. (4) Be loyal to the officers. (5)
Always defend ladies and girls in trouble. (6) [fyou get anything, always bring it in and see if it
can be useful. (7) Do not lie to each other.
48 Ibid at 292. Punishment ranges from hazing, ducking in cold water, a beating, or being marked for
death.
49 Ibid at 293-94.
50 Ibid at 297.
51 Ibid at 298.
46

47
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Bond theory leads to the hypothesis that the bonds between Aboriginal gang members
and conventional society may have been weakened or severed. A lack offamily bonding
as a result of family breakdown or the placement of children into state care has occurred
more frequently for Aboriginal offenders as children than non-Aboriginal offenders. 52 A
lack of educational bonding is indicated by high secondary and post-secondary drop out
rates for Aboriginal students in spite of an overall increase in attendance in the last three
decades. 53 A lack of employment bonding in the form of higher unemployment rates and
a great number of subordinate positions in the workplace, has occurred more frequently
for Aboriginal individuals.

54

Further, the perception by many Aboriginal persons ofthe

criminal justice system as unjust and oppressive means that Aboriginal people do not
respect the criminal law, and do not wish to obtain positions within the system. 55 And, a
lack of positive social bonding with peers has OCCUlTed for Aboriginal persons. 56 These
weak or severed bonds can lead to low self-esteem, and a desire to belong, feel loved, and
be supported. 57 Thus, gangs that offer may offer these bonds can appear attractive. In

52 Jana Marie Grekul & Patti LaBoucanc-Benson, An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment of
Aboriginal Gangs in Western Canada (Ottawa: Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada,
2006) [An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada] at
31-32; and Lawrence Deane, Denis C. Bracken & Larry Morrissette, "Desistance Within an Urban
Aboriginal Gang" (2007) 54 Probation Journal 125 ["Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang"] at
127. Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson cite empirical evidence from Shelley Trevethan, John-Patrick Moore,
Sarah Auger, Michael MacDonald & Jennifer Sinclair, "Childhood Experiences Affect Aboriginal
Offenders" (2002) 14 Forum, that 63% of Aboriginal offenders were involved in the child welfare system
as opposed to 36% of non-Aboriginal offenders; that 36% of Aboriginal offenders had an unstable
childhood as compared to 26% of non-Aboriginal offenders; and that 50% of Aboriginal offenders reported
instability during adolescence as opposed to 32% of non-Aboriginal offenders. Deane, Bracken and
Morrissette cite data from the Manitoba Department of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs from 2004 that 46
% of Aboriginal children in metropolitan areas live with one parent as opposed to 17% of non-Aboriginal
children.
53 An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra
note 52 at 32-33.
" Ibid at 333-34; and "Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang", supra note 52 at 127. Grekul and
LaBoueane-Benson cite empirical evidence fi'om Linda L. Lindsey, Stephen Beach & Bruce Ravelli, Core
Concepts in Sociology (Toronto: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2006) at 199, that the unemployment rate for
Aboriginal people is two to three times higher than that of the overall population; and that Aboriginal
people have earned less income in comparison to other working Canadians. Deane, Bracken and
Morrissette cite data from the City of Winnipeg in 2004 that unemployment rates in the neighbourhoods
with gangs that they studied, were three to four times higher than other neighbourhoods in the city, and that
family incomes were one third to one half the city average.
55 Pah'icia A. Monture-Angus, "Thinking About Change" in Wanda D. McCaslin, Jllstice as Healillg:
Indigenous Ways (St. Paul: Living Justice Press, 2005) at 275.
56 An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra
note 52 a\35-38.
l7 Ibid at 39.
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correctional institutions, where recruitment for Aboriginal street gangs often occurs, the
lack of family bonding and isolation exacerbate the negative effects felt by Aboriginal
offenders, and increases the attractiveness of the companionship, belonging, support and
protection offered by the gang. 58 The gang becomes a surrogate family.

3.3.5

Insights for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to

Social Control and Bond Theory
Social order is an aliificial, human design. 59 Order, balance, equilibrium is an ideal that
humans may strive for. However, it is not a reality. That social control needs to be
continually exercised60 indicates that disorder to one degree or another, or a consistent
pending challenge to order, is a more accurate description of the social balance within
society. A state of mal-order - an order or level of societal functioning without moral
. panic and the recognition of perceived threats within society - more accurately describes
the state of society at any given time. This societal mal-order occurs with a celiain level
of social control measures. The level of measures, so long as they preserve social order
without great risk to the lives and well-being of non-outlaw citizens, ought to be the goal
of social control mechanisms for organized crime.
The above analysis of social control and bond theory indicates that one of the reasons that
individuals obey the law is that they respect its principles and internalize the values it
represents. However, the mere presence of the institution of the law as a social control
mechanism may not be sufficient to combat crime or outlawry. Formal social controls
may not control crime and outlawry when groups within society perceive formal legal
institutions as unjust. Disobedience and consequent social disorder may result when the
law is not perceived as just and fair. This disobedience and consequent social disorder
may continue even after law enforcement takes efforts to reduce or decimate celtain
organized crime outlaw groups. Outlawry can obstruct the law in re-establishing
conventional social norms and laws. For instance, when law enforcement has decimated
" All Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ojAboriginal Gangs in Weslern Canada. supra
note 52 at 30.
" "Edward Alsworth Ross: The Need for Social Control", supra note I at 4, as interpreting Edward
Alsworth Ross, Social Conlrol: A Survey oJlhe Foundations oJOrder (New York: Macmillan, 190 I).
60

"Social Control ' supar note 1 at 521.
!I
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outlaw groups such as criminal organizations, new groups rise to fill or seize the vacated
territory.61 With this phenomenon in mind, some social benefit exists by the presence of
a known organized crime group as it controls activities within the criminal milieu, and
thus, provides a sense of predictability for law enforcement. The presence of known
organized crime groups and regulation of their outlawry maintains a sense of mal-order.
The potential contributions of social control and bond theory to an evaluation of criminal
organization laws in Canada are that social conditions must foster bonds among societal
members through attachment to conventional others, commitment to obeying societal
rules, involvement in conventional activities, and belief in a common and conventional
value system. Anti-organized crime measures must incorporate these goals. Further,
with respect to individuals who have already become organized crime outlaws, antiorganized crime measures must ensure the re-integration and rehabilitation of organized
crime offenders. Anti-organized crime measures must also be effective, principled, just
and fair in order to secure belief and commitment to forrnal societal values. They must
secure obedience by punishing non-law-abiding societal members, and deterring those
who may potentially violate the law. A complete eradication of organized crime outlaws
may not be attainable. Rather, maintenance of an acceptable degree of social order (or
mal-order) may be a more appropriate goal.
These insights will be examined in Chapter Four, section two "Requisite One for AntiOrganized Crime Measures", section four "Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures", and section five "Requisite Foul' for Anti-Organized Crime Measures."

Antonio Nicaso & Lee Lamothe, Angels, Mobslers & Norco-Terrorisls: The Rising Menace a/Global
Crime Empires (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Z005) at 57; and Stephen Schneider,lced: The
SIOIY a/Organized Crillle in Canada (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2009) at 479 and 501.
Nicaso and Lamothe state that as a result of American law enforcement efforts in the 1980s and 1990s that
targeted organized crime using the Rackeleer-Influenced and Con'upl Organizalions Acl, non-La Cosa
Nostra organized crime groups, such as Albanian groups, emerged in the some industries in their place.
Schneider provides an example of the dismantling of Columbian cartels, and subsequent occupation by
other groups of that territOlY.

61
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3.4

DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING WITHIN

GROUPS AND SUBCULTURES

3.4.1

Overview

Differential association has been applied to explain the development of delinquency in
youth, not adults. In the 1920s, Frederic M. Thrasher found that the juvenile gang plays
an important role in developing criminality and contributing to organized crime, I and he
noted that many members of adult criminal gangs were ex-reform-school boys and exconvicts. 2 In his research onjuvenile gangs in the mid-1990s, Irving A. Spergel indeed
found that known association with gang members, the presence of neighbourhood gangs,
and having a relative in a gang, increased the risk that children or youth will enter into a
gang.3
Arguably, differential association eQuid have direct application to all persons - and
specifically persons in organized crime groups - regardless of age due to the principles in
socialization, and the fact that individuals have continued social relations and interactions
that influence their behaviour throughout their lives. And, because differential
association or social learning occurs through social interaction generally, differential
association arguably, could continue to occur during one's lifetime. For instance,
although some organized crime outlaws may begin differentially associating and socially
learning within their family, such as members of the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra, the paths
of other outlaws lead them to outlaw groups later in life, such as in adolescence or
adulthood as evinced by outlaw motorcycle gangs and some Aboriginal street gangs.
Being "on the program" in the Hells Angels is a method not only of initiating associates
into becoming members, but it is also a way of socializing them to the values and norms

J Frederic M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1927) at 423. Thrasher opines:
The gang, then, while it is not the only element in organized crime, plays an important
part in the mobilization ofthe criminal and the organization of the criminal community. Its
influence in training criminals and facilitating crime has been partly described in the preceding
chapter. It is probable that most of Chieago's supposed 10,000 professional criminals have
received gang training, and it is evident that crime in Chicago roots in the gang as its basic
organized unit, no matter how it may have become elabomted into rings and syndicates.

2

I bid.at419.

Irving A. Spergel, The Youth Gang Problem: A COl/lmunity Approach (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995) at 90.

3
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of the group. While differential association theorists and empirical studies have focused
on youth, this focus does not render the theory inapplicable to adults. This thesis suggests
such an application by examining the concepts of differential association and subculture
in relation to adult organized crime outlaws.
The principles of differential association or social learning in conjunction with the
concept of subculture, contribute to an explanation for the processes by which individuals
develop into groups or subcultures, and form and internalize identities. In so doing, they
illuminate the development of various organized crime outlaws. Essentially, criminal
behaviour is learned from interaction or association with individuals who commit crimes,
and subcultures of criminals, such as organized crime outlaws, provide a fertile
environment for learning anti-social behaviours. " ... [A] person may be educated in either
conventional or criminal means of achieving success."4 Organized crime outlaw groups
such as Mafiosi groups, La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs, anti-Prohibitionists,
and Aboriginal street gangs, exemplify the effects of differential association or social
learning and subculture on identity formation. Once outlaw groups or subcultures are
formed, all members learn the values and normative behaviour of that subculture or
group, and reinforce them with each other. This phenomenon entrenches organized crime
outlaw identities, and organized crime outlaw behaviour.
This section will outline the tenets of differential association and social learning theory as
they explain criminal behaviour. It will discuss how learning and association in groups,
cultures and subcultures shape identities and develop cohesion oftheir members, and
specifically, how they shape outlaw identities and enhance cohesion of outlaw groups.
An examination of differential association and social learning in subcultures in this
section will reveal the following:
Insight 5.
Anti-organized crime measures should limit and prevent
differential association and anti-social learning within the subcultures of outlaws
by banning such associations to some degree and in some circumstances in order
Donald R. Cressey, Delinquency, Crillle and Differenlial Association (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1964) [Delinquency, Crime and Differential Association] at 70-71.
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to prevent the reinforcement of outlaw identities through ongoing anti-social
interactions with one another.
Insight 6.
These measures should prevent and limit the bolstering of
organized crime identities through the use of gang names and insignia in public
and in private.
Anti-organized crime measures should provide pro-social learning
Insight 7.
and pro-social learning environments for organized crime outlaws.
a.
The measures should provide re-educative processes for members who
leave or who are incapacitated from their organized crime group, and the
presence of a non-outlaw environment in which ex-members can interact
with law-abiding members of society.

3.4.2

Differential Association and Social Learning Within Groups

and Subcultures
3.4.2.1

Differential Association and SOCial Learning Generally

Edwin H. Sutherland provided a historical or genetic explanation of criminal behaviour, s
and essentially asserted that criminal behaviour is not inherited. 6 It is learned from an
excess of interaction or association with criminal patterns of behaviour or criminal
conduct as opposed to interaction or association with anti-criminal patterns or anticriminal conduct. 7 That is to say, differential association causes crime. s

Sutherland espoused nine tenets or principles to explain the cause of crime of which the
first, fourth, sixth and seventh have patticular relevance to leat'ning normative behaviour
of organized crime outlawry:
(1) Criminal behavior is learned. Negatively, this means that criminal behavior
is not inherited, as such; also, the person who is not already trained in crime does
not invent criminal behavior, just as a person does not make mechanical
inventions unless he has had training in mechanics.

(2) Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of
communication. This communication is verbal in many respects but includes also
"the communication of gestures."
Edwin H. Sutherland, "A Statement of the Theory - 1947", in AlbeIt Cohen, Alfred Lindesmith & Karl
Schuessler, eds., The SlItheriand Papel's (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956) ["A Statement of
the Theory- 1947"] at 7.
6 Ibid. at 8.
7 Ibid. at 9.
8 Ibid. at 13.
5
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(3) The principal part ofthe learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate
personal groups. Negatively, this means that the impersonal agencies of
communication, such as picture shows and newspapers, playa relatively
unimportant part in the genesis of criminal behavior.
(4) When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of
committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes velY
simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and al/itl/des.
(5) The specific direction of motives and drives is learnedJi'om dejinilions of
legal codes as favorable and unfavourable. In some societies an individual is
surrounded by persons who invariably define the legal codes as rules to be
observed, whereas in others he is surrounded by persons whose definitions are
favorable to the violation of the legal codes. In our American society these
defmitions are almost always mixed, and consequently we have culture conflict in
relation to the legal codes.
(6) A person becomes delinquent because ofan excess of definilions favorable to
violation of law over dejinitions unfavorable to violation oflaw. This is the
principle of differential association. It refers to both criminal and anti-criminal
associations and has to do with counteracting forces. When persons become
criminals, they do so because of contacts with criminal patterns and also because
of isolation from anti-criminal patterns. Any person inevitably assimilates the
surrounding culture unless other patterns are in conflict; a Southerner does not
pronounce "I''' because other Southerners do not pronounce "r." Negatively, this
proposition of differential association means that associations which are neutral so
far as crime is concerned have I ittle or no effect on the genesis of criminal
behavior. Much of the experience of a person is neutral in tllis sense, e.g.,
learning to brush one's teeth. This behavior has no negative or positive effect on
criminal behavior except as it may be related to associations which are concerned
with the legal codes. This neutral behavior is impOltant especially as an occupier
of the time of a child so that he is not in contact with criminal behavior during the
time he is engaged in neutral behavior.
(7) Differential associations may vary inJi'equency, duration, priority, and
intensity. This means that associations with criminal behavior and also
associations with anti-criminal behavior vary in those respects. "Frequency" and
"duration" as modalities of associations are obvious and need no explanation.
"Priority" is assumed to be important in the sense that lawful behavior developed
in early childhood may persist throughout life, and also that delinquent behavior
developed in early childhood may persist throughout life. This tendency,
however, has not been adequately demonstrated, and priority seem to be important
principally through its selective influence. "Intensity" is not precisely defined, but
it has to do with such things as the prestige ofthe source of a criminal or anticriminal pattern and with emotional reactions related to the associations. In a
precise description of the criminal behavior of a person these modalities would be
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stated in quantitative form and in a mathematical ratio be reached. A formula in
this sense has not been developed, and the development of such a formula would
be extremely difficult.
(8) The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and
anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any
other learning. Negatively, this means that the learning of criminal behavior is
not restricted to the process of imitation. A person who is seduced, for instance,
learns criminal behavior by association, but this process would not ordinarily be
described as imitation.
(9) Though criminal behavior is an expression ofgeneral needs and values, it is
not explained by those general needs and values since non-criminal behavior is an
expression of the same needs and values. Thieves generally steal in order to
secure money, but likewise honest laborers work in order to secure money. The
attempts by many scholars to explain criminal behavior by general drives and
values, such as the happiness principle, striving for social status, the money
motive, or frustration, have been and must continue to be futile since they explain
lawful behavior as completely as they explain criminal behavior. They are similar
to respiration, which is necessary for any behavior but which does not
differentiate criminal from non-criminal behavior. 9
Notably, Edwin H. Sutherland asselted in his third principle that "impersonal agencies of
communication" such as media play an insignificant role in the "genesis of criminal
behavior." The time period of Edwin H. Sutherland's assertions must be considered. In
contemporary society, unlike the 1940s, media and the communication of information
generally have assumed heightened importance - perhaps due to their ease of
transmission and ingestion. The significant impact of media in contemporary society has
been discussed in sub-subsection two "Social Construction of Organized Crime Through
Media" in subsection two "Social Constructionism" in this section.

The fourth principle specifies some knowledge of crime. Simply knowing how to commit
crime does not account for all or even most criminal behaviour. I 0 One must have learned
"motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes" that create a willingness to commit

9

Ibid at 7.

Ronald L. Akers, Social Learning and Social Structure: A General TheOJY of Crime and Deviance
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998) [Social Leol'l1ing and Social Structure: A General TheOJ)' of
Crime and Deviance] at 25.
10
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criminal acts."

Organized crime outlaw groups provide both the means to learn the

teclmiques of committing crime - namely, through socialization within or induction into
the group - as well as a rationalization for or attitude toward committing crime. The
techniques of committing crime may evolve over time as exemplified by the adaptation of
smuggling techniques by anti-Prohibitionists who developed new ways oftranspOlting
liquor to avoid capture by law enforcement. The development of new techniques to
commit crime by organized crime outlaws is taught or passed on to new members of
organized crime outlaw groups. Some outlaw motorcycle gangs developed new
techniques, ironically, as a result of criminal organization laws themselves. Disclosure
laws mandate the disclosure of police tecJmiques and information not otherwise revealed
to such organizations, and as a result, outlaws learn to modify their techniques in order to
evade law enforcement in the future . In relation to a criminal organization prosecution in
British Columbia, Inspector Gary Shinkaruk stated:
"The Hells Angels continue to learn from every CO\llt proceeding and
adapt their methods of operation to keep ahead of law enforcement," inspector
Shinkaruk told a House of Commons justice committee meeting in 2009.
"Disclosure during court proceedings has given the Hells Angels a clear
understanding of law-enforcement processes, techniques, policies, and
regulations. They are keenly aware of our limitations," he told lawmakers. 12
The sixth principle remains the most relevant to organized crime outlaws. Through
contacts with organized crime patterns and isolation from or less contact with nonorganized crime patterns (that is to say, differential association), individuals assimilate
patterns of the group and would become organized crime outlaws.

The seventh principle asselts that the more frequently, longer, more intensely and earlier
an individual is exposed to learning criminal behaviours, the more likely that individual
will engage in criminal behaviours. Thus, the more fi'equently, longer and more intensely
and earlier an individual is exposed to learning organized crime behaviours, one expects
that the more likely that individual will engage in organized crime behaviours. Notably,
the requirement of "earlier" suggests that early exposure has more of an effect on the
Ibid. at 26.
Neal Hall, Hell To Pay: Hells Angels vs. The Million Dollar Rat (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sones
Canada, Ltd., 20 II) at 192.
II

12
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behaviour. Thus, one would expect that exposure generally and later such as in

adulthood may still have an effect. This expectation requires empirical evaluation.

The theoretical principles espoused by Edwin H. Sutherland have received much and
varied criticism. 13 Perhaps, the principles of differential association remain overly
simplistic,14 unquantifiable or improvable in some respects,15 too broad,16 lacking in
"universal application",17 and inadequate in their consideration of extraneous factors. 18
However, the essence of the principles of differential association have relevance to the
formation of organized crime outlaws and the development and perpetuation of their
identities. The specific way or ways in which a new or potential organized crime member
learns to be an organized crime outlaw from other such outlaws, and the precise number
or ratio and type of significant associations with outlaws, matter not. Merely the fact that
significant associations with organized crime outlaw groups contribute to organized crime
outlaw membership and further organized crime outlaw identities, must be considered in
developing and implementing anti-organized crime measures.

13

Delinquency, Crime and Differential Association, supra note 4 at 81-82. Cressey cites a number of

sources, and succinctly outlines a few slIch criticisms:

... It has been stated or implied that the theory of differential association is defective because it
omits consideration of fTee will, is based on a psychology assuming rational deliberation, ignores
the role of the victim, does not explain the origin of crime, does not define terms such as
"systematic" and "excess'" does not take "biological factors" into account, is of little or no value to
"practical men," is not comprehensive enough because it is not interdisciplinary, is not allied
closely enough with more general sociological theory and research, and is too comprehensive
because it applies to non-criminals, and assumes that all persons have equal access to criminal and
anti-criminal behaviour patterns. '"
14 Ibid. at 88-89. Cressey assets that Sutherland does not provide sufficient explanation for the process by
which criminal behaviour is learned.
15 "A Statement of the Theory - 1947", supra note 5 at 10. Sutherland himself notes that quantification of a
mtio or development ofa formula regarding the frequency, duration, priority and intensity of differential
associations, remains "extremely difficult."
16 Ibid at 19. Sutherland states that he sought a causal explanation of criminal behaviour by looking at
conditions that were uuniversally associated" with crime, and "learning, interaclion, and communication"
~enerally accounted for processes to explain criminal behaviour.
7 Not all differential association will lead to criminal behaviour, and any assertion ofa correct ratio is
nearly impossible to determine, and may likely be self-serving.
18 "A Statement of the Theory - 1947", supra note 5 at 31-32. Sutherland himself notes that differential
association does not account for the presence of opportunities to commit crime. That is to say, a lack or
limitation on opportunity may result in no or less criminal behaviom.
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Ronald L. Akers integrated Sutherland's theory of differential association with social
learning and social behavioural principles, '9 and re-formulated the nine principles of
differential association into seven somewhat clearer statements. 20 However, the essence
of his theory of social learning is summarized in one statement:
The probability that persons will engage in criminal and deviant behavior is
increased and the probability of their conforming to the norm is decreased when
they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behavior and
espouse definitions favorable to it, are relatively more exposed in-person or
symbolically to salient criminal/deviant models, define it as desirable or justified
in a situation discriminative for the behavior, and have received in the past and
anticipate in the current or future situation relatively greater reward than
punishment for the behavior?'
Akers posited that learning produces both conforming and deviant behaviour, but that
deviant behaviour is more likely in circumstances in which an individual differentially
associates with others who commit crime or violate social norms; the individual receives
differential reinforcement for his violative behaviour over conforming behaviour; the
individual has exposure to and observes more deviant behaviour than conforming
behaviour; and the individual has learned definitions that favour the commission of crime
or deviance.

19

22

Social Learnil1g and Social Structure: A Gel1eral Theory o/Crime and Deviance, supra note 10 at xv and

46.
2. Ibid. at 45, as citing Robert L. Burgess & Ronald L. Akers, "A Differential Association-Reinforcement
Theory of Criminal Behaviour" (1966) 14 Social Problems 128. Akers sets forth his seven statements to

modify Sutherland's nine principles:
I. Criminal behavior is learned according to the principles of operant conditioning.
2. Criminal behavior is learned both in nonsocial situations that are reinforcing or discriminative
and through that social interaction in which the behavior of other persons is reinforcing or
discriminative fol' criminal behavior.
3. The principal P81t of the learning of criminal behavior occurs in those gronps which comprise
the individual's major source of reinforcement.
4. The learning of criminal behavior, including specific techniques, attitudes, and avoidance
procedures, is a function of the effective and available reinforcers, and the existing reinforcement
contingencies.
5. The specific class ofbeh.viors which are learned and their frequency of occurrence are a
function of the reinforcers which are effective and available, and the rules or norms by which these
reinforcers are applied.
6. Criminal behavior is a function of norms which are discriminative for criminal behavior, the
learning of which takes placed when such behavior is more highly reinforced than noncriminal
behavior.
7. The strength of criminal behavior is a direct function ofthe amount, frequency, and probability
of its reinforcement.
21 Ibid. at 50.
n Ibid. at 51.
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Social learning theory, as it integrates differential association, suggests that an individual
learns to favour the commission of crime or deviance - or outlawry - over conformi ty
from significant exposure to and association with individuals who engage in criminal,
deviant - or outlaw - behaviour, where that individual receives reinforcement for
engaging in outlaw behaviour rather than conventional normative behaviour, and where
that individual has or develops "learned definitions" that encourage him to engage in
outlawry. These suggestions may explain the way in which individuals become members
of criminal organizations. Through their association with the organized crime outlaws,
these individuals have exposure to and observe more outlaw behaviour than law-abiding
behaviour. They receive positive reinforcement from organized crime outlaw members
for behaviour which accords with outlaw behavioural norms. And, they come to "learn
definitions" or accept and internalize outlaw behaviour as the norm. The key to social
learning as it relates to or encourages organized crime outlaw behaviour, lies in access to
or involvement in a social group that accepts or values this outlawry as normative
behaviour. A subculture provides such social group.

3.4.3

Attributes of and Processes within Cultures, Subcultures

and Groups
3.4.3.1

Culture

The concept of culture facilitates an understanding of the concept of subculture and
subculture 0/ violence .
.. . Culture enables people to solve the problems created/or them by the social
structure. Culture consists of "traditional ways of solving problems" or of
"learned problem solutions" which are transmitted through the processes of
childhood socialization. . .. Structure and culture make incompatible demands and
it is at these points of pressure that subcultures have evolved to "solve" the
problems that arise. Subcultures typically borrow elements from the larger culture
and rework them into distinctive forms. Such elements (violence and hedonism,
for example) are available to all: but not everyone is a bearer of a subculture
which gives them unusual predominance. "The crucial condition for the
emergence of new cultural forms is the existence, in effective interaction with one
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another, of a number of actors with similar problems of adjustment." ... 23
[Emphasis original].
Outlaws, including organized crime outlaws, who stand in contrast to conventional
societal norms and who have "problems of adjustment", in some instances collectively
form or join a new culture - namely, a subculture. While this definition refers to
transmission of culture through "the processes of childhood socialization", "problems of
adjustment" do not always occur during childhood or youth. Rather, some individuals as
adults may problems with the larger culture, and thus, one expects that they would begin
to seek alternative culture(s) or a subculture at any time in their life and learn the values
and norms of a new culture or subculture through socialization. Thus, logically, leaming
culture and subculture (through pro-social or differential associations) could occur not
only during childhood.

3.4.3.2

Subcultures and Subcultures of Violence

Within the culture of a dominant society can exist a subculture. Milton M. Gordon
defined subculture as:
... a sub-division of national culture, composed of a combination of factorable
social situations such as class status, ethnic background, regional and rural or
urban residence, and religious affiliation, but forming in their combination a
jimctioning unity which has an integrated impact on the participating individual.
[Emphasis original].24
Subcultures are not totally different from, or completely in conflict with, the larger
culture. 25
A subculture implies that there are value judgements or a social value
system which is apart from and part of a larger or central value system. From the
viewpoint ofthis larger dominant culture, the values of the subculture set the latter
apart and prevent total integration, occasionally causing open or covert conflicts.
The dominant culture may directly or indirectly promote this apartness, of course,
and the degree ofreciprocal integration may vary, but whatever the reasonfor the
David Downes & Paul Rock, Understanding Deviance, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University, 2007) at
126, as quoting from and relying on A. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture ofthe Gang (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1955) at 59.
24 Milton M. Gordon, "The Concept ofthe Sub-Culture and its Application [1947]" in Ken Gelder & Sarah
Thornton, eds., The Subcultures Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997) 40 at 40-41.
25 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco FelTacuti, The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated TheOlY in
Criminology (London: Tavistock, 1967) at 101.
23

153

difference, normative isolation and solidarity 0/ the subculture result. There are
shared values that are learned, adopted, and even exhibited by participants in the
subculture, and that differ in quantity and quality ji'om those a/the dominant
culture. Just as a man is born into a cliiture, so he lIIay be born into a
26
subcllltllre. [Emphasis added].

This "apartness" within the concept of subculture connects to the theory of deviance and
labelling. Howard S. Beckel' asserted that when people who engage in deviance interact,
they will likely form a subculture based on their different perspectives and behaviours?7
Deviance and labelling theory also asserts that social norms of one group in society usually the more powerful group - serve as the marker for measurement, comparison and
judgmeneS of the others. Similarly, such "reference groups" exist in the theory of
subculture as noted by Albert K. Cohen. 29 The existence of comparisons, markers for
measurement and reference groups come into play when one asks the question, "Who am
I?" That is to say, they come into play when one questions or seeks one's identity.

Subcultures also may be subcultures a/violence whose values contain a "potent theme of
violence,,3o according to the theoretical assertions of Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco
Ferracuti. While the theory of a subculture a/violence as set forth by Wolfgang and
Ferracuti has received a "measure of acceptance in the field,,3! as well as some criticism
of its ability to explain violence in the United States,32 the concept of the existence of a
subculture a/violence is still referred to by sociologists and criminologists. Sociologist
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Ibid. at 99-100.

Howard S. Beckel', Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1968) [Outsiders] at 81-82. Beckel' asselted:
... Where people who engage in deviant activities have the opportunity to interact with one another
they are likely to develop a cuiture built around the problems rising out of the differences between
their definition of what they do and the definition held by other members of the society. They
develop perspectives on themselves and their deviant activities and on their relations with other
members of the society.... Since these cultures operate within, and in distinction to, the culture of
the larger society, they are often called subcultures.
28 Michel Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training" in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1984) [UThe Means of Correct Training"] at 196-97.
29 Albert K. Cohen, UA General Theory of Subcultures" in Ken Gelder & Sarah Thomton, eds., The
Subcultures Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997) 44 ["A General Theory of Subcultures"] at 47 and 48.
3. The Subculture of Violence: TOlVards an II/tegrated TheO/)' ill Criminology, supra note 25 at 140.
" Howard S. Erlanger, "The Empirical Status of the Subculture of Violence Thesis" (1974) 22 Social
Problems 280 at 289.
32 Ibid. Erlanger suggests, ibid. at 288 and 289, that further research is required in relation to Wolfgang and
Ferracuti's study, such as on establishing the pervasiveness ofa subculture, and clarifying the definition of
the subculture so as to remove demographics.
27
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Craig J. Forsyth noted its study when he described the impact of this subculture of
violence on individuals who subscribe to it:
... The subculture had arisen in the past for specific historical reasons, but
it transmitted from generation to generation as a set of ideas which can be
understood apart Ji'om those original social conditions (Erlanger 1974, 1976).
Each individual independently encounters these social environments, and to a
degree his behavior is a response to the social environment. But each individual
also learns ideas and interpretations ofthese conditions from others who face
similar conditions, and to a celiain degree his behavior is a reply to those
interpretations ...
Subcultures of violence are made up of groups whose values sanction the
use of violence and who are quick to use force in interpersonal relations. The
result is a quick responsive culture in which there is either a lot of fighting or a lot
of killing depending on the nature of interaction and the presence of firearms. ...
People in the subculture of violence tend to value honor more highly than
people in the dominant culture. On the other hand they tend to value human life
less highly. There are also normative conflicts between the subculture of violence
and the dominant culture. Those refer to "lUles" about what behaviors are
expected in response to the trivial jostles or remarks that were the cause of so
many homicides. Those norms are backed up with social rewards and
punishments: people who do not follow the norms are criticized or ridiculed by
other people in the subculture, and those who follow them are admired and
respected. Those norms take on a celiain life of their own, independent of
whether they are approved by the individuals who follow them, since the failure to
follow the nOlIDS may result in the person becoming a victim of the violence
(Barlow 1987; Void and Bernard 1986; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1981).... 33
Because differential association or social learning occurs through social interaction
generally, it occurs within cultures and subcultures. One would expect that the unique
attributes of subcultures of violence would provide an environment ripe for social
learning, and thus, facilitate organized crime outlaw values and normative behaviour.
Proof of this expectation requires empirical research.

Craig J. Forsyth, "The Use of the Subculture of Violence as Mitigation in a Capital Murder Case" (1998)
13 Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology 67 ["The Use of the Subculture of Violence as Mitigation in
a Capital Murder Case"] at 72-73. Forsyth refers to G.B. Void & T.J. Bernard, Theoretical Criminology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); H.D. Barlow, Introduction to Criminology (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1987); Wolfgang and FelTacuti, The Subculture a/Violence (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1981); H.S. Erlanger, "The Empirical Status of the Subculture of Violence Thesis" (1974) 22 Social
Problems 280; and H.S. Erlanger, "Is There a Subculture of Violence in the South?" (1976) Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 483.
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3.4.3.3

Groups

Like cultures and subcultures, groups have cohesion, but may be smaller in scale and less
integrated in an individual's life. Groups may exist within a culture or subculture. And,
like cultures and subcultures, differential association or social learning can occur within
groups. However, groups, but not always cultures or subcultures, may have or use
symbols that bolster their identity. The presence of symbols that denote the common
interests of the group, such as "music, rituals, distinctive names, titles, banner, slogans
and insignia", seem to increase "morale or emotional unity.,,34 The symbolic value of
names and insignia to group "morale or emotional unity" remains of some significance to
outlaws, and in particular, gangs and criminal organizations that sometimes have
identifiers specific to the group.
Not only do these symbolic names and insignia instill pallicular social reactions to
members of the group, they also increase the internal cohesion of the group, and thus, the
power of the group as against others 35 This phenomenon is exemplified by the display of
patches worn by some outlaw motorcycle gangs. Staff-Sergeant Jacques Lemieux, now
retired, provided the expert opinion that mere display of the Hells Angels insignia
demonstrates the power of the group:
In the opinion of Staff Sergeant Lemieux, the main purpose of the Hells
Angels organization is to facilitate the commission of criminal activity by its
members. The Hells Angels have a reputation for violence and intimidation. By
wearing the three-piece patch, an individual identifies himself as a member of that
organization, an organization that is reputed to be violent and involved in
intimidation. He does not have to identify himself in order to commit criminal
activities.
450

" Robeli L. Sutherland, Julian L. Woodward & Milton A. Maxwell, InlroduclOIY Sociology, 61h ed.
(Chicago: J.B. Lippincott, 1961) at 131. Six elements within a group seem to bolster "morale or emotional
unity":
... when (I) members feel that the preservation of the group is of vital impOJ1ance to their personal
welfare, when (2) each has a sense of sharing in the achievement of its objectives, when (3) the
relations of the members are intimate and personal so that words of encouragement and praise flow
ITeely ITom one to another, when (4) the group's objective is not too easily attained but calls for
the exercise of concerted effort, when (5) Ihe commoll illleresls oJlhe group are symbolizedJor Ihe
members ill the appealingJarms a/musiC, rilual, distinctive names, lilies, banners, slogans.
illsignia, and when (6) the members are made aware of the significance and superiority of their
group through acquaintance with the glorified tradition of its achievements .... [Emphasis added).
" R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLII24240, [2005] 0.1. No. 2870 (Ont. S.C,}.) [R. v. Lindsay] at paras. 450-51.
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451 The individual also enjoys the benefit of the organization backing its
members. [Ralph Sonny] Barger referred to this in his book as "one on all, all on
one", meaning when a person fights with one Hells Angel, he fights with them all.

3.4.4

Identity Formation and Perpetuation Via Differential

Association and Social Learning in Groups or Subcultures of Violence
The concepts of subculture and group suggest a way in which internal cohesion among
members develops and perpetuates - not only by learning, but also by accepting,
adopting, and passing along the normative behaviours and institutions ofthe socializing
group. This process enables members to answer the question, "Who amI?,' It provides
them with an identity.
Members of a group use one another as reference points for self-image
andfor establishing the relationship ofself to others. This process implies
continuing reinforcement of the subcultural values. A wish to remain an ingroup
participant does not necessarily mean, however, a total personal commitment or
commitment to the totality ofsubcultural values. The individual may occasionally
be more concerned with maintaining his group association than with sharing the
group's values. He may be reluctant to exhibit his group allegiance in a way that
is discordant with his own beliefs, but at the same time he may place a higher
value on remaining a member of the group than on abrogating the prescription of
conduct. The juvenile who conforms to the delinquent gang's demands for
fighting but who dislikes the resort to violence, and the soldier who goes to
combat with deep hatred for war are both unwilling to sever association with their
groups but cannot be said to share much in the value of violence. The value these
two individuals will share with their groups is that ofmaintaining the group.
Thus, while the manifest representation (conduct)ofthe subculture may generally
be a valid index of normatively induced values, latent and different values may be
retained by some individuals who are members ofthe group that share in this
subculture .... 36 [Emphasis added].
The above examples of the juvenile and soldier who do not like violence but engage in it
in order to remain a member of their group, demonstrate a lack of complete adoption or
internalization of the group identity but a willingness to engage in the prescribed
behaviour and to propagate the group regardless. In conjunction with a labelling
perspective (which theory will be discussed in section five "Deviance and Labelling
Theory" next), this phenomenon within subcultures reveals that even though members
who have been assigned a label within the stage of primary deviance will not necessarily

3G

The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology, supra note 25 at 102-03.
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internalize that label though he may engage in secondmy deviance. However, an outsider
observer would not be able to distinguish between the subculture member who wholeheartedly internalized the subculture identity, and the member who did not.

The above examples also show that within the learning or socialization process,
psychological personality variables playa role in the acceptance 01' rejection of the
subcultural norms,37 and that both cultures and subcultures tolerate a certain degree of
non-normative or deviant behaviour. 38 However, they only tolerate behaviour which does
not undermine their existence39 - that is to say, behaviour that does not cause disorder and
threaten internal cohesion. Subcultures and groups have formal and informal sanctions
that penalize members who violate the values or norms, and even sever membership.4o In
a subculture of violence, these social control mechanisms may include violent and
intimidating means of ensuring compliance with normative rules and violent punitive
sanctions against those who violate them. The existence of punitive sanctions within
groups or subcultures generally, and subcultures-of-violence specifically, demonstrates
mechanisms which not only assist members to learn deviant normative behaviour through
positive and negative reinforcement, but also trains those individuals to adopt,41 and thus,
essentially internalize those behaviours. This process -learning 01' training with punitive
sanctions - facilitates understanding the socialization and internalization processes within
outlaw groups within the criminal milieu.

Prisons exemplify subcultures of violence, and places for differential association to occur.
Michel Foucault asserted that convicts have their own value system,42 and that the prison
breeds "delinquents" through "anti-social" association:

Ibid. at 107.
Ibid. at 103.
39 Ibid. at 101.
40 Ibid. at 106.
41 Delinquency, Crime and Differential Association, supra note 4 at 3. Cressey refers to the early work of
Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles a/Criminology, 2"d ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1934).
42 "The Means of Correct Training", supra note 28 at 220-21. Ibid. at 220, Foucault distinguishes between
"delinquent" who has an affinity for crime or identifies with himself as a criminal, and the offender who has
simply engaged in crime:
The delinquent is also to be distinguished from the offender in that he is not only the
author of his acts (the author responsible in terms of certain criteria of fTee, conscious will), but is
37

38
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--The prison makes possible, even encourages, the organization of a milieu
of delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchized, ready to aid and abet any tilture
criminal act: "Society prohibits association of more than twenty persons ... and it
constitutes for itself associations of200, 500, 1,200 convicts in the maisons
centrales, which are consU'ucted for them ad hoc, and which it divides up for their
greater convenience into workshops, courtyards, dormitories, refectories, where .
they can all meet together. . .. And it multiplies them across France in such a way
that, where there is a prison, there is an association ... and as many anti-social
clubs." And it is in these clubs that the education of the young first offender takes
pace
I .... 43
That Aboriginal overrepresentation in the Canadian prison system has led to the increase
of Aboriginal street gangs,44 suppolis these theoretical assertions of Foucault. FUliher,
Aboriginal prison gangs serve as recruiters for Aboriginal street gangs, and some gangs
were formed or created in prisons. 45 This phenomenon suggests that the power within a
group or subculture to teach its members normative behaviour through ~'anti-social" or
differential associations, can create or embolden not only criminally deviant, but also
organized crime outlaw identities.

3.4.5

Application of Differential ASSOCiation and Social Learning

Within Groups and Subcultures to Organized Crime Outlaw Identities
Many organized crime outlaw groups fall within the category of subculture due to the
presence of apartness, difference, and solidarity within their group, and due to the
presence and transmission of their learned normative behaviour patterns. These outlaws
are "culture-carriers,,46 or subculture-carriers who exemplify the attitudes toward and
means to commit outlawry, transmit them to new members within their group, and
reinforce them among other members. The process oflearning normative behaviour
patterns occurs in the criminal milieu, and specifically, in organized crime groups and

linked to his offense by a whole bundle of complex threads (instincts, drives, tendencies,
character) ....
43 Ibid at 228.
44 Jana Marie Grekul & Patti LaBoueane-Benson, An Investigation into the Formalion and Recruitmellt of
Aboriginal Gangs in Westel'll Canada (Ottawa: Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada,
2006) [An Invesligation into the Formation and Recruitment of Aboriginal Gangs in Westel'll Canada] at 5.
The authors cite research by Ovide W. Mercredi, Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the Correctional Service
ofCanada on Aboriginal Youlh Gang Members in Ihe Federal Correcliolls Syslem (2000).
" Ibid at 21.
4G The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated TheOJ)' in Crimillology, supra note 25 at 99-\ 00.
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subcultures. 47 Associations or social interactions, whether reinforcing conventional or
deviant norms, affects any behaviour, generally,48 therefore, affects organized crime
outlaw behaviour.

Organized crime outlaw groups exemplify not only a subculture but also a subculture of

violence. As described in Chapter Two, anti-Prohibitionist organized crime outlaws,
Mafiosi groups and La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and Aboriginal street
gangs, all employ violence. In applying the description by Forsyth, their" ... values
sanction the use of violence and [they] are quick to use force in interpersonal relations .
. . . [T]here is either a lot of fighting or a lot of killing depending on the nature of
interaction and the presence offireanns.... ,,49 And, as particularly exemplified by
Mafiosi groups and La Cosa Nostra, they" ... tend to value honor more highly than people
in the dominant culture. ,,50

Mafiosi groups and La Cosa Nostra demonstrate that some organized crime outlaws are
born into an existing organized crime outlaw subculture or group. Long, frequent,
intense 5 ! and significant associations with members this subculture or group, will increase
the likelihood that individuals will become organized crime outlaws, engage in such
outlawry, and will adopt the organized crime outlaw identity. For example, the fraternal
association of Sicilian Mafia and 'ndrangheta members and the absolute power over
every part of their members' lives 52 uses or creates a familial environment for differential
association to occur. If an individual grows up in Calabria, he likely has a blood relation
to the 'ndrangheta,53 and will likely learn the normative behaviour of that group. Thus,
he has an increased likelihood, based on frequency, duration, priority and intensity of

Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 8th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007) [Organized Crime]
at 16.
48 Ibid.
4' "The Use of the Subculture of Violence as MItigation in a Capital Murder Case", supra note 33 at 72.
50 Ibid.
51 "A Statement of the Theory - 1947", supra note 5 at 9-10. Sutherland posited that the frequency,
duration, priority and intensity of differential associations affected the nature or degree of learning.
" Letizia Paoli, "Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises" (2004) 6 Global
Crime 19 ["Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises"] at 22.
53 Antonio Nicaso & Lee Lamothe, Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global
Crime Empires (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2005) at II.
47
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association, of becoming a member ofthis Italian Mafioso group. Further, the secrecy
obligations of "men ofhonour,,54 only would entrench the perceived imp0l1ance of the
anti-social values and norms learned in these Italian outlaw groups.

The perpetuation of these Sicilian and Calabrian Mafiosi groups in North America,
imports a similar differential association or social learning process within these outlaw
subcultures. The North American La Cos a Nostra employed or adopted the normative
behaviour of the Italian Mafia, and in particular, the use of violence and intimidation.
This Italian mode oflife was "impressed" in a criminal organization in North America.

55

Essentially the individuals, as well as the corporations and the organizations themselves,
internalized the methods of the Mafia. 56 Such organized crime outlaw characteristics
necessitate criminal organization laws that can penetrate cohesive groups and diffuse the
educative processes within them.

As members of a subculture of violence, outlaw motorcycle gangs also demonstrate the
products of differential association or social learning. They are a social group whose
members have shared values and normative behaviour. They use each other as reference
points in order to define themselves and guide their behaviour as described above by
Cohen and Becker57 and they induct new members into their group after a lengthy and
arduous "program" which, if completed, will demonstrate that these members have
accepted the mles, demonstrated commitment, and have learned the normative behaviour
ofthe group. Many outlaw motorcycle gangs reward these new members with "full
patches" which contain the gang's name and insignia, and are displayed on the clothing
and accessories worn by members in order to reinforce their power as a group, and in
particular as a violent outlaw group. This latter phenomenon accords with the use of
symbols by groups to reinforce identity.

54
55

"Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises", supra note 52 at 21.
Organized Crime, supra note 47 at 71.

56

Ibid.

57

"A General TheOlY of Subcultures", supra note 29 at 47 and 48; and Outsiders, supra note 27 at 81-82.
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Aboriginal street gangs demonstrate differential association within communities, families,
and institutional settings such as in prison. Criminal behaviour and gang behaviour is
taught and learned 58 in areas or neighbourhoods characterized by poverty, crime, and
gang presence. 59 Association with criminally deviant family members and peers lead
Aboriginal youth to become involved in Aboriginal street gangs. 60

.. .Family involvement in gangs is clearly a precursor to gang involvement for the
ex-gang members interviewed. One subject, originally from Winnipeg, started by
stating that his family was involved in the gang lifestyle. Another, from
Saskatoon, stated he was:
"surrounded by family members who were gang members. I had no
connection with my family otherwise - they were alcoholics and dmg
addicts." ...
. . .It seems that among the Aboriginal young people in our study, lack of respect,
lack of self-esteem, and the pursuit of these attributes led to gang involvement.
Gangs, as peer groups, are a source of respect - at least in the eyes of recmits.
The ex-gang member from Winnipeg states he " ... wanted a reputation. I spent
time in neighbourhood parks and earned a reputation from dealing dmgs and
standing up to other gang members." If there is a lack of bonding in the home,
marginalized youth will seek respect elsewhere. Surrounded by other likesituated youth, combined withfamity andfriends already gang involved, and the
pathway to gang involvement seems rather straightforward. As [Edwin H.]
Sutherland would say, in the case of disenfranchised youth in urban and rural
areas, an environment abundant in criminal "definitions" and criminal
"associations" makes this illegitimate career pathway almost inevitable.
Sutherland's theory implies that the side with the most, and the most significant,
"definitions" will win out. A youngster surrounded by pro-social definitions doctor/teacher parents, siblings who are engaged in sport or art, friends who are
high achievers in school- will likely follow the pro-social route and find respect
and recognition in legitimate, legal pursuits.
Furthermore, these pro-social associations, in addition to influencing the
'route' the young person takes, are also a source oflearning. The associations
teach individuals the 'tricks of the trade' whether they be pro-social, for example
58 E.J. Dickson-Gilmore & Chris Whitehead, "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a
Typology for Understanding and Strategizing Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3 at 15.
S9 Catherine Bainbridge, Katherine Cisek & CBC Newsworld, Indian Posse: Li/e in Aboriginal Gang
TerritDlY VHS (Montreal: Wild Heart Productions Inc., 1998) [fndian Posse: Li/e in Aboriginal Gang
TerritDlY]. Ibid. at 03: 10 and 05:33, father of gang member Trevor Lacasse, Paul Lacasse states that in the
north end of Winnipeg, girls are put on street by gang members and the traffic in the area is due to "johns."
Vehicles don't stop for him. Occupants don't live or work in the area. He states, ibid. at 06:50, that
prostitution goes on 24 hours a day. Resident ofthe same neighbourhood, Marie Kelly, states, ibid. at
05: 13, that prostitution is a problem in the area.
60 Ibid. at 19:42. Indian Posse member Trevor Lacasse says that the kids in his neighbourhood (including
his brothers) see him as a role model when he was wearing his flagging his gang colours, wearing his flags.
Trevor is not waving guns around now and harming people any more, and so now the kids see that instead
ofthe old Trevor. However, he is still a member of the gang.
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how to study effectively. On the other hand, a young person who is surrounded
by family members already well ensconced in a gang lifestyle, surrounded by
poverty and unemployment, associating withji'iends who skip school and instead
make money by drug running, is more likely to follow the illegitimate/criminal
route characterizing the lifestyle of his or her close associates. Importantly, the
anti-social associations in this case, teach the individual more criminal
techniques for being successfid in crime, for example, how to evade police while
on a drug run. 61 [Emphasis added).
Indeed, Paul Lacasse, resident in Indian Posse territory in the north end of Winnipeg, lost
three of his sons to the gang, and his fourth son was at risk. 62 The Regina Anti-Gang
Services or RAGS program targets 300 known Aboriginal gang members, 75 per cent of
whom are between the age of 12 and 20. In order to facilitate the exit of a member from a
gang, RAGS recognizes that power of gang territory and association, and states that
" ... the person must be physically removed from other gang members or any surroundings
that may help gang members locate them.,,63

In addition to the influence of negative associations on Aboriginal youth to join gangs,
Laboucane and Grekul note the need for protection also led to Aboriginal association with
gangs. 64 The concept of a subculture of violence explains this need for protection and the
necessity of differential association. If one's community already has the presence of
violence or is greatly influenced by a subculture of violence, then differential association
in a gang (and thus, employment of the values of a subculture of violence) facilitates
personal security, safety, and even survival. The gang provides the tools (the group
normative behaviour as well as the power of the group) to protect oneself.

These organized crime outlaw groups, each in their own way, show the ways that
differential association and social learning can inculcate individuals into adopting an
organized crime outlaw identity and participating in activities of the outlaw group. These

61

Anlnvestigatioll into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs ill Western Canada, supra

note 44 at 36-37.
62 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Territory, supra note 59 at 01: 19. Paul Lacasse lost sons
Norman, Benji, and Trevor to the gangs, and at the time of filming, Paul Jr. was at risk.
63 "Regina Anti-Gang Services: RAGS" (30 July 20 I0) online: Public Safety Canada
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.calprglcp/ythgnglcpaO I-rags-eng.aspx>.
64

An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, supra

note 44 at 37.

163

outlaw groups also demonstrate the ways in which subcultures of violence can entrench
and nourish this identity as members by maintaining values and normative behaviour
based on violence and intimidation.

Insights for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to

3.4.6

Differential Association and Social Learning Within Groups and
Subcultures
Notably, some indication ofa phenomenon of reverse differential association may exist.
Reverse differential association occurred when members of criminal organizations exited
illegitimate business, and engaged in non-criminal endeavours. This phenomenon
OCCUlTed during Prohibition and its demise,65 and indicates that social, economic, political
circumstances may affect learned deviant normative behaviour, and suggests that societal
enfranchisement may persuade some organized crime outlaws to leave outlawry and
adopt legal and conventional behaviours. In order to encourage or pursue this reversal of
identity, anti-organized crime measures may need to address societal states that
disenfranchise certain societal groups.

Differential association or social learning within subcultures of outlaws such as Italian
Mafiosi groups, La Cosa Nostra, Aboriginal street gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs,
demonstrates a need for re-educative processes based on anti-criminal patterns of
behaviour for members who leave or who are incapacitated from their organized crime
group, and the presence of a non-outlaw environment in which ex-members can interact
with law-abiding members of society. This insight from this socio-criminological theory
has been accepted in models for anti-gang initiatives.

Indeed, the health care model asserts that patt of an anti-organized crime strategy should
include the rehabilitation and redirection of deviant or delinquent acts of individuals who
., Organized Crime, supra note 47 at 54. Abadinsky describes this phenomenon:
With the onset ofthe Great Depression (1929) and the subsequent repeal of Prohibition
(1933), the financial base ofOC narrowed considerably. Many players dropped out; some went
into legitimate enterprises or employment; others drifted into conventional criminality.

Bootlegging, as.noted earlier, required trucks, drivers, mechanics, garages, warehouses,
bookkeepers, and lawyers- skills and assets that could be converted to non-criminal endeavors.
For those who remained in the business, reorganization was necessary.....
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have become members of gangs66 or criminal organization groups. Further, the third
component of the Spergel model of gang prevention and intervention, now referred to as
the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and
Suppression Program model,67 emphasizes educative processes and oPPoltunities to
reintegrate into conventional society. The Spergel model is a primary initiative of the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the United States Department of
Justice. 68 The model advocates community mobilization to create programs to strengthen
institutions in the comrnunity;69 social intervention in the form of programs that seek to
increase the resilience of individuals against gang membership;7o provision of programs
to increase educational and employment oPPOliunities;71 suppression by augmenting legal
system responses to gangs;72 and organizational changes and development to improve the
administration of agencies that deal with gangs. 73 This third component of the Spergel
model asserts that the provision of programs which increase educational and employment
opportunities will achieve socio-cultural goals through instilling institutional norms, and
thus, counteract social disorder and deviancy.74 The provision of educational and
Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) [Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective] at 148. Tobin refers to the health care model in
formulating three prevention levels for anti-gang strategies. As discussed in, infra, in Chapter Four at
section four "Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at sub-section "I. Fostering Pro-Social
Bonds Through Anti-Organized Crime Legal Measures", primary prevention and secondary prevention
amount to the principles in Requisite Three. Primary prevention targets youth or individuals before they
involve themselves in a gang, and specifically, targets youth or individuals at risk of gang membership due
to attributes of their population or community and not individual attributes. Seconda,y prevention targets
individuals who have a high risk of joining gangs or who have had exposure to gangs, and uses intensive
efforts to increase the resilience of these individuals against gang membership.
67 IrvingA. Spergel, "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem" (Paper
presented to the 20 I 0 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit Conference, Toronto, Ontario, 25 March 20 I 0) online:
20 I 0 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit <http://www.gangsummit.comiAssets/Spergel%20Speech.pdf> ["A
Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem"] at I. This model is discussed
fU1iher, infra, in Chapter Four at section four "Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at subsection "I. Fostering Pro-Social Bonds Through Anti-Organized Crime Legal Measures."
66

68 Ibid.
" Ibid. at 9.
70 Ibid at 9-10.
71 Ibid. at 10.
n Ibid. at 11-12.
" Ibid at 12.

Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) at 150. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model according to Irving Spergel and G. David
Curry, "The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process" in Arnold P. Goldstein
and C. Ronald Huff, eds., Gang Intervention Handbook (Champaign: Research Press, 1993) ["The
National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process"]. Gang policy in the United States,
for the most part, has incorporated five main components set forth in the Spergel model of gang prevention
74
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employment oppOitunities remains the most expensive and most challenging anti-gang
measure to implement, but achieves the most success in countering gang membership or
activity.75 Opportunity provisions are the most effective strategy for cities with chronic
gang problems, and community mobilization is the most effective strategy for cities with
emerging gang problems. 76 However, opPOltunity provision policies and community
mobilization policies often remained the least utilized. 77
In addition to prevention and intervention techniques, concepts of differential association
or social learning within subcultures of outlaws support the employment of other antiorganized crime measures as well. The reinforcement of their identities tlu'ough ongoing
anti-social interactions with one another within their outlaw groups necessitates that antiorganized crime responses ban such associations to some degree and in some
circumstances. First, the bolstering of their identity through the use of names and
insignia, suggests that organized crime measures place limitations on the display of gang
name and insignia in public and in private.
Second, disassociation from gangs may need to occur in a physical sense, such as by
pai'ents removing their children from delinquent, criminal or gang environments. 78 It may
occur when accused persons who are gang members are released on bail and courts
impose conditions of non-association with the gang. Further, COUlts ought to consider
and intervention. As referred to in more detail, infi'a at Chapter Four in section six "Requisite Five for
Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at subsection two "Reactive Anti-Organized Crime Methods to Limit and
Prevent Differential Association and Anti-Social Learning Within Subcultures of Outlaws", at subsubsection "b. Reactive Methods of Suppression Via the Criminal Law", at sub-sub-subsection "ii. NonAssociation Orders in Bail Conditions as a Reactive Method of Suppression", the Spergel model of gang
prevention and intervention also includes community mobilization to create programs to strengthen
institutions in the community; social intervention in the form of programs that seek to increase the
resilience of individuals against gang membership; provision of programs to increase educational and
employment oppOltunities; suppression by augmenting legal system responses to gangs; and organizational
changes and development alter the administration of agencies that deal with gangs.
75 Ibid. at 154. Tobin cites empirical research oflrving Spergel and G. David Curry in "The National Youth
Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process", supra note 74.
76 Ibid. at 150. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model according to Irving Spergel and G. David
Curry in "The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process", supra note 74.
77 Ibid. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model according to Irving Spergel and G. David Curry in
"The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process", supra note 74.
78 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang TerrilOly, supra note 59. One mother, Mary Kelly, moved her
children tram a neighbourhood in which Indian Posse operated in order to submerse her children into a
ditTerent lifestyle and avoid the negative influence of the gang.
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where the accused person intends to reside, and whether a condition of not attending the
gang territory is necessary in order to not only prevent further crimes from occurring, but
to prevent the continuance of anti-social relations which may encourage futiher criminal
activity, and in order for some pro-social associations to begin to develop tln'ough
government and community agencies. If a sentence is not so severe as to mandate prison,
then coUtis ought to consider the same types of conditions in imposing conditions of
probation. If a sentence results in imprisonment for two years or more, then parole
boards ought to consider such types of conditions in releasing the offender into the
community.

These insights will be examined in Chapter Four, section five "Requisite Four for AntiOrganized Crime Measures", section six "Requisite Five for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures", and section seven "Requisite Six for Anti-Organized Crime Measures."
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3.S

3.5.1

DEVIANCE AND LABELLING THEORY

Overview

The preservation or maintenance of collective values and norms leads to the
condemnation of acts that violate those values and norms. This condemnation defines
deviance and crime, and thus, defines who is deviant and criminal. The process of
labelling the deviant and the criminal contributes to an explanation for the genesis and
development of some organized crime outlaw identities.

This section of Chapter Three will set forth generally the theory of deviance and
labelling, and specifically it will discuss the phenomena of primary and secondary
deviance as well as self-labelling. It will use the circumstances and perspectives of
outlaws who were anti-Prohibitionists, Mafiosi and La Cosa Nostra members, outlaw
motorcycle gang members and Aboriginal street gang members to breathe life into these
theoretical concepts. In so doing, this section will illuminate the process of internalizing
an organized crime outlaw identity.

As examination of deviance and labelling theory in this section will reveal the following:
Insight 8.
Anti-organized crime approaches should avoid the imposition of
formal negative labels and stigmatization in order to prevent potential deviants or
outlaws from being ousted from larger society.
Insight 9.
Anti-organized crime measures should maintain or foster positive
interactions between perceived deviants or outlaws and members of conventional
society.
Insight 10.
Anti-organized crime measures should reduce the internal cohesion
and power of gangs or organized crime outlaws in order to prevent the
perpetuation of their identity and the empowerment of their reputations.

3.5.2

Deviance and Labelling Theory Generally

In recent years, criminologists have sought to use labelling theory to complement other
theories regarding deviance. I However, as far back the 1800s, much before the
I J6n Gunnar Bernburg, Marvin D. Krohn & Craig J. Rivera, "Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness,
and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory" (2006) 43 J. of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 67 ["Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness, and Subsequent Delinquency: A
Longitudinal Test of Labeling TheOly"] at 67-68.
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development oflabelling theory, Emile Durkheim espoused the repercussions of
collectivity in his discussion of social solidarity as it relates to the concept of anomie:
The link of social solidarity to which repressive law corresponds is one
whose break constitutes a crime; we give this name to every act which, in any
degree whatever, evokes against its author the characteristic reaction which we
term 'punishment'. To seek the nature of this link is thus to ask what is the cause
of punishment, or, more precisely what crime essentially consists in ...... an act is
criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the conscience collective .
... We do not deny that every delict is universally condemned, but we take as
agreed that the condemnation to which it is subjected results from its delinquent
character. Then, however, we are hard put to say in what its delinquent character
consists. Is it to be found in an especially serious transgression? Perhaps so; but
that is simply to restate the question by putting one word in place of another, for it
is precisely the problem to understand what this transgression is, and particularly
this specific transgression which society reproves by means of organised
punishment and which constitutes criminality. It can evidently come from only
one or several characteristics common to all criminological types. The only one
which satisfied this condition is the very opposition between a crime, whatever it
may be, and certain collective sentiments. It is, accordingly, this opposition which
forms the crime, rather than being a derivation of crime. In other words, we must
not say that an action shocks the conscience collective because it is criminal, but
rather that it is criminal because it shocks the conscience collective. We do not
2
condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it. ...
[Emphasis original]
Social solidarity through condemnation or labelling applies to the development of the
term "organized crime" and "criminal organizations." These labels do not occur because
the entities are inherently criminal, or because their members participate in crime.
Rather, these labels are applied because ofthe perception and response of the collective namely, that the collective (or a collective) feels abhonence, intimidation and the fear in
relation to these sO\1s of groups, and as a result, these groups become so labelled.
Further, when society, through its government, formally denounces or condemns their
conduct in law, the label in relation to these groups becomes entrenched, and the
collective reaction may perpetuate or enhance.

Similar to Durkheim, Gary S. Becker posited that society creates deviance not by creating
social situations that cause deviance, or social factors which cause individuals to act in a

Emile Durkheim, Anomie and the Moral Structure ofIndustlY, trans. by Anthony Giddens, ed. (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1972) at 123-24.
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deviant fashion. Rather, society creates deviance through the application of rules and
sanctions to individuals, and an individual who breaks them is regarded as an "outsider,,:3

... [S]ocial groups create deviance by making the rules whose irifj'action
constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to pmticular people and labeling
them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the
person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and
sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully
been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.,,4 [Emphasis
original].
Essentially, the powerful in society, who are perceived as the "norm", label and cast out
the less powerful in society. 5 They use their social norms as a ruler against which all
others are judged, measured and compared, 6 and assign a label to an individual or another
group in society that deviates fi'om this norm. The greater the schism between the social
norm and the deviancy, the more significant the label. Relations and reactions by the
"normal" to the deviant change as a result of that label and become negative. These
negative social reactions to the person labelled as deviant cause that individual to react to
the stigma. 7 He negotiates his own meaning and activities in relation to these "normal"
others. 8 He internalizes his deviant label, and engages in further behaviour in keeping

Howard S. Becker, Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1968) [Outsiders] at 1.
Ibid at 9.
5 Ibid at 15,17 and 18.
6 Michel Foucault, "The Means of Correct Training" in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New
3

4

York: Pantheon Books, 1984) ["The Means of COlTect Training"] at 196-97.
Edwin M. Lemert, "Societal Reaction, Differentiation, and Individuation" in Charles C. Lemert &
Michael F. Winter, eds., Crime and Deviance: Essays and Innovations ofEdwin M Lemert (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) ["Societal Reaction, Differentiation, and Individuation"] at 38. Lemert
describes the process of labelling an individual who first engages in deviance (also called "primary
deviation"), and the subsequent change in behaviour as a result (also called "secondary deviation)", in this
way:
The sequence of interaction leading to secondary deviation is roughly as follows: (I)
primary deviation; (2) social penalties; (3) further primary deviation; (4) stronger penalties and
rejections; (5) further deviation, perhaps with hostilities and resentment beginning to focus upon
those doing the penalizing; (6) crisis reached in the tolerance quotient, expressed in formal action
by the community stigmatizing the deviant; (7) strengthening ofthe deviant conduct as a reaction
to the stigmatizing and penalties; (8) ultimate acceptance of deviant social status and efforts at
adjustment on the basis of the associated role.
th
S David Downes & Paul Rock, Understanding Deviance, 5 Ed. (New York: Oxford University, 2007) at
177. Downes and Rock describe the impact of labeling and "symbolic interactionism" on deviants as
follows:
... Deviants are those who construct activities and assess meanings in the company of others. They
are not always constrained. Neither are they always free. They are restricted by circumstances, by
the significance which behaviour can attain and by their ability to negotiate meaning....
7
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with that label. 9 Ifhe perceives his judges or labellers as incompetent or illegitimately
entitled to do so, the deviant or outsider may view them rather than himself as
"outsiders.,,10 As will be discussed in section six "Identity Formation From a Social
Psychology Perspective" in this Chapter, this phenomenon accords with a possible
outcome within the concept of degradation where a "victim" of a degradation or casting
out ceremony attacks the institution imposing the negative identity, and may seek to
devalue those attempting to degrade him. II

The assignment of a label can occur not only through social definition, but also by
individual definition. Some individuals can label themselves even when no societal
labelling or social reaction has occurred prior. 12 These individuals must be wellsocialized actors; they must agree with societal norms and recognize violations of those

nor~s; and they must be "motivated to conform to social expectations" and be cognizant
of the cultural labels that apply to violators of those norms.!3 This phenomenon of selflabelling, without societal imputation of a label, may also result in the formation of a
deviant identity:
... A cmcial symbolic interactionist insight is that social control is largely a
product of self-control (Shott 1979). That is, role-taking abilities enable
individuals to view themselves from the imagined perspective of others. One can
anticipate and respond in advance to others' reactions regarding a contemplated
course of action.
These considerations suggest that one can also reflexively assess the
meaning of one's actual or contemplated behaviors. Those people who
contemplate violating social norms or who engage in actualmle breaking do not
depend on the presence and reactions of others to assess the meaning of those
actions. They can do so imaginatively or vicariously. In short, public, official

Sean Maddan, The Labeling ofSex Offenders: The Unintended Consequences of the Best Intentional
Public Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008) [The Labeling ofSex Offenders: The
Unintended Consequences ofthe Best Intentional Public Policies] at 22.
10 Outsiders, supra note 3 at 1-2.
11 Andrew J. Weigert, J. Smith Teitge & Dennis W. Teitge, Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986) at 47-48. Weigert, Teitge and Teitge cite Harold
Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies" (1956) 61 American Journal of Sociology
420.
12 Mordechai Roteuberg, "Self-Labelling: A Missing Link in the 'Societal Reaction' Theory of Deviance"
(1974) 22 The Sociological Review 335 ["Self-Labelling: A Missing Link in the 'Societal Reaction'
Theory of Deviance"] at 337.
13 Peggy A. Thoits, "Self-Labeling Processes in Mental Illness: The Role of Emotional Deviance" (1985)
91 The American Journal of Sociology 221 at 223.
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labeling of one's rule breaking is not necessary for the emergence of a deviant
identity; there can be private se(f-Iabeling .... 14 [Emphasis original].
Essentially, self-labelling also amounts to the adoption of a deviant identity.

How does the adoption of a deviant or criminal identity or the assigning of a deviant or
criminal label manifest in deviant or criminal behaviour? Indeed, Mordechai Rotenberg
questioned this aspect of labelling theory by asserting that the labelling process cannot
magically transform a person into a frog simply by calling him a frog, and nor can it turn
that frog into a prince. IS He asked, "[W]hat makes the label stick from the actor's
perspective?,,16 The answer lies in "secondary deviation" or internalization ofthe
adopted or assigned label.

Edwin M. Lemelt distinguished between the two types of symbolic reactions of societal
members to the same deviant behaviour during the labelling process - that of primary
deviation or deviance and that of secondary deviation or deviance. 17 This distinction
illuminates the difference between original behaviour, and socially affected behaviour,
and it explains the development of a criminally deviant identity .
. . . [I]f deviant acts are repetitive and have a high visibility, and if there is a severe
societal reaction, which, through a process of identification is incorporated as part
of the "me" of the individual, the probability is greatly increased that the
integration of existing roles will be disrupted and that reorganization based upon a
new role or roles will occur. (The "me" in this context is simply the subjective
aspect of the societal reaction.) Reorganization may be the adoption of another
normal role in which the tendencies previously defined as "pathological" are
given a more acceptable social expression. The other general possibility is the
assumption of a deviant role, if such exists; or, more rarely, the person may
organize an aberrant sect or group in which he creates a special role ofhis own.
When a person begins to employ his deviant behavior or a role based upon it as a
means of defonse, attack, or acijustment to the overt and covert problems created
by the consequent societal reaction to him, his deviation is secondary. Objective
evidence of this change will be found in the symbolic appurtenances of the new
role, in clothes, speech, posture, and mannerisms, which in some cases heighten
" Ibid. at 222.
"Self-Labelling: A Missing Link in the 'Societal Reaction' Theory of Deviance", slIpra note 12 at 337.
16 Ibid. at 335.
17 Edwin M. Lemelt, "Some Aspects ofa General Theory of Sociopathic Behavior" in Charles C. Lemelt &
Michael F. Winter, eds., Crime and Deviance: Essays and Innovations ofEdwin M Lemert (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) at 23.
15
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social visibility, and which in some cases serve as symbolic cues to
professionalization. 18 [Emphasis added].
Thus, regardless of whether the process occurs through self-labelling or through
secondary deviance, the result remains the same - namely, the internalization or
acceptance of a label that transforms the social interactions and behaviour of the
individual, and likely, the social reactions and behavior of others toward that individual.
The transformation of social interactions and reactions reinforces the new label adopted
by the individual or imposed on him. Thus, the label manifests into the identity of the
individual.

3.5.3 Application of Concepts within Deviance and Labelling Theory to
the Identity of Outlaws
3.5.3.1

Deviance and Labelling as Exemplified by Organized Crime

Outlaws
"".Am I a criminal because I violate a law which the people do not want?"
19
asked bootlegging kingpin Rocco PelTi, rhetorically, in 1924.

At the stage of primary deviation or deviance, individuals who do not fall within societal
norms, become unaccepted by, or cast out from a segment or segments of conventional
society. Some of these labelled deviants will become ordinary criminals. Others will
become outlaws. The process of internalization and amplification within secondary
deviation or deviance as espoused by Lemert and the process of self-labelling lead to the
manifestation ofthe outlaw identity.

Ironically, secondary deviance may stem, to some degree, from an effort to conform to
the social perception or portrayal of a deviant. 20 Whether through internalization and
18

"Societal Reaction, Differentiation, and Individuation", supra note 7 at 37.

Craig Heron, Booze: A Distilled HistOlY (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2003) [Booze: A Distilled
History] at 262. Heron refers to comments made by Rocco Perri during an interview with the Toronto Star
in 1924.
20 Richard V. Ericson, Criminal Reactions: The Labelling Perspective (Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon
House, 1975) at 68. Ericson asserts:
".[T]he 'secondary deviant' in the labeling perspective is one who conforms to society's objective
portrayal of him. For example, when crime control agents and other social controllers conceive
and act towards the individual on the basis ofa particular 'criminal' label, the individual's drift
into crime may increase in order to conform with others' expectations, so that he eventually is
19
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amplification, or through self-labelling, criminal deviants use conventional societal values
and norms as a reference point that indicates who they are not,21 and outlaws are not
different in this regard. However, outlaws internalize their assigned or self-proclaimed
label so as to entrench a new non-conformist identity beyond that of an individual who
commits crime.

Anti-Prohibitionist bootleggers may have been seen by many segments of society,
particularly temperance associations, as outlaws because they illegally participated in
liquor smuggling operations. However, the support that many bootleggers received ii'om
large percentages of the Canadian and American populations, demonstrate, in answer to
Rocco Perri's question, that no, he and other bootleggers are not criminal simply because
they violate a law that many people do not want. Perri, the "King of the Bootleggers" in
southern Ontario,22 and other bootleggers became criminals and outlaws because their
actions extended beyond violating Prohibition laws. Their actions and mindset
transcended common criminality, and came to be labelled "gangsters" or "mobsters" as
they intensely, violently, and murderously vied for territory.

In 1922, Paul Matoff, brother-in-law of renowned distiller and bootlegger Sam Bronfinan
of the Regina Vinegar Company and Canada Drugs Limited, was shot after have just
collected money from an American bootiegger. 23 In 1930, Bessie Starkman, wife of
Rocco Perri, was gunned down during a war with Al Capone's outlaw group.24 Perri
himself would disappear in 1944.25 Rocco Perri would argue against the criminal label
assigned to bootlegging outlaws, but he simultaneously admitted living in an underground

similar to other 'criminals'; he is a criminal when he takes the label into account in guiding his
own behaviour. The label 'criminal' is the name or the role and he fulfils its expectations as he
does in any other role. [Emphasis original].
lbid.
Booze: A Distilled HiStOl)" sllpra note 19 at 245.
23 Ibid. at 246; and Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall a/Prohibition (New York: Scribner, 2010)
at 151.
24 Booze: A Distilled HistOlY, sllpra note 19 at 246.
25 lbid.

21

22
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world that administered its own sense ofjustice,26 and thus, his protestations seem flimsy
at best.

A very powerful Mafiosi member in Canada, Paul Volpe, would explain the ostracization
of members of La Cosa Nostra in society, and thus, the reasons why police targeted such
groups:

... Deep down they [the police] hate ethnics ... and if they see an ethnic family that
is doing good, they're jealous of it and say, "How come he's got it and 1
haven't?" ... Who the hell would be a policeman in the first place? Who lVould
take ajob as apoliceman? ... They're ninety per cent drunks anyway.27
[Emphasis original].
Notably, Volpe was born in Canada, but became connected to Mafia Families in the
United States that had ties to Italy and that had Italian members. His words evince the
"we" and "they" dichotomy that exists not only from the perspective of conventional lawabiding members of society who label criminal deviants, but also from the perspective of
organized crime members who look back at larger society.

Outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Hells Angels, exemplify the metamorphosis from
simply receiving a social label of criminal deviant to internalizing an outlaw identity. Not
only do they engage in criminal activity that deviates from acceptable social norms
governing behaviour, but they also embrace their label, reject the stigma imposed by
conventional society, and perpetuate their identity through criminal associations with
other outlaws. Most, if not all, Hells Angels members have been previously labelled as a
criminal or deviant, and seek interaction with other criminals or deviants for social as
well as economic purposes. That a significant portion of full patch members of the Hells
Angels in Canada have criminal records28 indicates prior negative social interactions and
previous criminal deviancy within society. The disenfranchisement of these individuals
within society (perhaps through differential opportunity to achieve socio-cultural values,

Ibid. at 262. Rocco Perri acknowledged that the criminal milieu operated outside the legal system of
conventional society.
27 James Dubro, Mob Rule: Inside the Canadian Mafia (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985) at 138.
William Macadam conducted the interview of Paul Volpe for the television program Connections, and this
excerpt aired in June of 1977.
28 R. v. Violelfe, 2009 BCSC 1557, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2262 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 5.
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perhaps through the application of a deviant label, or perhaps due to a combination of
these events), draws these individuals to the power of the gang. When the identity of the
gang is bestowed on them, they accept it, and internalize what conventional society and
what their deviant outlaw group say that they are. In this way, after social deviants join
violent and intimidating outlaw motorcycle gangs within the criminal milieu, and spend
months or years becoming members, they adopt the identity of outlaw. Some full patch
Hells Angels members have related the great value and significance in obtaining full
membership, and in achieving the right to wear the winged death head and the right to use
the Hells Angels name. 29

The history of outlaw motorcycle gangs in N0l1h America,3o demonstrates the
transformation from labelling to internalizing an outlaw identity. The outlaw motorcycle
gang label resulted from the incident in Hollister, California on July 4th weekend in
1947/' and the subsequent negative depiction of bikers in Life magazine32 portrayed an
evil image of bikers, and their corresponding reputation began. However, the social label
of outlaw motorcycle gangs only became entrenched when the American Motorcyclist
Association used the designation "one-percenters" to refer to outlaw motorcycle clubs
"that do not want to abide by society's laws .... ,,33 Ralph "Sonny" Barger, Hells Angel

Ibid at para. 18. Ronaldo Lising described the significance of being a Hells Angels member in an
intercepted communication on July 13, 2004:
18 Lising goes on to tell Plante about his perspective on being in the HAMC:
No, but listen man, ya know I've been in the club for fuckin' s-, seven years now. Fuck, it
took a long time to make fuckin', I was broke for a long time. I was broke. The day I got
my patch my fuckin' jewelry was in the pawn shop for sale, in a store for sale, man,
broke.

29

It took me a long time to make money and here he is with an opportunity of a lifetime and
he's like, oh yeah, yeah, ya know. Okay grow up, right, I mean you're gonna have a
fuckin' few bucks in your pocket and be a Hell's Angel? Puck man. You know that's like
the top of my world.
30 This history is discussed in as discussed in subsection one "The Origins of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in
Canada" of section four "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs" of Chapter Two, and as mentioned in subsection four
"Social Construction of Organized Crime Through Media" of section two "Social Constructionism" in
Chapter Three.
31 Brock Yates, OUllmv Machine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999) at 11.
32 Jbid. Yates refers to an issue of Life magazine from July 21, 1947 at page 3 I.
33 R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLII24240, [2005] O.J. No. 2870 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 205. Then-Staff Sergeant
Jacques Lemieux opined that a "one percenter" is a motorcycle club that is a criminal organization.
Essentially, one percent of bikers are outlaw bikers.
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and former President of the Hells Angels, explained the application and subsequent
internalization of that label by outlaw motorcycle gangs:
Looking down on the fighting Hell's Angels was the American
Motorcyclist Association's way of covering their asses and trying to clean up the
reputation of bike riders in general. In 1948, after the Hollister incident cut deep
into their cred, they labeled rowdy, outlaw motorcyclists the "one-percenters, "
According to AMA propaganda, one percent of motorcycle riders were the outlaw
clubs giving bike riding a bad name while the other ninety-nine percent were good
old-fashioned ass-kissing, law-abiding citizens.
One particular incident occurred less than a year after I took over the
Oakland club. We were down in the small town of Angels Camp, California, to
visit anAMA gypsy tour road rally. While over 3,700 riders joined in this AMAsanctioned event, we were considered a disruption. During the gypsy tour, two
Sacramento Hell's Angels raced out of town at speeds of over one hundred miles
per hour. As they crested on top of a hill, their bikes sailed in the air, crashing
down on a pack of riders coming up the hill. Both Sacto members were killed,
and the accident scene was pretty ugly.
The AMA wore a big black eye after the papers wrote about it, and they
decided to shitcan any such future events. Oddly enough, while the AMA looked
bad, the publicity sparked even more enmity toward the Hell's Angels from the
straight world.
Since then, we made it our mission to be a thorn in the AMA's ass. We
held a big meeting in San Franscisco and all the clubs from Southern California
got together with all the Bay Area clubs, and it wasn't just Hell's Angels either.
There were representatives from other bike clubs in the state, like the
Executioners and the Galloping Gooses. That's when we proudly adopted the
name that the AMA shoved on us, the One-Percenters, We sketched a OnePercenter design, a triangle with a "1%" symbol. After drawing ilup, George
Wethem and 1 went out and got out tattoos that night, Later we even had patches
made, But the harmony soon ceased. When all the other clubs wanted to be
treated as equals, the Hell's Angels ended up leaving the One-Percenters. We
didn't feel they were equal, and no matter what, we weren't ever going to treat
other clubs the same way we treated ourselves .... 34 [Emphasis added].
While the Hells Angels later rejected this label, they did so out of a deeply ingrained
identity that led them to perceive themselves as better than all other "one-percenters" that is to say, more powerful than all outlaw motorcycle gangs. Some Hells Angels still
wear that patch on their leather vests,

34 Ralph "Sonny" Barger, Keith Zimmerman & Kent Zimmerman, Hel/'s Angel: The Life and Tillles of
SonllY Barger and the Hel/'s Angels Motorcycle Club (New York: HarperCollins, 2001) at 40·41.

177

Aboriginal street gangs also have either self-labelled or have internalized an organized
crime outlaw identity as described by the concept of secondary deviation.
Where does labeling begin? One can readily see that labeling can be very
much a result of self-identification. When one decides to join an organization
such as the Manitoba Waniors, it is an act of self-labeling. However, when such
groups get involved in criminal activities another form oflabeling takes over.
Societal labeling such as the term "gang" carries with it a cultural definition that is
neither positive or desirable.
When members of, say, the Manitoba Warriors or Indian Posse get
involved in criminal activities, these societal definitions are automatically applied
to them. The fact that these groupings may lack organization or leadership culture
of "white" gangs or lack the capacity to be involved in "organized gang crime" is
to the general public of little or no meaning. After all, for the general public and
their politicians - crime is offensive and needs to be controlled if not stamped out.
In essence, "Aboriginal youth gangs" have become by their self-labeling, the
enemy to be defeated with the full force of the law and law enforcement. 35
Whether the above allegations of Ovide Mercredi that the self-label alone results in law
enforcement casting its social control net over Aboriginal members of gangs and that
Aboriginal gangs such as the Manitoba Warriors are not like other organized crime
groups, is debatable. Evidence of the nature of Aboriginal street gangs, and the
application of the Criminal Code definition of "criminal organization" to the Manitoba
Warriors by the Manitoba COUli of Queens Bench in R. v. Fangman, 36 dispute some of
these postulations about lack of organization and leadership. Regardless, one can still
conclude that however the act of labelling occurs, whether by self-labelling or by
labelling in primary and then secondary deviation, the effects manifest through negative
treatment by other segments of society, such as law enforcement institutions and nonAboriginal non-outlaw community members.

Ovide W. Mercredi, Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the Correctional Service a/Canada on Aboriginal
Youth Gang Members in the Federal Corrections System (October 2000) online:
<http://www.csgv.ca/counselor/assets/AboriginaIGangs.pdf> [Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the
Correctional Sen'ice a/Canada on Aboriginal Youth Gang Members in the Federal Corrections System] at
7-8.
36 R. v. Pangman, 2001 MBCA 64, [2001] M.J. No. 217 (Q.L.); and Manitoba COUlt of Queen's Bench
decisions in R. v. Panglllan, (1999),143 Man. R. (2d) 161, [1999] M.~. No. 396 (Q.L.); (1999),141 Man. R.
(2d) 143, [1999] M.J. No 475 (Q.L.); (2000), 141 Man. R. (2d) 200, [2000] M.J. No.5; [2000] M.J. No. 31
(Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B. (2d) 155; [2000] M.J. No. 51 (Q.L.), (2000), 45 W.C.B. (2d) 56; (2000),144
Man. R. (2d) 144, [2000] M.J. No. 60 (Q.L.); (2000), 144 Man. R. (2d) 192, [2000] M.J. No. 123 (Q.L.);
(2000),32 C.R.(5 th ) 272, [2000] M.J. No. 125 (Q.L.); 2000 MBQB 47, [2001] M.J. No. 235 (Q.L.); 2000
MBQB 85, [2000] M.L No. 300 (Q.L.). This case dealt with the criminal organization provisions as they
existed in 1997 prior to the amendments in 200 I.
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3.5.3.2

Evidence of Deviance and Labelling in Relation to Gangs

Empirical evidence relating to labelling theory generally, and youth gangs specifically,
supports the asseliions that the labelling theory accurately accounts for some of the
processes that give rise to an outlaw identity. Some empirical research generally suppOlis
the labelling perspective - that is to say, that some individual labels strongly or
moderately affect whether an individual will engage in secondary deviance or crime. 37
Some empirical research also demonstrates that public labelling increases secondary
deviance, and greater deviance amplification. 38 Further, formal criminal proceedings play
a role in embedding deviance. 39 Young persons who received juvenile justice
intervention, and thus official deviant or criminal labelling, were significantly more likely
to be a gang member after such intervention, than those youths who did not. 40 However,
labelling alone within the criminal justice system may not account for gang membership
and patiicuiarly gang membership by individuals of ethnic minority groupS.41
Empirical research that links the effects oflabelling and deviant associations, also links
labelling theory with the concepts of differential association and subculture as they relate
to identity. Empirical evidence shows that deviant groups or gangs shelter members from
stigma received in social interactions with non-deviants or non-gang members.42 It shows
that association with delinquent peers contributes to criminal embeddedness. 43 It shows

The Labeling ofSex Offenders: The Unilltended Consequellces ofthe Best Intelltional Public Policies,
supra note 9 at 31.
38 Sean Maddan, The Labeling ofSex Offenders: The Unintended Consequences of the Bestilltelltional
Public Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008) at 32.
39 J6n Gunnar Bernburg, Marvin D. Krohn & Craig J. Rivera, "Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness,
and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory" (2006) 43 J. of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 67 at 69.
40 J6n Gunnar Bernburg, Marvin D. Krohn & Craig J. Rivera, "Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness,
and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory" (2006) 43 J. of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 67 at 77. Berburg, Krohn and Rivera assert that juvenile justice intervention increases
~ang membership by a factor of 5.2.
1 Robert M. Gordon, "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and " Wanna- Be" Groups: A
Vancouver Perspective" (2000) 42 Canadian Joumal of Criminology 39 at 55. Gordon asserts that
individuals from ethnic minorities may be more often surveyed and arrested, and thus, prosecuted.
"Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness, and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of
Labeling Theory", supra note 1 at 82.
43 Ibid at 71.
37
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that membership in a delinquent gang contributes to criminal embeddedness.

44

Thus,

earlier gang membership significantly increases the chance of subsequent gang
membership,45 as well as subsequent delinquency.46 Such data indicates that labelling
individuals augments the breadth of deviant associative ties, and increases deviance and
perpetuates deviance.

Evidence of the severe nature of criminal embeddedness and outlaw identity via gang
membership is demonstrated by the comments ofIndian Posse member Trevor Lacasse
who says, "1 regret ever picking up a rag.,,47 His comments evince the power of the
symbol of the gang bandanna - that is to say, that the rag marks him as a member. His
tattoos also permanently mark him, and permanently provide him with an identity and
sense of belonging. Lacasse has certain meanings for every tattoo that he has on his
body, and in spite of his regret in "picking up a rag", he will never take them off, such as
48
his "pride" refening to a tattoo of that word along the underside of both of his forearms.
He has been asked to take them off, but will never take them off. 49 He is not "heavy into"
the gang any more, but he will never take off his tattoos. They are there for life. 50 He
explains, "For me to take these off would just be like ...just like putting a knife into the
heart, ya know, saying, 'Fuck that you never had any part of these guys no more' .. .I'm
patt of them forever."sl

Like tattoos, once imposed, labels are difficult to remove. Even when an organized crime
outlaw attempts to de-self-label, the process is arduous and may not readily be accepted
by members of conventional society or the criminal milieu. Not only is the decision to
de-self-label difficult and conflicting, but pressures from the organized crime group may

Ibid.
Ibid. at 77.
46 Ibid. at 80.
47 Catherine Bainbridge, Katherine Cisek & CBC Newsworld, Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang
TerritOlJ' VHS (Montreal: Wild He.,1 Productions Inc., 1998) at 12:27.
48 Ibid. at 34:26.
49 Ibid. at 34:31.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. at 34:37.
44
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stymie effOits to extricate oneself. The Ontario Superior C0U11 of Justice in R. v. Myles 52
noted this phenomenon:

14

I then tUI'll to the other change in circumstances, that is, Mr. Myles' alleged
resignation from the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club that is said to have occurred
on June 15, 2007. There are a number of problems with this assertion. One is that
the resignation is not, on Mr. Myles' own evidence, complete. It cannot be
completed until Mr. Myles "dates" his Hells Angels tattoo and that cannot be done
while he is in a detention facility. Another is the fact that a member who has
resigned can apply for re-admission into the Hells Angels, a fact that Mr. Myles
admitted. While Mr. Myles contended that this process would take at least two
years, I have doubts that it would take an individual, such as Mr. Myles, who has
been a member of this, or a predecessor, club for some twenty years, and who has
held a senior position within that organization, such a length of time to rejoin his
former comrades.

15 More imp0l1antly, however, is the manner in which this resignation came
about. While Mr. Myles contends that he had been contemplating this action for a
few years, the fact is that he never acted upon it until he had twice been denied his
release as a direct consequence of his membership in the .Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club. He did not act on it in late 2000 when the Hells Angels absorbed most of the
members of the Para-Dice Riders, the club of which Mr. Myles was then a
member. Instead he decided to accept membership in the Hells Angels even
though his former wife urged him not to do so.

16

Further, Mr. Myles did not resign from the Hells Angels at any later point,
even though he knew that his current wife objected to his membership in the Hells
Angels as did his father-in-law. Indeed, not only did Mr. Myles not resign from
the Hells Angels, he put himself forward for, and was elected to, the position of
Vice-President of the Toronto chapter and was re-elected to that same position just
last year.

17 In addition, throughout the time that Ml'. Myles says that he was debating
giving up his membership in the Hells Angels, the evidence suggests that he was
actively engaged in a significant cocaine transaction; that he was involved in
attempting to resolve a serious dispute that had arisen regarding another member
of the Toronto chapter over a large transaction in GHB; and he was directly
involved in questioning the police agent regarding whether he was, in fact, a
police agent when suspicions arose regarding that individual. Fut1her, Mr. Myles'
home was used in connection with some ofthese events including being the place
where the police agent picked up a kilogram of cocaine and where the questioning
of the police agent occurred. Still further, when the police arrested Mr. Myles and
searched his house, they found a number of sheets on Hells Angels' members with
detailed personal information ~ the purpose of which, it is suggested, was to
ensure that members would not inform on the Hells Angels because the
organization would know the whereabouts of members' families.
" [2007] 0.1. No. 4985 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.C.J.) [R. v. Myles].
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18 I do not believe that it would be giving cynicism too much sway in those
circumstances to question the genuineness of Mr. Myles' resignation. However,
even if Mr. Myles has sincerely and irrevocable severed his association with the
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, I am not convinced that that fact would materially
change the analysis that lead Madam Justice Wilson to her conclusion that Mr.
Myles' detention was justified. Indeed, I believe that Mr. Myles' father-in-law put
the issue into its proper context when he said in his evidence that MI'. Myles'
resignation from the Hells Angels was "too little, too late, perhaps".

19 In terms of the secondary grounds, just because Mr. Myles is no longer a
member of the Hells Angels does not mean that he is still not susceptible to
direction at the instance of others who are still members of that club. To conclude
otherwise is to ignore the very nature, structure and histOlY of that organization. I
would note in that regard that Mr. Myles carefully followed the rules to resign
from the Hells Angels. That could be because he remains respectful of the
organization or because it [sic1fears it. It would also ignore Mr. Myles' statement
that he was "conflicted" in his decision to resign, a suggestion that he still feels
some considerable degree of attachment to the organization.
The stickiness of negative labels necessitates the adoption of anti-organized crime
measures that do not formally label, stigmatize and degrade individuals.

3.5.4

Insights for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to

Deviance and Labelling Theory
The use oflabelling theOlY in conjunction with social constructionism reveals, in part, the
reasons that labels embed criminal deviancy. At the very least, such an interlacing of
theolY brings to light the inherent dangers within the social construction of labels. The
crystallization and rigidity of language 53 cement the application of criminally deviant
labels to individuals in society, and entrench subsequent negative social interactions
between the deviant and non-deviant. The historicity of language 54 leads to stereotyping,
and stereotyping often accompanies the application of a label, and potentially a false label

53 Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction ofReality, 1" ed. (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1966) at 36.
54 Ibid. at 35-36 and 55. While Berger and Luckmann use the term "historicity" in relation to "social
institutions", similar elements apply to language. Berger and Luckmann describe the merits and demerits of
language as it conveys a constructed reality, ibid. at 36:
... [L]anguage is capable of becoming the objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning
and experience, which it can then preserve in time and transmit to following generations.
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that still results in secondary deviance. 55 In the context of organized crime, although
gangs have distinctive characteristics, the label of "gang" sweeps diverse groups into one
category. For instance, labelling of imprisoned Aboriginal offenders as gang members or
non-gang members leads to more discrimination that the usual racism alleged to occur in
prison institutions. 56 Aboriginal prisoners labelled as gang members allegedly have less
access to and provision of institutional programs. 57 Aboriginal offenders generally also
may fail to qualify for short-term release, release to community facilities, or parole more
often than non-Aboriginal offenders. 58

Stereotyping as a negative effect of labelling also prevents the consideration and
implementation of proper solutions to the gang problem, and even increases deviancy of
gang members who become what others consider them to be:
... The public and researchers commonly stereotype gangs, often assuming there is
no variation between them and that all gangs develop the worst behavior displayed
by anyone. "A gang is a gang is a gang" (Moore, "Gangs" 28) attitude prevails
when gangs actually have diverse traditions and organization and vary between
city, community, and neighborhood (Hagehorn 167; Miller 282; Monti 9). This

stereotyping is often accompanied by two dangerous side effects. First, when
gang members are labeled and treated as though they belong to the most deviant
gang, they often act like members of that gang (Huff313). Secondly, when
55 Jana Marie Grekul &Patti LaBoucane-Benson, An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment of
Aboriginal Gangs in Westel'l1 Canada (Ottawa: Aboriginal Corrections Policy Unit, Public Safety Canada,
2006) [An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Westel'l1 Canada] at

23-24; and Robert M. Gordon, "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and "Wanna-Be" Groups: A
Vancouver Perspective" (2000) 42 Canadian Journal of Criminology 39 at 47-48. Grekul and LaBoucaneBenson describe, ibid at 42, the negative effects offalse labelling in the context of aboriginal street gangs:
How does labelling contribute to gang involvement? Let us turn to one of our ex-gang
members for his insight on the topic. "The police are not trusted because ofa history ofracism,
like finding gang members, taking off their shoes and leaving them in rival gang territory." This
individual also describes how "police called them a gang so they began to act that way and
identifying themselves that way". It is not a far leap to see how disenfranchised youth labelled as
gang members by authorities would fall into that role relatively easily. For how long can one
protest one's innocence (or in this case, non-gang affiliation) before it seems futile to do so and
easier to just concede? Considering the larger "battles" these children are faced with such as
family abuse, substance abuse, violence, and school problems, it is understandable that fighting a
false label may result not only in concession but a "giving in", palticularly when family members
or peers are encouraging the young person to in fact join a gang. At any rate, whether directly or
indirectly, it appears that labelling plays a key role in the creation and perpetuation of gang

involvement.
Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the Correctional Service of Canada on Aboriginal Youth Gang Members
in the Federal Corrections System, slIpra note 35 at 7.
" Ibid.
58 Ibid.
56
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stereotypes and second guessings are used as the basis for public policy and
reform efforts, the wrong treatment is often prescribed to the problem (Hagehorn
169; Miller 282; Moore, "Gangs" 32). 5 [Emphasis added].
The inability of a socially constructed label to accurately set forth gang differences,
necessitates consideration of whether a socially constructed legal definition may capture
all gangs by relying on stereotypical assumptions, and thus, will not accurately administer
justice, nor deter and prevent gangs from engaging in criminal activities.

The connections between labelling theory and theories of differential association, social
constructionism, and social psychology (which will be discussed in Chapter Six next)
explain the significance of deviancy and labelling in the creation of otherness and outlaw
identities. These connections also suggest the ways in which society maintains and
perpetuates a collective conventional identity, and paradoxically, maintains and
perpetuates criminally deviant or outlaw identities.
... [Llabelling theory offers the important component of stigmatization by
authorities, whether they are parents, teachers, police officers, or others. Negative
labels can propel the marginalized youth further into the so-called deviant
subculture. Having been rejected by mainstream society, the welcoming arms of
their fellow comrades, similarly labelled, seem like the best and perhaps the only
choice for support and feelings of belonging. In a sense then, labelling theorists
credit social control agents and other authority figures in some instances with the
creation, and celtainly the perpetuation and solidification of deviant groups and
subcultures. The suggestion is that if we could avoid labelling, we could prevent
the formation of criminal careers, and for our jurposes in this paper, the
attractiveness and "staying power" of gangs. 6
Futther, the ongoing demonization of gang and organized crime outlaws makes efforts to
understand their origins, and the ways in which society ought to address their outlawry,
less clear and more difficult.

61

Kristin M. Peterson, Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Foclls GrollI' Discllssions with Gang Members
and At-Risk Youth (M.A. Thesis, Greenspun School of Communication, University of Nevada, 1994)

59

[unpublished] at 18.
60

An Investigation into the Formation and Recruitment ofAboriginal Gangs in Western Canada, sllpra

note 54 at 40.
61 E.J. Dickson-Gilmore & Chris Whitehead, "Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a
Typology for Understanding and Strategizing Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3 at 19; and
Michael C. Chettleburgh, Young Thugs: Inside the Dangerous World of Canadian Street Gangs (Toronto:
HarperCollins, 2007) at 26. Chettleburgh opines:
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The application of deviance and labelling theory to gangs suggests that labelling
individuals negatively affects subsequent social interactions between the declared
deviants and non-deviants, and casts them out or outlaw them from conventional society.
This process can lead those labelled to adopt the assigned deviant, criminal or outlaw
identity, and perpetuate their identity through criminal associations with other deviants or
outlaws. These phenomena suggest that anti-organized crime approaches ought to avoid
formal negative labels and stigmatization in order to prevent potential deviants or outlaws
from being ousted from larger society; to maintain or foster positive interactions between
perceived deviants or outlaws and members of conventional society; and to reduce the
internal cohesion and power of gangs or organized crime outlaws. Criminal law measures
may remedy some of these requisites. Civil law and non-legal measures may provide
other, better or more effective solutions.

These insights will be examined in Chapter Four, section six "Requisite Five for AntiOrganized Crime Measures", and section eight "Requisite Seven for Anti-Organized
Crime Measures."

... Perception is OUl' biggest obstacle to ending gang violence. Demonizing gang members as the
evil other, the barbarians at the gate~and therefore requiring the stern hand of our government
protectors~will almost certainly cloud our understanding of what to do about the gang problem.
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3.6

IDENTITY FORMATION FROM A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

PERSPECTIVE

3.6.1

Overview

Social psychology' weaves its way into the patchwork of theory pertaining to criminal
organization outlaws and identity in the ways that it suggests individuals, singularly, and
collectively as a group, form identities2 in society. Social psychology asserts that identity
is constituted from self and society? It is a socially constructed reality.4 Self is
developed through self-objectification which occurs when the self, "as an object among a
world of objects", experiences interaction with other objects. 5 The self is realized or
defined through subjectivation based on experiences without the presence of others, or
through objectivation based on experiences with others, such as another individual or
group. 6 Only this latter category of experience, which deals with events that result in an
individual orienting himself to the presence of others, is relevant within social
psychology. 7 Group objectifications also can shape the development of self, and occur

I C. Norman Alexander, Jr. & Mary Glenn Wiley, "Situated Activity and Identity Formation" in Morris
Rosenberg & Ralph H. Turner, eds., Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1981) ["Situated Activity and Identity Formation"] at 269. Alexander and Wiley note the
broad or amorphous nature of social psychology, and cite G.W. Allport, "The Historical Background of
Modern Social Psychology" in G. Lindzey & E. Aronson, eds., The Handbook a/Social Psychology, Vol. [
(Reading: Addison-Wes[ey, 1968) at 3 in order to explain the essence of the theory:
Despite major differences of theory and method there is general subscription to Allpolt' s
definition of social psychology as " ... an attempt to understand and explain how the thought,
feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of
others" ....
2 Andrew J. Weigelt, J. Smith Teitge & Dennis W. Teitge, Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University, [986) [Society and Identity: Toward a SOCiological
Psychology] at 53 define "identity" as follows:
Identity is a typified self at a state in the life course situated in a context of organized social
relationships.
At ibid. at 40, referring to Gregory P. Stone, "Appearance and the Self' in Arnold M. Rose, ed., Human
Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), Weigert, Teitge and Teitge explain the
term "identity" in this way:
Identity is a "typified" or socially expressed dimension of self (Stone 1962). An
individual has one self that becomes situation ally typified through a variety of identities. Identities
constitutes [sic] the "social self," or self in the context of social action.
3 Ibid. at 32 and 34. In the context of the individual self, the term " I" applies, and the terms "me", "you",
"he" and "she" reflect the context of self with others. Ibid. at 32. A collective identity becomes "we" or
"they." Ibid. at 33.
4 [bid. at 35.
, Ibid. at 43.

6

Ibid.

7 "Situated

Activity and Identity Formation", supra note I at 273.
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when a group serves as the reference point or reference reality that defines the individual
based on the association of the individual and others in that group.8

Similar to social constructionist assertions that social reality affects and shapes the
identities of individuals and that individuals have variable and constrained ability to shape
their own identities,9 and similar to the labelling theory which shows the influence of
social interaction on identity,1O the social psychology perspective asserts that the
experience and interaction of individuals continuously shapes identity as a social reality. I I
Identity is formed or constructed through social and symbolic interaction or situated
activities l2 in relation to objects with meaning, such as others. Acts of bestowal or
appropriation of meaningful objects, are met with responsive acts of acceptance or
rejection. 13 An individual expresses something about himselfto others, and in so doing,

8
9

Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological Psychology, supra note 2 at 45.
Ibid at 2-3. In contrast, reductionist social constructionists asselt that individuals create their own

identities.
IO Sean Maddan, The Labeling oJSex Offenders: The Unintended Consequences oJthe Best Intentional
Public Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008) at 23-24.
II Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological Psychology, supra note 2 at 30.
12 "Situated Activity and Identity Formation", supra note I at 273. Alexander and Wiley explain that
"situated activity" provide the conditions for identity formation:
... Conduct becomes situated activity when it is anchored outside the self and constrained by
presumed monitoring. Thus, we define situated activity as conduct in the symbolically defined
space and time within which an actor presumes that events are being or might be monitored by
another. The monitoring does not have to coincide with the action, as when traces are left or
accounts are planned, and ... it does not have to be actual monitoring, merely presumed or
potential.
13 Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological Psychology, supra note 2 at 31. Weigert, Teitge and Teitge
cite George H. Mead, Mind, Self & Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) in their
description of the process of identity development:
As a totally social production, identity is a humanly constructed, defined, and sustained
meaningful object. To be recognizably human, an organism must be interpreted as a meaningful
identity; that is, as an object. An "object" is any reality toward which humans symbolically
organize their responses and thus give it a meaning (Mead 1934). The object is socially
meaningful to the extent that responses by others and by self fit together to reach the goals and
embody the intentions of interacting individuals, as well as to represent the group's collective
action. Yet human identity is a special meaningful object: It is both totally social and uniquely
personal; it results from varying degrees of appropriation by self andlor bestowal by others. The
dramatic quality of life flows in part from the endless negotiations of identities as self attempts to
appropriate identities that others do not bestow, or others attempt to bestow identities that self does
not appropriate.
How is it that identities are selves as "meaningful objects" that individuals can bestow or
withhold, and appropriate or reject? The answer to this question derives from the paIticular reality
of human identity. Identity is a definition that transforms a mere biological individual into a
human person. It is a definition that emerges fi'om and is sustained by the cultural meanings of
social relationships activated in interaction. At the everyday empirical level, identity is available
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affects their perception of him, 14 and in turn, he is formed or changed through their
reaction or expression to him. As this process repeats and continues, society affects the
behaviour of an individual, and in so doing, shapes an individual's identity. Identity, in
turn, then affects behaviour.

Unlike other theories discussed in this Chapter, social psychology brings a different
perspective to the collection by explaining the process or processes by which individuals
internalize and develop an identity - namely, the process of degradation and the act of
display. This section will not outline the essential tenets of social psychology, but rather,
it will focus on only two concepts within this theory that have relevance to identity
formation. Namely, it will explain and apply "degradation" and "display" in relation to
organized crime outlaws.

As examination of these concepts in social psychology in this section will reveal the
following:
Insight 11.
Anti-organized crime measures in Canada should increase positive
social and symbolic interaction or situated activities with individuals who are at
risk of criminal deviance or outlawry.
Insight 12.
Anti-organized crime measures should avoid degradation of
organized crime outlaws through social and legal processes.
Insight 13.
Anti-organized crime measures should diminish display of negative
or violent identities of organized crime outlaws in order to decrease their internal
cohesion and the power of their reputation.

3.6.2

Identity Formation From a Social Psychology Perspective

3.6.2.1

"Degradation" Within Social Psychology

Within the social psychology is the concept of "degradation ceremony" which bears a
marked resemblance to the process oflabelling:

thl'Ough language, the systems of codes by which humans define self and other. An empirically
adequate treatment would have to include the myriad forms available in each historical period for
defining selves. We intend "definition" in a broad sense to include nominal as well as qualifYing
terms. Indeed, the "languages" of gestures and appearances are also included.
14 "Situated Activity and Identity Formation", supra note I at 274.
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Garfinkel (1956) outlines an interaction process in which a negative
identity is forcejilily imposed on an unwilling recipient. A young woman claiming
innocence is publicly proclaimed guilty of murder at a criminal trial in a court of
law and forcefully jailed for life; and adult man is publicly court-martialed,
stripped of all privileges, and dismissed from the army on charges of collaborating
with the Vietcong against his own country; a young child is publicly denounced
for cheating on an English test, accused of violating the standards of the school,
and given an F grade in front of his classmates - each of these scenarios
represents that Garfinkel calls a "degradation ceremony."
A degradation ceremony is "any communicative ·work between persons,
whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into something looked on as
lower in the local scheme ofsocial types ... " (Garfinkel 1956: 420). If we assume
that no normal citizen desires a negative or "lower" identity in the moral ranking,
then a degradation ceremony involves the coercive imposition of a demeaning
identity on an unwilling recipient. The ceremonial order of human life includes
the offering of deference, or appreciation for a person, and the enactment of
demeanor, or the expression of the unique valued qualities of a person (Goffman
1967). In a degradation ceremony, the value of a person is negated: A person,
like bad money, is depreciated; and he or she is forced to act in a demeaning way,
like sitting in a comer, wearing a dunce cap, kneeling obeisantly, or kissing a
superior's foot.
Degradation ceremonies are not always successful, however. Persons
whose identities are being devalued may actually seek to devalue them 01',
paradoxically, succeed in devaluing the identities of those presiding over the
ceremony. In these cases, the ceremony is used by the "victims" to attack the
reigning institutional order. By turning the tables, the victims of the ceremony
degrade the identities of those presiding over it. ... 15 [Emphasis added].

In this degradation process, the act of imposing or attempting to impose a morally inferior
identity resembles the process of imposing a deviant label within the concept of primary
deviance. The acceptance of degradation or the internalization of a societal label during
secondary deviance can result in the formation of a new identity, such as a morally
inferior, criminally deviant, or outlaw identity. And, like the process of internalization in
secondary deviance, the degradation process seemingly contemplates a situation where
the individual who is subject to degradation or labeling, rebels against the degradation or
labeling and may maintains an adherence to societal values and institutional norms and
does not adopt a new identity. As Becker noted, if a person being labelled perceives his
judges or labelers as incompetent or illegitimately entitled to do so, he may view them
15 Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological Psychology, supra note 2 at 47-48. Weigert, Teitge and
Teitge cite Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies" (1956) 61 American
Journal of Sociology 420.
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rather than himselfas the "outsider." I 6 This situation would again lead to Rotenberg's
assertion that more may be required to make a label, such as "frog" or "prince", stick.

3.6.2.2

"Display" Within Social Psychology

Social reality as it shapes and affects identity in social construction theory, and the
concepts of bestowal and acceptance in the theory of social psychology, echo the essence
of the concepts oflabeling, internalization, and secondary deviance within the labeling
theory. All three of these theories recognize the impact of social relationships or
interaction on an individual's sense of self. They propose that an individual will accept,
to some degree, what others impose on him as to what or who he is, and what he accepts
affects how he navigates within society.

The continuous process of shaping of identity and affecting of future behaviour, further
emboldens identity. This effect contributes to an explanation for the generation of an
outlaw identity.
To be an identified self is to be a "displayed" self. Display means to "fold
apart" or "unfold" into meaningful patterns of interaction and symbolic
presentation that communicate self. The term is borrowed from ethologists, and
its use for the cOlllll1unication of human identity is apt. The kind of
communication involved in presenting self for identification is indeed display; it is
behavior rendered meaningful as interaction; it is interaction interpreted as
symbolic manifestations of self. Humans must appear to one another; they must
act toward each other; and they normally engage in a generalized symbolic
medium of mutual presentation constituted by language and gesture. Each of
these modes of presentation of self follows its own intrinsic logic of display. Each
is the object of a number of separate disciplines, and each discipline defines
separate objects found nested in its methodological and theoretical paradigms
from fashion to metalinguistics.
In addition to the literal content of the message communicated through
each of these modalities, identity is simultaneously and necessarily communicated
as well. Every moment of our lives can be interpreted as an identity display and
probed for the meaning it contains relevant for knowing the identities of the
displayer ....
Displays do not merely communicate identity to others, however. They
also communicate identity to self, both through the inner "propriosensation" of
kinesthetic and self imagery available to the performer, and through the
interactional interpretation made of the display in subsequent responses by others.
16

Howard S. Becker, Outsiders (New York: Free Press, \968) at 1-2.
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Classical symbolic interaction theory emphasizes the interactive process in the
"looking-glass self," or mirror theory of identity. The mirror theory argues that
we are what others' reflections make us. In addition, however, we are also what
we sense ourselves to be in our inner conversation within the private forum of
self-consciousness and concomitant self-awareness. Displays, then, construct
identities in the minds,feelings, and responses of others, and simultaneously in
the mind, feelings, and actions ofself. Identity is produced as a social object by
the hl'O processes ofsubjectivation and objectivation. We construct ourselves as
we display ourselves /0 others. We become what we show ourselves to be to
others and self(see Gecas 1982) .
... A person displays an identity because she or he is committed to that
identity by self and for others. Commitment refers to a structure of meaning
constituting our self experience, both that which we hold in awareness and that
which may be temporarily out of awareness. Identities are part of this structure of
meanings. 17 [Emphasis added].
Based on the foregoing, an individual who displays an identity may have a certain level or
degree of commitment to that identity. However, he may not be aware of the extent of
the structure of meaning associated with that identity. This temporary lack of awareness
suggests that bolstering of the identity may occur through further experience or
comprehension related to the meanings derived from the display of and response to that
identity.

3.6.3 Application of Concepts within Social Psychology to the Identity
of Organized Crime Outlaws
The concepts of degradation and display have palticular relevance to the formation of
outlaw identities. With respect to degradation, Aboriginal street gangs exemplify
instances where members, as well as Aboriginal peoples generally, have been subject to
negative stereotypes, and cast out of various societal institutions - educationally,
politically, socially and economically. As some members of the Indian Posse indicate,
such as Trevor Lacasse, membership in a gang provides acceptance and familyl8 that may
not otherwise be available in conventional societal institutions. The societal
disenfranchisement of Aboriginal street gang members amounts to a situation where
17 Society and Identity: Toward a Sociological Psychology, sllpra note 2 at 50-51. Weigert, Teitge and
Teitge cite Viktor Gecas, "The Self Concept" (1982) 8 Annual Review of Sociology I.
18 Catherine Bainbridge, Katherine Cisek & CBC Newsworld, Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang
Terrifol)' VHS (Montreal: Wild Heart Productions Inc., 1998) [Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang
TerrifDlY] at 34: 13.

191

"negative identity is forcefully imposed on an unwilling recipient.,,19 Further, the
initiation process within Aboriginal street gangs only exacerbates this forceful imposition
when gang members physically beat a prospective member to initiate him into the gang. 20
While the concept of display within social psychology does not specifically make
mention of tangible items which communicate identity, an elaboration on the concept
would explain the social reaction and interactions that occur during the communication of
identity via a meaningful object. In this way, the act of display, and consequent
augmentation of identity by display, has particular relevance to gangs or criminal
organizations in which members have gang names or insignia. Display of gang insignia
has elicited, or been associated with, negative responses by non-gang members or lawabiding members of society. The display of gang insignia instills fear and intimidation,
and gang members, such as members of the Hells Angels and other outlaw motorcycle
gangs, use or display their names and insignia in order to effect their criminal purposes. 21
However, according to "display" within social psychology, another purpose exists for, or
another consequence occurs as a result of such behaviour. Display directly relates to the
development or entrenchment of an identity within an individual when that individual
wears a gang insignia or uses a gang name in reference to himself. If such selfobjectification occurs in relation to the individual, group-objectification could arguably
occur as well- that is to say, that display may also contribute to the maintenance and
emboldening of internal cohesion within the gang or self-perceived power of the gang
when members collectively wear their insignia and assert their gang name.
Among outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Hells Angels organization exemplifies extreme use
of display, and the entrenchment of an organized crime identity. Essentially, they declare
who they are to each other. The Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation owns the

19 Society and Idenlily: Toward a Sociological Psychology, supra nole 2 al 47-48. Weigert, Teilge and
Teitge cile Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies" (1956) 61 American
Journal of Sociology 420.
20 Indian Posse: Life in Aboriginal Gang Terri/oIY, supra note 18. Gang member Trevor Lacasse
described recruitment.
.
21 R. v. Wagner, 2008 CarswellOnl 5093 (Ont. S.C.1.) at paras. 32-34.
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"colours" or trademarked patch ofthe club. 22 Hells Angels take innumerable photographs
of themselves with each other in their gang insignia and also without it. Hells Angels
clubhouses containing a large number of Hells Angels photos of members in their patches
have been observed, along with banners, plaques, and endless types of paraphernalia
bearing the Hells Angels name or death head or both. The exterior of Hells Angels
clubhouses often have signs with the Hells Angels name or emblems. These clubhouses
have significant security systems, such as the East End clubhouse,23 and limitations as to
who may enter. The display of Hells Angels name and insignia within the clubhouse and
by one member to another, demonstrates the means or efforts to bolster internal cohesion
among the full patch members, "prospects", "hangarounds", "official friends", and
associates who have the right or an invitation to attend. This display within the group
serves to entrench the Hells Angel outlaw identity collectively.
Hells Angels members also individually demonstrate extreme uses of display, and
internalization of the Hells Angels identity. For instance, often Hells Angels have tattoos
of the death head. 24 Indeed, like other full patch Hells Angel members, Ronaldo Lising
had top and bottom Hells Angel rockers tattooed on the front of his torso, as well as other
Hells Angel tattoos on his alms. He filled his basement with countless t-shil1s, hats,
pieces of jewelry, photos bearing the Hells Angel name or death head or both. 25
Seemingly part of his security system, Lising had three Hells Angels stickers on exterior
entrance ways to his house?6 On a number of occasions in public and in dealings with
individuals within the criminal milieu, he wore the Hells Angels emblem, death head
earrings, and clothing that revealed his Hells Angel tattoos. The actions of Hells Angel
full patch members, Steven Patrick Lindsay and Raymond Lawrence Bonner, also
exemplify display and declaration of identity. They wore their Hells Angel emblems on
the jackets that they were wearing when they conducted an extol1ion in association with

R. v. Lilld",y, 2005 CanLII 24240, [2005] OJ. No. 2870 (Q.L.) [R. v. Lilldsay, Irial decision] at para. 237.
R. v. Violelle, 2009 BCSC 1025, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1940 (Q.L.) [R. v. Violelle] at paras. 66-69.
" R. v. Lindsay, trial decision, supra note 22 at para. 264. EXPeJt and then-Staff-Sergeant Jacques Lemieux
22

23

testified that Hells Angels members often have tattoos of the death head.
R. v. Violelle, supra note 23 at para. 36.

25

26

Ibid.
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the Hells Angel organization,27 and thus, sought to elicit a pat1icular response in the
person with whom they were coercively interacting. The actions of Hells Angel Randall
Richard Potts also show the use of display, and significant entrenchment of the Hells
Angel identity. After two and a half years of being "on the program" within the East End
Hells Angels Chatier, Potts became a full patch member, and was "exceedingly proud of
this fact.,,28 He displayed a black version of his patch, and alluded to his membership in
the club during his dealings with individuals within the criminal milieu. And, he used the
Hells Angels name to conduct a wide range of activities, such as ordering an individual to
return a car,29 attempting to retrieve fuearms and grenades,30 and making dinner
reservations. These examples not only J'eveal proof of theoretical explanations for
external and internal declaration of identity by outlaws to produce particular responses in
others and themselves. They also reveal some requirements for legislative provisions that
seek to counter organized crime.

3.6.4

Insights for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to

Social Psychology
The concepts of "degradation" and "display" within social psychology, and its
reinforcement and augmentation of explanations within social construction and labelling
theories pedaining to identity formation, internalization, and externalization, are useful in
evaluating criminal organization laws in Canada. They suggest that anti-organized crime
measmes in Canada ought to increase positive social and symbolic interaction or situated
activities with individuals who are at risk of criminal deviance or outlawry; avoid
degradation through legal processes; and diminish display of negative or violent identities
in order to decrease internal cohesion and to reduce the schism between outlaw and
conventional norms and values. These theoretical revelations suggest the development of
tmique methods to counter organized crime, such as through the dilution or tamishment of
gang names and insignia through trademark and copyright laws.

R. v. Lindsay, trial decision, slIpra note 22 at paras. 1085-86.
R. v. Violelle, slIpra note 23 at para. 65.
29 Ibid. at para. 66.
30 Ibid. at para. 75.

27
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194

These insights will be examined in Chapter Four, section four "Requisite Three for AntiOrganized Crime Measures", section five "Requisite Four for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures", section six "Requisite Five for Anti-Organized Crime Measures", and section
seven "Requisite Six for Anti-Organized Crime Measures."
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3.6

SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS FOR EVALUATING CRIMINAL

ORGANIZATioN MEASURES

This Chapter analysed theoretical concepts within social consttuctionism, social control,
differential association or social learning in groups and subcultures, deviance and
labelling, and social psychology. One theory alone cannot account for the creation of
organized crime outlaws, and cannot itself explain the purpose and effects of the antiorganized crime measures. Each theory is but a pair of glasses to use to view the world.
Each theory fails to account for details that other theories address, but at times, theories
have overlapping concepts. Thus, the employment of a variety of theories will likely
improve one's vision. This compound lens will illuminate the birth of organized crime
outlaws, and facilitate a critique and formulation of requisites for anti-organized crime
measures. The lessons learned from these sociological, psychological and criminological
theories regarding the causes of organized crime outlaws and their outlawry, will be
synthesized into requisites in the introduction to the next chapter of this thesis, Chapter
Four. These requisites will inform the evaluation in the next sections of this thesis as to
the effectiveness, the justness, and the fairness of organized crime legislation in Canada.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SATISFYING THE THEORETICAL REQUISITES

FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES
4.1

INTRODUCTION: SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES
Just as some concepts and assertions within the various sociological and criminological
theories overlapped, some of their insights for anti-organized crime measures also overlap
or have great similarity with subtle differences. These overlapping or similar insights will
be combined together as one requisite. As a result, the following list of requisites will be
used in each section of this Chapter to analyse and evaluate the criminal organization
laws that presently exist in Canada. The theoretical insights for anti-organized crime
measures, as well as the names of the sociological

01'

criminological theories from which

these insights were extracted in Chapter Three, are summarized below.

Insight One from social constructionism and Insight Four from social control and bond
theory both comment on the fairness, justness, effective and principled natnre and of
organized crime laws. Thus, these two Insights will be combined to form the new
Requisite One in Chapter Four of the thesis:
Requisite Olle

Rooted in Social Constrllctionism and Social Control and Bond TheO/y:
Anti-organized crime measures should calm moral panic and re-establish or
maintain social order with substantive rather than hollow criminal measures that
legitimize the state.
a.
These measures should either socially construct a legal definition that
applies to all organized crime outlaw groups without capturing more than
the intended groups, or they should simply proscribe that certain organized
crime groups are criminal organizations according to the Criminal Code.
b.
These measures should be useful to law enforcement and prosecutions;
they must not be overly complex in relation to evidentiary and procedural
issues.
c.
These measures should foster belief and commitment to formal societal
values, and thus, secure obedience by punishing non-law-abiding societal
members, and deterring those who may potentially violate the law.
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Insight two, the insights extracted from social constructionism regarding regulation of
media, does not overlap with other theoretical concepts analysed in Chapter Three. Thus,
Requisite Two remains the same as Insight Two:

Requisite Two

Rooted in Social Constructionism:
Anti-organized crime measures should fairly restrain or use media, in accordance
with principles offreedom of expression, in their public dissemination of
information.
a.
These measures should prevent stigmatization, ostracization, and
sensationalizing organized crime outlaws through media.
b.
These measures should not incite moral panic via media representations
that glorify gang lifestyles, that increase the power of their reputations, and
that bolster gang identities.
c.
These measures should use media to launch anti-gang advertising
campaigns in order to discourage gang membership; to create new noncriminal identities for these offenders ifthe offender has a Willingness to
change; and to sensationalize the powers and victories of law enforcement
in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry.
Part ofInsight Three from social control and bond theOlY, and Insight Nine from deviance
and labelling theory both comment on the creation and maintenance of pro-social
interactions and bonds among law-abiding societal members. Thus, these two Insights
will be combined to form Requisite Three in Chapter Four:

Requisite Three

Rooted in Social Control and Bond TheOlY, and Social Psychology:
Anti-organized crime measures should foster pro-social bonds among societal
members.
a.
These measures should foster bonds through attachment to conventional
others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in conventional
activities; and belief in a common and conventional value system.
Part ofInsight Three from social control and bond theory, Insight Seven from differential
association and social learning in subcultures, and Insight Eleven from social psychology
all comment on the creation and maintenance of pro-social interactions and bonds
between non-deviant (and thus, non-organized crime) members of society and deviant
(including organized crime) members of society. Thus, these three Insights will be
combined to form Requisite Four in Chapter Four:

Reqllisite FOllr

Rooted in Social Control and Bond TheOlY, Differential Association and Social
Learning in Subcultures, and Social Psychology:
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Anti-organized crime measures should maintain or foster positive social aud
symbolic interactions or situated activities between perceived deviants or outlaws
(that is say, individuals who are at risk of criminal deviance or outlawry), and
members of conventional society.
a.
These measures should ensure the re-integration and rehabilitation of
organized crime offenders.
b.
These measures should provide pro-social learning and pro-social learning
environments for organized crime outlaws.
c.
The measures should provide re-educative processes for members who
leave or who are incapacitated from their organized crime group, and the
presence of a non-outlaw environment in which ex-members can interact
with law-abiding members of society.
Insight Five from differential association and social learning in subcultures, and Insight
Ten from deviance and labelling theory both comment on the internal cohesion and antisocial relations within a deviant or anti-social group, and the consequent bolstering of that
identity. Thus, these two Insights will be combined to form Requisite Five in Chapter
Four:
Requisite Five
Rooted in Differential Association and Social Learning in Subcultures, and
Deviance and Labelling TheolY:
Anti-organized crime measures should limit and prevent differential association
and anti-social learning within the subcultures of outlaws.
a.
These measures should reduce the internal cohesion and power of gangs or
organized crime outlaws, and the reinforcement oftheir identities through
ongoing anti-social interactions with one another in order to prevent the
perpetuation of their identity and the empowerment of thei r reputations,
for instance. For instance, such measures should ban associations to some
degree and in some circumstances.
Insight Six from differential association and social learning in subcultures, and Insight
Thirteen from social psychology both comment on the power of gang identities through
the use or display of names and insignia. Thus, these two Insights will be combined to
form Requisite Six in Chapter Four:
Requisite Six
Rooted in Differential Association and Social Learning in Subcultures, and Social
Psychology:
Anti-organized crime measures should prevent and limit the bolstering of
organized crime identities th.rough the use of gang names and insignia in public
and in private in order to decrease their internal cohesion and the power of their
reputation. For instance, such measures should diminish or ban the display of
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names and symbols associated with negative or violent identities of organized
crime outlaws.
Insight Eight from deviance and labelling theory, and Insight Twelve from social
psychology both comment on the processes by which ostracization occurs for deviant
(including organized crime outlaw) members of society. Thus, these two Insights will be
combined to form Requisite Seven in Chapter Four:

Requisite Seven

Rooted in Deviance and Labelling TheOlY, and Social Psychology:
Anti-organized crime approaches should avoid the imposition of formal negative
labels, stigmatization and degradation in social and legal processes in order to
prevent potential deviants or outlaws from being ousted from larger society, and
thus, deepening the chasm between non-outlaw members of society and outlaw
members of society.
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4.2

REQUISITE ONE FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES
Requisite Olle
Rooted ill Social Constructionism, and Social COlllrol and Bond TheO/y:
Anti-organized crime measures must calm moral panic and re-establish or
maintain social order with substantive rather than hollow criminal measures that
legitimize the state.
a.
These measures must either socially construct a legal definition that
applies to all organized crime outlaw groups without capturing more than
the intended groups, or they must simply proscribe that certain organized
crime groups are "criminal organizations" according to the Criminal Code.
b.
These measures must be useful to law enforcement and prosecutions; they
must not be overly complex in relation to evidentiary and procedural
issues.
These measures must foster belief and commitment to formal societal
c.
values, and thus, secure obedience by punishing non-law-abiding societal
members, and deterring those who may potentially violate the law.

4.2.1

Overview

The elements within Requisite One require an evaluation of the criminal law and
regulatory measures that the Canadian government has implemented in order to target
organized crime in Canada. The following questions arise in assessing whether these
measures are substantive and effective rather than hollow and ineffective, and will be
addressed in this Chapter: Should the state employ pre-existing laws and measures to
address organized crime, or should it enact legislation that specifically targets these
outlaws and their outlawry? Has the specific legislation enacted by the Canadian
government to target organized crime, captured the essence of organized crime outlaws in
the Criminal Code definition, and how can definitional problems inherent within criminal
organization legislation be remedied? Are expanded law enforcement and law
enforcement powers necessary and useful in targeting criminal organizations? Can the
evidentiary and procedural issues arising from the criminal organization legislation be
overcome so as to successfully prosecute organized crime outlaws, without prolonging
the administration of justice and undermining essential criminal law principles at an
exorbitant expense? Will the criminalization and regulation of activities associated with
organized crime provide mechanisms to socially control organized crime outlaws, and are
such mechanisms too complex and piecemeal to be useful? Do the criminal organization
provisions provide adequate punishment and deterrence of orgallized crime outlaws? Can
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proscription of specific organized crime groups and membership in those groups remedy
the definitional, procedural, evidentiary, and sentencing problems that exist within the
Canadian criminal organization legislation? This Chapter will answer these questions.

4.2.2

Pre-Existing Laws and Measures Versus Criminal

Organization Laws and Measures to Combat Organized Crime
Although organized crime may have existed in some form or another for years, decades,
and even centuries, the Canadian government determined in the late 1990s that specific
laws were required to combat this perceived social problem, and to calm the moral panic
that had risen to a level that the state thought demanded a response. Organized crime
outlaws have changed with social conditions, economic opportunity and legal controls,
but such outlawry is not new. Organized crime outlawry, like crime generally, is an
inherent and normal patt of society. Whatever its form, it poses a constant tlu'eat to social
order, and thus, society has consistently had a state of social mal-order since the entity
that is now called "organized crime" or "criminal organizations" came into existence.
Should the state employ pre-existing laws to address organized crime, or should it enact
legislation that specifically targets these outlaws and their outlawry?! Legal measures
have existed to address all types of crime generally, including outlawry, and debate exists
as to whether legal measures ought to expand or change as the threat of organized crime
increases and the nature of organized crime outlawry evolves to evade law enforcement.
Legal measures that existed prior to the declaration of the social problem of organized
crime in Canada, that is to say, legal measures that existed prior to the implementation of
criminal organization legislation in 1997, still remain relevant to organized crime

I This thesis will use the terms "pre-existing criminal laws" to refel' to the body of law that existed and
continues to exist and be amended prior to the introduction of criminal organization laws in 1997 and
subsequent amendments thereto. It will use the term "criminal organization laws" to refer to the legal
provisions that Parliament has enshrined in the Criminal Code as well as other statutes and that provincial
govemments have enshrined in provincial legislation, that have one of the following characteristics:
1.
The laws were specifically intended to target or be used for organized crime and

organized crime criminals or outlaws; or

3.
The laws themselves specifically refer to criminal organizations.
"Criminal organization laws" will not refer to legal provisions that can be or have been used in relation to
organized crime if those laws were not intended to be so used and are used for other types of criminals,
such as proceeds of crime legislation and forfeiture laws.
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activities. Fm1her, the inherent and entrenched presence of organized crime in society
supports the "Business as Usual" model oflegislative responses to societal problems .
... The Business as Usual model is based on notions of constitutional absolutism
and perfection. According to this model, ordinary legal rules and norms continue
to be followed strictly with no substantive change even in times of emergency and
crisis. The law in times of war remains the same as in times of peace. 2
The assertions were made in the context of anti-terrorism. However, some similarities
exist between organized crime and terrorism - namely, the act of instilling fear of
violence and personal injury or death, as well as the nature and extent of legislative
responses to both types of crime. Although organized crime outlawry creates societal
disorder and crisis, unlike ten'orism, it may not amount to an "emergency" as defined in
the Emergency Act in that it is not an urgent situation that "seriously endangers the lives,
health or safety of Canadians ... " and is temporary in nature. 3 In spite of this distinction
between terrorism and organized crime, the dilemma regarding the nature and extent of
anti-organized crime measures remains similar in principle to that regarding antiterrorism measures - that is to say, should society employ pre-existing legal measures to
deal with a perceived threat, or should it implement specific legal measures that target
that perceived threat?

Pre-existing and constitutionally sound criminal laws should have the ability and power
every day and any day, to adequately re-establish order or peace during times of disorder
or emergency, but it may be idealistic to assume so. In spite of this potential limitation,
the Business as Usual approach has significant appeal due to its adherence to
constitutional standards. Traditional and conventional laws will have likely already been
SUbjected to constitutional scrutiny, and only those laws that have withstood these tests

Oren Gross, "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?" (2003)
112 Yale L.J. 1011 ["Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?"] at
1021.
3 Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.) [Emergencies Act] at s. 3. Section 3 states:
3. For the purposes of this Act, a "national emergency" is an urgent and critical situation ofa
temporary nature that
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health 01' safety of Canadians and is of such proportions
or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity ofCan.da
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Can ad •.
2
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will remain. If governments employ lawless or unjust measures in order to target
organized crime, they sacrifice precisely the legal rules, principles and norms which they
are obliged to protect,4 and against which outlaws, such as organized crime groups, may
be revolting.
The crimes of organized crime groups involve violence and intimidation, and include
threats, assaults, extortion, manslaughter, and murder. These are "ordinary" or "preexisting" criminal offences. The fact that organized crime falls within the parameters of
these pre-existing criminal offences leads one to initially conclude that measures that
specifically target organized crime are altogether not necessary. In addition, employment
of pre-existing sentences for these pre-existing offences seem reasonable. However, the
use of pre-existing criminal offences alone is a reactive response to organized crime - that
is to say, one must wait for harm in order to address it. And, the reactive versus proactive
method of law enforcement and social control sacrifices social order and security to some
degree precisely because it waits for a degree of harm to occur - harm so significant that
it amounts to a social problem. Pre-existing legal measures alone may not be effective in
combating these outlaws.
Some countries, such as Italy, have resorted to passing innumerable criminal laws in a
"more is better" approach. s A number of justifications exist for the implementation of
legal measures that specifically target organized crime. One justification stems from the
belief that the battle against organized crime can be fought and won. Another lies in the
covert and organized nature of the acts themselves which stymie ordinary or pre-existing
investigative methods. A third results from the fact that state governments must respond,
and be seen to respond, to threats to societal security. A fourth results from an increasing
intemational pressure or obligation to control organized crime because it has transnational
impact and consequences.
4 "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?", supra note I at 102223.
, Umberto Santino, "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized Crime" Celltro
Siciliano di Documentaziol1e Giuseppe Impastato (2003) online: Centroimpastato
<hltp:!lwww.centroimpastato.itlotherlanglmcdonald.php3> ["Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against
Mafia and Organized Crime"] at Section 1.1. Santino states that in the battle against the Mafia, the lIalian
government passed 114 laws from 1982 to 1992.
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The distinction between normalcy and emergency remains difficult, if not impossible, to
discern. 6 A risk exists that the exception becomes the rule, and emergency measures and
extraordinary powers become the norm,7 such as in Italy where anti-Mafia legislation that
was implemented as an emergency response has become dated. 8 Sunset clauses may
provide a partial solution. Sunset clauses, such as those employed in some anti-terrorist
provisions, provide a pre-determined time to reassess the extraordinariness of situations
and ensure what Oren Gross describes as an assumption ofseparation:
... The assumption ofseparation is defined by the beliefin our ability to separate
emergencies and crises from normalcy, counteltelTOrism measures from ordinary
legal rules and norms. This assumption facilitates our acceptance of expansive
governmental emergency powers and counteltelTOrism measures, for it reassures
us that once the emergency is removed and terrorism is no longer a threat, such
powers and measures will also be telmmated and full return to normalcy ensured.
It also assures us that counter-emergency measures will not be directed against us,
but only against those who pose a threat to the community.9 [Emphasis original].
Sunset clauses may work. For instance, the minority government in Canada in 2007
could not renew the investigative hearing and preventive arrest provisions in the antiterrorism legislation after a five-year sunset clause. 10
Sunset clauses do not mandate constitutional review, nor do they have safeguards that
ensure that the old norms do not become lost among the new. However, they provide
some assurance that the dangers posed to civil rights during alleged emergency or
extraordinary times do not continue unchecked. They are essential to ensuring that police
and prosecutorial powers in the name of national security, such as those powers present in
the anti-terrorism provisions, do not permanently derogate, or abrogate, individual rights .
. . . Security powers, as mentioned, are best understood as extraordinary powers.
Indeed, often they are emergency powers, enacted or invoked for deliberately
short periods of time in order to react to some exigent circumstance but allowed to
"Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?", supra note 2 at 102223.
7 [bid.
S "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized Crime", supra note 5 at Section 1.1.
9 "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?", supra note 2 at 1022.
10 Stanley A. Cohen, "Policing Security: The Divide Between Crime and Terror'; (2004) 15 Nat. J. of
Const. Law 405 at 448.
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expire or cease to be operational after a crisis has passed. Their use or application
in the general endeavour of crime control is generally abjured, although, as the
recent experience in the United States has shown, exceptions to this general rule

11
.
do eXIst. ...

Many anti-terrorist legislative provisions in the Criminal Code do not employ sunset
clauses to retire emergency powers after a crisis has passed, or they do not employ them
routinely and consistently. Further, the legislated twilights of various terrorist provisions
are indeterminate in length, and random in choice - a haphazard approach to reviewing
laws which significantly impact individual rights and freedoms, and thus, which do not
adequately ensure adherence to due process and principles offundamental justice.
The legislative provisions that specifically target organized crime do not have any sunset
clauses in spite of the expansion of investigative powers that will facilitate gathering
evidence to be used in prosecutions. Perhaps the lack of such clauses is due to the fact
that organized crime does not threaten national security and does not amount to a national
emergency pursuant to the Emergencies Act. However, sunset clauses are not limited to
national security or national emergency provisions. They could be applied to organized
crime legislation.
Does the absence of sunset clauses in the criminal organization legislation in Canada
indicate a lack of faith on the part of government that the provisions are substantive and
effective? If the government believes that its legislation will actually control and reduce
organized crime outlaws and their outlawry, then one might expect it to employ sunset
clauses in relation to the criminal organization provisions. However, sunset clauses are
uncommonly employed, and most Criminal Code provisions are implemented without

.

them. Their absence may indicate that the government does not consider the provisions
to abrogate individual rights and freedoms to such an extent that the provisions should
end after the social crisis has abated or ended. Their absence may indicate that the
government expects organized crime to be present in the future to some degree or
another, and that it expects that all criminal offences in the Criminal Code will be present
in the future as well. That is to say, organized crime specifically is part of the societal
"Ibid at 448.
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mal-order, and governments may seek to maintain these laws in the long-term in order to
socially control organized crime as its violence waxes and wanes. The absence of sunset
clauses may indicate that the government has simply not contemplated their use for
organized crime provisions. It does not necessarily indicate the substantive or hollow
nature of these laws.
Although not employed thus far for criminal organization provisions in the Criminal
Code, the concept of sunset provisions has the potential to give criminal organization

laws substantive teeth while protecting individual rights and fi·eedoms. If criminal
organization provisions proscribed celtain organizations as criminal and membership in
those organizations as criminal, then sunset clauses could be used to limit the abrogation
of the freedom of association and other rights, such as freedom of expression, as
minimally as possible until the power of these organizations is reduced or decimated.
Sunset clauses would provide safeguards to ensure that certain behaviour was
criminalized, and celtain rights restricted only as long as the social problem of an
organized crime group acutely threatened society.

4.2.3

Definitions and Definitional Problems Inherent in Criminal

Organization Legislation
4.2.3.1

The Difficulty and Impossibility in Accurately Defining

"Organized Crime" and "Criminal Organizations"
Has the specific legislation enacted by the Canadian government to target organized
crime captured the essence of organized crime outlaws in the Criminal Code definition,
and how can definitional problems inherent within criminal organization legislation be
remedied? A lack of consensus among academics, legislators, lawyers, police officers,
communities, and gang members themselves l2 exists with respect to who or what is a
12 Kristin M. Peterson, Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Focus Group Discussions with Gang Members
and At-Risk Youth (M.A. Thesis, Greenspun School of Communication, Universily of Nevada, 1994)
[unpublished] at 46. Ibid. al2, Peterson sought Ihe opinions and responses of gangs and ai-risk youth

regarding aspects of anti-gang advertising, and showed them several anti-gang television advertisements.
Ibid at 25, her three focus group members were age 12 to 17; they were in gangs or were highly
predisposed to gang activity; they had committed felony offenses which meant they were at risk of being
removed from their homes and placed in correctional institutions; and they were enrolled in non-punitive
rehabilitative programs. These individuals did not have a consensus as to what constitutes a "gang."
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"gang", "organized crime" or a "criminal organization." Canadian Parliament has
imposed its definition on society, and as social constructionism teaches, the
crystallization of an entity into language may not always capture reality, it may produce
negative stereotypes,13 and it does not adequately allow for evolution of the entity or the
definition. The idea of a "gang", "organized crime", or a "criminal organization" at its
essence includes the concept of a reputation for violence and intimidation in the context
of an identifiable group within the criminal subculture 01' milieu, and when such terms are
used in everyday conversation the parties to the conversation may adequately convey and
understand their meaning. However, legally defining what societal members may
conceptually know to be a "gang", "organized crime", or a "criminal organization"
remains far different, and likely impossible.
Frederic M. Thrasher's study of 1313 juvenile gangs, criminal and non-criminal,14
totaling over 25000 members in the slums of Chicago in the 1920s1 5 is relevant in
considering whether one legal definition can accurately capture the essence and attributes
of gangs generally. Thrasher defined juvenile gangs l6 by their spontaneous and
unplanned origins;17 intimate face-to-face relations;18 collective expressive social
behaviours, such as group activities, talks, or festivities; 19 collective traditions;2o
attachment to territories;21 and collective responses or thinking in relation to hostile or

13 These negative stereotypes have advantages and disadvantages for organized crime outlaws. They may
increase internal cohesion of conventional societal members and commitment to their social values and
norms, but they may also hinder acceptance of and eff0l1s by organized crime outlaws to rehabilitate and
reintegrate into society.
14 Frederic M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study 0//,313 Gangs in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1927) at 58.
l' {bid. at 58 and 64.
16 {bid. at 57. Thrasher states:
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated
through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face,
milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict, and a planning. As a result of this collective
behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de COIPS, solidarity,
morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory.
17 {bid. at 50. Thrasher's study is referred to in subsection four "Application of Concepts within Social
Control and Bond Theory to Ihe Identity of Outlaws" of section Ihree "Social Conlrol and Bond Theory" in
Chapter Three.

" {bid.
19 Ibid.
20 {bid. at 55.
21 Ibid. at 57.
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contlict forces. 22 "It is as the result of collective action and particularly of conflict that
the gang, especially in its solidified fi-om, develops morale.,,23 However, Thrasher opined
that each gang is unique:
... [T)he gang is a protean manifestation: no two gangs are just alike; some are
good; some are bad; and each has to be considered on its own merits,z4
Thrasher also asserted that gangs are not permanent, and their membership changes with
social, economic, and legal forces. 25
If the distinctiveness and constant state of change that characterizes juvenile gangs
applies to adult gangs, one wonders if any generalizations about gang activities,
organization, norms, and rules can be made. Can any set of causes 01' reasons for the
formation of outlaw identities be determined, and thus, can anyone legal definition can
properly capture the "bad" gangs or criminal organizations? Surely, some basic common
features of gangs must exist in order for the term "gang" 01' "organized crime" or
"criminal organization" to implant a particular notion into one's head and allow for
communication about this societal entity. However, these definitional traits, at a
simplistic level, seem to focus on what or who members of society ought not to be.
Indeed, the Criminal Code includes a list of what a criminal organization need not be or
have. 26 Further, the essence or traits of gangs seem to relate to conflict, hostility,
Ibid. at 54-55.
Ibid. at 55. Thrasher defines morale as " ... that quality--{)f an individual or of a group---<lf unwavering
r.ursuance of an aim in the face of both victory alld defeat."
4 Ibid. at 5.
2l Ibid. at 35. Thrasher states:
The ganging process is a continuous flux and flow, and there is little permanence in most
of the groups. New nuclei are constantly appearing, and the business of coalescing and
recoalescing is going on everywhere in the congested areas. Both conflict and competition
threaten the embryonic gangs with disintegration. The attention ofthe individual is often divelted
to some new paloI' to some other gang that holds more attractions. When delinquency is detected
the police break up the group and at least temporarily interrupt its career. Some new activity of
settlement, playground, or club frequently depletes its membership.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] at s. 467.1. For instance, section 467.1(1) states
467.1 (I) ... It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate
commission ofa single offence .
... (2) For the purposes of this section and section 467.11, facilitation of an offence does not
require knowledge ofa particular offence the commission of which is facilitated, or that an offence
actually be committed.
FUlther, with respect to a charge of participation in the activities ofa criminal organization, the Criminal
Code in subsections 467.11(2) and (3) list what the prosecution need not prove and the court mayor may
not consider:
22
23

2.
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difference, distinction, anti-society, and subculture. Defining attributes seem to denote
gangs as "the other" or "the outcast" or "the outlaw." Further, gangs evolve. Notably,
the criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code require proof of a group as a
"criminal organization" each and every time an indictment is laid, regardless of whether a
court has found the patticular gang to be a criminal organization on a prior occasion.
This legal requirement SUppOltS the assertion that gangs are unique from one another, that
they are fluid in membership, and that they constantly are in a state of evolution within
themselves.
That gangs are unique and different, atld thus difficult to define, lends SUppOlt to an
argument for proscription. If the state on behalf of democratic society deems certain
gangs to be "bad", then ought a legal definition to be employed at all? Perhaps a ban on
that particular gang, given its organization, its activities, its mandate, and its affects on
society, should take place, rather than forcing a cookie-cutter definition on divergent and
distinct sub-cultural social organizations. If governments seek to tat'get "gangs" or
"criminal organizations" wim specific organized crime measures, rather than employing
pre-existing measures, then proscription may provide a solution to the problem oflegally
defining organized crime outlaws. Proscription will be analysed in the section eight
"Proscription as a Solution to Definitional, Investigative, Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial
Problems within Criminal Organization Legislation" in this Chapter.

(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (I), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to
prove that
(a) the criminal organization actually facilitated or committed an indictable offence;
(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhanced the ability of the
criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence;
(c) the accused knew the specific nature of any indictable offence that may have been
facilitated or committed by the criminal organization; or
(d) the accused knew the ident ity of any of the persons who constitute the criminal
organization.

(3) In determining whether an accused paJ1icipates in or contributes to any activity of a criminal
organization, the COllrt may consider, among other factors, whether the accused
(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is associated with,
the criminal organization;

(b) rrequently associates with any ofthe persons who constitute the criminal organization;
(c) receives any benefit rrom the criminal organization; or
(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any ofthe persons who constitute
the criminal organization.
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Canadian Criminal Code provisions exemplify the difficulties in applying legal
definitions to social constructs of reality through language. The main provisions in the
Criminal Code that define "criminal organizations" and proscribe offences in relation to

criminal organizations are set forth in section 467.1,467.11,467.12, and 467.13. The
next section will discuss some of the problems within each of these definitional
provisions - namely, how they fail to construct a legal definition that applies to all
organized crime outlaw groups without capturing more than the intended groups, and how
they fail to be useful to law enforcement and prosecutions of organized crime outlaw
groups.

4.2.3.2

The Definition of "Criminal Organization" in Section 467.1

The Criminal Code presently defines "criminal organization" as follows:
467.1 (1) The following definitions apply in this Act.
"criminal organization" means a group, however organized, that
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or
commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would
likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including
a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute
the group.
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate
commission of a single offence.
"serious offence" means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of
Parliament for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or
more, or another offence that is prescribed by regulation.
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 467.11, facilitation of an offence
does not require knowledge of a particular offence the commission of which is
facilitated, or that an offence actually be committed.
(3) In this section and in sections 467.11 to 467.13, committing an offence means
being a party to it or counselling any person to be a paIty to it.
(4) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribin¥ offences that are
included in the definition "serious offence" in subsection (1).2
The first problem with this definition is its failure to capture the essence of organized
crime outlaw groups - that is to say, it does not make legally relevant the attributes or
characteristics that set organized crime outlaws apart from other criminal groups. It
criminalizes being a group that facilitates or commits "serious" criminal offences, but it
27

[bid at s. 467.1.
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does not require any further proof of adopting an identity, posing some sort of challenge
to societal order, and using a reputation for violence and intimidation to effect one' s ends.

In comparing the Canadian requirements of proof to the American requirements, Don
Stuart criticized the old 1997 criminal organization provisions for their overbreadth, and
for their inability to target the cohesion that characterizes such groups. His comments
apply equally to the present definition in section 467.1:

22 The Canadian scheme appears to be a much wider version of the United States
RICO model. Passed in 1970 as a weapon against organised crime, the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act requires proof of an
"enterprise" and a connected "pattern of racketeering activity." Although the
RICO net is itself notoriously wide, there is, in contrast to the Canadian model, a
requirement of an ongoing structure of persons associated in time and purpose,
organized for consensual decision-making.
23 It has been suggested that a proper definition of organised crime should
embrace the elements of corruption, violence, sophistication, continuity, structure,
discipline, ideology, multiple enterprises, involvement in legitimate enterprises
and a "bonding" ritual. 28
The failure to accurately characterize organized crime outlaws by requiring proof of their
essential traits means that the state will cast its social control net too widely, and it will
capture groups that are transient in their associations and inconsequential or ineffective in
their power to intimidate and commit violence against societal members.

A second problem lies in proof of a main purpose - that is to say, that the criminal
organization group "has as one of its main purposes or main activities the faci litation or
commission of one or more serious offences." As noted by Stuati, the American
legislation specifies the means by which the prosecution may prove an "enterprise" and a
"pattern of racketeering activity." The explicit definition of "pattern of racketeering
29

activity" in the United States Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act or

RICO may provide a plausible solution. This "pattern" requires proof of at least two

Don Stuart, "Time to Recodify Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons
from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution" (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89 ["Time to Recodify Criminal Law And
Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons fi'om the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution"] at para. 22.
29 Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970), and amendments thereto
[RICO], at § 1961(1).
28
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predicate acts of "racketeering activity,,,lO and "racketeering activity" itself remains
extremely broad and includes a wide variety of criminal offences. 31 The American
definition of "enterprise" rather than "criminal organization" is also more inclusive in that
it captures any group of individuals who are associated with one another but who may not
be a legal entity and may in fact be a legal business. 32 While prosecutors can provide
evidence of past criminal acts,33 the parameters of the definitions in Racketeer-Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act seems to facilitate proof of an organized crime group, and
do not mandate such potentially prejudicial evidence.
The Canadian legislation provides few clues as to what evidence would prove a criminal
organization. The amorphous wording results in prosecutions having to provide, for each
and every prosecution, a vast amount of evidence relating to the nature of an alleged
organized crime group - such as proof of a fOl1ified meeting place or clubhouse, rules and
regulations, gang insignia and paraphemalia, proof of criminal records of members,
criminal acts of members, counter-surveillance conducted by the group on police, and
expert evidence regarding past violence committed by members and the history and main
purpose of the organization. The fact that such evidence varies significantly from case to
case and from group to group only ful1her evinces a problem in legally defining criminal
organizations. Whether a group is criminal or not criminal from one day to another ought
not to depend on the evidence that a police force can seize and the prosecution can tender
on a case by case basis.

Ibid. Notably, Howard Abadinsky in Organized Crime, 8th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007)
[Organized Crime] at 297 defines "labor racketeering" and discusses "business racketeering" - two
common forms of racketeering employed by organized crime:
Labour racketeering is the infiltration, domination, and use of a union for personal benefit
by illegal, violent, and fraudulent means.
Abadinsky asserts, ibid at 315-16, that business racketeering centers around businesses or industries that
require a low cash investment, rely on labour, and that are highly competitive because organized crime
groups can reduce their costs by controlling labourers and unions, and thus, they can dominate or
monopolize an industry.
31 RICO, supra note 29 at § 1961 (I).
32 Michael Levi & Alaster Smith, "A Comparative Analysis of Organised Crime Conspiracy Legislation
and Practice and Their Relevance to England and Wales" HOllie Office Online Reporl1 7102 (December
2002) online: Home Office <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uklrdslpdfs2/rdsolrI702.pdf.> ["A Comparative
Analysis of Organised Crime Conspiracy Legislation and Practice and Their Relevance to England and
Wales") at 2.
33 Ibid.
30
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The answer to this second problem - that is to say, the answer to the difficulty in proving
that a member of a criminal organization participated in organized crime activities - may
lie in the drafting ofthe indictment itself. For instance, with respect to outlaw motorcycle
gangs, such as the Hells Angels, much evidence regarding the general criminal activities
of other members of a chapter will be prejudicial and inadmissible to specific criminal
charges of one member. Thus, indictments could state that the criminal organization is
the group of accused itself-whether or not one of them is a member of the Hells Angels
or another outlaw motorcycle gang. That is to say, indictments could charge a number of
individuals (three 01' more) whose acts rather than whose membership in a particular
organization, meet the definition of "criminal organization" in section 467.1 of the
Criminal Code. Thus, the Hells Angels would not be indicted as the criminal
organization, and only its member would be so indicted as being in a criminal
organization with the other non-Hells Angels members and accused.

In R. v. Speak,34 the indictment charged that two criminal organizations existed in relation
to a drug trafficking conspiracy. First, the accused Speak, who was a Hells Angels
member, was charged with having trafficked in association with a criminal organization,
namely, the Hells Angels. 35 Second, the other tln'ee accused, one of whom was a Hells
Angel member and the other two who were not Hells Angels members, were charged
with having trafficked in association with a criminal organization, namely, themselves as
a group and not the Hells Angels?6 Lastly, the accused Speak was also charged with
having trafficked in association with the non-Hells Angels group as a criminal
organization?7 The Ontario Superior COUlt of Justice held that no evidence existed to
prove that the substantive offences of dlUg trafficking by Speak were committed in
association with the Hells Angels criminal organization. 38 However, the Court held that
Speak had committed such offences in association with the non-Hells Angels criminal
organization comprised of the other co-accused. This approach to drafting and
prosecuting indictments would invoke the more serious penalties associated with
R. v. Speak, [2005] 0.1. No. 5880 (Q.L.), (2005), 70 W.C.B. (2d) 782 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Ibid. at para. 40.
36 ibid.
37 Ibid. at para. 43.
3S ibid.
34

35
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committing offences in connection with criminal organizations. However, it would fail to
capture the essence and workings of outlaw motorcycle gangs and other outlaws who use
the power of their reputations to commit crimes, and it would fail to formally declare or
denounce such groups as organized crime in society. Rather, it would treat the accused
almost as a group within the outlaw group, and ignore the power of the outlaw group and
the outlaw group identity.

A third problem with the Criminal Code definition lies in the inclusion of the term
"material benefit." The benefit to organized crime outlaw groups is not always material.

It can be using a reputation for violence and intimidation to effect one' s. ends, and thus,
maintaining and perpetuating that reputation for other organized crime group members to
benefit in their illegal pursuits. The 1997 definition of "criminal organization" did not
include the term "material benefit", and "benefit" referred only to the benefit of the act of
the accused to the organization. "Benefit" was defined in R. v. Leclerc39 as
" ... [a]dvantage, material or moral gain derived from something.,,4o The broader term of
"benefit" in the 1997 definition more accurately captures the benefit that accrues to a
criminal organization as a result of the actions of those who pruiicipate in and contribute
to it, and should replace the term "material benefit" in the present section 467.J.

A fOUlih problem with the Criminal Code definition lies in the possible interpretations for
the term "organized." The Supreme COUlt of Canada in R. v. Venneri

41

asserted that

courts should utilize a flexible approach to defining "organization", and avoid checklists
as well as stereotypical concepts of sophisticated crime groups:
27 Some trial cOUlis have found that very little or no organization is required
before a group of individuals are potentially captured by the regime: see R. v.
Atkins, 2010 ONC] 262 (CanLII); R. v. Speak, 2005 CanLII 51121 (Ont. S.CJ.).
Others, properly in my view, have held that while the definition must be applied
"flexibly", structure and continuity are still important features that differentiate
criminal organizations from other groups of offenders who sometimes act in
concert: see R. v. Shariji, [2011] OJ. No. 3985 (QL) (S.CJ.), at paras. 37 and 39;
R. v. Battista, 2011 ONSC 4771, No. 08-G30391, August 9, 2011 , at para. 16.
R.I'. Leclerc. [2001) R.J.Q. 747, [2001) Q.J. No. 426 (Q.L.) (Que. Ct. (Crim. and Pen. Div.)) [R. v.
Leclerc).
40 Ibid at para. 283.
41 2012 SCC 33, [2012) S.C.J. No. 33 (Q.L.) [R. 1'. Vel/nel'i].

39
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28 In R. v. Terezakis (2007), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (B.C.C.A.), Mackenzie I.A.
explained in these tenns the need for flexibility in applying the statutory definition
of "criminal organization":
The underlying reality is that criminal organizations have no incentive to
conform to any formal structure recognized in law , in patt because the law
will not assist in enforcing illegal obligations or transactions. That requires
a flexible definition that is capable of capturing criminal organizations in
all their protean forms. [para. 34]
29 I agree with Mackenzie J.A. that a flexible approach favours the objectives
of the legislative regime. In this context, flexibility signifies a purposive approach
that eschews undue rigidity. That said, by insisting that criminal groups be
"organized", Parliament has made plain that some form of structure and degree of
continuity are required to engage the organized crime provisions that are palt of
the exceptional regime it has established under the Code.
30 Qualifying "organized" in s. 467.1 by "however" call1lot, as a matter of
language or logic, be taken to signify that no element of organization is required at
all. "Organized" necessarily cOllllotes some form of structure and co-ordination, as
appears from the definition of "organized" in the Shorter Oxford English
DictionOlY on Historical Principles (6th ed. 2007), vol. 2:
Formed into a whole with interdependent patts; coordinated so as to form
an orderly structure; systematically aLTanged. [Emphasis original; p. 1023.]
In French, the definitions inLe Grand Robert de la languefi'anryaise (electronic
version) are consistent with this: it defines the noun "organisation" as the
[TRANSLATION] "[a]ction of organizing (something); the result of such an
action" and the verb "organiser" as "[t]o give a specific structure or composition,
order, or method of functioning or administration to".
31 "However" and "organized" -- the two words read together, as they are
written -- are complementary and not contradictory. Thus, the phrase "however
organized" is meant to capture differently structured criminal organizations. But
the group must nonetheless, at least to some degree, be organized. Disregarding
the requirement of organization would cast a net broader than that intended by
Parliament.

38

Care must be taken, however, not to transform the shared attributes of one
type of criminal organization into a "checklist" that needs to be satisfied in every
case. None of these attributes are explicitly required by the Code, and a group that
lacks them all may nonetheless satisfy the statutory definition of "criminal
organization" .

40 It is preferable by far to focus on the goal of the legislation, which is to
identify and undetmine groups of three or more persons that pose an elevated
threat to society due to the ongoing and organized association of their members.
All evidence relevant to this determination must be considered in applying the
definition of "criminal organization" adopted by Parliament. Groups of individuals
that operate on an ad hoc basis with little or no organization cannot be said to pose
the type of increased risk contemplated by the regime.
41 Coutts must not limit the scope of the provision to the stereotypical model of
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organized crime -- that is, to the highly sophisticated, hierarchical and
monopolistic model. Some criminal entities that do not fit the conventional
paradigm of organized crime may nonetheless, on account of their cohesiveness
and endurance, pose the type of heightened threat contemplated by the legislative
scheme. 42 [Emphasis original].
This guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada may assist courts in applying the
definition of "criminal organizations", but the Criminal Code provisions contain many
more difficulties not addressed by the COUIt.

4.2.3.3

The Participation in and Contribution to a Criminal

Organization in Section 467.11
The Criminal Code prohibits the patticipation in and contribution to a criminal
organization in section 467.11 :
467.11 (I) Every person who, for the purpose of enhancing the ability of a
criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence under this or
any other Act of Parliament, knowingly, by act or omission, participates in or
contributes to any activity of the criminal organization is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a telm not exceeding five years.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that
(a) the criminal organization actually facilitated or committed an indictable
offence;
(b) the palticipation or contribution of the accused actually enhanced the
ability of the criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable
offence;
(c) the accused knew the specific nature of any indictable offence that may
have been facilitated or committed by the criminal organization; or
(d) the accused knew the identity of any of the persons who constitute the
criminal organization.
(3) In determining whether an accused participates in or contributes to any activity
of a criminal organization, the COUIt may consider, among other factors, whether
the accused
(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is
associated with, the criminal organization;
(b) frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the
criminal organization;
(c) receives any benefit from the criminal organization; or
(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instlUction of any of the persons
43
who constitute the criminal organization.
42
43

Ibid. at paras. 27-31, 38, 40 and 41.
Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 467.11.
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The convoluted wording of section 467.11 means that the prosecution need not prove that
the accused did indeed enhance the ability of the criminal organization to facilitate or
commit an indictable offence. The accused may have a lack of knowledge that he did
indeed enhance this ability of tlie criminal organization, and still be convicted of an
offence.
This section also makes proof of an offence very difficult because the prosecution must
prove that the actions of the accused could enhance "the ability of the criminal
organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence." The prosecution need not
prove actual enhancement, but proof of possible enhancement still remains problematic
since some criminal organizations do not commit criminal offences themselves 01' know
about offences committed by their members. Rather, individual members use the
reputation of the criminal organization to commit criminal offences. Fmiher, the type of
enhancement is not specified. The use of violence by a criminal organization member
could indeed enhance the ability of other members or of the criminal organization itself to
commit an indictable offence later due to the perpetuation of its reputation for violence
and intimidation. While this type of enhancement is very significant to maintaining the
power of a criminal organization, proof of any use of a gang name or insignia would then
amount to such enhancement - that is to say, the section would be very broad. And,
without mandating proof that the actions of the accused did indeed enhance the power of
a criminal organization makes the connection of one aspect of the offence to the other too
tenuous.

4.2.3.4

Commission of a Criminal Offence in Connection with a

Criminal Organization in Section 467.12
The Criminal Code creates an offence of committing a criminal offence in connection
with a criminal organization in section 467.12:
467.12 (1) Every person who commits an indictable offence under this or any
other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with, a criminal organization is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fomieen years.
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(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that the accused knew the identity of any 'of the persons who
constitute the criminal organization. 44
These provisions essentially re-criminalize a number of pre-existing offences by creating
a criminal offence where another offence was committed in connection with a criminal
organization. For instance, the possession of explosive substances is an offence,45 as is
the possession of explosive substances in connection with a criminal organization.46 The
criminal organization provisions have deemed a murder to be in the first degree
regardless of whether it was planned and deliberate, if the killing was done in connection
with a criminal organization, or if it was done while committing or attempting to commit
an indictable offence in connection with a criminal organization. 47 In addition, the
government has criminalized drive-by shootings,48 and has proscribed an aggravated
sentence for such shootings when they are done in connection with a criminal
organization. 49 This legislation requires not only proof of the substantive or predicate
offence, but also proof of a criminal organization, as well as proof of connection of the
predicate offence to the criminal organization. However, the provisions are silent as to
what will amount to "benefit", "direction" and "association." These additional proof
requirements render the criminal offences more complex, and demand additional
resources from law enforcement and prosecution services.

4.2.3.5

Instructing a Criminal Offence in Connection with a

Criminal Organization in Section 467.13
The Criminal Code creates the offence of instructing a criminal offence in connection
with a criminal organization:
467.13 (1) Every person who is one of the persons who constitute a criminal
organization and who knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to
commit an offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with, the criminal organization is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
Ibid.
Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
44
45

at s. 467.12.
at s. 82.
at ss. 82(2).
at s. 231.
at s. 244(1).
at ss. 244(2) and 244.2.
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(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (I), it is not necessary for the
prosecutor to prove that
(a) an offence other than the offence under subsection (1) was actually
committed;
(b) the accused instructed a particular person to commit an offence; or
(c) the accused knew the identity of all of the persons who constitute the
criminal organization. 50
Due to its connection requirement, this section suffers from similar problems that exist in
section 487.12, but the primary concern with this section has been its potential violation
of section 7 of the Charter in relation to fault requirements. Don Stuart set fmih these
concerns prior to the passage of the 2002 amendments to the criminal organization
provisions:

41 It can be seen that knowledge is expressly not required to be proved of the
crime to be facilitated or committed or ofthe identity ofthe members of the
criminal organization. That is a knowledge requirement that has no real meaning
and points to absolute responsibility which is unconstitutional where the liberty
interest is at stake. So too it is express that no crime need to have been facilitated
or committed by the criminally organization or even made more likely. Even the
Backgrounder [The Depmiment of Justice Backgrounder "Highlights of the
Organized Crime Bill" (5 April 2001)] acknowledges the "provisions could target
anyone (not just members)." Contrast the focus in conspiracy jurisprudence on a
meeting of the minds on a common purpose. As Justice Dickson put it in Cotroni,
Papalia [(1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.c.) at 17-18]:
The word "conspire" derives from two Latin words, con and spirare,
meaning "to breathe together". To conspire is to agree ... There must be
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged conspirators acted
in conceli in pursuit of a common goal.
42 Hopefully Courts will intervene when the new definition is challenged, as it
inevitably will be, on the basis of violation of the act atld fault requirements
required under section 7 of the Chmiel' of Rights and Freedoms. Even if the new
laws survive Charter challenge the blunderbuss laws will do no credit to the
51
Canadian justice and will lead to injustice.
Indeed, Canadian courts have heard challenges to section 467.13 as well as sections 467.1
and 467.12 for vagueness and overbreadth pursuant to section 7 of the Charter.

Ibid at s. 467.13.
"Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons ITom the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 28 at paras. 41-42.
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However, the fault requirements in section 467.13 52 as well as 467.12 53 have been upheld
by a number of appellate courts. FUlther, the similar and previous provision in the 1997
version of section 467.1 which used the term "in association with" has also been upheld
by the Quebec COUlt of Appeal. 54

4.2.3.6

Reasons for Definitional Problems in the Criminal Code

Provisions
These definitional problems in sections 467.1, 467.11, 467.12 and 467.13 of the Criminal
Code may result from the nature of defining and applying definitions of crime. Social

construction teaches, or perhaps confirms, that definitions of crimes do not result from
consensus as to the existence of a social problem, and they reflect one group's perception
of a social problem. Thus, definitions of crime are not clear, not necessarily accurate, and
consequently, not always fair and just. Indeed, the criminal organization provisions
suffer all of these problems.
One recalls the nature of defining crime according to Quinney's theory on the social
reality of crime in section two "Social Constructionism" in Chapter Three:
PROPOSITION 1 (DEFINITION OF CRIME): Crime is a definition o/human
conduct that is created by authorized agents in a politically organized society. 55

The problems associated with defining "criminal organization" and the actions of the
members of these organizations may result in failure to properly legislate fault
requirements due to a desire to capture the "other" - the less powerfi.tl groups in society
that contravene or contradict conventional values and norms - and to remedy the social
problem by subjecting the "other" to legal sanctions.

" R. v. Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1592 (Q.L.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2007]
S.C.C.A No. 487 (Q.L.); and R. v. Smith. 2006 SKQB 132, [2006] S.J. No. 184 (Q.L.) [R. v. Smith].
53 R. v. Lindsay, 2009 ONCA 532, [2009] O.i. No. 2700 (Q.L.) at paras. 28-33, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 540 (Q.L.) and [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 541 (Q.L.); and R. v. Smith, sllpra note
50. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the law was not overbroad because the adverse effect of
legislation on individuals subject to it was not grossly disproportionate to the state interest the legislation
sought to protect or achieve, and the law was not impermissibly vague because there existed a basis for
legal debate and coherent judicial interpretation.
S< R. v. COli/lire, 2007 QCCA 1609, [2007] J.Q. no. 13091 (Q.L.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2008]
S.C.C.A No. 58 (Q.L.).
" Richard Quinney, The Social Reality o/Crime (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970) at 15.
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Indeed, one may also recall that powerful groups or segments in society apply criminal
definitions:

PROPOSITION 3 (APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL DEFINITIONS): Criminal
definitions are applied by the segments ofsociety that have the power to shape the
enforcement and administration of criminal law. 56
Relaxation or lack of fault requirements in statutory definitions of organized crime acts
may result from the social pressure or political desire to implement legal measures that
seem to offer solutions to organized crime as a social problem. However, while the
criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code may have withstood Charter
scrutiny, the complex and onerous proof requirements may lead them to being employed
in only the clearest and strongest of cases, and not for every alleged criminal
organization. Thus, they may not combat organized crime as intended or to the degree
intended, and the application of any criminal definition simply will not be used and will
not matter.

While even in a democracy such as Canada, 'criminal definitions remain constructed by
the powerful segments of society and imposed on the less powerful segments, the
application of a criminal definition need not fail for this reason. If the government seeks
to combat organized crime by using specific criminal provisions rather than proscription
or rather than by using pre-existing or ordinary Criminal Code provisions, then it will
need to include in its definition of "criminal organization" the essential attributes of
organized crime outlaw groups. It will need to set forth these essential traits that
characterize organized crime outlaw groups, and not simply define as criminal the acts
common to those groups. It would also need to specify the nature of proof that would be
required to show a main purpose or main activity of facilitating or committing one or
more serious offences, and to legislate exceptions to evidentiary rules in order to make
such proof admissible or more easily admissible in criminal trials. For instance, if proof
of a main purpose or activity is based on past criminal convictions by any 01' all members
of the alleged criminal organization, then evidentiary rules would need to be re-written or

5.

Ibid at 18.
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relaxed in order to allow the admissibility of such evidence. In some, and perhaps few
instances, proof of such a main purpose or main activity may not exist based on past
activities or actions committed by the group due to the recent origins of the group or due
to little known history of the group, and thus, such evidentiary accommodations need not
be made since the substantive offences themselves will have to provide proof of the main
purpose or activity.
If the government chooses to combat organized crime using specific criminal provisions,
it also need not specify that the main purpose or main activities of the commission ofthe
serious offence would likely result in a "material" benefit. Such inclusion removes the
benefits that accrue to organized crime groups from the maintenance and perpetuation of
their reputation for violence and intimidation. The government also need not specify that
the offences be "serious offences" since while most organized crime outlaw groups do
indeed commit offences which amount to "serious offences", a designation based on the
number of years in prison excludes other serious or indictable criminal offences that
outlaw groups could specialize in or form to commit. While the specification of "serious
offences" may be an effort to only target organized crime groups that pose a significant
t1u-eat to society, this requirement disallows law enforcement from targeting organized
crime outlaw groups that have not yet risen to such levels, but still commit crimes
connected to their outlaw groups.
All of these difficulties and technicalities in constructing a definition of "criminal
organization" that can be proven in a criminal trial and that does not capture individuals
who are not organized crime outlaws, strengthen the arguments for proscription or for
simply using pre-existing or ordinary Criminal Code offences to target organized crime
outlawry. Time and resources that are spent on administering justice for ill-defined
"criminal organizations" are time and resources not spent on administering justice for
crimes - including those committed by organized crime outlaws - using pre-existing
Criminal Code offences.
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4.2.4

Expanded Law Enforcement Personnel and Law

Enforcement Powers
... The existence oforganized crime, itl jacI, depends on the way in which the criminal 1m,' is
enJorced and administered III order (0 continue its operations, organized crime must maintain
some amount of immunity fi'om the Imy." [Emphasis added].

Are expanded law enforcement personnel and law enforcement powers necessary and
useful in targeting criminal organizations? Instead of legislating new investigative
powers for police in relation to organized crime outlaws as the Canadian government
created in the various criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code, federal,
provincial and municipal governments across the country could simply increase resources
to increase investigations.58 Canada, like other countries targeting organized crime,59 has
indeed done so. It has increased law enforcement personnel and created special units in
order to specifically target organized crime outlaws. 60 FUither, some provinces in Canada
have made health care workers agents of the state in criminal investigations. For
instance, to facilitate law enforcement investigations of organized crime activity,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia have passed legislation that
requires health care facilities and emergency medical employees to disclose gunshot and
stab wounds that are not self-inflicted or unintentionally inflicted, to local police as soon

" Ibid at 269. Ibid at 269-70, Quinney refers to Marshall B. Clinard and Richard Quinney, Criminal
Behavior Systems: A Typology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967) at 386-87, and asserts that

immunity from the law may manifest through evasion from law enforcement; political power and influence;
p,ublic toleration; ineffective legislation; infiltration of legitimate business enterprises.
'''Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra nole 28 at para. 34. Stuart opined:
Biker violence in Quebec and elsewhere may well require considerably more police investigative
resources to gather evidence but no new laws are needed or likely to be effective.
59 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c. 15, and amendments thereto [Serious
Organised Crime and Police ACI2005 (U.K.)] at ss. 1-5. In its the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act
2005, the United Kingdom created the Serious Organised Crime Agency in order to prevent and detect
serious organized crime. Section 2(1) orthe Seriolls Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 states:
2 Functions of SOCA as to serious organised crime
(I) SOCA has the functions of(a) preventing and detecting serious organised crime, and
(b) contributing to the reduction of such crime in other ways and to the
mitigation of its consequences ....
60 Canada has a number of police forces that specifically combat organized crime. For instance, the
Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit or tile Royal Canadian Mounted Police, vaious gang task
forces, and the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia. Some of these units preceded the criminal
organization legislation in 1997. Many municipal police forces have also created gang or organized crime
units.

224

as is reasonably practicable to do so.61 Ontario, Nova Scotia and Quebec have similar
legislation, but only require repOliing if the wound results from a gunshot. 62
From a social control perspective, the presence of law enforcement and the increase of its
powers to target an outlaw group, reinforce attachment, belief and commitment of
conventional societal members to their values and norms, encourages their law-abiding
behaviour, and maintains internal cohesion among these members. However, increased
expenditures on investigations do not necessarily provide police with the types of tools
needed to penetrate organized crime outlaw groups. The cohesive and insulated nature of
criminal organizations renders infiltration extremely difficult if not impossible, and their
reputations for violence and intimidation make witnesses afraid to cooperate with police
investigations. The British Columbia Court of Appeal noted this predicament in R. v.
Payne. 63 In that case, the offender Payne was a member of a criminal organization when

he cut off the finger of Shawn Giesbrecht who was a drug "salesperson" for the
organization. The crime was committed because Giesbrecht owed a drug debt to the
criminal organization, and Payne sought to make an example out of him and maintain
discipline and control over other "sales staff.,,64 The Court found such membership to be
an aggravating factor pursuant to section 718.2(a)(iv), and noted the significance and
negative effects of witness intimidation in relation to the administration of justice:
... Criminal conduct that makes victims afraid to report crimes to police and makes
witnesses afraid to cooperate with police in the investigation of crimes subvelts
the rule oflaw and must be checked by an exemplary sentence. 65

Gunshot and Stab Wound MandatOl), Disc/osure Act, S.A. 2009, c. G-12 at s. 3; The Gunshot and Stab
Wounds MandatOl), Reporting Act, C.C.S.M. 2008, c. 21 at s. 2; The Gunshot and Stab Wounds MandatDl),
Reporting Act, S.S. 2007, c. G-9.1 at s. 3; and Bill 12, Gunshot and Stab Wound Disc/osure Act, 2" Sess.,

6i

39" Leg., British Columbia, 2010 (assented to 3 iune, 2010), S.B.C. 2010, c. 7.
MandatOl), Gunshot Wounds Reporting Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 9 at s. 2; Gunshot Wounds MandatOJ)'
Reporting Act, S.N.S. 2007, c. 30 at s. 3; and "New B.C. Anti·Gang Law Will Make It Mandatory for
Health Workers to Report Gunshot, Stabbing Injuries" The Province (II December 20 10), online:
<http://www.theprovince.com/neIYs/anti+gang+will+make+mandatory+health+workers+report+gunshot-tst
abbing/3963672/story.html>.
6) R. v. Payne, 2007 BCCA 541, [2007) B.C.i. No. 2391 (Q.L.), aff'g 2006 BCSC 1651, [2006) B.C'!. No.
2885 (Q.L.) [R. v. Payne].
64 Ibid. at para. 46.
6' Ibid. at paras. 45 and 48.
62
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Historically, evidence against most organizations, such as the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra,
has been obtained through organized crime members who have left the group or are
disenchanted with the group, and who become police informants or agents of the state:
Given the difficulty of securing testamentary evidence against mafia
members, the fight against mafia-type organizations has always significantly
relied upon the encouragement of defection. In Italy, the evidence of defectors
has not only led to the judicial convictions of many mafia affiliates but also
contributed to a better understanding of the structure ofthe Sicilian Cosa Nostra
and to the shattering of the image of the impeccable 'man of honour'. Mafia
defectors are former members who leave the organization in exchange for more
lenient judicial treatment and a tailor-made protection programme intended to
provide protection, financial assistance and, in some cases, a new identity .... 66
Indeed, criminal charges and criminal organization charges involving members of
organized crime outlaw groups in Canada often rely on evidence provided by an
informant or a defector from the organized crime group,67 or through surveillance and the
interception of private communications. While this evidence amounts to that of an
unsavory witness, evidence such as police surveillance and private comnumication
intercepts can be used to confirm such testimony and reinforce the case for the Crown.
Infiltration by undercover police officers has occurred,68 but requires extreme personal
commitments and sacrifices, and therefore, is rare. As a result, the expansion of law
enforcement powers, such as in obtaining wiretaps, would facilitate police investigations
that will result in the laying of criminal charges against organized crime outlaw suspects .
.. Stefano Maffei & Isabella Merzagora Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and
Modernity in a Troubled Country" (2007) 4 European J. of Criminology 461 at 471.
. G1 R. v. Leclerc, supra note 39 at paras. 37, 45 and 46; R. v. Violette, 2009 BCSC 1557, [2009] B.C.J. No.
2262 (B.C. S.C.); and CBC News Online, "Top Hells Angel Arrested in Montreal" (I November 20 I 0)
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.calcanadalmontreal/story/20IOIII/Ollhells-angels-arrested.html>; and
Paul Cherry, "SharQC Takes Bite Out of Hells Angels" (17 Apri12009) The Gazette online:
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/SharQc+takes+bite+Hells+Angels/1498885/story.html>. The
main witness for the prosecution in R. v. Violelle was Michael Plante who had achieved the status of official
friend in the East End chapter of the Hells Angels. The witness providing evidence against the accused in
R. v. Leclerc, Peter Paradis, had achieved the status of prospect in the Rock Machine outlaw motorcycle
gang. In Operation SHARQC, with the assistance of evidence from a past Sergeant-at-Arms turned
informant, police arrested more than 123 people, II I of whom were full-patch members of the Hells Angels
and have yet to be tried.
6' Joseph D. Pistone & Richard Woodley, Donnie Braseo: My Undercover Life in Ihe Mafia (New York:
New American Library, 1988); William Queen, Under and Alone: The True SIOIY ofthe Undercover Agenl
Who Infiltraled Allleriea 's Mosl Violenl OUllmv Motorcycle Gang (New York: Random House, 2005); and
Jay Dobyns and Nils Johnson-Shelton, No Angel: My Harrowing Undercover Journey to the Inner Circ/e
oflhe Hells Angels (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009). Queen spend years undercover, and became a
full-patch member and Vice President of the Mongols motorcycle club. Jay Dobyns spent years
undercover, and became a gunrunner and hitman for the Hells Angels.
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Canada, like other countries targeting organized crime, has indeed expanded law
enforcement powers.69 The ability to obtain search warrants and production orders has
been increased by the 1997 legislation due to increased protections that now exists in the
Criminal Code for confidential informants. 7o Further, the criminal organization
provisions in the Criminal Code have relaxed the requirements for judicial authorization
to intercept private communications. For instance, applications under various sections of
the Criminal Code for judicial authorization in relation to criminal organization
investigations need not demonstrate investigative necessity;71 and an authorizing judge
may extend the time that that the Attorney General or Minister for Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness must give notice to the persons intercepted and notice of the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (U.K.), supra note 59; Organized Crime, supra note 30;
and "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized Crime", supra note 5 at Section
1.1. According to Santino, during approximately the last decade, Italy has again increased law enforcement
by creating the Direzione Investigativa Anti-mafia or Antimafia Investigative Adminstration, as well as the
Direzione NazionaIe Antimafia or Superprocura: National Antimafia Adminstration, in order to combat
organized crime.
In the United Kingdom, officers orthe Serious Organised Crime Agency with powers and
privileges of any police, customs or immigration officer anywhere within the territory of England, Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as adjacent waters, Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(U.K.), supra note 59 at ss. 46-49. In addition, the provisions enhance the powers ofan'est, ibid. at s. 110;
reduce pre-requisites for search warrants for premises, ibid. at ss. 113-14; increase powers to stop and
search individuals, ibid. at s. 115; facilitate taking DNA samples, photographs, fingerprint, and footwear
impressions of suspects, ibid. at ss. 116-19. Further, this legislation mandates that the chief officers or
constables of other law enforcement agencies in Great Britain or Northern Ireland cooperate with the
Serious Organised Crime Agency by apprising the Agency of relevant information about crime; and it
imposes a duty on every police officer, customs officer, armed forces member and coastguard member to
assist the Agency in its functions, ibid. at 5S. 36 and 37. In tum, the Agency must keep law enforcement
agencies abreast ofinformation relevant to criminal investigations, ibid. at s. 3.
The United States has historically resorted to increasing law enforcement agencies in order to
combat outlaws and organized crime. For instance, during the "Wild West", the federal government
established the United States Marshals Service in 1789, Organized Crime, supra note 30. at 368. Prior to
Prohibition, in 1791, the Prohibition Bureau evolved from the imposition of tax on alcoholic beverages.
After Prohibition, the Prohibition Bureau became the Alcohol Tax Unit, and subsequently, with an
expansion of its jurisdiction over firearms, arson and explosives, it became the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives or ATF, ibid. at 370-71. The Department ofTreasUly- lnternal Revenue Service
or IRS collects revenues for the federal government, and in so doing, has access to information that assist
law enforcement agencies dealing with organized crime, ibid. at 371. Congress expanded the ability ofthe
IRS in 1982 to facilitate cooperation between it and law enforcement, ibid. The Depal1ment of Homeland
Security or DHS originated ITom the anti-terrorist goals within the Homeland Security Act of2002, in order
to co-ordinate activities ofthe Immigration and Custom Enforcement or lCE agency, the Coast Guard, and
the Secret Service, ibid. at 371-72. This Department of Homeland Security also administers the United
States Secret Service which investigates money and credit card counterfeiting, and the Postal Inspection
Service which investigates the use of mail to further racketeering and smuggling of controlled substances,
ibid. at 376.
.
70 Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 487.3.
71 Ibid. at ss. 185(1.1) and I86{1.1).
69
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covert entry pursuant to such an authorization to a period not exceeding three years rather
than the usual 90 days.n Since 1993, police had preventative powers in that they could
obtain judicial authorizations without having to demonstrate investigative necessity in
urgent circumstances to prevent serious harm to any person or property/3 and while this
section was used to obtain evidence for gang prosecutions, the British Columbia Supreme
Court has held that this section violates section 8 of the Charter, is not saved by section 1
of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 74 and is of no force and effect pursuant
to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 75 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has
also held that this section violates section 8 ofthe Charter, but is constitutional because
its overbreadth could be remedied by severance and the absence of notice can be read
down. 76 At a micro-level, the interception of private communications of organized crime
outlaws since the passage of the 1997 legislation has facilitated law enforcement. It has
contributed evidence used to atTest and prosecute a number of organized crime outlaws in
Canada. 77 However, from a macro-level perspective, in spite of increased law
enforcement power, organized crime outlaw groups stilI exist, and acts of violence and
intimidation by their members stilI occur in this country.
The expansion of law enforcement powers generally has had inconsistent success in the
overall suppression of organized crime in other countries as well. At various points in
history, the United States has used its numerous organized crime agencies to increase law
Ibid. at 55.185(3),196,487.01(5.1) and (5.2).
Ibid. at s. 184.4.
74 R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] S.C.J. No 16 (Q.L.), aff'g 2008 BCSC 211, [2008] B.CJ. No. 1764
(Q.L.) (B.C.S.C.) [previously R. v. Six Accused Persons, 2008 BCSC 212, [2008] B.C.J. No. 293 (Q.L.)
(B.C.S.C.)] [R. v. Tse]; and R. v. Sipes, 2009 BCSC 285, [2009] B.C.J. No. 421 (Q.L.) [R. v. Sipes]. Section
I of the Canadian Charter ofRights alld Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.II [Charter] states:
The Canadian Charter ofRights alld Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
72

7J

subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.
" Constilution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, App. II., No. 44, Schedule B, s. 52. Section 52 states:
The Constitution of Canada is the Supreme Law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
7. R. v. Pangman, 2000 MBQB 85, [2000] MJ. No. 300 (Q.L.) (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Pereira, 2008 BCSC 184,
[2008] B.C.J. No. 2779 (Q.L.); R. v. Tse, supra note 74; R. v. Sipes, supra note 74; R. v. Riley (2008), 60
C.R. (6 th) 105, [2008] OJ. No. 2887 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.C.J.) [R v. Riley]; R. v. Riley (no. 2), [2008] O.J. No.
2889 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.CJ.) [R. v. Riley (no.2)]; and R. v. Deacon, [2008] OJ. No. 5756 (Ont. S.c.J.) [R. v.

Deacon].
77 R. v. Riley, supra note 76; R. v. Riley (no. 2), supra note 76; and R. v. Deacon, supra note 76.
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enforcement in relation to specific organized crime groups and their activities. An
extensive law enforcement initiative using organized crime legislation has led to a
number of convictions of organized crime members and associates under RICO occurred
in the I 960s/ 8 in the 1980s79 and again in the 1990s. 8o Italy created the Alto
Commissario or High Commissioner in 1982 in order to coordinate the government fight
against the Mafia. However, this effolt became useless and was revoked in 1992notably the same year in which the assassinations of two criminal justice officials,
Candidate for Superprocuratore or General Attomey Giovanni Falcone, and Judge Paolo
Borsellino, as well as their families and bodyguards, occun·ed. 81 In the 2000s, the Italian
government deployed thousands of military and police officers into Naples in order to
Organized crime convictions in the United States rose from 14 in 1960 to 373 in 1963. Attorney General
Robelt F. Kennedy increased fund s and manpower for the Justice Department; assigned a special team of
prosecutors to assume conduct of the entire process of investigating and prosecuting racketeer cases;
implemented a coordinated program involving all 26 federal law enforcement agencies that were tasked
with investigating organized crime in 1960; and eventually successfully lobbied Congress for an expansion
of federal powers in the fight against organized crime. This data was obtained from the Robert F. Kennedy
Exhibit, John F. Kennedy Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts.
79 Antonio Nicaso & Lee Lamothe, Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace of Global
Crime Empires (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons Canada, 2005) [Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists:
The Rising Menace of Global Crime Empires] at 54. Nicaso and Lamothe cite the following statistics to
demonstrate this law enforcement initiative:
Coordinated attacks on America's La Cosa Nostra in the 1980s led one United States
Attorney in Massachusetts to dub the decade "the gold age of law enforcement." By the mid·
1980s there were more than 3,500 convictions of organized crime figures and associates, with $15
million in fines levied and $387 million in assets, drugs, and other contraband seized. Across
America special organized crime task forces were formed; throughout a network of26 cities these
units, often working with anti-drug task forces, besieged LCN [La Cosa Nostra] operations. The
number of FBI agents mandated to fight organized crime was increased by 20 percent, and U.S.
Attorneys began using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act- RICO-against
criminal organizations. Under RICO, offenders found guilty received sentences of up to 20 years
and $25,000 fines. RICO allowed prosecutors to pull diverse crime together into a single case to
show a pattern of racketeering enterprises. Funding was increased for wiretapping and room probe
operations; this led to an increase in informants who essentially convicted themselves through their
own conversations.
8. Ibid. at 56. Nicaso and Lamothe cite the following statistics to demonstrate the FBI law enforcement
initiative of 1996 called Operation Button Down:
By the end of the first year, Button Down officers had indicted andlor convicted a total of
4 bosses, 3 underbosses, 3 consigliere, 46 capos, 48 soldiers, and 331 associates and seized more
than $116 million. And by December 1998 another 53 LCN [La Cosa Nostra] members and
associates were indicted or convicted in labor racketeering cases, inCluding indictments against the
Gambino and Genovese Families. [n total, 3 bosses, I underboss, I consiglie!'e, 20 capos, 26
soldiers, and 270 associates were arrested.
The Button Down office was involved in cases involving LCN activities across America,
including Las Vegas, Buffalo, New York, Youngstown, and Pittsburgh. In all, almost 1,000 LCN
members and their associates were charged. According to the FB[, the effect of Button Down is in
the numbers: active Families in the U.S. were reduced from a Whopping 24 to nine.
8! "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Matia and Organized Crime", supra note 5 at Section 1.1.
78
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combat the extreme violence resulting from gang wars. In spite of increased law
enforcement, increased arrests, increased public outrage over the death of innocent
civilians, the Camorra continued to operate their usual criminal enterprises, and adapted
to the police presence by sending members overseas to generate income to SUppOit the
neighbourhoods in Naples. 82 Some observers of the wars asselt that the violence and
deaths will only end when one gang achieves supremacy over the others. 83 That is to say,
law enforcement has limited ability to suppress gang wars. Rather, it may exert only
peripheral control, and its presence largely attempts to calm moral panic.
Ideally, both expansion of enforcement powers and an increase in police officers should
occur if the state seeks to aJ1'est and prosecute organized crime outlaw groups. However,
the decimation of an organized crime group does not permanently oust all outlaws from
an area or territory. New groups rise to fill or seize the vacated and lucrative tell'itol'y,84
and resilient groups re-emerge, as evidenced by the recovery of Sicilian Mafia from law
enforcement in the 1980s. 85 Indeed, as a result of American law enforcement efforts in
the 1980s and 1990s that targeted organized crime using RICO, non-La Cosa Nostra
organized crime groups, such as Albanian groups, emerged in the some industries in their
place. 86 In Canada, the convictions and incapacitation of significant crime figures in
British Columbia has not rid society of organized crime outlawry and violence. This
phenomenon suggests that social control in the form of law enforcement and prosecutions
does not address the larger societal issues that create and perpetuate organized crime.
From a social constructionist perspective, little utility results fi'om expending resources
for a revolving practice - that is to say, if aJ1'ests, prosecutions, and convictions cannot
solve the problem of organized crime, then perhaps criminal laws as anti-organized crime
measures and specifically criminal laws that are tailored to target organized crime, are not
the answer, or are not the whole answer. The increased presence of police may make the
82 Angels, Mobsters & Norco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a/Global Crime Empires, supra note 79 at
69.
8l Ibid at 70.
" Ibid at 57; and Stephen Schneider,lced: The StOlY o[Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga: John
Wiley & Sons Canada, 2009) [Iced: The StOlY o[Orgonized Crime in Canada] at 479 and 50 I.
" Angels, Mobsters & Narco-Terrorists: The Rising Menace a[Global Crime Empires, supra note 79 at
33.
86 Ibid at 57.
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public think the state is responding to the problem of organized crime - that is to say, it
may legitimate the state - but over time the public will realize that this technique alone is
not the solution. It is somewhat hollow.

4.2.5

Criminalization and Regulation of Activities Associated with

Organized Crime
Will the criminalization and regulation of activities associated with organized crime
socially control organized crime outlaws? Are such measures too complex and piecemeal
to be useful? Federal and provincial governments in Canada have implemented a variety
of laws to stymie the effOlis of organized crime outlaws. Some of these laws are
peripheral, and they hinder the legal activities of organized criminals that assist them in
their illegal pursuits. Such technique oftargeting organized crime is not new or unique.
For instance, in Italy, in order to reduce the extreme violence in Naples resulting from
gang wars and then associated vendettas, in the early 2000s, the Italian government
sought to ban motor scooters to reduce the mobility of Camorra gunmen. 87 These laws
may effect small and yet significant changes to organized crime behaviour, but these
piecemeal measures do not pierce the real reasons for the power of organized crime
groups. Thus, criminalization of activities - illegal and legal activities - of organized
crime outlaws lack substance and effectiveness. However, social constructionism
suggests that from the state's perspective, more important than the actual effectiveness of
the solution to the problem of organized crime violence in society, is the short-term
legitimacy of the state and the law as a social control mechanism.
As referred to in section two "The Birth of Criminal Organization Legislation in Canada"
in Chapter One of this thesis, the Canadian federal government criminalized various acts
if they were done in connection with a criminal organization. 88 Recently, British
Columbia has criminalized the possession of body armour and armoured vehicles or
87

88

Ibid at 69.
Criminal Code, supra note 26 at ss. 82(2) criminalizes the possession of explosive substances in

connection with a criminal organization ; section 231 deems a murder to be in the first degree regardless of
whether it was planned and deliberate, if the killing was done in connection with a criminal organization, or
if it was done while committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence in connection with a criminal
organization; and drive-by shootings and proscribed an aggravated sentence for such shootings when they
are done in connection with a criminal organization.
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vehicles with after-market compartments in an effort to target gang violence.89 Other
provinces have followed suit. 9o Further, the British Columbia government has
contemplated legislation to prevent the chips from one casino from having value and
being used in another casino in order to stymie this compact method of CUITency used by
some organized crime outlaws in their illegal transactions and in money laundering. 91
The cl'iminalization of activities associated with organized crime, or the statutOlY
connection of already existing criminal offences to organized crime, essentially attempts
to criminalize organized crime generally without specifically proscribing organized crime
groups themselves. It also demonstrates the employment of extreme social control
measures by the state in order to respond to a social problem. For example, shootings of
organized crime members' vehicles, houses and clubhouses is a social problem. They
have occurred since gang wars began in Canada, and in the last few years in the Metro
Vancouver area of British Columbia, have risen to unprecedented levels.92 These
shootings occur in neighbourhoods and public places. The moral panic that ensues from
seemingly random shootings and the risk to the lives of the innocent seemed to demand
some sort of state response. The state did not simply increase law enforcement,
prosecution and criminal justice system resources to increase arrests and prosecutions of
organized crime outlaws, and employ pre-existing ordinary criminal laws, such as
attempted murder; 93 discharging a firearm with intent to wound, maim or disfigure (prior

89 Body Armour Control Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 24; and Arll/oured Vehicle and After-Market COII/partmelll
Control Act, S.B.C. 2010, c. 8.
90 Body Armour Control Act, S.A. 20 I0, c. B-4.8; Body Armour Control Act, S.N.S. 20 II , c. 2; and The
Body Arll/our and Fortified Vehicle Control Act, S.M. 2010, c. 12. These Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia
Acts are not yet in force.
9 1 CBC News Online, "B.C. Moves to Control Casino Chips" (10 January 2011), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.calcanadalbritish-columbialstory/201I/OI/IOlbc-casino-chips-rules.html>; and CBC News
Online, "B.C. to Move Against Casino Money-Laundering" (7 January 2011), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.calcanadalbrit ish-columbialstOly/20 11 10 I107Ibc-casinos-money-Iaunderingregulations.html>.
92 City of Surrey Community Impact Statement Letter from Mayor Dianne L. Watts & Chief Superintendent
W. Fraser MacRae, (undaled). Mayor Wal1s of the ,City of Surrey and Chief Superintendent MacRae of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Surrey Detachment state that " ... there has been a 55% increase in
firearms-related homicides from 2007 to 2008 in the Metro Vancouver area." In 2009 in Metro Vancouver,
they state that there were 39 confirmed firearms-related homicides. In Surrey alone, they state that a 20%
increase in confirmed (through persons, propel1y damage, and/or shell casings) shots fired incidents
occurred in 2008 as compared to 2007.
9, Crilllinal Code, supra note 26 at ss. 230 and 463.
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to the October 2, 2009 amendments connecting this offence to a criminal organization);94
unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm;95 and unauthorized
possession of a firearm in a motor vehicle. 96 Rather, the Canadian government enshrined
a number of new criminal laws. However, no evidence existed or exists to show that
investigations and prosecutions require the majority of these specific organized crime
measures to incapacitate organized crime outlaws. Debate as to whether any criminal
organization laws were required to tackled the problem of organized crime in society did
not occur when the Canadian government consulted police, provincial and federal
governmental officials, the legal community, private industry, and academics. 97 These
approaches by federal and provincial governments again suggest that the state is
attempting to calm moral panic by being seen to pass laws that are intended to combat
organized crime. However, ineffective and useless laws amount to hollow solutions.

Canadian provinces have also passed laws to regulate criminal organization activities or
activities of their members. For instance, some provinces have legislated powers for the
state to interfere with business endeavours of organized crime members through the
suppression and publication of information about members in order to combat the
activities of organized crime and organized crime members. Criminal organizations have
numerous businesses and companies in order to launder illegally obtained money. For
example, by the mid 1980s, the Hells Angels had over 40 registered companies. 98 The
Hells Angels corporation may not have owned these companies so much as individuals
within the corporation owned them. These non-criminal law measures did not exist prior
to the Criminal Code criminal organization legislation. They seek to reduce the economic
and social SUppOlt of the community for labeled organized crime outlaws. They seek to
limit the economic viability of businesses associated with criminal organizations or
criminal organization members, and thus, reduce their economic power within society.

lbid. at s. 244.
lbid. at ss. 91,92 and 95.
% lbid. at s. 94.
97 "Time to Recodify Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 28 at para. 14.
98 lced: The Story a/Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 84 at 399.
94
95
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In Saskatchewan, The Criminal Enterprise Suppression Act,99 allows a court to cancel any
licence held by an individual who owns or manages a business and who is a member of a
criminal organization; to prohibit that individual from owning or managing a business for
a specified period of time; and to prohibit the Liquor and Gaming Authority from
approving a licence for any premises owned or used by the business. 100 Similarly, The

Civil Remedies Against Organized Crime Act lOl in Manitoba allows a police chief to
apply to a court to cancel various business licences that are essential to operating a
business, if those licences are held by members of criminal organizations. 102

Further, both Saskatchewan and Manitoba governments have used civil rights legislation
that empowers a court to require the owner of a property to ensure that the property is
used in a way that does not adversely affect the community or neighbourhood. These
legislative effOlis may also be used to target criminal organization activities. The Safer

Communities and Neighbourhoods Act,103 of Saskatchewan empowers a cOUli to make a
community safety order against a property if there is proven "a reasonable inference that
it is being habitually used for a specified use and ... the community or neighbourhood is
adversely affected by the activities.", and those activities pose "a serious and immediate
threat to the health, safety and security of one or more occupants of the property Of
persons in the community or neighbourhood.,,104 A "specified use" includes activities

S.S. 2005, c. C-46. I.
Ibid. at s. 4.
101 S.M. 2002, c. 56, C.C.S.M. c. C I 07 [The Civil Remedies Against Organized Crime Act]; and Manitoba
Justice, Project Gang-Proof A Handbook For Families and Community Members, 2'd ed. (2004), online:
Manitoba Government <http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/safe/gangproof/ganghandbook2004.pdt> [Project
Gang-Proof A Handbook For Families and Community Members] at 38.
102 The Civil Remedies Against Organized Crime Act, supra note 101 at s. 4.
103 S.S. 2004, C.S-O.I as amended by S.S., 2005, c. 41; and 2006, c.R-22.000 I [The Safer Communities alld
Neighbourhoods Act of Saskatchewan].
I'" Ibid. at s. 8. Section 8 states:

99

100

8 (I) The cOUli may make a community safety order if:
(a) it is satisfied that:
(i) activities have been occurring on or near the property named in the application
that give rise to a reasonable inference that it is being habitually used for a specified
use; and
(ii) the community or neighbourhood is adversely affected by the activities; or
(b) it is satisfied that the activities about which an application is made are a serious and
immediate threat to the health, safety and security of one or more occupants ofthe
property or persons in the community or neighbourhood.
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that are traditionally believed to be associated with organized crime groups, such as
illegally selling liquor, drug dealing, prostitution in a bawdy house, and "the commission
or promotion of a criminal organization offence, [or] ... the accommodation, aid,
assistance or suppol1 of any nature of a gang or criminal organization or any of its
activities or the facilitation of any of its activities. ,,105 Since its proclamation, reported
cases indicate that courts have generally refused to grant community safety orders. 106
However, in Saskatchewan (Director of Community Operations) v. Li,107 and

(3) A community safety order may:
(a) require any or all persons to vacate the property on or before a date specified by the
court, and enjoin any or all of them from re-entering or reoccupying it;
(b) terminate the tenancy agreement or lease of any tenant of the property on the date
specified pursuant to clause (a);
(c) require the director to close the property from use and occupation on a specified date
and keep it closed for up to 90 days;
(d) limit the order to part of the property about which the application was made, or to
pat1icular persons;
(e) make any other provision that the court considers necessary for the effectiveness of
the community safety order, including, but not limited to, an order of possession in favour
ofthe respondent.
105 The SaleI' Communities and Neighbourhoods Act of Saskatchewan, supra note 103 at ss. 4(1 )(1).
Subsection 4(1 )(1) states:
4(1) ... (1) "specified use" means, in relation to property, the use of property for:
(i) the use, consumption, sale, transfer or exchange of a substance mentioned in section 90
of The Alcohol and Gaming Regulation Act, 1997, in contravention of that Act and the
regulations made pursuant to that Act;
(ii) the use, consumption, sale, transfer or exchange of beverage alcohol, as defined in
The Alcohol and Gaming Regulation Act, 1997, in contravention ofthat Act and the
regulations made pursuant to that Act;
(iii) the use or consumption as an intoxicant by any person of an intoxicating substance,
or the sale, transfer or exchange of an intoxicating substance ifthere is a reasonable basis
to believe that the recipient will use or consume the substance as an intoxicant, or cause
or permit the intoxicating substance to be used or consumed as an intoxicant;
(iv) the possession, growth, use, consumption, sale, transfer or exchange of a controlled
substance, as defined in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Canada), in
contravention of that Act;
(v) child sexual abuse or activities related to child sexual abuse;
(vi) prostitution or activities related to prostitution;
(vi.!) the commission or promotion ofa criminal organization offence;
(vi.2) the accommodation, aid, assistance or SUppOlt of any nature ofa gang or criminal
organization or any of its activities or the facilitation of any of its activities; or
(vii) any other prescribed use; ....
106 Saskatchewan (Director olCommunity Operations) v. Li, 2007 SKQB 114, [2007] S.J. No. 153 (Q.L.)
[Saskatchewan (Director olCommunity Operations) v. Li] at para. 3.
107

Ibid.
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Saskatchewan (Director of Community Operations) v. Mercer,

108

the Saskatchewan

Court of Queen's Bench did grant such orders. 109
Similarly, The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Ad 10 in Manitoba allows a court
to make a community safety order if an activity "negatively affects the safety or security
of one or more persons in the community or neighbourhood" or "interferes with the
peaceful enjoyment of one or more propeliies in the community or neighbourhood.,,111
Further, the Fortified Buildings Ad 12 of Manitoba designates a fOliified building as a
threat to public safety if public safety concerns exist. 113 These provincial statutes attempt
to reduce organized crime activities and maintain conventional societal values for
communities. Since its proclamation in July 2001, applications for community safety
orders were sought in three cases in Manitoba, although 340 other complaints were

108

2007 SKQB, [2007] S.J. No. 390 (Q.L.).
Ibid. at paras. I and 6-8; and Saskatchewan (Director ofCommunity Operations) v. Li, supra note 106 at
pams.7-IO.
110 The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Act, S.M. 2001, c. 6, C.C.S.M. c. S5 [The Safer
Communities and Neighbourhoods Act of Manitoba] at s. 6(1); and Project Gang-Proof A Handbook For
Families and Community Members, supra note 101 at 38.
III Ibid; and ibid. Sections 1(2) and 6(1) and (2) of The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Act of
Manitoba state:
109

1(2) For the purposes of this Act, a community or neighbourhood is adversely affected by
activities if the activities
(a) negatively affect the safety or security of one or more persons in the community or
neighbourhood; or
(b) interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of one or more properties in the community or
neighbourhood, whether the property is privately or publicly owned.
6(1) The court may make a community safety order if it is satisfied that
(a) activities have been occurring on or near the property that give rise to a reasonable
inference that it is being habitually used for a specified use; and
(b) the community or neighbourhood is adversely affected by the activities.
6(2) Subject to subsection (3), the court may include in a community safety order
(a) a provision requiring any or all persons to vacate the property on or before a date
specified by the COUlt, and enjoining any or all of them from re-entering or re-occupying
it;
(b) a provision terminating the tenancy agreement or lease of any tenant ofthe property
on the date specified under clause (a);
(c) a provision requiring the director to close the property from use and occupation on a
specified date and keep it closed for up to 90 days; and
(d) any other provision that it considers necessary to make the order effective, including,
but not limited to, an order of possession in favour of the respondent.
112 S.M. 2002, c. 3, C.C.S.M. c. F153.
113 Ibid.; and Project Gang-Proof A Handbook For Families and Community Members, supra note 101 at
38.
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resolved out of comt.114 The employment of civil statutes reduces the standards of proof
required to obtain court orders, and thus, may assist communities in their efforts.
However, whether these civil proceedings are frequently used and have their desired
effects in the long term remains to be seen.
Should governments seek to interfere with or suppress business endeavours of organized
crime outlaws, then they should consider empowering law enforcement to publish the
names of individuals who are members of criminal organizations; the names of members
of entities that courts have determined to be criminal organizations; as well as the titles
and ownership of those members, for instance that they are directors of particular
companies and businesses. Such publication would infornl the public as to whom they
are supporting as consumers. In a similar vein, if an entity has been convicted of a
criminal offence, legislation regulating business and incorporation could be amended in
order to prevent companies from continuing to operate. Although such measures may
circuitously chip away at the one aspect of power of organized cdme outlaws, these
piecemeal efforts do not directly target the essence of power of criminal organizations
and their members, and they will not be consistently applied. From a labelling and social
psychology perspective, the stigmatization of these organized crime outlaws only widens
the gap between them and conventional law-abiding citizens, and further prevents prosocial interactions. Individuals who are business owners and also revealed to be
organized crime outlaws may have fewer pro-social relations with conventional societal
members and more anti-social relations with non-conventional societal members and
outlaws. Such stigmatization only entrenches outlaw identities.
The criminalization and regulation of certain acts associated with organized crime activity
does not mean that the police and prosecutors can prove these new offences; nor that such
proof will not require complex and lengthy legal arguments; nor that such proof will not
have economic costs that prohibit the use of such provisions. As a result, these specific
organized crime measures may not be used although they exist for the plilpose of

114

Manitoba (Aboriginal and Communily Law En/orcemenl, DireclOl'l v. Mal/oigre, 2009 MBQB 113,

[2009] M.J. No. 153 (Q.L.) at para. 4.
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combating criminal organizations. The state can declare that they have put forth a
remedy to the problem of organized crime violence, but police, prosecutors and the COutts
may have real difficulties using these measures. Consequently, in the long-term, such
measures may actually produce a negative impact on the legitimacy of these laws and the
state when the public eventually comes to realize that these laws did not, or were not used
to, combat organized crime outlaws.

4.2.6

Problems Administering Justice in Criminal Organization

Trials
Can the evidentiary and procedural issues arising from the criminal organization
legislation be overcome so as to successfully prosecute organized crime outlaws, without
prolonging the administration of justice and undermining essential criminal law principles
at an exorbitant expense? The Manitoba Warriors trial exemplifies one of the first of
many very costly changes to administering justice for alleged criminal organizations.
Twenty months of pre-trial motions occurred. I IS There were 32 guilty pleas to trafficking
in cocaine, and only two guilty pleas by minor participants to participation in a criminal
organization.

116

The prosecution withdrew the other criminal organization charges for a

plea bargain with other accused. 117
30 The cost of building the coutihouse was $3.7 million and the additional costs
of this trial have been estimated at well over $7 million. The money spent on the
special measures taken in this case would have been far better spent on crime
prevention programmes targeted at Aboriginal peoples and general police
investigative deployment. This show trial is a monument to state folly, both in
terms of the expedient passage of the anti-gang laws and their use in Manitoba.
Roland Penner, a former Attorney-General for Manitoba, has described it as
"politically motivated, expensive and constitutionally invalid." Professor David
Deutscher suggests it was "too complex, with too many accused and too many
charges to have a chance of success."
32 Prosecutors should have treated this case as a routine dmgs conspiracy trial
with discretion exercised to target only the major participants. The trial judge
should have granted severance for lesser pmticipants far earlier than the date at
which it was clear the trial had unraveled. At worst this was overarching state
115 "Time to Recodity Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons rrolll the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 28 at para. 29.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.

238

action based on false stereotypes that these Aboriginal people were dangerous to
themselves and everyone else. ll8
The Manitoba Warriors trial resulted in 170 years of sentences being imposed overall,
although the longest sentence was 4.5 years for trafficking in cocaine. 119 Whether or not
the security provisions of the courthouse were necessary to conduct trial proceedings
remains difficult to judge. When such proceedings in such facilities do not give rise to
security or safety breaches, one cannot definitively assert that such measures were
warranted as no other comparison exists. FUliher, even if breaches did occur, human
error rather than the nature of the facilities may be to blame. The point is that
overwhelming security provisions portray to the public and to the accused that the
accused are organized crime outlaws to be feared.

Subsequent criminal organization prosecutions have been no different than the Manitoba
Wal1'iors proceedings, and perpetuate the message to the public that their moral panic is
justified and that the individuals charged are indeed individuals to be feared. Exorbitant
expenditures for courthouse and cOUliroom security, prosecutorial and judicial salaries,
law enforcement wages, witness protection costs and expenses, legal aid funding, and the
expenditure of these resources in one area as opposed to for usual investigations and
trials, have characterized other large and complex criminal cases across Canada, and will
continue to do so. For instance, in the case of R. v. Violette, 120 pre-trial voir dires took
approximately a year to complete, and the jury sat from September 2008 to July 2009.
Four prosecutors worked almost exclusively on this case for three and a half years, and
three ofthe four accused had two lawyers in court representing them each day.
Additional Sheriffs were assigned to the cOUliroom for safety and security purposes, and a
contingent of police officers were present to protect the police agent while he testified for
months. The police agent received in excess of one million dollars plus stipends for his
patiicipation throughout the investigation and court proceedings. While all accused were
convicted of various counts in the 28 count indictment, none were convicted of criminal
118
119

Ibid. at paras. 30 and 32.
Ibid. para. 29.

120
2009 BeSe 1557. As this trial was heard by a jury, no citation exists to review the nature oflhe case.
However, Ihis citation for the sentencing decision for accused Potts and Punko refers to its breadth and
complexity.
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organization charges. The prosecutions arising from Project SHARQc also are expensive
due to a 2.9 million dollar police agent,12I a team of prosecutorial staff, and extensive
cOUli resources overly a lengthy period of time. Some charges have been stayed because
the Quebec justice system could not handle the size and complexity of the case and delays
prevent the accused from having fair trials. 122 Justice is not only blind, but Spotts a huge
price tag.

Physical challenges to administering justice in a safe manner (or in a manner perceived to
be safe) and the cost oflengthy complex cases are not the only problems with criminal
organization trials. A number of evidentiary hurdles associated with formally defining
criminalizing organized crime into statutory law, as evidenced by the Canadian
jurisprudence. These evidentiary hurdles hinder efforts to prosecute and convict
individuals, and thus, these legal measures lose their social control value. For instance,
traditional rules of evidence may also be inadequate to prove the new legal concept of a
criminal organization. While exceptions to the hearsay rule exist in order to admit
statements and acts of co-conspirators against one another if that evidence was made in
fU11herance of the conspiracy, no such hearsay exceptions exist for criminal organizations
and their members. Rather, hearsay rules limit or circumscribe the inclusion of evidence
of other members' criminal acts to prove the "main purposes or main activities,,123 of the
group which is alleged to be a "criminal organization."
As discussed in the previous section, the federal government has criminalized the act of
committing a criminal offence in connection with a criminal organization, and has created
a number of these specific types of offences. For instance, the provisions criminalize the
possession of explosive substances in connection with a criminal organization,124 and
deem a murder to be in the first degree regardless of whether it was planned and
121 CSC News Online, "Hells Angels Informer Will Earn Millions for Crackdown Help" (23 April 2009)
ClJC News online: CSC News <http://www.cbc.calnews/canadalmontreal!story/2009/04123/montreal·
hellsangels-informer-0423.html>.
122 CSC News Online, "Quebec to appeal release of31 accused bikers" (01 June 20 II) CBC News online:
CSC News <http://www.cbc.calnews/canadalmontreal/story/20 11 /0610 I/quebec-sharqc-stay-proceedingsappeal.html>. Defence counsel alleged that the case may require ten years to complete the prosecutions of
all accused.
I2J Crimina! Code, supra note 26 at s. 467.1 (b).
124 Ibid at ss. 82(2).

240

deliberate, if the killing was done in connection with a criminal organization, or if it was
done while committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence in connection with
a criminal organization. 125 In addition, the government has criminalized drive-by
shootings, and has proscribed an aggravated sentence for such shootings when they are
done in connection with a criminal organization. 126 This legislation requires not only
proof of the offence of discharging the firearm, but also proof of a criminal organization,
as well as proof of connection of the predicate offence to the criminal organization. Thus,
the enforcement and prosecution of this new law require not only comprehensive and
significant evidentiary proof, but also significant resources.

FUilher, significant prejudices can occur in relation to criminal organization trials because
evidence may be admitted at trial in order to prove the existence of a criminal
organization, but that evidence may be irrelevant to the predicate offences, and may also
be prejudicial in nature. Prejudice can also occur from the amount of evidence required
to prove the existence of a criminal organization, and the connection of the predicate
offence to that organization. 127 These evidentiary hurdles result in voir dires that last
weeks or months, and thus, delay justice and result in significant expense.

These evidentiary and procedural failures also mean that tme criminal organization
members can escape the branding and social tarnishing of the outlaw label, and that they
may relish in the emboldening oftheir reputation as bad, but untouchable. Law-abiding
citizens will have less confidence in the declaration of social norms and values as
espoused by the law, and thus, less reason to conform. Thus, these evidentiary and
procedural problems within criminal organization laws will not adequately prevent the
challenges to social disorder that they seek to eradicate.

These are but a few of the problems that plague the administration of justice for criminal
organization trials in Canada. The brevity ofthis discussion does not reflect the time125
126

Ibid. at s. 231.
Ibid. at s. 244.2.

127 R. v. Violetle, 2008 BCSC 422, [2008] B.C.J. No. 2781 (Q.L.) at para. 116. The Court in this voir dire in
R. v. Violetle adopted the telm "piling on" as used by Defence Counsel, and held that prejudice may result
from the cumulative effect of individual pieces of admissible evidence.
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consuming, complicated, expensive, and sometimes unsolvable nature of these problems.
It makes the point that the criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code, and

their implementation in the social and political climate of the day, cannot be used to
effectively administer justice. These provisions cannot substantively and fairly try and
decide whether a social group is indeed an organized crime outlaw group or a "criminal
organization. "

4,2,7

Punishment and Deterrence

4.2.7.1

New Punitive Provisions for Criminal Organization Outlaws

Do the criminal organization provisions provide adequate punishment and deterrence of
organized crime outlaws? In 1997, the Canadian government augmented sentencing
provisions in relation to organized crime offenders l28 and continued to do so in
subsequent amendments to the Criminal Code. The sentencing principles provide that an
offence " ... committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a
criminal organization," is an aggravating factor in sentencing an offender. 129 Further,
specific sections ofthe Criminal Code proscribe greater punishments for offences
committed in connection with a criminal organization than pre-existing offences or
offences not committed in connection. 13o Parliament has made its position clear to the
judiciary: criminal organization offenders warrant more punitive sentences. In so doing
it has made its position clear to the public: their moral panic is warranted because
criminal organization offenders are fearsome, and unlike "others" - unlike other societal
members and other criminals.

128
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Criminal Code, supra note 26 at ss. 82(2); 71 8.2(a)(iv); and 467.14.
Ibid. at s. 71 8.2(a)(iv). SecHon 718.2(a)(iv) slates:

7 18.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideraHon the following principles:
Ca) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing,
(iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benetit of, at the direction
of or in association with a criminal organization, ...
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;
130 Ibid. at ss. 82(2), 231, 244(2) and 244.2.
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The criminal law proscribes and sentencing courts have imposed more punitive sanctions
for criminal organization offenders in order to denounce, deter and incapacitate such
offenders, and to limit the furtherance of the reputation for violence and intimidation,
The British Columbia Court of Appeal stated the following when sentencing an offender
. R . v. P ayne: 131
In

46 First is the appellant's motive. The appellant cold-bloodedly amputated Mr.
Giesbrecht's finger to punish him for failing to pay a small drug debt owed to the
criminal organization and to make of him a deterrent example to other
"salespersons" in the organization. This was not a crime of passion 01' impulse - it
was simply business. The appellant used this extreme violence as a management
tool to maintain discipline amongst and control over the sales staff who worked
under him. Thus, the purpose of the violence was to further the financial interests
of a criminal organization that is involved in an industry that spreads misery and
death to vulnerable members of our society, that drains the resources of our public
health care system, and that spawns collateral criminal activity of staggering
proportions. That the appellant was found to be a member of a criminal
organization and that he committed the offence for the benefit of and in
association with the criminal organization is an aggravating circumstance by
vittue of s. 718.2(a)(iv) of the Criminal Code. This factor distinguishes this case
from R. v. Jordan, supra, where there was no finding that the offender acted on
behalf of a criminal organization, and for that reason, all else being relatively
equal, it warrants a more severe sentence.
47 Next is the appellant's moral blameworthiness. The depth and endurance of
his moral degradation is illustrated by his remark, made one year after he
mutilated Mr. Giesbrecht, that if Mr. Holtz were his employee he would cut his
finger off for being "short" in his payment. Fm1her, the appellant deliberately
chose a vulnerable drug addict as his salesman and callously put him at risk of
suffering beating and mutilation by feeding his addiction at the same time as he
was holding him responsible for selling the drugs and collecting and remitting the
money. As well, he put the severed portion ofMr. Giesbrecht's finger in a box for
display to others who might be tempted to transgress the organization's rules. It is
difficult to comprehend such barbarous behaviour. It calls out for denunciation
and demands a strong punitive sentence. I32
Such an approach is not new with respect to targeting organized crime outlaws. 133
However, these laws, like other laws that increase the length of incarceration, are subject
to continued debate as to whether more punitive sanctions effect deterrence and

R. v. Payne, supra note 63.
Ibid. at paras. 46 and 47.
133 "A Comparative Analysis of Organised Crime Conspiracy Legislation and Practice and Their Relevance
to England and Wales", supra note 31 at 4. In the United States, RICO has also created a higher sentencing
regime in relation to racketeering activities.
131

132
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denunciation of offenders, and thus, whether they reduce recidivism and crime generally.
Sentencing principles generally provide for more punitive sanctions for more severe
crimes and more violent and prolific criminals. Although the Criminal Code now
specifically refers to committing offences for a criminal organization as an aggravating
factor and has increased some penalty provisions, the individualization in sentencing and
pre-existing common law ranges of sentences may have sufficed to appropriately
sentence an offender. Further, from a social constmctionist perspective such specific
provisions declare that organized crime offenders are indeed to be feared more than other
offenders - societal moral panic is warranted. From a deviance and labelling perspective,
such declaration further stigmatizes individuals who are sentenced as organized crime
members, and further entrenches the their deviant or outlaw identity.

4.2.7.2

Difficulties in Evaluating the Deterrent Value of Sentences

for Organized Crime Outlaws
In spite of efforts by the government to more severely punish criminal organization
offenders, a number of problems exist in deterring these offenders and in evaluating any
deterrent effect of laws that specifically target them. The effectiveness of sentences in
detel1'ing criminal organization outlaws cannot be judged by arrest, convictions, and
length of punitive sanctions imposed on organized crime members. According to insights
gained from social control theory and bond theory, it must be gauged by conformity to
societal norms. The concept of deterrence assumes significant relevance within criminal
organization legislation, but general detelTence of the general public may be more
significant than specific deterrence of convicted offenders.
The strength of official deterrence-force oflaw-is measured according
to two dimensions: risk versus reward. Risk involves the ability of the criminal
justice system to detect, apprehend and convict the offender. The amount of risk
is weighed against the potential rewards. Both risk and reward, however, are
relative to one's socio-economic situation. In other words, the less one has to
lose, the greater is the willingness to engage in risk. ... And the greater the reward,
the greater is the willingness to engage in risk. . .. 134 [Emphasis original].
Organized crime outlaws may not be individuals who have little to lose, and thus, would
have greater willingness to engage in the risk of organized crime activities. They may be
134

Organized Crime, supra note 32 at 23.
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those whose reward is paIlicularly lucrative, and w011h a significant risk. In addition, if
the application of laws only produces a low risk due to the lack of sufficient enforcement
or the lack of punitive consequences, then, as demonstrated by anti-Prohibitionists,
organized crime outlaws will assume such risk in pursuit of their rewards. Thus,
deterrence of these outlaws may be difficult to effect with penal laws.

4.2.7.3

The Need to Consider the Impact of Outlaw Identities in

Sentencing
A second problem with effecting deterrence via criminal organization legislation is that
the utilitarian equations within the concept of deterrence fail to account for the
significance of identity, as espoused by insights gained from labelling theory and social
psychology. Even with many arrests and convictions, specific deterrence may not occur
for criminal organization members who are convicted of criminal offences due to the
significant development and entrenchment oftheir outlaw identity. Incapacitation alone
in institutional settings with other organized crime offenders, may not provide sufficient
pro-social interactions to instill conventional societal values and behaviours. The
difficulty at this point in time is assessing the recidivism rate of the organized crime
outlaws who have been convicted and sentenced to incarceration, since many such
outlaws remain in custody due to the newness of the legislation, due to its rather recent
implementation, and due to the length of sentences that are imposed for the serious crimes
usually committed by organized crime outlaws.

With respect to general deterrence, increased penalties for organized crime outlaws may
have some value for law-abiding non-members and associates of criminal organizations,
but again, difficulties arise in assessing the effectiveness of general detell'enCe, since one
cannot measure criminal acts that did not occur. From a social control perspective and
labelling, however, one expects that social cohesion among conventional law-abiding
societal members would increase as the criminal "others" are punished more harshlythat is to say, they are denounced as even "more bad", and thus, are more distinguished
from law-abiding groups.
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4.2.7.4

Sentences that Specifically Target Organized Crime

Offenders Lack Fairness and Justness
A third problem with increasing the punitive sanctions for organized crime outlaws is the
lack of fairness and justness of such laws. From a social control perspective, organized
crime sentencing measures must secure obedience by punishing societal members who
violate the law, and deterring those who may potentially violate the law. From a social
constructionism perspective, unfair and unjust laws will delegitimize the law, and thus,
will not effect specific or general detelTence. No one will be deterred from committing
organized crime offences, and no one will want to follow the laws of society if those laws
are perceived to be unfair, unjust, and thus, violations of individual rights and fi·eedoms.
Under the present legislative provisions, criminal organization offenders who are
sentenced for an offence under section 467.11, 467.l2 or 467.l3 must serve that sentence
consecutively to any other punishment imposed for an offence arising out of the same
event or series of events, and consecutively to any other sentence to which the person is
subject at the time of that the sentencing. 135 In addition, criminal organization provisions
increased the liability to imprisonment for possession of explosive substances from five
years to 14 years if possession is in connection with a criminal organization. 136 It
mandates that sentences for offences that are in connection with a criminal organization
be served consecutively to sentences for all other offences. 137 An amendment to the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act in 1999 also made sentences more punitive for

organized crime offenders by mandating that inmates convicted of an organized crime
offence could not have access to the accelerated parole review available to some
offenders after they have served one sixth of their sentence. 138

Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 467.14.
Ibid. at ss. 82(2).
137 Ibid. at s. 467.14.
138 Dominique Valiquet, "Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection
of Justice System Participants" (16 March 2009), online: Parliament of Canada
<http://www2.parl.gc.calS ites/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/B illsJs.asp?lang~E&ls~c 14&source~library--p1'
b&Parl~40&Ses~2#c95>. Amendments in 1999 to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C.
1992, c. 20 at s. 125, prevented inmates convicted of organized crime offences from having access to
accelerated parole review which some offenders may seek after service of one-sixth of their sentence.
135

136
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The sentencing provisions for organized crime offenders are unfair and unjust because
they treat these offenders as status offenders - that is to say, they punish criminal
organization outlaws simply for being such an outlaw and simply for belonging to a
criminal organization. The Canadian government has not proscribed as illegal those
organized crime groups or membership in those groups, and thus, has not criminalized
their state of being or simple existence, yet its imposition of more punitive sanctions for
organized crime offenders does just that.
For instance, an individual who possesses explosives is liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years, 139 but an individual who possesses explosives in connection
with a criminal organization is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen
years. 140 The organized crime offender may be punished more harshly because of who or
what he is. The distastefulness of status offences has long been recognized and legislated
against. 141 The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Budreo l42 has expressed the
unconstitutionality of status offences in its review of section 810.1 of the Criminal Code
regarding judicial preventative measures for potential sexual offenders, and whether this
section violated the principles of fundamental justice as required in section 7 of the
Charler

l43

because it may have created a status offence; whether the section was

impermissibly broad; and whether it was impermissibly vague. The COUll concluded tbat
Criminal Code, supra note 26 at 55. 82( I).
[bid. at 55. 82(2).
141 For instance, since The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892 Vict. 55-56, c. 29 at ss. 187, 190 and 207,
Canada had criminalized being a common prostilute, a bawdyhouse keeper or inmate, or a frequenter of
houses ofill-repute, as well as vagrants. It also <riminalized activities in which prostitutes may engage
during the exercise of their trade. As a result ofa declaration by the Royal Commission on the Status of
Women in Canada, Report a/the Royal Commission all the Status a/Women in Canada, (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1970) that the Criminal Code treated women who engaged in prostilution inequitably,
without consideration for their socio-economic plight, and with no regard for their rehabilitation, in 1972,
the government criminalized in the Criminal Code, S.C. 1972, c. 13, at s. 195.1, the public nuisance of the
action of soliciting, rather than the state of being a common prostitute.
One of the imp0l1ant advances of the Young Offenders Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 110 was to end
status offenders for youth, as stated in Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, No. 15 (17 May
1982) [House a/Commons Debates, (17 May 1982») at 17487 (Svend Robinson).
142 (2000), 142 e.C.C. (3d) 225, [2000) OJ. No. 72 (Q.L.) (Ont. e.A.), leave to appeal refused (2000), 271
N.R. 197, [2000) S.C.C.A. No. 542 (Q.L.) [R. v. Budreo].
143 [bid. at paras. 21-23. The Crown acknowledged that section 810.1 deprived the appellant of his liberty,
and thus, the Ontario Court of Appeal restricted its attention to whether that deprivation accorded with the
principles of fundamental justice. Section 7 of the Charter, supra note 74 states:
7.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
IJ9

140

247

section 810.1 is not overbroad 144 and not void for vagueness,145 and read down the
mandatory requirement that a provincial court judge "shall" hold a hearing on receipt of
an information to obtain a section 810.1 recognizance, to a permissive "may". 146 The
Court declared that status offences contravene the principles of fundamental justice, but
differentiated section 810.1 from status offences because it does not create an offence,
and contains preventative rather than punitive measures. 147

The act of defining someone as criminal for who they are rather than what they did, is not
only distasteful, unfair and unjust, but socially damaging according to deviance and
labelling theory and the concept of "degradation" in social psychology. As the discussion
in section six "Deviance and Labelling Theory" and section seven "Identity Formation
From a Social Psychology Perspective" in Chapter Three reveals, the imposition of a
stigmatizing social label on an individual based on their status in society results in
negative social perceptions of (such as abhOll'enCe, intimidation and fear) and negative
social interactions with the individuallahelled. These negative experiences can lead to an
individual internalizing the label and engaging in acts to confirm and perpetuate it. Thus,
creating a status offence for members of criminal organizations formally and powerfully
applies a negative societal label, and may entrenches the outlaw identity associated with
that label.

4.2.7.5

Criminal Organization Sentences Require Adequate Proof of

Fault ReqUirements
The fourth problem relates to the third problem regarding criminal organization offences
as status offences. Individuals who are not fOlmally charged with criminal organization
offences, nor proven to have committed them as set out in the Criminal Code provisions,
are being treated as status offenders - that is to say, they are being sentenced as criminal
organization members who have committed crimes in relation to that organization. At
144 R. v. Budreo, supra note 142 at para. 47. The Court held that the section " ... strikes a reasonable balance
between the liberty interest of the defendant and the state's interest in protecting young children from
harm."
145 Ibid. at para. 54.
146 Ibid. at paras. 57-59.
147 Ibid. at paras. 24-26.
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sentencing hearings, the Crown must prove facts that establish aggravating factors beyond
a reasonable doubt as such facts have a "critical effect" on the length of a sentence - they
support or justify a lengthier or more punitive sentence. 148 In spite of this fact, courts
have not required proof of a criminal organization or commission of an offence connected
to that organization when imposing sentences that use the connection to a criminal
organization pursuant to section 718.2(a)(iv) 149 as an aggravating factor. ISO Some courts
have held that proof of membership only in a "gang" and not necessarily a "criminal
organization" and without proof of any connection to the offence, may also justify a
greater sentence to deter other gang members. lSI

For instance, in R. v. Lights, IS2 the Ontario Court of Justice did not make a formal finding
of a "criminal organization", or a finding that an offence was committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization as required by section
7l8.2(a)(iv). However, the Court found that the accused was a member of a gang, and
that his "gang activity" was an aggravating factor that mandated a more punitive
sentence:

58

The troubling question in this case is whether the offences can properly be
characterized as gang violence, in the sense that these were so-called "missions"
carried out by the Rascalz as a gang. The evidence establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that they were. A number of the other individuals involved in
both sets of offences have been identified as members of the Rascalz. The
offences committed were the type of "missions" described in the evidence of
Detective Constable Russell as being characteristic of the Rascalz. Section
718.2(a)(iv) of the Criminal Code requires that a court shall treat as aggravating
"evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or
in association with a criminal organization." Violence committed by groups, an
aggravating factor recognized at common law (see Regina v. A.o., supra), is
R. v. Gardiner, [1982]2 S.C.R. 368, (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 477 at paras. 38, III and 112.
Section 718.2(a)(iv) of the Criminal Code, supra note 26, states:
718.2 A comt that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, ...
(iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction
of or in association with a criminal organization ....
1'0 R. v. Bogor, 2006 CarswellOnt 7076, [2006], OJ. No. 3589 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.CJ.) at para. 3; and R. v.
Whal'lY, 2007 ABQB 462, 207 CarswellAlta 923 at paras. 42-47.
1'1 R. v. Dhak, 2003 BCCA 595, 2003 CarswellBC 1173 at para. 17; R. v. Lights, 2007 ONCJ 173,2007
CarswellOnt 2498 [R. v. Lights] at para. 58; and R. v. Bailey, 2005 CarswellOnt 7706 (Ont. C.J.) at para. 2.
1'2 R. v. Lights, supra note 151.
148

1'9
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considered to be more serious when committed by members of a gang. Whether
the Rascalz fit within the formal definition of a "criminal organization" under s.
467.1 of the Criminal Code (and I suspect they do), the evidence proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that both sets of offences involved gang activity. Even without s.
71 8.2(a)(iv), it is appropriate to treat this feature of the offences as an aggravating
factor on sentence. Crimes committed by street gangs must be severely punished
in order to deter this type of activity, and to assure the public that the cOUlis are
properly concerned with imposing just sentences that contribute to and fost~r
public safety. 153
The offender Lights was a young person sentenced as an adult to eight years
imprisonment minus two years credit for "dead time." His offences were very serious, 154
and he did not receive a probation order. However, this decision ofthe Ontario Court of
Justice suggests that evidentiary findings to satisfy the anti-organized crime provisions of
the Criminal Code are not required in order to determine that certain circumstances
involving an alleged member of an alleged criminal organization wanant a more severe
sentence. That is to say, the common knowledge of "gang activity" or gang violence is
sufficient to act as an aggravating circumstance, and to increase a sentence for an
offender.

Similarly, in R. v. Payne, 155 the offender was a member of what the trial judge asserted
was, and the appellate cOUli referred to as, a "criminal organization" and the judge and
the cOUli clearly accepted the connection of his offence to that criminal organization.

156

They made such findings in spite of the fact that no criminal organization charges had
been laid, and thus, no formal and specific proof or legal argument took place that the
offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a
criminal organization as set forth in section 467.12 of the Criminal Code.

157

59 The judge found that the appellant was a member of a criminal organization,
not a crime in itself, but a circumstance that put the appellant at "the threshold of
potential criminal sanction" (R. v. Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384, [2007] B.C.J. No.
1592 (QL) at para. 58). I do not read the reasons of the sentencing judge as

153

Ibid. at para. 58.

at paras. 70-71. As a result of two separate incidents, Lights was sentenced for aggravated assault,
use of a firearm, break and enter, breach of recognizance times two, breach of probation, robbery with a
firearm, possession of prohibited weapon with ammunition, and possession of unauthorized weapon.
'55 R. v. Payne, supra note 63.
156 Ibid. at paras. 46 and 47.
157 Ibid. at paras. 1-3.
'54 Ibid.
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making a finding that the aggravated assault was committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of or in association with a criminal organization. In my view, he was
not required to make such a finding to impose the sentence he gave.
60 The appellant was not charged under s. 467.12 of the Criminal Code committing an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization. Section
718.2(a)(iv) of the Criminal Code is engaged when there is evidence that an
offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with
a criminal organization. In this case, there clearly was such evidence. For
example, in paras. 14 and 15, the judge said:
[14] These individuals and their organization, as I stated previously, have
openly cultivated an atmosphere and a reputation for extreme violence.
They have, on the evidence at this trial, already engaged in the chopping
off of fingers, violent beatings, and other forms of extreme violence.
[15] The subject of such violence is an open topic of discussion amongst
those associated with the organization, and the discussions of violence and
the trophies they take, in the form of fingers and videos, appear to be the
means by which they strive to maintain discipline and control of their
organization.
61 Parliament has made it clear that criminal conduct undertaken in association
with criminal organizations is to be condemned and discouraged. For example, the
commission of an offence under s. 467.12 carries a maximum sentence of 14
years, which, pursuant to s. 467.14, is to be served consecutive to any other
sentence imposed for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events.
Parliament has directed that evidence suppOlting such an offence is an aggravating
ls8
circumstance to be taken into account when sentencing for other offences.
This appellate court decision allows Parliament to guide the application of these
aggravating factors. It ignores the lack of an appropriately applied fault element in
attributing a more punitive sanction for an offender than he might otherwise be entitled.
And, it does not consider whether punishment of this offender in particular, as well as
offenders who have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed offences
in connection with criminal organizations, are punished for their states of being. As
stated above, this COUlt is not alone in doing so.

In contrast to the decision in R. v. Payne, but without commenting on criminal
organization offences as status offences, the Nova Scotia Provincial Court in R. v.

Nguyen, I59 held that in spite of some evidentiary foundation laid at the trial that the
accused was a " ... an established leadership role in a sophisticated, well planned and well

158

159

Ibid. at paras. 59-61.
R. v. Nguyen. 2007 NSPC 69, [2007] N.S.J. No. 481 (Q.L.).
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organized marihuana production operation,,,16o the Court could not conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offender Nguyen was connected to a national or international
"crime organization," as defined in the Criminal Code. 161 The Court considered R. v.

Payne, and distinguished it on the basis that the trial Judge found and the appellate Court
noted the presence of a connection of the substantive offence to the criminal
organization. 162 The Court then stated the proper procedure and evidentiary foundation
for applying aggravating factors at the sentencing of a criminal organization offender:

22 ... [I]t would appear that Marsden, ... [2004 MBCA 121, 187 Man.R. (2d)
298 at para. 13] stands for the proposition that to be an aggravating factor the
impugned activity must be gang sanctioned or be related to gang membership.
Moreover, while hearsay evidence is permitted at sentencing, along with its
relevancy, it must be credible, trustworthy and reliable. R. v. Gardner (1982), 68
C.C.C. (2d) 477 (S.C.C.). Here, the finding of guilt was not predicated upon the
assumption that the crimes were carried out in concert and association with an
organized network of the criminal underground. The findings were that it was a
local group activity and no more. Thus, in my view, any submission of
aggravating circumstances, must comply with the same evidentiary rules as facts
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and supp0l1ing the conviction. See: R. v. Ly,
[1992] N.J. No. 354 (Nfld. C.A.), Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e).
23 Hence, in the circumstances, as I have found, there was no evidence that
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, a pattern common to Nova Scotia and
other places; that the crimes were committed by the same group of individuals in
other places with an association with any identified criminal group; an
inextricable link between the group's activity in Nova Scotia and other national 01'
international crime groups; or that the accused crimes were committed in the
company of members of a crime organization known to the police to specialize in
marihuana grow operations. Therefore, I do not think that it is sufficient, at a
sentencing hearing where the evidential rules are relaxed to present some opinion
evidence that the accused activities, without proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
falls within the ambit of the Criminal Code, s. 467.1 and therefore engages the
Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a)(iv). All the same, in my opinion, the testimony ofDet.
Constable Fisher, at the sentencing hearing is relevant only to the extent that it
suggests some context to an otherwise presented vacuous and bland activity and it
has amplified, from his experience and knowledge, some of the Court's trial
findings and conclusions, and no more.

24

Further, in my view, this opinion evidence did not establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a connection between the accused and any known national or
international criminal groups. It also did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt

Ibid. at paras. 17 and 18.
1bid. at paras. 17 and 19.
162 Ibid. at para. 20.
160
161
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that the group in which the accused was found to be associated was known to the
police as a criminal group or network that had established a pattern of operation
across the nation or internationally. Therefore, given the principle of parity in
sentencing for similar offences and offenders, Fisher's opinion evidence, in my
view, cannot be given the weight in order to magnify unduly the gravity and
serious nature of the same offences committed in the same set of circumstances by
similar offenders. 163
This decision correctly applies section 7l8.2(a)(iv) ofthe Criminal Code, and guards
against punishing non-status or unproven status offenders as status offenders. However,
the decision does not address the fact that the Criminal Code provisions still maintain
punishment for organized crime offenders as status offenders.

4.2.8

Proscription as a Solution to Definitional, Investigative,

Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial Problems within Criminal Organization
Legislation

4.2.8.1

Advantages of Criminalizing Specific Criminal Organizations

and Membership in Those Criminal Organizations
Can proscription of specific organized crime groups and membership in those groups
remedy the definitional, procedural, evidentiary, and sentencing problems that exist
within the Canadian criminal organization legislation? Statutory proscription of certain
groups, formal criminal code definitions of certain groups, and the criminalization of the
activities of these groups, exemplify legal measures that are not "ordinary" or pre-existing
in that they are meant to respond to a particular social problem within society - the
problem of organized crime. In 1997 and again in 2000, relatively early in the
implementation of criminal organization legislation in Canada, then Ministers of Justice
and Attorneys General of Canada, Allan Rock and his successor Anne MacLellan,
considered and dismissed the idea of proscription of membership in criminal
organizations. 164 To date, formal proscription has not occurred. However, it is legally

163 Ibid at paras. 22-24. Notably, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice also applied the aggravating factor
in section 7IS.2(a)(iv) after it had determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the downtown Toronto
Chapter of the Hells Angels was a criminal organization, as per R. v. Maddigan, 2008 CarswellOnt 8798
(Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 18.
164 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, No. 160 (21 April 1997) at 10013 (Hon. Allan Rock);
and R. v. Beauchamp (2009), 68 C.R. 6th 293, [2009] 0.1. No. 3006 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 64.
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possible to implement, and after numerous difficult, lengthy, and failed prosecutions,
Parliament ought to reconsider proscription if it continues its attempt to pursue criminal
organizations by imposing criminal organization legislation rather than pre-existing
criminal law provisions.

The first legislative provisions that criminalized "participation in a criminal
organization,,165 and that defined "criminal organization" amounted to proscription in that
any person who is a member of a criminal organization would most likely, if not be
obliged to, participate in or contribute to that organization. Further, the breadth of the
provisions captured many groups of criminals - organized crime outlaws as well as
loosely associated individuals committing crime.
15 The centrepiece, explained the ministers, was a new offence of "participation
in a criminal organization." This criminalised mere membership in a criminal
organisation and laid the groundwork for the targeted use of new investigative
tools to be directed against criminal organisations ....
16 The new crime in s.467.1(1) of participation in a criminal organisation or
"gangsterism" as the media now calls it, extends criminal responsibility beyond
the already wide net for accessories or conspirators. Under s.467.1(2) there must
be a mandatory consecutive sentence and double criminality for a participant in a
criminal organisation who is a pmty to an offence committed in association with
that organisation. The major flaw is that it is not narrowly targeted and sets up a
potentially severe and unjust law ofguilt by association for those acting in loose
groups offlve or more.
17 The linchpin is the definition of "criminal organization" inserted into the
Criminal Code definition, section 2.
"Criminal organization" means any group, association or other body
consisting of five or more persons, whether formally or informally
organized,
(a) having as one of its primary activities the commission of an
indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for
165

Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 467.1 as it existed in 1997. This old section stated:

Everyone who:
a) participates in or substantially contributes to the activities of a criminal organization
knowing that any or all of the members ofthe organization engage in or have, within the
preceding five years, engaged in the commission of a series of indictable offences under
this or any other Act of Parliament for each of which the maximum punishment is
imprisonment of five years or more, and
b) is a party to the commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction
of or in association with the criminal organization for which the maximum punishment is
imprisonment of five years or more is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
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which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years
or more, and
(b) any or all ofthe members of which engage in or have, within the
preceding five years, engaged in the commission of a series of
such offences.
This dejinition extends far beyond a cohesive gang committed to violence. This
legislation does not just reach such broadly structured gangs as the Majia, the
Hell's Angels or the Triads. It could certainly be applied to low level members ofa
highly organised gang, to those only velY loosely associated in crime and to those
who have never been violent. Only one of the group has to have committed a
series of offences within jive years. There is no requirement ofgang continuity. 166
[Emphasis added].
Proscription of specific organized crime groups and membership in these groups would
have remedied some of the problems with the early criminal organization legislation.
Proscription would have only infringed the freedom of association of actual declared
organized crime outlaws, and not the freedom of association of loosely associated
criminal groups that may not identifY as organized crime outlaws and that commit
criminal acts on occasion rather than consistently engage in a criminal enterprise.

Parliament declared that the current organized crime legislation does not specifically
proscribe certain groups as criminal organizations, and does not formally criminalize
membership in those groups. 167 However, the wording of section 467.11 still remains as

166 "Time to RecodifY Criminal Law And Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the
Manitoba Warriors Prosecution", supra note 28 at paras. 15· 17.
167 Criminal Code, supra note 26 at ss. 467.1, 467.11, 467.12 and 467.13. Of particular note is section
467.11:
467.11 (1) Every person who, for the purpose of enhancing the ability ofa criminal organization to
facilitate or commit an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament, knowingly, by
act or omission, participates in or contributes to any activity ofthe criminal organization is guilty
of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (I), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to
prove that
(a) the criminal organization actually facilitated or committed an indictable offence;
(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhanced the ability of the
criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence;
(c) the accused knew the specific nature of any indictable offence that may have been
facilitated or committed by the criminal organization; or
(d) the accllsed knew the identity of any of the persons who constitute the criminal
organization.
(3) In determining whether an accused participates in or contributes to any activity of a criminal
organization, the Court may consider, among other factors, whether the accused
(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is associated with,
the criminal organization;
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close to proscription as legislation could be. It criminalizes participation in or
contribution to a criminal organization if the accused has the purpose of enhancing the
ability of the criminal organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence. The
convoluted wording of the provision regarding participation in and contribution to a
criminal organization makes it difficult to understand and prove, and thus, difficult to
discern if indeed proscription has taken place. The difficulty in proving an offence under
this section because of its wording 168 provides reason for Parliament to employ formal
proscription. Not only is such an offence difficult to prove, it also essentially criminalizes
membership in criminal organizations without candidly doing so.
In Italy, the state introduced the crime of Mafia association in 1982. 169 Courts in the
United States have struck down proscription of membership, and unlike Canada, 170 have
IUled that freedom of assembly includes assembly for a criminal purpose.I 7I In spite of
the fact that conspirators, parties, and accessories after the fact have ill-intent in their
groups and assemble or associate in order to commit a criminal offence, they can commit
criminal offences while being subject to criminal penalties but without being
constitutionally prevented from assembling or associating. Criminal organizations differ
from these groups, however. Criminal organizations consistently associate in order to
commit serious criminal offences, and thus, consistently pose a threat of violence and
(b) frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the criminal organization;
(c) receives any benefit from the criminal organization; or
(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any of the persons who constitute
the criminal organization.
168 This issue was discussed above under section three of this Chapter under the heading "3. Definitions
and Definitional Problems Inherent in Criminal Organization Legislation."
169 "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized Crime", supra note 5 at Section
1.1.
170 Michael A. Moon, "Outlawing the Outlaws: Importing R.LC.O.'s Notion of 'Criminal Enterprise' into
Canada to Combat Organized Crime" (1999) 24 Queen's L.J. 451 ["Outlawing the Outlaws: ImpOlting
R.LC.O.'s Notion of 'Criminal Enterprise' into Canada to Combat Organized Crime") at para. 52. The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that freedom of association in section 2(d) of the Charter only includes
association for a lawful purpose. Moon cites Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union
(OPSEU), [1991)2 S.C.R. 211; Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987)1
S.C.R. 313; and Professional Institute of the Public Service ofCanada v. Northwest Territories
(Commissioner), [1990)2 S.C.R. 367.
171 "Outlawing the Outlaws: ImpOlting R.LC.O.'s Notion of 'Criminal Enterprise' into Canada to Combat
Organized Crime", supra note 170 at para. 52. Moon cites D.R. Truman, "The Jets and Sharks are Dead:
State StatutOlY Responses to Criminal Street Gangs" (1995) 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 683 at 716; and A.A. Molina,
"California's Anti-Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement and Protection Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back?" (1993) 22 S.W. U.L. Rev. 457 at 469.
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intimidation within society. If criminal organizations have as their main purpose or
activity the facilitation of and pa11icipation in criminal activities, then freedom of
assembly or association ought not to apply to them in order to proactively extinguish their
power, rather than waiting until they have committed serious criminal offences and
reacting to their violence in spite of knowing in advance their essence and identity of
being an organized crime outlaw and committing outlawlY. Prevention of organized
crime violence and intimidation in society through proscription of organized crime groups
for a specified period oftime should be not only constitutionally legal, but also politically
.reasonable and publicly acceptable. Proscription of specific criminal organizations, and
of membership in these organizations, is constitutionally possible in Canada whether or
not it violates freedom of association in the Charter,l72 but Parliament must have the
political ability and desire to implement this perhaps unpopular method of social control
via the cl'iminallaw.

Proscription of organizations has taken place in relation to terrorism provisions to the
extent that ce11ain organizations, but not membership in those organizations, are
proscribed as terrorist organizations.

173

However, unlike organized crime, terrorism

amounts to a social or national emergency, and thus, may warrant or necessitate
proscription. The Emergencies Act l74 declares four types of emergencies: public welfare
emergencies; public order emergencies; international emergencies; and war
emergencies. 175 While ongoing organized crime violence may threaten public welfare
and public order in a broad sense at various times and to varying degrees, it does not
satisfy the definitions in the Emergencies Act. 176 It falls short of a "national emergency"
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Charter, supra note 74 at s. 2(d). Section 2(d) states:

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(d) freedom of association.
Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 83.01 and 83.05; and Order Recommending that Each Entity Listed
as ofJuly 23, 2004, in the Regulations Establishing a List ofEntities Remain a Listed Entity, S.1.I2004-155,
schedule (Criminal Code). The schedule to this Regulation lists the entities declared to be terrorist
organizations. Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines "terrorist group" and includes in the definition
173

an association to such groups.
174 Emergencies Act. supra note 3.
175 Ibid at Parts I-IV.
176 Ibid. at ss. 5 and 16. Section 5 states:
"public welfare emergency" means an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent
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that "seriously endangers the lives, health or safety ofCanadians ... ",177 and that allows
the Canadian government to invoke emergency or extraordinary powers - particularly
because such violence could be dealt with under the Criminal Code. Notably, like a
sunset clause, the type of state of emergency under the Emergencies Act dictates when the
emergency is terminated. FUliher, Parliament has the power to revoke the declaration of a
state of emergency, 178 and to renew the term of the state of emergency. 179 The
notwithstanding clause could playa similar role with respect to proscription of organized
cnme groups.

Parliament could, in theory, proscribe criminal organizations and membership in such
organizations as illegal by invoking the notwithstanding clause in section 33 of the

Charter. ISO Parliament has the parliamentary sovereignty to pass any law. I81 The

(a) fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon,
(b) disease in human beings, animals or plants, or
(c) accident or pollution
and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the
flow of essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a national emergency.
Section 16 states:
"public order emergency" means an emergency that arises fi'om threats to the security of Canada
and that is so serious as to be a national emergency;
"threats to the security of Canada" has the meaning assigned by section 2 of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act.
177 Ibid. at s. 3. Section 3 states:
3. For the purposes of this Act, a "national emergency" is an urgent and critical situation of a
temporaIY nature that
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions
or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.
178 Ibid. at ss. 58 and 59.
179 Ibid. at s. 60.
180 Charter, supra note 74. Section 33 states:
33. (I) Parliament or the legislature ofa province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or
of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this section is in
effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in
the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (I) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into
force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under subsection
(I).

(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect ofa re-enactment made under subsection (4).
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notwithstanding clause allows Parliament to expressly declare that legislation shall apply
notwithstanding specific rights and freedoms in the CharIer. 182 It must expressly declare
the validity of its statute notwithstanding a CharIer right; it must expressly make
reference to hoth the impugned statute and the CharIer right that is being infringed. I !3
Parliament can do so after a judicial decision that declares the legislation to infringe the
Charter, 184 or prior to judicial deliberation, and therefore public deliberation, if

Parliament anticipates that the legislation will indeed infi'inge the Charler. 18S Given that
levels of organized crime violence can escalate quickly, waiting months or years for
constitutional review by the judiciary may not best address legislation targeted at
organized crime outlaws.
The notwithstanding clause essentially would enable Parliament to evade arguments, for a
period of time, that assert that criminal proscription of organized crime outlaw groups and
membership in these groups violates the freedom of association. After five years, the
legislation is of no force or effect, and Parliament must re-enact the provisions. Instead
of relying on the five-year provision, Parliament could also specify a sunset clause such
as existed in some of the anti-terrorist provisions. Sunset clauses less than five years
would reduce the risk or extent of public condemnation of proscription, and require a
more timely review of the "crisis" or social problem. The separation of "crisis" or social
181 Richard Albert, "Advisory Review: The Reincarnation ofthe Notwithstanding Clause" (2008) 45
Alberta Law Review 1037 ["Advisory Review: The Reincarnation of the Notwithstanding Clause") at para.
44.
.
182 Tsvi Kahana, "Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism" (2002) 52 University of Toronto Law
Journal 221 [Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism"] at 222. Ibid at 231, section 33 does not
empower Parliament to override democratic rights in sections 3 to 5; mobility rights in section 6; or
language rights in sections 16 to 23.
183 "Advisory Review: The Reincarnation of the Notwithstanding Clause", supra note 181 at para. 45.
184 Ibid. at para. 45 and 58.
185 Ibid at para. 58; and "Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism", supra note 182 at 265-66.
Richard Albeit in "Advisory Review: The Reineamation ofthe Notwithstanding Clause", states:
58 ... Consider the understood pre-conditions for Parliament to invoke the notwithstanding
mechanism: (I) ill/he course of litigation, a court must inleJpret a Charter provision ill a certain

way, or Parliament lIllist have reason 10 believe thaI a court will interpret a Charter provision in a
cerlaillway; (2) Parliament mllsf disagree with Ihe cOllrl's actual 01' anticipated interpretation; (3)
Parliament mllst muster a majority to act on this disagreement; and (4) Parliament mllst. infllll
view and subject /0 public criticism, propose a bill expressly rejecting the courl's interpretation.
The notwithstanding process is consummated ollly aj/er the bill has successfitlly navigated the
parliamentat)' law-making trajectol)" This leaves no doubt about the momentous quality of the
Clause -- something that becomes apparent in light of the direct confrontation setting Parliament
against the judiciary. [Emphasis added].
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problem from "normalcy" or some sense of social order ensures that individual rights and
freedoms are not infringed for longer than the acute social disorder or moral panic
associated with the "crisis" or social problem lasts.
However, the notwithstanding clause exists because of the lack of consensus regarding
rights and freedoms to enshrine in the Charier at its inception. 186 While the rights and
freedoms in the Charter have become largely accepted and expected since their
enshrinement, a lack of consensus existed when the Charter was passed. Unlike these
rights and freedoms, the notwithstanding clause has not become largely accepted and
expected, and its power to override constitutional constraints for the legislature have
become unpalatable. It has rarely been invoked, 187 has been delegitimized,188 and may
result in significant negative political repercussions. 189 Section 33 has problems due to an
acceptance of judicially imposed constitutional constraints on Parliament:
First, the constitutional text of the Clause places the legislature in the unpalatable
position of suspending the Charter itself rather than a judicial interpretation of the
Charter. This conflates a Charter right with ajudicial interpretation of that right,
with grave consequences for the moral authority of the legislature. Second, the
Clause creates the presumption that judicial decision-making is constitutionally
correct and that legislative deliberation fails to reach a comparable standard of
legitimacy. This is a weak presumption that rests on even weaker premises. 190
The constraints on Parliament limit its ability to effectively address social problems that
may amount to social crises or that may result in social disorder. The consequent
reluctance of Parliament to enshrine into law provisions that a comt may declare to
violate certain rights and freedoms occurs even when those violations target a minority of
individuals who pose a threat to societal order and who cause moral panic. While these
problems are not fatal to the use of the section, they have currently "doomed" the section
to "constitutional purgatory.,,191

"Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism", supra note 182 at 223.
"Advisory Review: The Reincarnation of the Notwithstanding Clause", supra note 181 at para. 13.
Albert assel1s that the clause has been invoked only 17 times since its inception.
188 ibid. at paras. 44-45.
189 ibid. at para. 12.
190 ibid. at para. 3.
191 ibid. at para. 4.
186
187
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In spite of political reluctance to use the notwithstanding clause for proscription, this antiorganized crime measure may actually be effective. Sociological descriptions of the
behaviour of social groups within subcultures,192 suggest that unless the law targets
associations themselves, it will do little to dismantle gang identities and organized crime
activities. Indeed, lessons learned from differential association or social learning within
subcultures demonstrate that the law ought to limit associations with organized crime
outlaw groups because such associations teach new members organized crime normative
behaviour, perpetuate the power of the group, and reinforce their identities through
ongoing anti-social interactions with one another within their outlaw groups. Thus, the
requisites of some criminological and sociological theory suggest that anti-organized
crime responses should indeed ban organized crime associations to some degree and in
some circumstances, such as through proscription.
Further, proscription ensures that only those groups that pose a threat to societal order and
cause moral panic, as deemed so by Parliament, are captured within criminal organization
legislation. Thus, the social control net would not be cast too widely so as to capture
smaliloosely-associated groups of individuals who are not long-term outlaws and who do
not pose a significant threat to society and societal order.

4.2.8.2

Problems With Proscription of Criminal Organizations and

Membership in Criminal Organizations
Many problems and dangers exist within the concept of statutory proscription of celiain
groups, or within formal definitions that criminalize of the actions of these groups as
"organized crime." First, from a labelling and social psychology perspective, proscription
neatly labels, via the black letter of the law, members of organized crime as deviant and
criminal in society. It preserves the power of labelling in the executive branch of
government, and limits judicial and constitutional review of unfairly imposed labels.

192 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, Tlte Subculture o/Violence: Towards an Jlltegrated TheDlY
in Criminology (London: Tavistock, 1967) at 102. As noted in Part V, Chaptel' Four: Differential

Association and Social Learning Within Groups and Subcultures, normative behaviours of a culture or a
subculture become crystallized into rules.
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Second, proscribed labels attribute certain characteristics to organized crime members,
and in turn, members may internalize those aspects of their identity. Indeed, social
constructionism advises that language, including the language of the law, stabilizes and
crystallizes experiences,193 in order for members of society to understand the reality of
everyday life. 194 However, in so doing, it also constructs reality195 - it constructs criminal
organizations, especially ifit formally proscribes them in law, The dangerousness of this
construction lies in the history-laden descriptors oflanguage, its longevity, and its
resistance to change, The concept of "gangs" and the gang image illustrate this power.
The term "gang" is fraught with preconceptions and typifications,196 and it instills fear.
The power of this construction is evidenced not only by the fact that gang members lise
the name and insignia of an organized crime group to effect their purposes, but also by
the fact that various groups, such as law enforcement agencies and criminal justice
depmiments, employ or insert the "gang metaphor" into discourse in order to bolster or
legitimize their social problem and their existence, and thus, influence the allocation of
resources. 197

A third problem with proscription stems from a lack of any guidelines to detennine when
a social problem wan'ants state intervention, And, because proscription is a measure to be
used sparingly due to its extensive power, how does one evaluate not only the beginning
but also the end of the social problem, social disorder, or social crisis? How does one
determine when the acute violence and intimidation and social threat posed by criminal
organizations to the social order have reduced to a declared tolerable level? How does
one evaluate a level of violence? Does one consider whether moral panic has perceivably
subsided, and when social order or mal-order has been re-established? The creation of an

Petel' L, Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Cons/ruction ofReality, 1" ed. (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1966) at 36,
I", Ibid. at 35.
m Ibid. at 36. Berger and Luckmann state:
... [L]anguage is capable of becoming the objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning
and experience, which it can then preserve in time and transmit to following generations.
1% Ibid. at 32. Berger and Luckmann state: "The social reality of everyday life is thus apprehended in a
continuum of typifications, which are progressively anonymous as they are removed from the 'here and
now' of the face-ta-face situation.l1
197 Ronald BUnls, Carol Y. Thompson, & Robert L. Young, "Representing Gangs in the News: Media
Constructions of Criminal Gangs" (2000) 20 SOCiological Spectrum 409 at 428-29.
193
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advisory review body comprised of judicial and legislative officials may assist with such
assessments, and provide some solution to this problem. 198 A review to determine
whether proscription of criminal organizations and their membership violated rights and
freedoms in the Charter could occur with the implementation of the proscription laws,
and thus, may assist in assessing any change in circumstances from when the laws were
first passed. Alternatively, a strictly legislative body, such as the Governor in Council on
the advice of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness does pursuant to

198 "Advisory Review: The Reincarnation of the Notwithstanding Clanse", supra note 181 at paras 7-9 and
78. Albert advocates a revitalization of the notwithstanding clause through the creation of an advisory
review body, and mandates legal reform only when there exists unanimity in a Supreme Court judgment
about a Charter violation:

7 ... Advisory review reincarnates the spirit ofthe notwithstanding clause into a new judiciallegislative institutional relationship that reca~ts the marriage of parliamentary sovereignty and
constitutional democracy. Its immediate ambition is to fulfill the unfulfilled functions ofthe
notwithstanding clause. Its larger ambition is to conciliate courts and legislatures, reformers and
traditionalists, activists and minimalists, and liberals and conservatives.
8 The new model of advisory review clothes legislative decision-making in a presumption of
constitutional correctness. Constitutional review consequently becomes purely advisory insofar as
the new model endows the legislature with the discretion to decide whether to bring its impugned
legislative enactment into conformity with the cOUltjudgment. The new model does not compel
the legislature to adopt ajudicial decision that recommends either revisions to or invalidation of its
legislative enactment, but nonetheless recognizes that the legislature will face public pressure to do
so. This first wrinkle to the current model of judicial review relocates the locus of constitutional
decision-making in the legislal1lfe.
9 But the new model of advisOlY review also guards against the peril of majority rule, which
remains the Iynchpin of parliamentary sovereignty. Advisory review concedes that a court ruling
on constitutional rights may sometimes be so compelling as to justify binding the legislature to
heed that judgment. Perhaps the legislature has so flagrantly overstepped its bounds that the
judiciary issues a decision whose force leaves the legislature with no palatable political option but
to revise or repeal its impugned law. Those special instances are unanimous Supreme Court
judgments. They are exceptional because judges are political actors holding dissimilar political
beliefs. Judicial unanimity -- which represents the aggregation of divergent political views -conveys an undeniable force of reason that demands corrective action. The new model of advisory
review obliges the legislature to cede only when the judiciary issues a nnanimous Chalter opinion
invalidating or revising a legislative enactment.
Further, AlbeIt states:
78 Under the new model of advisory review, the judiciary retains the authority to review
legislation for Charter infirmity. But this constitutional review becomes only advisory. What was
once judicial review -- authorizing the judiciary to compel the legislature to act in conformity with
itsjudgment--is now advisory review. The judiciary is still summoned to assess the
constitutionality of legislation, but its decisions are no longer binding. The legislature is not
required to revise its impugned legislation consistent with a judicial decision. This fosters judicial
deference to legislative choice, which meshes with the effort to relocate the locus of constitutional
decision-making in the legislature.

263

the anti-terrorism provisions, 199 could assess change in the status of proscription for
entities.
Fourth, iflegally defining what societal members may conceptually know to be a "gang",
"organized crime", or a "criminal organization" results in different and divergent
concepts, and may be impossible to achieve, then how can Canadian Parliament know
what groups to proscribe? The whole set of circumstances of a group in society must be
considered by a Minister or legislative body responsible for criminalizing a particular
group. Not every criminal organization group will have the same attributes,
characteristics, rules and regulations, ways of conducting its criminal enterprises, and
power. However, the provisions that establish due process and judicial review regarding
proscription of terrorist groups could be implemented with respect to criminal
organizations. The Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Minister for
Public Safety, or Solicitor General, or both, could determine which entities amount to
criminal organization groups. Like the terrorism provisions, such a determination could
be reviewed every two years, notice could be given to the proscribed entity, and a
procedure for challenging such proscription and obtaining judicial review of it could be
established 200 in order to provide checks and balances on the powers of the executive

199

. 200

Criminal Code, supra note 26 at s. 83.05 .
Ibid. Section 83.05 makes the following provision:
83.05 (I) The Governor in Council may, by regulation, establish a list on which the Governor in

Council may place any entity if, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, the Governor in Council is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that
Ca) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or
facilitated a terrorist activity; or
Cb) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an
entity refwed to in paragraph Cal.
CI.J) The Minister may make a recommendation referred to in subsection (I) only ifhe or she has
reasonable grounds to believe that the entity to which the recommendation relates is an entity
referred to in paragraph (I)(a) or Cb).
(2) On application in writing by a listed entity, the Minister shall decide whether there are
reasonable grounds to recommend to the Governor in Council that the applicant no longer be a
listed entity.
(3) Ifthe Minister does not make a decision on the application referred to in subsection (2) within
60 days after receipt of the application, he or she is deemed to have decided to recommend that the
applicant remain a listed entity.
(4) The Minister shall give notice without delay to the applicant of any decision taken or deemed
to have been taken respecting the application referred to in subsection (2).
(5) Within 60 days after the receipt of the notice ofthe decision referred to in subsection (4), the
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branch of government. Such provisions could be created in relation to criminal
organizations. However, in its report on organized crime, the Standing Committee on
Justice and Human Rights evaluated "listing" criminal organization and noted concems
about the transparency of the "listing" process. 201

A fUliher problem with proscription or "listing" is noted by the Standing Committee on
Justice and Human Rights in its report - namely, that membership and names of some
organized crime groups are always changing, and thus, a list would always be incomplete
and outdated. 202 In the end, the Standing Committee recommended that options other
than "listing" be explored and implemented. 203
applicant may apply to a judge for judicial review of the decision.
(6) When an application is made under subsection (5), the judge shall, without delay
(a) examine, in private, any security or criminal intelligence reports considered in listing
the applicant and hear any other evidence or information that may be presented by or on
behalf of the Minister and may, at his or her request, hear all or part of that evidence or
information in the absence of the applicant and any counsel representing the applicant, if
the judge is of the opinion that the disclosure of the information would injure national
security or endanger the safety of any person;
(b) provide the applicant with a statement summarizing the information available to the
judge so as to enable the applicant to be reasonably informed ofthe reasons for the
decision, without disclosing any information the disclosure of which would, in the judge's
opinion, injure national security or endanger the safety of any person;
(c) provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and
(d) detennine whether the decision is reasonable on the basis of the information available
to the judge and, if found not to be reasonable, order that the applicant no longer be a
listed entity.
(6.1) The judge may receive into evidence anything that, in the opinion of the judge, is reliable and
appropriate, even if it would not otherwise be admissible under Canadian law, and may base his or
her decision on that evidence.
(7) The Minister shall cause to be published, without delay, in the Canada Gazette notice of a final
order ofa court that the applicant no longer be a listed entity.
(8) A listed entity may not make another application under subsection (2), except if there has been
a material change in its circumstances since the time when the entity made its last application or if
the Minister has completed the review under subsection (9).
(9) Two years after the establishment of the list referred to in subsection (1), and every two years
after that, the Minister shall review the list to determine whether there are still reasonable grounds,
as set out in subsection (I), for an entity to be a listed entity and make a recommendation to the
Governor in Council as to whether the entity should remain a listed entity. The review does not
affect the validity of the list.
(10) The Minister shall complete the review as soon as possible and in any event, no later than 120
days after its commencement. After completing the review, he or she shall cause to be published,
without delay, in the Canada Gazette notice that the review has been completed. ...
201 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The State of Organized
Crime, 41'1 ParI., I" sess. (March 2012) at 19 and 20.
202 Ibid. at 20.
203 Ibid. at 22. The Standing Committee suggested a number ofaltematives to "listing", such as allowing a
trial judge to take judicial notice of decisions in which a particular group has been found to be a "criminal
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4.2.9

Evaluations and Recommendations

The criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code were enacted in 1997 as a
result of moral panic to a perceived social problem, and the hasty efforts of the Canadian
government to deal with this problem on the eve of a federal election. History repeated
itself in 2000. These circumstances demonstrate how laws are created pursuant to a
social constructionist perspective. Such circumstances lend suspicion to the effectiveness
of the legislative response, and indeed, legal analyses of various aspects of the provisions
demonstrate that the problems and defects within the measures make them ineffective or
less effective than they ought to be. The definitional problems associated with criminal
organization legislation cause lengthy prosecutions, unwieldy evidentiary and procedural
arguments, and expensive pre-trial and trial proceedings. The employment of preexisting criminal law measures to combat organized crime outlawry would not have
resulted in many of these difficulties. A change in investigatory and prosecutorial policy
rather than amendments to the law would have been more substantive. By creating
criminal organization laws, Parliament calmed moral panic in the short-term, but the
ineffectiveness of these provisions will not rid society of the social problem of organized
crime, and will not reinstate social order or social mal-order. Essentially, these provisions
are hollow.

organization"; empowering trial judges to determine whether a group meets the definition of "criminal
organization" prior to trial; or allowing experts to provide affidavit evidence as proof of a group as a
"criminal organization." However, each of these suggestions is fraught with difficulties. For instance,
taking judicial notice ofa prior COUlt'S decision means that the later or second court is relying on evidence
that may be different and ordinarily inadmissible in its own proceeding. Although the empowering trial
judges to determine whether a group is a "criminal organization" prior to trial may spare the jury ITom
considering the complicated definition in the Criminal Code, much of the evidence used to prove the
existence of the criminal organization likely also would be used to prove the connection of the predicate
offence to the criminal organization, and thus, little time would be spared as this evidence would still have
to be presented to the jury. The suggestion of removing this finding of fact from the jury seems to be an
effort to seek to have the judiciary align or be consistent its decisions about certain groups rather than to
have each COUlt base its decisions on the evidence that is admissible and presented in the prosecution. The
suggestion of relying on affidavits does little to abbreviate the time required to deal with expert evidence.
That is to say, arguments will still take place and evidence will still have to be called regarding the expertise
ofthe expert, the parameters of the expelt opinion, and the bases for the opinion (such as the reliance on
informant information and on inadmissible information). Expert repOIts, though not in affidavit form but
likely with similar content, are already created by experts and disclosed to the defence prior to voir dires on
expert evidence.
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Criminal law provisions can indeed assist in combating organized crime outlaws and
outlawry. However, the state should look the problem in the eye. Provisions that are
convoluted, lengthy, and unfair or prejudicial to the accused also violate individual rights
and freedoms by bits and pieces. Individually those violations may withstand Charier
scrutiny, but collectively they risk violating or undermining principles of fairness and
justice on which the Canadian legal system is based. If Parliament believes that
organized crime poses a significant societal threat and if it seeks to reduce organized
crime outlaws and outlawry as well as its societal effects, then it ought to do so explicitly
and candidly. Proscription essentially does what Parliament seeks to do - outlaw the
outlaws. No proof exists that criminalization of membership in and criminal
organizations themselves would reduce organized crime, but it may well have an equal
chance of success or failure as the current legislative provisions. Over a decade has past
since the first organized crime provisions were implemented, and gang wars and social
unrest continue to plague areas of the country. This bold and perhaps unpalatable legal
option is rarely employed, but it could be.
In order to address the organized crime problem head on and not risk any infringements
of the rights and freedoms in the Charter, Parliament should employ pre-existing criminal
laws and measures in order to combat organized crime outlaws and outlawry rather than
legislating new provisions that seek to define "criminal organizations" and criminalize
their activities. Due to the oft impenetrable nature of organized crime groups, Parliament
could enact specific cl'iminallaws and measures in order to expand law enforcement
powers so that they evolve as organized crime outlawry evolves in its evasive techniques.
However, Parliament should only do so if it does not resort to the use of a definition of
"organized crime outlaw group" or "criminal organization" in order to specify when these
unique and expanded investigative powers can be employed. Alternatively, because
moral panic and social order or mal-order may necessitate some state action, this thesis
recommends proscription in order to remove inconsistencies in judicial declarations as to
what groups constitutes a criminal organization, and in order to rid the Criminal Code of
its convoluted and over-inclusive definition that is unwieldy to prove - that is to say, in
order to ensure consistency and timeliness in the administration of justice.
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Based on the analysis of Requisite One and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations:

Recommelldatioll Olle: Parliament should employ pre-existing Criminal Code and other
statutOlY provisions in order fa enforce the law against organized crime outlaws and
organized crime outlaw groups.

Recommendatioll Two: Parliament should have expanded, and continue to expand as
necessG/Y, law enforcement powers in relation to organized crime outlaw investigations.

Recommelldatioll Three: Parliament should proscribe the specific groups that it deems
criminal organizations.
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4.3

REQUISITE TWO FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES

Requisite Two
Rooted in Social Constructionism:
Anti-organized crime measures must fairly restrain or use media, in accordance
with principles of freedom of expression, in their public dissemination of
information.
These measures must prevent stigmatization, ostracization, and
a.
sensationalizing organized crime outlaws through media.
These measures must not incite moral panic via media representations that
b.
glorify gang lifestyles, that increase the power of their reputations, and that
bolster gang identities.
These measures should use media to launch anti-gang advertising
c.
campaigns in order to discourage gang membership; to create new noncriminal identities for these offenders if the offender has a willingness to
change; and to sensationalize the powers and victories oflaw enforcement
in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry.

4.3.1

Overview

Legal protections for the media reinforce their power to report as they choose and about
subjects they choose. Limited regulations and restrictions on media reporting allow the
media to sensationalize organized crime violence, to stigmatize organized crime groups,
and to incite moral panic among conventional non-outlaw citizens. In these ways, the
media can contribute to fostering and perpetuating organized crime.

Legal constraints may limit the ability of the media to construct social reality tlu'ough its
pOlirayal of a set of circumstances, and thus reduce this power to sensationalize.
However, legislative attempts to constrain media reports other than via court imposed
publication bans regarding criminal proceedings would violate the freedom of expression
in the Charter. This section of Chapter Four will outline legal and non-legal regulation
and protection of the media. It will set forth initiatives that use the media for antiorganized crime initiatives that do not violate the freedom of expression, such as through
educative advetiising campaigns in communities to reduce organized crime membership.
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4.3.2

Regulation and Protection of Media

4 .3.2.1

Legal Regulation and Protection of Media

To some extent, the new criminal organization measures protect media more than they
restrain it. For instance, preventative judicial restraint measures in the current criminal
organization provisions allow courts to impose recognizances for individuals who may
commit an offence involving intimidation of a criminal justice participant or journalist. i
FUl1her, the government in Canada created a specific offence criminalizing conduct that
intentionally provokes a state of fear in journalists in order to impede them from repo11ing
information about a criminal organization? Anyone who so "invokes a state of fear" or
intimidates a journalist, commits an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for
up to 14 years.3 This legislation implies that organized crime groups know that the media
can influence public opinion, and that they will intimidate media in order to obtain the
influence they so desire. In some circumstances, these groups may desire no publicity or
only publicity that disseminates acts of social alttuism. In other circumstances, they may
desire media reports that reinforce their power in order to further their reputation for
violence and intimidation, and thus, their ability to conduct criminal endeavours.

Criminal Code. R.S.C. 1985. c. C-46 at s. 810.0 I(I )-(3) and (4).
Ibid. at s. 423 .1. Section 423.1 states:
423.1 (I) No person shall, wilhoullawful authority, engage in conduct referred 10 in subsection (2)
wilh the intenl to provoke a slale of fear in
(a) a group of persons or Ihe general public in order to impede Ihe adminislration of criminal
justice;
(b) ajustice system participant in order to impede him or her in the performance of his or her
duties; or
(c) a journalist in order to impede him or her in the transmission to the public of information in
relation to a criminal organization.
(2) The conduct referred to in subsection (\) consists of
(a) using violence against a juslice system participant or a journalist or anyone known to either
of them or destroying or causing damage to the property of any of those persons;
(b) threatening to engage in conduct described in paragraph (a) in Canada or elsewhere;
(c) persistently or repeatedly following ajustice system participant or ajournalist or anyone
known to either of them, including following that person in a disorderly manner on a
highway;
(d) repeatedly communicating with, either di rectly or indirectly, a justice system participant or a
journalisl or anyone known to either of them; and
(e) besetting or watching the place where a justice system participant or ajournalist or anyone
known to either of them resides, works, attends school, carries on business or happens to
be.
(3) EvelY person who contravenes this seclion is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to
imprisonment for a term of not more than fOUl1een years.
3 Ibid. at s. 423.1(3).
I

2
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Freedom of expression largely prevents control of the media and stifling its accounts of
"news." Although statutory laws may seek to protect media in some instances, in other
instances the common law hinders their news-making abilities, and limits their civil rights
and remedies by empowering courts to ban publication of criminal proceedings. 4 In the
United States, the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act makes specific
provision for courts to exercise their discretion and close court proceedings in order to
protect "the rights of affected persons.,,5 Publication bans in Canada and closed
proceedings in the United States seek to prevent sensationalism, and perhaps
exaggeration, of the power of gang names and insignia. Time steals media's thunder;
delayed reporting of court cases in palticular may lessen the impact that inciting events
have on the administration of justice, as well as on societal fears and panic. Some courts
in Canada have indeed exercised their common law power to gag media in order to
protect the administration of justice, and specifically, the interests of the accused in
obtaining fair trial. 6 However, as mentioned in section two "Social Constructionism" in
Chapter Three, the criminal justice system failed or could not do so in relation to the R. v.

Pangman trial. 7 The media only increased the panic associated with the Manitoba
Warriors, and inflamed a sense of "otherness" in relation to the accused gang members
who were charged.
Notably, the employment of publication bans and closed courtrooms have been imposed
in order to protect the administration of justice rather than to prevent the portrayal of

organized crime outlaws in a fashion that may empower them individually or as a group.
How can the law breathe life into the insights from social constructionism that the media
must not incite moral panic through depictions that glorifies gang lifestyles, that increase
Toronto Star Newspapers v. Canada Ltd., 20 I0 SCC 21, [2010] S.C.J. No. 21 (Q.L.) in which the
Supreme COUlt recently banned the publication of proceedings at bail hearings so as to protect the right of
the accused to a fair trial; and Dagenais v. Calladian Broadcasting COIp., 1994 Canll 39, [1994]3 S.C.R.
S35 at para. 36.
, Racketeer-Influenced and Corrl/pt Organizations Act, IS U.S.C. § I96 I (1970), and amendments thereto
{RICO] at §196S.
R. v. Violelle, 200S BCSC J 154, [200S] B.C.J. No. 2769 (Q.L.); and R. v. Giles, 200S BCSC 1900, [200S]
B.C.J. No. 2S30 (Q.L.).
7 In section two "Social Constructionism" in Chapter Three, R. v. Pangman is discussed under section two
"Application of Concepts within Social Constructionism to the Identity of Outlaws and the Creation of
Criminal Organization Laws", at subsection two "Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw
Identities", at sub-subsection three "Social Construction of Organized Crime Outlaw Identities Via Media."
4
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the power of their reputations, and that bolster gang identities? The first inclination may
be to muzzle the media. However, government should not constrain or limit the media in
their reporting of organized crime, other than to protect the administration of justice
through publication bans. Restraints on the media to prevent sensationalization of
organized crime may also prevent the dissemination of important factual information as
well. Media is one of the primary methods of educating the public about organized
crime; dissuading individuals from palticipating in organized crime outlawry; and
conveying information to the public about the successes and failures of various antiorganized crime measures. Without information regarding governmental efforts to
address the organized crime problem, the public may not be aware of any difficulties with
the anti-organized crime measures, such as the criminal law, and will not seek to evaluate
the laws and lobby for further changes.
Laws that protect and slightly restrain media in their dissemination of information to the
public demonstrate the endless effOlt to balance rights to freedom of expression with
rights of accused persons to fair trials. Effol1s to work with the media in its p011rayai of
organized crime outlaws rather than to impose legal restrictions on them, may reduce
sensationalism and prevent increasing outlaw cohesion without violating the Charter.
The media can be used to prevent individuals from joining organized crime groups, and
thus reduce their power, through anti-gang education and advertising.

4.3.2.2

Non-Legal and Self-Regulation of the Media

Non-legal attempts to use and regulate the role of media in relation to crime reporting
generally have occurred. A holistic or comprehensive approach where the media works
in conjunction with groups in society that seek to implement anti-organized crime
measures, is possible.
The cooperative eff0l1s of the British Columbia Gang Task Force and two media outlets,
the Canadian Broadcasting COlporation [CBC] and The Vancouver Sun, exemplify
circumstances where the media regulates its portrayals of organized crime in conjunction
with law enforcement. In an eff011 to thwaI1 the "'mimicking ofthe gang behaviour'" in
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elementary school-age children and to prevent youth from being attracted to and entering
into criminal organization lifestyles, the Task Force, the CBC and The Vancouver Sun
launched an anti-gang advertising video contest for students in grades eight to twelve. 8
The contest, Teens Against Gangs, seeks to have students send messages to their peers
about the dangers of "a criminallifestyle.,,9 The Task Force emphasized the importance
of having peers speak to peers, and also in creating discussion among teens about gang
issues and problems. 10
Another example of non-legal, cooperative self-regulation is that of some media
corporations that depict crime in their programs. For example, in the United Kingdom,
the British Broadcasting Corporation has created guidelines for producers in order to
govern depictions of crime in television programs, such as CrimelVatch UK which
reconstructs crime in order to obtain the assistance ofthe public in identifying offenders.
These guidelines prohibit reconstructions that seek to entertain rather than convey factual
information, that frighten or disturb audiences, that provide details that did not occur or
that might lead to copycat crimes, that cause more than minimal distress to victims of
crime and their families, and that glamorize crime or criminals. I I However, these
guidelines may be loosely interpreted by producers of Crime watch UK. 12

8

Kim Bolan, "Sun Helps Launch Anti-Gang Video Contest for B.C. High School Students" The Vancouver

Sun (30 November 2010), online: The Vancouver Sun

<http://www.vancouversun.comlnews/helps+launch+anti+gang+video+contest+high+school+students/3903
868/story.html> ["Sun Helps Launch Anti-Gang Video Contest for B.C. High School Students"].
, Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Yvonne Jewkes, Media and Crime (London: Sage, 2004) at 154. Jewkes provides the BBC Producer
Guidelines:
• Do not use reconstructions simply to attract or entertain audiences, but to convey factual
information.
• Do not reconstruct detail which there is no reason to believe actually occurred.
• Filming techniques IllUSt not frighten or disturb audiences.
• Do not reveal details which could lead to copycat crimes.
• All reconstructions must be clearly signaled.
• Reconstructions must minimize the distress caused to victims of crime or their relatives.
• Do not glamorize crime or criminals.
12 Ibid.
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4.3.3

The Use of Media in Anti-Organized Crime Initiatives Such

as Education, Consciousness-Raising and Anti-Organized Crime
Advertising
Social change occurs as a result of education in addition to law enforcement.!3 Social
adveliising is one method to reduce gang membership.!4 As the anti-gang adveliising
video contest launched by the British Columbia Gang Task Force and two media outlets
demonstrates, the media can playa significant and effective role in anti-gang education
and consciousness-raising in the community. Police in British Columbia asseli that the
success of anti-gang contests and community education in reducing gang violence and
homicides is evidenced by the reduction of gang violence and homicides in Abbotsford a city fraught with gang violence and homicides in recent years, and a city where the
police launched a series of anti-gang posters and videos, and conducted workshops and
community forums for students and other citizens. IS Advetiising campaigns and
community awareness may not be the only events that reduced organized crime outlawry
in Abbotsford, however. Prosecutions that have resulted in convictions and sentences for
these outlaws may also contribute to the reductions. Two notorious outlaws from
Abbotsford, Clay Roueche and James "Jamie" Bacon, have been and continue to be
incarcerated for years - Roueche since May 2008 16 and Bacon since Apri12009.! 7 In
addition, the turf wars among outlaw groups vying for telTitory ebb and flow, and thus, a
social mal-order may have been established and may have "naturally" reduced gang
violence - at least for a period of time.

" Kristin M. Peterson, Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Foclls Group Discussions with Gang Members
and AI-Risk Youlh (M.A. Thesis, Greenspun School of Communication, University of Nevada, 1994)
[unpublished] [Exploring Anti-Gang Advertising: Foclls Group Discussions with Gang Members and AIRisk YOlllh] at 12. Peterson asselis that social change also occurs due to engineering.
14 Ibid. at 16.
15 "Sun Helps Launch Anti-Gang Video Contest for B.C. High School Students", sllpra note 8.
16 Kim Bolan, "B.C. Gangster Clay Roueche Plolted Deaths of Prosecutors: Documents" Leader-Post (8
July 201 0), online: Leader-Post
<hltp:ll www.leaderpost.comlnews/gangster+Clay+Roueche+plotted+deaths+proseeutors+Documentsl3248
552/story.html>; Kim Bolan, "United Nalions Gang Leader Clay Roueche Seutenced to 30 Years" The
Vancouver Sun (16 December 2009), online: The Vancouver Sun
<http://www.vancouversun.com/newsiUnited+Nations+gang+leader+Clay+ Roueehe+sentenced+yearsn 34
8698/story.html>; and Kim Bolan, "Judge Must Reconsider Clay Roueehe's 30-year Sentence: UN Gang
Founder Wins Patiial Victory in U.S. Court" The Vancouver Sun (2 November 20 I 0), online: The
Vancouver Sun <http://www.vaneouversun.comlstory_print.html?id~3760957 &sponsoF >.
17 R. v. Bacon, 2010 BCPC 325, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2539 (Q.L.).
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Some empirical evidence shows that peers educating peers and youth in gangs educating
youth-at-risk may be effective. Kristin M. Peterson sought the opinions and responses of
gangs and at-risk youth regarding aspects of anti-gang advertising, 18 and showed them
several anti-gang television advetiisements l9 in an effort to determine whether it
discouraged gang membership?O Her research in the United States noted that anti-gang
messages have more influence if gang members the age of the audience delivered the
message, rather than older gang members. 21 Anti-gang messages were also most credible
and effective when they came from individuals who had first-hand experience of being in
gangs such as a black gang member, and not when they came from a white
spokesperson,22 such as a politician or government officia1. 23

The research findings of Peterson's study outline many ways in which media advertising
can contribute to anti-organized crime measures or campaigns. These findings confirm
many of the principles and tenets asserted by the sociological and criminological theories
discussed in this thesis, and may prove instructive in anti-gang advertising:

1.
Threats ofdeath and imprisonment in anti-gang advertisements are not
deterrents.
Anti-gang messages from an inmate that used the threat of death to discourage
gang activity did not have a deterrent effect24 because gang members accepted
death as reality and did not fear it, and they placed a value on dying for a gang25
that made it honourable or respected if it happened. Participants debated the
merits of depicting death and violence.26 Anti-gang messages from an inmate that
used the threat of prison had a poor deterrent effect because the possibility of jail
or death did not scare the study participants who agreed that while they did not
"Peterson employs the term "anti-gang" perhaps due to the youthfulness of her study group. This thesis
will use that term interchangeably with "anti-org.nized crime."
19 E'pioring Anti-Gang Advertising: FoclIs Grollp Discussions with Gang Members alld At-Risk Youth,
supra note 13 at 2. Her three focus group members were age 12 to 17; they were in gangs or were highly

predisposed to gang activity; they had committed felony offenses which meant they were at risk of being
removed ITom their homes and placed in correctional institutions; and they were enrolled in non-punitive
rehabilitative programs. Ibid. at 25.
2. ibid. at 1-2.
21 Ibid. at 50.
22 Ibid. at 36.
" Ibid. at 37.
24 Ibid.
" Ibid. at 37-39. Peterson says that the study group did not suggest that gang membership increased the

honor or value of dying. However, some of their comments imply just that, such as "It's like dying for

something you believe in"; "It's a like a pride thing"; uIt's like an ego ... We have a gang ego."; and "It's
like saving face." Ibid. at 38.
2. Ibid. at 48-50.
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want to be incarcerated, reminding them of the consequences of their gang
membership does not ~revent them from committing crimes27 likely due to their
fatalistic view of life?

2.
Anti-gang advertisements that glamollrize gang life are perceived as
unrealistic and not effective.
Advel1isements that attempted to glamourize gang life by showing gang members
wearing their colours and carousing to loud music in prison were perceived as
unrealistic, and generated criticism, disgruntlement and concern that younger
children may receive the wrong message. 29
3.
Portrayals ofgang cohesion in anti-gang advertisements were realistic,
but may make gangs attractive.
Anti-gang messages that asserted that gangs form because of the bonds or internal
cohesion that occurs among gang members, received a positive response from
study pal1icipants who related that this message reflected their personallives. JO
However, one pal1icipant asserted that the message might encourage kids to
belong to a gang.) 1
4.
Anti-gang advertising lI1ay have limited effictiveness on gang members,
and will not rid society ofgangs.
Anti-gang messages were not goin§: to change behaviour, and were not going to
change the lives of gang members. 2 The study participants asserted individual
responsibility for pal1icipating in gangs:
To the surprise of the moderators, the focus group members were adamant
that regardless of why they became involved in deviant or gang activity,
they were each responsible for their own behaviors. They also suggested
that regardless of the amount of pressure from peers or the unavailability
of jobs, a young person "has a choice" whether or not to join a gang.
Consequently, if a young person wants to abandon deviant or gang
behavior, "nothing is gonna make him change except for himself."
Counseling 01' anti-gang messages are ineffective because young people
have "really got to help themselves." Unf011unately, this does not happen
often.))
Study participants predicted the proliferation of gangs in the future: "One youth
in pal1icular wagered, 'I give you five more years and the whole world will be in
gangs,' and another responded, 'Yep.",)4

Ibid. at 40.
Ibid. at 41.
" Ibid. at 42-43.
30 Ibid. at 43-44. Peterson describes the bonding portrayed in the message as " ... 'kids listen to kids' when
their families often do not."
" Ibid at 44.
32 Ibid. at 52.
" Ibid. at 53-54.
" Ibid. at 48.
27

23
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5.
Anti-gang advertisements may have I//Ore success with youth not involved
in gangs.
Anti-gang messages would have the most influence on young kids who knew
about gangs but were not members and were not hanging around with gangs.3~
6.
Anti-gang advertisements must adequately portray the subject-matter.
Anti-gang advertisements are ineffective because they are too short, and the issue
requires more time to present the realities of gang membership.36
7,
Anti-gang advertisements must not perpetuate labels based on otherness,
but rather, accurately portray the subject-matter to promote understanding.
Negative portrayal of gangs by the media evinced a "we" and "they" mentality,
strengthened gang cohesion, and enhanced or encouraged gang violence. 37 It
generated frustration with the lack of accuracy in depicting gang violence:
.. , One teen also made a passionate attempt to explain the frustration he
had with the way new repOlters and outsiders view gangs,
They're making it entirely wrong on us and that' s putting more
pressure on us, so society's coming at us. We're like, fuck you all,
you all coming at us. Why are we gonna stop to think when we're
gonna shoot when you already put us on the basis that we do itthat we do it everyday, that every time a gang gets together, they
going out doing a job like every time they're together - when gang
bangers only do a shooting every once in a while, whenever they
have to or whenever we get blasted on,38
The study pmlicipants opined that outsiders who have not experienced gang life
ought not to make judgments about it,39 Anti-gang adveltising campaigns must
break down the barriers between gangs and conventional societal members,4o The
advertisements must accurately reflect the truth about gang life, otherwise they
may augment the barriers,41
8.
Anti-gang advertising is tainted by the biases o/the receiver, and thus,
may not be received the same byevelyone,
Peterson noted some dangers inherent in social adveltising. Translation may not
occur as the creator or disseminator intended due to the individual perspective of
the receiver:
, , ,Like Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman who argued that
"reality" and "knowledge" are socially constructed, Dervin proposed that
messages are constructed by the individuals who interpret them,
Consequently she questioned the common assumption that the information
in a message can be transferred fi'om source to receiver without change,
ibid.
Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid

35

36

at 54-55.
at 50.
at 51.
at 5[-52.
at 36.
at 64.
at 65.
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suggesting that a "view of audiences-as-receivers of messages constrains
our vision" ... and perpetuates the fallacy that "information is a thing
rather than a construction". . .. Instead, information should be viewed as a
product of individual human observation, and an audience member should
not be depicted as the receiver but rather the creator of the message.
Ultimately, information is a "creation inexorably tied to the time, place,
and perspectives of its creator" .... 42
Anti-gang campaigns target not individuals who subscribe to conventional
institutional norms and cultural goals, but individuals who may be gang members
who have adopted illegitimate means to achieve their goals and who may not
connect with conventional society or who may not view the same set of
circumstances as law-abiding individuals would. Advertising campaign designers
must know how their audience will interpret the communicated information, in
order to ensure it is received as intended. 43
Peterson's reference to social constructionism in this last finding demonstrates a
connection between her empirical data and the insights of some criminological theory as
it may be applied to organized crime outlaws. For instance, gang members in Peterson's
study noted that they have bonds or internal cohesion. Social control and bond theories
assett that the development of organized crime outlaw identities develop from members
forming bonds, developing an identity, and having internal cohesion. Also connected to
Peterson's findings is deviance and labelling theory. In spite of the fact that gang
members believed they have independence in their choice to be patt of a gang, and thus to
change to their lifestyle must come from within themselves, social relations affect them.
Gang members noted that negative portrayals of gangs created a sense of otherness and
that served to strengthen the gang identity and encourage or enhance gang violence.
These observations exemplify the concepts of primary and secondary deviation in
deviance and labelling theory, and the concept of degradation in social psychology.
These connections between the empirical evidence and criminological and sociological
theory suggest that Peterson' s findings are relevant to determining how the media can
participate in anti-organized crime measures.

Ibid. at 18. See Brenda Dervin, "Mass Communicating: Changing Conceptions of the Audience" in B.
Dervin, L. Foreman-Wernet & E. Lauterbach, eds., Sense-Making Methodology Reader: Selected Writings
Of Brenda Dervin (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2003) at 205.
, Ibid. See Brenda Dervin, "Mass Communicating: Changing Conceptions of the Audience" in B. Dervin,
L. Foreman-Wernet & E. Lauterbach, eds., Sense-Making Methodology Reader: Selected Wrilings of
Brenda Dervin (Cresskill: Hampton Press, 2003).

42
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4.3.4

Evaluations and Recommendations

Legislative restraints on the media may effect many of the requisites posited by insights
fi'om social constructionism, such as preventing sensationalization of an organized crime
lifestyle; increasing organized crime group cohesion; and reducing stigmatization of
organized crime outlaws. However, muzzling the media, except through publication bans
to protect the rights of accused persons in criminal trials, not only violates the fi'eedom of
expression, but also risks misinforming the public about the state of society and its laws.
The media can play an important part in anti-organized crime initiatives. However, the
media alone, through anti -gang advertising and education or consciousness-raising,
cannot reduce gang violence and homicides. The use of organized crime reduction
strategies require coordinated and cooperative effol1s including law enforcement;
community patlicipation; media cooperation; public communication campaigns which
include social advel1ising; school-based education and personal contacts; corporate
cooperation; youth programs; and social services. 44 Cooperative and coordinated efforts
can indeed benefit from the power of media, provided that adequate studies are conducted
to understand the effects of dissemination of anti-organized crime information.
In order to not use legal constraints on the media in implementing anti-organi zed crime
measures, law enforcement and communities should seek the voluntary support of media
in portraying organized crime outlaws, and.in launching anti-organized crime initiatives.
The media should impose self-regulations to guide its depictions of crime and organized
crime.
In keeping with Peterson's research findings, the media ought be used in order to launch
anti-organized crime advertising campaigns that target primarily youth who are not
involved in gangs, but also all individuals - youth, adults, organized crime members, and
potential organized crime members - in communities that have (or at'e developing) an
organized crime problem. In order to understand the effects of the advellisements on the
receivers of the information, and in order to accommodate the biases of the receiver of
" Ibid. at 15.
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anti-organized crime advertising campaigns, empirical research ought to be conducted
prior to their implementation. For instance, the advertisements may be effective by not
resorting to threats of death and imprisonment; by not glamourizing gang Iife; by not
p011raying gang cohesion; by not adequately portraying the subject-matter; and by not
perpetuating labels, but rather, by promoting understanding.

Based on the analysis of Requisite Two and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations: 45

Recommendation FOllr: Law enforcement agencies, communities and media groups
should work cooperatively in launching anti-organized crime initiatives, such as antiorganized crime advertising campaigns that target all members ofthe community which
has or is developing an organized crime problem. Namely, such campaigns should largel
all community members - youth who are not involved in gangs, youth who are involved in
gangs, law-abiding adults, organized crime outlaw group members, as well as potential
organized crime members.
Recommendation Five: The media should impose self-regulations to guide its depictions
of crime and organized crime, and to deliver effective anti-organized crime messages.
Recommendation Six: Empirical research alight to be conducted in relation to and prior
to any anti-gang advertising campaign that the law enforcement agencies, communities,
andlor media groups implement.

•, These recommendations are numbered sequentially to those recommendations in Requisite One, and the
recommendations in the remaining sections of Chapter Four will follow suit.
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4.4

REQUISITE THREE FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES

Requisite Three
Rooted in Social Control and Bond TheOlY, and Social Psychology:
Anti-organized crime measures must foster pro-social bonds among societal
members.
a.
These measures must foster bonds through attachment to conventional
others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in conventional
activities; and belief in a common and conventional value system.

4.4.1

Overview

Almost every community that suffers from problems associated with gangs 01' organized
crime at some point becomes recruited by anti-organized crime groups or motivated on its
own to act. Usually communities respond in order to reduce the effects of gang or
organized crime violence in the community; and to prevent non-outlaw and non-deviant
individuals from becoming associated with 01' becoming members of a gang 01' organized
crime group. They do so in palt because anti-organized crime laws cannot adequately
respond to the entire organized crime problem. The largely reactive nature of the law,
especially the criminal law, limits its ability to prevent organized crime groups from
forming and committing violence, and limits its ability to foster pro-social bonds among
societal members. This thesis will set fOlth the limitations of the law in effecting the
principles in Requisite Three. It also will demonstrate the ways in which the law can and
does effect the principles in Requisite Three. It will not critique and evaluate communitybased approaches to anti-organized crime measures - countless and varied initiatives
involving communities have occurred in Canada and the United States. Rather, it will
refer to types of community involvement that exemplify ways to maintain healthy and
pro-social relations among societal members.

4.4.2

Fostering Pro-Social Bonds Through Anti-Organized Crime

Legal Measures
The law, and specifically the criminal law, has a general or broad ability to foster prosocial bonds among societal members. For instance, the codification of societal rules and
values in the Criminal Code declare what societal members should do and who they
should strive to be. Formal codification into the law also decries what societal members

281

should not do, and who they should not be. This criminalization of certain acts and states
of being makes some law-abiding members of society more committed to norms and
values declared by the law because they do not want to stray from or violate convention. t
Essentially, the attachment to norms and values has a reciprocal relationship with the law.
Where members of society already have attaciunents to conventional others, and are
involved in conventional activities, the declaration of societal norms and values in
criminal law provisions can reinforce such attachments, commitment, involvement and
belief. The greater the attachment, the more likely individuals will accept and obey their
rules. 2 The declaration of laws bolsters attachment of an individual to others because it
reinforces "moral restraints" and "normative boundaries", and thus, facilitates the
"internalization of norms and conscience.,,3 That newly passed legislative provisions
aimed at remedying social problems, even prior to testing them in courts of law, can calm
moral panic4 demonstrates the power of the law to reinforce cohesion among
conventional societal members - that is to say, it demonstrates the fostering of pro-social
bonds. The legitimacy of the law as a social institution is perceived as something that can
I This phenomenon underlies one oflhe purposes of denunciation in sentencing.
, Travis Hirschi, Callses of Delinquency (Berkeley: UniversitY of California Press, 1969) at 30.
3 Ibid at 18.
, For example, the creation of criminal harassment and crime comics laws have calmed moral panic.
Rosemary Cairns Way in "The Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation and
Political Opportunism" (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 379, discusses the rise of criminal harassment laws in the
United States and Canada. In California in 1989, the stalking of five women by their ex-partners, and the
murder ofa television actress by an obsessed fan, received much media attention, and catapulted the issue
of stalking into public view. Once the threat of stalking emerged or came to be identified by some members
of the public, the mass media quickly advertised the problem, and the risk that it presented to not just
celebrities, but to all women. In Canada, the murders of women by their ex-partners motivated Canadian
legislators to act. In JanualY 1993, the media seized on the murders of three women by men who were, by
virtue of restraining orders, not to have contact with them. On the heels of the United States, Canadian
legislators had identified the existence of the grave nature of the threat posed by stalking, and in 1992 and
1993, introduced legislation to criminalize the behaviour. The legislation in California did not calm moral
panic right away. With respect to stalking in the State of California, even after the enshrinement of "antistalking" sentiments into statutory law, the sensat ionalism of the problem continued for yenrs. However, in
Canada, months afier the creation of the offence of criminal harassment, media attention on the issue
" virtually ceased" indicating that moral panic subsided.
Janice Dickin McGinnis in " Bogeymen and the Law: Crime Comics and Pornography" (1988) 20
Oltawa L.R. 3 discusses the rise of crime comic. In the late I 940s in Canada, the anti-crime comic
campaign gained momentum in waging war against" ... material portraying acts which the campaigners
themselves regarded as improper", ibid. at 5. Such material included crime comics, horror comics, and
"true love" stories. The crime comics legislation also exemplifies the utilization of the law to calm moral
panic stemming from a social problem, or rather, a non-existent problem. Regardless of the reasons for the
rise ofthe panic, the turbidity within the nation surrounding the crime comics mandated, and resulted in the
state legislating the panic away.
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rescue law-abiding societal members from "others", such as from organized crime
outlaws.
Legal approaches to organized crime, and in particular strictly legal approaches, have
limitations and fallibility in fostering pro-social bonds among societal members, however.
Sociologists and criminologists have recognized that the use of the law comprises but one
component of anti-gang or anti-organized crime initiatives. Indeed, community
involvement comprises more significant components in anti-organized crime initiatives
that give effect to Requisite Three.

4.4.3

Community Education and Action Programs That Foster

Pro-Social Bonds
Anti-organized crime measures that foster pro-social bonds largely employ preventative
measures involving the community. The health care model emphasizes preventative
measures for anti-gang initiatives, and prevention involves the community. Primary
prevention targets youth or individuals before they involve themselves in a gang, and
specifically, targets youth or individuals at risk of gang membership due to attributes of
their population or community and not individual attributes. Secondary prevention
targets individuals who have a high risk of joining gangs or who have had exposure to
gangs, and uses intensive efforts to increase the resilience of these indi viduals against
gang membership. Teliiary prevention, discussed as part of Requisite Four, s seeks to
rehabilitate and redirect delinquency after individuals have become members of gangs. 6
Primmy and secondary prevention'methods within the health care model do not engage
criminal law or punitive sanctions to achieve their ends.
Further, gang policy in the United States, for the most part, has incorporated five main
components set forth in the Spergel model of gang prevention and intervention now
referred to as the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention,

, See section five "Requisite Four for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" in this Chapter.
G Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual alld Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) [An Illdividual and Group Perspectil'ej at 148.
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Intervention and Suppression Program model. 7 First, community mobilization occurs to
create programs to strengthen institutions in the community. 8 This approach advocates
equilibrium and social cohesion in order to maintain social order,9 and thus, fosters a
cooperative environment in order to mobilize communities and maintain behaviour which
accords with their values and norms. This approach also accords with social control
theory which suggests the use or maintenance of social norms to perpetuate law-abiding
behaviour.
Second, social intervention occurs in the form of programs that seek to increase the
resilience of individuals against gang membership. 10 This approach asserts that
individual risk factors or deficits, such as those present in the family and psychologically,
result in gang membership. Thus, social intervention seeks to develop connections
between these individuals and larger society in order to achieve conformity to
conventional beliefs and values.
The last three components of the Spergel model do not directly relate to fostering prosocial bonds among law-abiding societal members. The third component, as elaborated
on as pali of Requisite Four, II is the provision of opportunities in the form of programs to
increase educational and employment opportunities. 12 The fOU1ih, as discussed in
Requisite One,13 is suppression which occurs by augmenting legal system responses to

Irving A. Spergel, "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth·Gang Problem" (Paper
presented to the 20 I 0 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit Conference, Toronto, Ontario, 25 March 20 I0) online:
20 10 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit <http://www.gangsummit.com/Assets/Spergel%20Speech.pdt> ["A
Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem"] at 1. This Spergel model
includes community mobilization to create programs to strengthen institutions in the community; social
intervention in the form of programs that seek to increase the resilience of individuals against gang
membership; provision of programs to increase educational and employment opportunities; suppression by
augmenting legal system responses to gangs; and organizational changes and development alter the
administration of agencies that deal with gangs.
8 Ibid at 9.
9 Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective. supra note 6 at lSI. This approach draws from anomie
theory emphasizes the need for social cohesion among members in order to maintain social order rather
than produce anomic states.
10 "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra note 7 at 9-10.
II See section five "Requisite Four for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" in Chapter Four.
12 "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra note 7 at 10.
13 See section two "Requisite One for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" in Chapter Four.
7
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gangs. 14 The fifth component, also as discussed in Requisite One,15 deals with
organizational changes and development alter the administration of agencies that deal
with gangs. 16 For instance, law enforcement agencies may create gang task forces or
integrated units; prosecution offices may create specialized prosecutors; and governments
may pass legislation that targets gangs and gang activities.

17

Recent research findings of Spergel and a team of researchers indicate the significance of
community-based or "social-development"-based measures for preventing crime and
outlawry in youth. This research also suggests that anti-gang measures must consider the
nature of their targets or subjects in order to achieve any success. The Spergel research
analysed youth contact with outreach youth workers, caseworkers, case managers,
teachers, and treatment and manpower personnel, or altogether, that emphasized social
development exclusively (that is to say, social intervention, provision of social services,
and provision of opportunities such as education, training and jobs), or that emphasized
interaction with suppression that includes low-level contact with police as well as
arrests. 18 With respect to youth, the degree of entrenchment in criminality plays a role in
selecting the proper type or component of anti-gang response:
We found in our current analysis that a strategy of social development
alone, at a low or moderate level, was more effective in reducing violence arrests,
patticularly for younger youth; but a combination (or interaction) of social
intervention and suppression was more effective in reducing felony or
misdemeanor violence arrests for youth (at different ages and who had prior
violence arrests) who were provided with low, moderate, or even high frequencies
of worker contacts. On the other hand, the strategy of social development alone
was particularly more effective with youth at any age in reducing drug arrests,
than was a combination 01' interaction of social-intervention and suppression
strategies.
Also, the interaction of social-development and suppression, particularly at
low or moderate (and sometimes high) levels, was effective in reducing propelty
arrests-and total arrests-for older youth between 16 and 19 years of age. Most
of these youth had been clu'onic offenders.
In other words, collaboration of social-development workers, especially
with each other, appeared to be more effective in reducing aO'ests particularly for
"A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra nole 7 at 11-12.
See section two "Requisite One for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" in Chapter Four.
16 "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra note 7 at 12.
17 Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective. slipro note 6 at 156-57.
18 "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem". supra note 7 at 18-19.
14
15

285

younger youth engaged, or about to be engaged in violence behavior. Socialdevelopment contacts alone were especially effective in reducing drug-use and
drug-selling arrests. However, the interaction of social-development and
suppression strategies was more effective with chronic offenders and older youth
than were social development contacts alone, paliicularly for those youth with
pre-program arrests for property crime.
We have not yet explored the differential effects of these strategies for
males and females, for youth in the programs for longer and shorter periods, and
for gang youth who might engage in a combination of criminal acts. The
effectiveness of celiain services, the mediating effects of school, jobs and family
problems, and gang and peer relationships are yet to be examined. Also to be
examined are how different types of agencies relate to each other, and contribute
to positive change for gang youth. 19
The inconclusive nature of this research data indicates the complexity of empirically
evaluating preventative and community-based programs for law-abiding youth, youth-atrisk, and youth in gangs. However, the research does demonstrate that community-based
programs or "social-development"-based programs are important to maintain or foster
pro-social bonds and prevent outlawry.

A wide range of community-based, pro-social, preventative programs exists in Canada
that may foster pro-social bonds among societal members. These programs may not be
those that focus on or have as their mandate, education about gangs and gang prevention,
but rather, they may simply be school programs or extracurricular social and sports
programs that allow youth to interact in pro-social environments. Notably, in its report on
organized crime, the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights reviewed
information and statistics about the impact or organized crime on youth, and advocated
allocation of resources for youth at risk in order" ... to divert them from gangs and to
promote alternatives to gangs.,,20 Pro-social clubs and programs for adults, also without
an anti-gang mandate, may serve the same pUlpose.

19

Ibid. at \9-20.

20

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The State o/Organized

Crime, 41" ParI., 1'1 sess. (March 2012) at 34.
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For example, with respect to youth, the SNAP® or Stop Now And Plan program in
Ontario seeks to "keep kids in school and out oftrouble.,,21 "It is a cognitive-behavioural
strategy that helps children and parents regulate angry feelings by getting them to stop,
think, and plan positive alternatives before they act impulsively.,,22 This program
initiated in Toronto in the late 1970s by the Earlscourt Child and Family Centre, now the
Child Development Institute, and involves scientists and practitioners. In 1985, the
program was developed into the SNAP® Under 12 Outreach Program in order assist
young children in conflict with the law. In 1996, the SNAP® Girls Connection was
developed in order to make the SNAP® program gender-sensitive. Both of these SNAP®
programs, unlike many community-based pro-social programs it seems, have been
empirically evaluated, and have achieved success in fostering pro-social interactions?3

A wide range of community-based, pro-social, preventative programs that 5pecifically

have an anti-gang mandate, also exists in Canada. For example the British Columbia
Integrated Gang Task Force and the Vancouver Police Dedicated Gang Squad are
involved in a joint federal-provincial-municipal-community partnership called the
Interministry Committee on the Prevention of Youth Violence and Crime. This
Committee has a four-year mandate which targets middle-school-age youth, and seeks to
24
implement measures that prevent youth participation in gangs. FUl1her, tbe Teens
25

Against Gangs video contest for high school-age youth seeks to bolster attachments to
conventional others, and conunitment to and belief in societal rules, by involving teens in
21 "What is SNAP®: The Stop Now and Plan® Program Keeps Kids In School And Out Of Trouble"
(20 10) online: <http://www.stopnowandplan.com/whatis.php>.
22

Ibid.

"Outcome Evaluation: Does SNAP® Work?" (2010) online:
<http://www.stopnowandplan.comiresearch.php>.Generally.chiidren participating in the program made
more improvements than non-participants in the areas of externalizing behaviours such as aggression and
delinquency, internalizing behaviours such as anxiety and depression, and social competency such as peer
relations and participation in activities. Children reported improved quality of interaction with parents.
They reported less positive attitudes toward anti-social behaviour, association with fewer peers whom
parents considered a "bad influence", and more pro·social skills in relating with teachers, peers and family
23

members.

Information regarding this program was provided by Superintendent Dan Malo, (lecture presented to The
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law on Gangs: International Organized Crime to Street
Corner Gangsters, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2009) [unpublished].
II Kim Bolan, "Sun Helps Launch Anti-Gang Video Contest for B.C. High School Students" The
Vallcollver SUII (30 November 20 I0), online: The Vancouver Sun
<http://www.vancouversun.com/news/helps+launch+anti+gang+video+contest+high+school+students/3903
868/story.html>.
24
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an activity that promotes pro-social lifestyles and values. Simultaneously, and perhaps by
necessity, it educates teens as to who is "deviant" and whom or what that teen should not
be. This activity may create a mentality or power in the teens to label "others", and thus,
not foster pro-social interactions bet ween teens who are not at risk and teens who are at
risk of becoming criminals or organized crime outlaws. These relatively new initiatives
do not have the longevity of the SNAP® programs, and thus, have not received rigorous
empirical evaluation, it seems.
With respect to adults, bar watch and restaurant watch programs exemplify communitybased, pro-social, preventative programs that specifically have an anti-gang mandate. For
example, some Canadian communities have created voluntary community safety
programs that prevent gang members from wearing their patches, gang insignia, or gang
colours in licensed public establishments, or from entering celtain establishments at all.
In British Columbia and Alberta,26 club and restaurant owners in various communities27
have voluntarily joined Bar Watch and Restaurant Watch programs. Some Bar Watch
members have signs stating, "Anyone known to associate with gang organizations or
activity will not be permitted entry." Members allow police to enter their premises
uninvited; to use metal detectors to locate weapons and identification scanners to identify
patrons; and to escmt known gangsters from their premises. 28 Restaurant Watch
members agree to call police if they identify a gang member, gang associate, dlUg
trafficker,

01'

person with a propensity for violence on their premises; and they allow

26 CBC News Online, "Calgary Bars, Clubs Band Together to Keep Watch on Customers" (28 April 2009),
online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.calcanadalcalgary/story/2009104/28/cgy-bar-watch-safety-securitycameras.html>. Calgary, Albelta implemented a bar watch program similar to that in Vancouver in April of
2009.
27 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Upper Fraser Valley Bar Watch - Committed to Community Safety"
(10 March 2009), online: RCMP in B.C.
<http://bc.rcmp.caiViewPage.action?siteNode Id=50&languageld= 1&contentld=8526>. The Bar Watch
r,rogram exists in various communities, and not only in downtown Vancouver or the Metro Vancouver area.
8 Darryl Dyck, "Bar Watch Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened" (20 March 2009), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.calcanadaJbl.itish-columbiaistory/2009/03/20ibc-bar-watch-earls.html> ["Bar Watch
Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened"].
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uniformed and plain clothes officers to conduct random checks on their premises for
gangsters. 29
Some gangs have retaliated against patiicipation in such programs by shooting at and
writing threatening graffiti on Bar Watch establishments. 3o The successful
implementation of bar watch and restaurant watch programs lies in the existence of social
cohesion among law-abiding, and perhaps fearful, members of society. It also may be
driven by economics, since bar and restaurant owners likely realize that they may lose
business ifthey cater to organized crime members, and that they cannot survive on the
business of organized crime members alone. One effect of such programs may be social
control through the positive reinforcement of the social norms and non-criminal 01' nonoutlaw behaviour. A second effect may be the maintenance and perpetuation of the label
of "deviant" or "other" in relation to organized crime members. A third effect may be the
preservation of identity - both of the law-abiding and ofthe organized crime outlaw.
Empirical research needs to evaluate these community watch programs in order to
determine whether they indeed foster pro-social interactions and cohesion among societal
members; whether their true value lies in reducing community fear; and whether they
actually thwati organized crime outlawry.
Whether or not a specific anti-organized crime program is in place or whether or not such
a program thwarts organized crime outlawry may not matter. The act of educating and
mobilizing community members against a common "evil" or social problem, may
contribute to fostering pro-social bonds among societal members. Police forces and
communities in the Fraser Valley, British Columbia have organized public forums to
educate the public about the gang problem. 31 Abbotsford is home to many young
organized crime outlaws and their families, and is a "petri dish,,32 to grow gang members.
29 CBC News Online, "New Effort Aims to Keep Gangs Out of Vancouver Restaurants" (17 July 2008),
onl ine: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadalbril ish-columbia/story/2008/07/ 17Ibc-vancouver-restaurantwatch.html>. Twenty-nine restaurants had become members as of July 17, 2008.
30 "Bar Watch Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened", supra note 28.
31 Kim Bolan, "Parents Urged to Help Stamp Out Gangs" The Vallcouver SUII (7 January 201 I), online: The

Vancouver Sun

<http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Parents+urged+help+stamp+gangs/4073755/stOly.html>.
32 Ibid. as quoting Chief Bob Rich ofthe Abbotsford police.
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Abbotsford Mayor, George Peary, sought to "deputize" corrununity members, and told
them that they needed to form posses to aid the police in the fight against organized
crime?3 The effect ofthis initiative and other such initiatives, on community cohesion
and the reinforcement of pro-social bonds needs to be empirically tested.

Community-based education and action programs seem to be positive grassroots efforts to
prevent organized crime, since they seek to reinforce conventional social norms and
behaviours. They may serve to calm any fears or panic that communities may have about
organized crime, and thus, attempt to strengthen a law-abiding identity and social order.
However, they are not necessarily effective for all community members, and they are not
necessarily all individuals who are at risk of becoming youth gang members or adult
organized crime outlaws. Indeed, ftnther empirical evaluations of various communitybased anti-organized crime measures are required. 34 Spergel concludes from his recent
research on youth:
We still do not know-based on good evidence-what models or
approaches to the youth-gang problem----{)n an outreach, community-wide basisare effective. There have been few quasi-experimental program evaluations; they
35
are complex, expensive, and very difficult to accomplish.
Without further research that evaluates gang programs, policies and initiatives will
continue to be "afflicted by myths, politics and wrong decisions .... ,,)6 In order to
substantively combat organized crime outlaws, each community-based program ought to
be evaluated for youth as well as for adults.

Evaluations and Recommendations

4.4.4

Although community-based programs or "social-development"-based programs generally
are impOltant to maintain or foster pro-social bonds and prevent outlawry, the lack of
empirical evidence regarding such programs with respect to adults; the inconclusive
. nature of research regarding the ability of community-based or "social-development"based programs to prevent youth from engaging in criminal behaviour; and the diverse
3l

Ibid.

"A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra note 7 at 15.
" Ibid. at 15.
34

3. Ibid. at

20.
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and various types of community action and education programs that have anti-gang or
anti-organized crime mandates, demands that further empirical research be conducted.
The law, and specifically the criminal law, should not be used in isolation as a means of
fostering pro-social bonds among societal members. Although the formal criminalization
of organized crime outlawry may have some positive effect on attachments, commitment,
involvement and belief of law-abiding conventional societal members, these
achievements are by-products rather than substantive ends for creating criminal
organization legislation.
Based on the analysis of Requisite Three and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations:
Recommendation Seven: Criminal laws that have anti-organized crime mandates should
be used in conjunction with community-based education and action programs.
Recommendation Eight: Community-based education and action programs that have
anti-organized crime mandates should be empirically evaluated in the short-term, as well
as in the long-term in order to determine whether they foster pro-social bonds among
societal members, and specifically, to determine whether they achieve the goals of
attachment to conventional others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in
conventional activities; and belief in a common and conventional value system.
Recommendation Nine: Community-based education and action programs that do not
have anti-organized crime mandates, sllch as school programs, extracurricular
programs, social clubs, athletic associations, should also be empirically evaluated in
order to determine whether they foster pro-social bonds among societal members, and
specifically, to determine whether they achieve the goals ofattachment to conventional
others; commi/ment to obeying societal rilles; involvement in conventional activities; and
belief in a common and conventional value system.
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4.5

REQUISITE FOUR FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES

Reqllisite FOil/'
Rooted in Social Control and Bond TheOlY, Differential Association and Social
Learning in Subcultures, and Social Psychology:
Anti-organized crime measures must maintain or foster positive social and
symbolic interactions or situated activities between perceived deviants or outlaws
(that is say, individuals who are at risk of criminal deviance or outlawry), and
members of conventional society.
a.
These measures must ensure the re-integration and rehabilitation of
organized crime offenders.
b.
These measures must provide pro-social learning and pro-social learning
environments for organized crime outlaws.
c.
The measures must provide re-educative processes for members who leave
or who are incapacitated from their organized crime group, and the
presence of a non-outlaw environment in which ex-members can interact
with law-abiding members of society.

4.5.1

Overview

Requisite Foul' accords with principles within the theory of restorative justice, and
specifically, with some of the principles within John Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative
shaming. I This section of Chapter Four will use restorative justice principles to unify and
implement some of the relevant concepts underlying labelling theory, differential
association and subculture theory, and social control theory. In so doing, it will
determine whether community action programs and criminal laws have an effective
proactive as well as reactive means of contributing towards a remedy for the problem of
organized crime.

The application or implementation of restorative justice principles has some practical
legal challenges in relation to organized crime outlawry due to the seriousness of most
criminal organization offences, and due to the emphasis on principles of incapacitation,
deten'ence and stigmatizing denunciation rather than principles of reparation,
rehabilitation and pro-social denunciation in sentencing organized crime outlaws. This
Chapter will set fOlth these difficulties, and evaluate the capacity of present laws relating
to Criminal Code offences and laws relating to corrections, to extend restorative justice
I John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reinlegration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
[Crime, Shame and Reinlegration].
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methods to organized crime outlaws. That is to say, it will set forth ways in which
criminal and corrections law can denounce offending behaviour without stigmatization,
and involve the community in pre-offence and post-offence ':iustice" or reparative healing
to members of criminal organizations.

4.5.2
4.5.2.1

Restorative Justice Principles
The Relevance of Restorative Justice to Organized Crime

Outlaws
Insights from restorative justice theory present positive and idyllic goals for many aspects
of and processes within criminal justice. These insights offer the means to implement
some of the requisites for anti-organized crime measures as suggested by sociological and
criminological theories, and in particular, Requisite FOllr. However, restorative justice
theory has limitations in its legal application and in its principles for organized crime
outlaws, and it does not represent, in all circumstances, the only or the most appropriate
method of what some might describe as "righting wrongs" or others may call
"administering justice."

Restorative justice is not a theory which offers explanations or reasons for the creation
and perpetuation of organized crime outlaw identities. It is a reactive theory to the extent
that an offender must become involved in the criminal justice system (even if this
involvement is prior to arrest) in order for restorative justice principles to apply. Like
sentencing theories, restorative justice is reactive to an event that has occurred, and, like
sentencing theories, it is proactive in its intent to "right the wrong" in order to ensure that
it does not occur again. Restorative justice extends beyond sentencing, however. It
suggests ways to restore harmed relationships among community members, victims and
offenders included, prior to sentence, prior to trial, and prior to charge approval.

The relevance of restorative justice in this thesis is two-fold. First, many of the tenets of
restorative justice accord with concepts posited by criminological theories of deviance
and labelling, differential association or social learning and subcultures, social control,
and social constructionism. Second, restorative justice provides ideas for the
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implementation of the requisites for anti-organized crime measures in the administration
of justice. However, the inherent conflicts and limitations within the principles of
restorative justice generally, and specifically as they may apply to organized crime
outlaws, reveal the legal difficulties in applying restorative justice methods to criminal
organization offences as they presently exist in the Criminal Code.

2

This section will

discuss these difficulties, and focus on the circumstances in which restorative justice may
be applied to "righting the wrongs" that result from organized crime outlawry.

4.5.2.2

TheHistorical Tenets and InSights of Restorative Justice

Unlike retributivist methods of seeking to instill or awaken a sense of guilt in offenders
by punishment effected through imprisonment, 3 restorative justice seeks to restore
harmed relationships4 and social equilibrium. 5 Restorative justice asserts that crime
destroys "right" relationships in the community and creates harmful ones. Crime destroys
6

shalom or community wholeness, completeness, and fulfillment; it destroys peace and
disturbs the relationship between the wrongdoer and the sufferer. 7 In order to re-establish
community peace and repair or restore the disturbed relationship, the sufferer, the
wrongdoer and the community must collectively repair the harm that occurred, and must
each satisfy their concepts of justice. 8 Restorative justice aims to transform the
relationship - not to reinstate the previous status quo - but to ensure that the wrong does
not occur again. 9 Restitution for the victim must occur, and vindication ofthe victim as
well as the law must take place. The restoration of a community damaged or harmed by
crime does not occur through vengeance, but rather, through healing. 10

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Crimina! Code].
Jennifer Llewellyn & Robert Howse, "Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission" (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 355 ["Institutions for
Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission"] at 377.
4 Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework" (Ottawa: Law
Commission of Canada, 1998) ["Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework"] at 1-2.
, Ibid. at 3.
6 D.W. Van Ness, "New Wine and Old Wineskins: 4 Challenges of Restorative Justice" (1993) 4 Criminal
Law Forum 251 ["New Wine and Old Wineskins: 4 Challenges of Restorative Justice"] at 254.
7 "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework"> supra note 4 at 1.
8 Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relationships Through ParticipatOlY Justice (Ottawa: Law
Commission of Canada, 2003) at 15.
9 "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 43.
10 "New Wine and Old Wineskins: 4 Challenges of Restorative Justice", supra note 6 at 254-55.
2

3
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Restorative justice draws from methods of ancient systems of social control.
Early legal systems that form the foundation of Western law emphasized
the need for offenders and their families to settle with victims and their families.
Although crime breached the common welfare, so that community had an interest
in, and a responsibility for, addressing the wrong and punishing the offender, the
offense was not considered primarily a crime against the state, as it is today.
Instead a crime was viewed principally as an offense against the victim and the
victim's family. This understanding was reflected in ancient legal codes from the
Middle East, the Roman empire [sic], and later European polities. Each of these
diverse cultures responded to what we now call crime by requiring offenders and
their families to make amends to victims and their families - not simply to insure
11
that injured persons received restitution but also to restore community peace.
The Norman invasion of Britain in the Ill" centmy marked a turning point away from the
idea of crime as a breach of community and toward the idea that crime breached the
King's peace. 12 In England, a criminal offence became an offence against the state rather
than society, and this concept was passed to many common law jurisdictions including
Canada. The principles of restorative justice attempt to shift the emphasis of the breach
of monarchical or state peace back to a breach against society.

Restorative justice is holistic in the sense that all parties - the victim, the offender, the
community and the government - must respond to crime and patiicipate in the healing
process. It emphasizes negotiation, reconciliation, reparation, mediation, reintegration,
victim empowerment, and community inclusion. To effect these objectives, restorative
justice requires a community to embrace a wrongdoer, and thus, to provide that
wrongdoer with pro-social associations. Some proponents of restorative justice assert that
it also requires a punitive sanction to have propOliionality with the amount of harm
inflicted on the community by the offence, and that it requires the sanction to be relevant
to the needs of the offender as well as to the offence committed.

13

Thus, healing and

restoration would not come without some punitive obligation or duty. Regardless, the
involvement of the community with the wrongdoer in restorative justice accords with
asseliions by differential association or social learning theory, as well as social control
11

12

Ibid. at 253-54.
Ibid. at 255-56. In 1066, William the Conqueror of Normandy, claiming that he had been promised the

English Throne, invaded and imposed his rule on England.
13 G. Bazemore & D. Maloney, "Rehabilitating Community Service: Toward Restorative Service Sanctions
in a Balanced Justice System" (1994) 58 Federal Probation 24 at 25.
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and bond theory that a wrongdoer or outcast must have pro-social attachments from
which to develop the beliefs, values and attaclunents necessary to abide by societal laws.

4.5.2.3

"Righting the Wrongs" of Organized Crime Outlawry:

Application of Restorative Justice Principles to Insights from
Sociological and Criminological Theory
Insights from the principles of some restorative justice theories may playa role in
applying and critiquing concepts within the theories of deviance and labelling; differential
association or social learning and subcultures; social control and bonding; and social
constructionism to organized crime outlaws. They may also assist in formulating
appropriate legal responses. John Braithwaite distinguished his concept of restorative
justice from criminological theory and critiques aspects of social control 14 and labelling
theories, but his description of his theory regarding reintegrative shaming, demonstrates it
to be a method of social control, and he acknowledges that shaming is a "participatOlY
form of social control.,,15
Criminological theory has tended to adopt a rather passive conception of
the criminal. Criminal behavior is determined by biological, psychological and
social structural variables over which the criminal has little control. The theory of
reintegrative shaming, in contrast, adopts an active conception ofthe criminal.
The criminal is seen as making choices - to commit crime, to join a subculture, to
adopt a deviant self-concept, to reintegrate herself, to respond to others' gestures
of reintegration - against a background of societal pressures mediated by shaming.
The latter pressures might mean that the choices are somewhat constrained
choices, but they are choices. This is especially so because the theOlY of
reintegrative shaming explains compliance with the law by the moralizing
qualities ofsocial control rather than by its repressive qualities. Shaming is
conceived as a tool to allure and inveigle the citizen to attend to the moral claims
of the criminal law, to coax and caress compliance, to reason and remonstrate
with him over the hal'1lifulness ofhis conduct. The citizen is ultimately free to
reject these attempts to persuade through social disapproval.
An irony of the theory is the contention that moralizing social control is
16
more likely to secure compliance with the law than repressive social control.
[Emphasis added].

" Crime, Shame and Reintegration, supra note I at 13. Braithwaite asserts that Travis Hirschi's control
theory fails to account for the adoption of different criminality or criminal paths by "uncontrolled
individuals."
81.
Ibid at 9.

l' Ibid at
16
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Reintegrative shaming relies on a form of denunciation because it requires conventional
societal members to inform non-conforming deviant members about the harmful effects
the non-conformity deviance has. 17 It encourages rather than coerces compliance, unlike
imprisonment which acts a repressive social control that restricts autonomy. 18 However,
shaming can only take place after an individual has been well-socialized and has adopted
a conscience based on conventional normative behaviour and values. Shaming builds
such consciences when citizens express "abhorrence" toward the criminal acts of other
citizens, and thus, makes crime "an abhorrent choice" for citizens and one for which they
will repent. 19 "Pangs of conscience" replace shaming and repentance, and are more
reliable and timely in any event. 20 The effectiveness of reintegrative shaming without a
common value structure, and thus, without the foundation to build a conscience at the
outset, remains unclear. Braithwaite asserts that shaming is more effective than
deterrence measures,21 but without a presence within mainstream culture and a wellsocialized conscience, an individual may not benefit from shaming alone.
Reintegrative shaming also accords with some of the principles within deviance and
labelling theory, as well as concepts within differential association and subcultures.
The first step to productive theorizing about crime is to think about the
contention that labeling offenders makes things worse. The contention is both
right and wrong. The theory ofreintegrative shaming is an allempt to specifY
whim if is right and when w/:ong. The distinction is between shaming that leads to
stigmatization - to outcasting, to corifirmation of a deviant master status - versus
shaming that is reintegrative, that shames while maintaining bonds of respect or
love, that sharply terminates disapproval with forgiveness, instead of amplifYing
deviance by progressively casting the deviant out. Reintegrative shaming controls
crime; stigmatization pI/shes offenders toward criminal subcultures.

The second step to more productive theorizing about crime is to realize
what scholars like Sutherland, Cressey and Glaser grasped long ago - that
criminality is afunction of the ratio of associations favorable to crime to those
unfavorable to crime. If this is a banal point, it is one that criminological theorists

systematically forget. ... 22 [Emphasis added].
17 Ibid at 10. Braithwaite asserts, ibid at 17, that "'the more said about crime the better'" so as to express
dismay and disapproval but in a constructive manner.
" Ibid at 10.
19 Ibid at 81-82.
20 Ibid at 82.
21 Ibid at 69.
12 Ibid at 12-13.
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Further, Braithwaite's concept of reintegrative shaming accords with some explanations
for the formation of outlaw identities through criminal subcultures:
The theory of reintegrative shaming posits that the consequence of
stigmatization is attraction to criminal subcultures. Subcultures supply the outcast
offender with the opportunity to reject her rejectors, thereby maintaining a form of
self-respect. In contrast, the consequence of reintegrative shaming is that criminal
subcultures appear less attractive to the offender. Shaming is the most potent
weapon of social control unless it shades into stigmatization. Formal criminal
punishment is an ineffective weapon of social control partly because it is a
degradation ceremony with maximum prospects for stigmatization. 23
Essentially non-stigmatizing reintegrative shaming incorporates forgiveness with an offer
of social approval based on changed behaviour. However, the application of shaming to
subcultures seemingly must OCClli' before the shamed individual becomes a part of the
subculture since subcultures facilitate and empower their members to " ... reject the
rejectors. ,,24

Restorative justice also has a connection to the social constructionist perspective.
Proponents of restorative justice asselt that for the law to have the respect of the people,
the people or the community must palticipate in or be part of the process that creates that
law. 25 Social constructionism ascribes legitimacy to the state when its institutions, such
as its institutions oflaw and justice, respond to public outcry. That is to say, law
stemming from moral panic generated by a perceived social problem seeks and will
obtain respect because the state has responded to the demands of the people. Even ifthe
law does not work in the long-term, in the short-term, that law is seen as responsive, and
therefore, receives respect and lends legitimacy to the state. Respect for the law in the
long-term, would require not only the continued involvement of the people from a
restorative justice perspective, but also proven effectiveness which would derive from
also public or community participation.
23
24

Ibid at 14.
Ibid at 102. Braithwaite states, ibid at 68:
... Reintegrative shaming is superior to stigmatization because it minimizes risks ofplIshing Ihose
shamed inlo criminai subcllilllres, and because social disapproval is more effective when

embedded in relationships overwhelmingly characterized by social approval. [Emphasis added]. .
""Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission", supra
note 3 at 380-81.
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The connection of restorative justice to social constructionism has particular relevance to
Aboriginal street gangs. The disenfranchisement of Aboriginal peoples in Canada has
resulted in a lack of respect for the law, and this may explain not only criminalization of
acts associated with Aboriginal subsistence and spiritual practices,26 but also a rejection
of legal institutions and the segment of society that creates and imposes them. This lack
of respect and rejection of state institutions may contribute to the development of
Aboriginal street gangs, similar to the detachment that occurs according to social control
and bond theory.
Generally, when individual or group behaviour is "criminalized through
the laws of a society, a significant percentage of the members of that society are
comfortable in the belief that their lawmakers have engaged in a considered and
careful analysis of the social context of this particular behaviour, prior to its
formal and legal denunciation through the law. The confidence of mainstream
Canadian society is based on the belief and broad understanding that the ethos of a
democratic society guarantees all of its members the right to full participation in
the processes of their own government, including law making.
Most Aboriginal people have been, and continue to be, excluded from
these processes of law-making in Canada. The reasons for this lack of
involvement are many and complex, often related to legal, political, linguistic, and
accessibility issues. The democratic approach, then, cannot and does not work in
this context. In fact, the ongoing creation of laws, policies, and formal
agreements that threaten Aboriginal peoples' survival continues without their full
and informed pal1icipation as peoples. They remain objects of the legislation and
are neither equal members of Canadian democracy nor cultural beings within their
27
own acknowledged and respected distinct societies.
Restorative justice requires involvement of all persons in the development of the law, and
until such inclusion and participation occurs, rejection of societal laws and legal
institutions by Aboriginal peoples, including Aboriginal street gang outlaws, will
continue.

These principles with restorative justice theory integrate insights from the various
sociological and criminological theories discussed in Chapter three Further, restorative

Lisa Chattrand & Cora Weber-Pillwax, "PimotsDwin Weyasowewina: Our Lives, Others' Laws" jn Ianet
Mosher & Joan Brockman, eds., Constructing Crime: Contemporary Processes ojCriminalizalion

26

(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 88-89.
27 Ibid. at 90.
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justice principles, and particularly Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming, suggest
ways to implement remedies for the negative aspects of labelling, anti-social association,
and subculture membership in relation to organized crime outlaws in order to promote
respect for the law, and belief and attachment to conventional societal values and norms.
However, the practical implementation of restorative justice measures to criminal
organization laws remains more challenging.

4.5.3

Implementation of Restorative Justice to Organized Crime

Outlaws

4.5.3.1

Limitations and Inherent Conflicts Within the PrinCiples of

Restorative Justice in Relation to Organized Crime Outlaws28
A number of limitations and conflicts exist within restorative justice as it applies to
organized crime outlaws. First, definitions of restorative justice contain goals of restoring
or re-establishing "balance,,29 or "peace. ,,30 These terms seem to imply a state of affairs
that existed for a "victim" or wronged individual prior to the criminal act in question.
However, in the context of organized crime, states of affairs may have been far from
balanced or peaceful - especially if that "victim" or wronged party operated within the
criminal milieu. Indeed, the existence of balance and peace within society remains akin
to social order or public peace, and due to the constant presence of crime and organized
crime, balance and peace remain ideals and unattainable notions. This reality mutes the
resounding potential and promises offered by restorative justice and its proponents.

The last three paragraphs in this section incorporate some of my earlier ideas and work in the area of
restorative justice. They comprised part of my LL.M. thesis, Carol Fleischhaker, Sentencing Legislation in

28

Canada and the Conditional Sentence ... The Answer to Our Problems or Just the Beginning of a New One?
(L.L.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1999) [unpublished].
Bruce P. Archibald, "Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building
Via Meta/Regulation in a Deliberative Democracy- A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and
Restorative Justice" (2008) 16 Cardozo Journal oflnternational and Comparative Law I ["Let My People
Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building Via MetalRegulation in a Deliberative
Democracy-A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice"] at 29. Archibald adopts
the following definition:
"Restorative justice is an approach to accountability for crime based on the restoration of balanced
social relations and reparation of criminal harms [which] is rooted in values of equality mutual
respect and concern, and [which] uses deliberative processes involving crime victims, offenders,
their respective supporters and representatives of the broader community under the guidance of
authorized and skilled facilitators."
30 "New Wine and Old Wineskins: 4 Challenges of Restorative Justice", supra note 6 at 254.
29
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Second, proponents of restorative justice repeatedly use the term "community" in their
definitions and in their application of the concept to criminal justice processes. However,
there exists a general lack of explanation about the parameters of "community", and
whose community it is ~ that of the offender, the victim, or some other segment of
conventional law-abiding society. Further, implicit in the use of the telm "community" is
consensus. However, Canadian society contains, and even embraces, pluralism and
divergence, and thus, bias and conflict of values are inherent within any community
regardless of its size, location or cultural make-up. In his recent study of "Aboriginal
youth gangs",3! Michael Totten stated that community development approaches are
founded on the premise that a singular cohesive "Aboriginal community" exists, but such
community does not exist in reality due to competing interests on reserves and urban
neighbourhoods, religious and spiritual divisions, as well as unequal access to income and
wealth. 32 The needs of an offender may conflict with the "victim" or "community's"
concept of what degree and what type of punishment is necessary to right the wrong.

33

A third problem lies in the fact that restorative justice requires the "community" and the
"victim" to participate in reconciling and reintegrating the offender. However, the
community may not exist or it may be fragmented, and it, as well as the victim, may be
completely unwilling to paIiicipate. "It is undisputed that without a community willing to
help to restore and reintegrate the offender into the community the restorative approach is
doomed to fail. ,,34 Restorative justice efforts for some offenders can create an artificial
community comprised of persons employed by the government or private agencies that
provide suppOli to offenders and positive role modeling. However, such provisions
hardly cease or reduce social control and surveillance ofthe individual by the state. In
addition, community-based restorative justice may be a misnomer or contradictory in
Mark Totten, "Aboriginal Youth and Violent Gang Involvement in Canada" (2009) 3 Institute for the
Prevention of Crime Review 135 at 136. While Totten's research pel1ains to "Aboriginal youth", he
employs this term to include Aboriginal individuals between the ages of 12 and 30 years.
32 Ibid at 143-44.
33 In a similar vein, restorative justice also does not abate the inherent conflict between individualization in
sentencing and the sentencing principle of prop0l1ionaiity in s. 718.1 and parity in section 718.2(b) ofthe
Criminal Code which requires a sentence to be pl"Oportionate to the offence as well as to other sentences for
that offence.
" R. v. Taylor (18 December 1997) Regina 6896 (Sask. C.A.) at 27.
31
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principle when the state regulates these programs. 35 Further, the methods and techniques
of administering justice or righting wrongs in one community or for one offender, may
have little value or application when used

01'

imposed on another community or in relation

to another offender. 36

A fourth problem with restorative justice in relation to organized crime outlaws (01' any
offender) is that the responsibility of the "community" to reform, rehabilitate, and
reintegrate offenders seems illogical when the community itself played a role in the
creation of deviance. The community from which the offender came may be "unhealthy"
and its inclusion in the reintegration process may serve to reinforce the values which
conventional society finds unacceptable. While the offender may be able to participate in
programs and projects provided by a "healthy" segment of the community from which he
probably did not originate, he may have to sever previous ties with family

01'

friends in

order to maintain law-abiding behaviour.

4.5.3.2

Legal Limitations in the Application of Restorative Justice to

Criminal Organization Offences
Restorative justice is an ideal,37 and thus, it has practical and legal limitations. Many of
the criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code contain mandatory minimum
sentences. Thus, "community" involvement will be legally limited at the front end of
these prosecutions and sentences. That is to say, diversion or altemative measures will
likely not apply as criminal organization charges involve serious offences, and probation
" "Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation
in a Deliberative Democracy-A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice", supra
note 29 at 39.
36

For instance, the concept of"aboriginaijustice" and "sentencing or healing circles" are often touted as

demonstrative of methods of utilizing restorative justice techniques. HoweVer, "aboriginal communities"
themselves are far fi'om singular and without difference. E.J. Dickson-Gilmore & Chris Whitehead in
"Aboriginal Organized Crime in Canada: Developing a Typology for Understanding and Strategizing
Responses" (2002) 7 Trends in Organized Crime 3 at 18 assert that no homogenous "Canadian Indian" or
" Indian offender" exists, and that Aboriginal people and offenders come fi'om various backgrounds and
cultures. In Canada, there are 50 Aboriginal languages, 52 cultural groups, and six major culLural regions the Woodland, Iroquoiau, Plains, Plateau, Pacific Coast, and Mackenzie aud Yukon River basins. Further,
not all "aboriginal communities" have the social health, cohesion, self-governance, or wealth to support an
offender. Further, while section 718.2(e) mitigates sentences ifan offender is an aboriginal offender, the
emotional links and desired connections of aboriginal offenders to their bands, communities and nations are
also individual and divergent.
37 URestorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 26.
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and conditional sentence conditions that promote "community" involvement will not be
imposed because sentences will involve two or more years of imprisonment. For
instance, the offences of drive-by shootings, sexual assault with a firearm, and kidnapping
with a firearm have proscribed aggravated sentences when they are done in connection
with a criminal organization - they impose mandatory minimum sentences offive years
for a first such offence and seven years for a second or subsequent offence. 38

Other offences that involve criminal organization charges or criminal organization
members do not contain mandatory minimum sentences, but they still mandate or result in
significant periods of incarceration that limit the availability of restorative justice options.
The possession of explosive substances in connection with a criminal organization is an
indictable offence, and an offender is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14
years.39 One offender who was not convicted of the connection offence, but was
convicted of the offence of possession of explosive substances simpliciter and was found
to be a member of the Hells Angels, received seven years imprisonment. 40 Another
offender who was convicted of extortion in connection with a criminal organization
received four years and four months in addition to credit for 20 months of pre-sentence
custody.41 In spite of the fact that sentences for extOltion do not generally exceed five to
six years,42 another offender who was convicted of extortion not in connection with a
criminal organization but who was found to be a Hells Angel member, received four
years with credit for 44 days of pre-trial custody.43 Similarly, although an offender's act
of extortion "was not an example of the most serious act ofextortion",44 the offender was
45
a memb~r of the Hells Angels and received four years imprisonment. These sentences
amount to federal time, and exclude the possibility of probationary or conditional

Crimina! Code, supra note 2 at ss. 244.2, 272(2) and 279(1.1).
Ibid. at ss. 82(2).
40 R. v. Violelfe. 2009 BCSC 1025, [2009) B.C.J. No. 1940 (Q.L.) at para. 89. Randall Richard Potts had
stored grenades as \vell as firearms under Ihe porch of his mother's trailer home. The Honourable Mr.
Justice Romilly held, ibid. at paras. 83 and 85, that the only purpose of the explosive substances was for
"sinister" and "eviL"
41 R. v. Lindsay, 2009 ONCA 532, [2009] O.J. No. 2700 (Q.L.) at paras. 38-47.
42 R. v. Violelle, 2009 BCSC 1557 at para. 135.
43 Ibid. at para. 156.
44 R. v. Grant, 2007 MBQB t35, [2007J M.J. No. 193 (Q.L.) at para. 12.
" Ibid. at para. 91.
38

39
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sentence order terms that might involve reparation to, rehabilitation in, or reintegration
into a community.
Further, the definition of "criminal organization" itself in section 467.1 includes the
presence of "serious offences" which are defined as indictable offences with a maximum
sentence of five years or more. This part of the definition suggests that organized crime
offences are to be considered serious offences that will attract significant sentences of
imprisonment. And, it mandates that sentences for offences that are in connection with a
criminal organization be served consecutively to sentences for all other offences. 46 Thus,
the majority of organized crime outlaws who are convicted of a criminal organization
offence or offences will receive lengthier sentences than they might otherwise if they
could benefit from concurrent sentences.
Given these statutory provisions, the nature of a criminal organization itself, and the types
of offences that are likely to be prosecuted using section 467.1 will be indictable offences
or offences which will attract prison sentences of two years or more rather than jail
sentences ofless than two years. There have been exceptions where courts have dealt
with less serious offences involving organized crime outlaws, and imposed more severe
sentences pursuant to section 718.2(a)(iv) of the Criminal Code.47 These sentences did
not amount to federal time, but this type of circumstance will not be the majority of
criminal organization cases. Consequently, conditional sentences which cannot be
imposed for sentences of two 01' more years, and probation orders which can only attach
to sentences of less than two years, very likely have no application to criminal
organization offences or offenders. Restorative justice techniques in relation to criminal
organizations could not occur through conditional sentence orders or probation orders.
Another problem in practically applying restorative justice principles to criminal
organization offences is that statutory laws both limit and empower COUltS to not employ
Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 467.14.
R. v. Timmins, 2006 BCCA 354, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1767 (Q.L.); and R. v. Kir/on, 2007 MBCA 38, [2007]
M.J. No. 299 (Q.L.). The offellder Timmins was sentenced for breach of probation, and received a
probation order. The offender Kirton was sentenced for assault and breach of pI'obati 011, and received a
probation order.

46
47
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restorative justice principles and techniques. For instance, courts have power to impose
conditions as a part of sentencing, but not as apart of statutory or conditional release after
a jailor prison term. They do not have the power to impose conditions attaching to the
release and parole of organized crime outlaws. FUliher, the Criminal Code enshrines
deterrence and incapacitation as sentencing principles to which a court can resOli in
determining the appropriate sentence for an individual offender,48 and these principles
often remain appropriate for organized crime outlaws. In reviewing the sentences of
members of the Manitoba Warriors inR. v. Pangman,49 the Manitoba Court of Appeal
noted the significance of deterrence, incapacitation and denunciation in spite of the
presence of the restorative justice objective in section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code
regarding aboriginal offenders,5o and asserted:

43 While no categories of offences are exempt from consideration, courts have
recognized that, depending on the circumstances, sentences for serious offences
may well not be ameliorated by the principles arising from R. v. Gladue. There are
some serious offences and some offenders for which and for whom separation,
denunciation and deterrence are fundamentally relevant (R. v. Gladue at para. 78).
This point is also made in R. v. Sackanay (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 612 (C.A.) at para.
11:
Admittedly, both Gladue and the later Supreme Court of Canada
decision in R. v. Wells, [[2000] I S.C.R. 207, 2000 SCC 10]
acknowledge that sentences should not be automatically reduced for
aboriginal offenders, and that for more serious and violent offences
sentences are likely to be similar whether the offender is aboriginal or
not.
44 Whether a crime is a serious one is a factual matter determined on a case by
case basis. The gravity of the offence must be considered as well as the offender's
degree of responsibility. It should also be acknowledged that for some aboriginal
offenders, and depending upon the nature of the offence, the goals of denunciation
Criminal Code, supra note 2 at ss. 718(b) and (c).
2001 MBCA 64, [2001] M.J. No. 217 (Q.L.) [R. v. Pangman].
'0 Ibid. at para. 38. The appellate Court states:
38
The section recognizes the overincarceration of aboriginal offenders and the fact that
most traditional aboriginal conceptions of sentencing hold restorative justice to be the primary
objective. The overincarceration of the aboriginal offenders is of special concern in Manitoba.
According to information from the Manitoba Department of Corrections, in 1999, aboriginal
offenders made up approximately 66% of prisoners on remand status and 70% of the population of

48
49

provincial inmates.
39
The section does not mandate better treatment for aboriginal offenders than nonaboriginal offenders. It is simply a recognition that the sentence must be individualized and that
there are serious social problems with respect to aboriginals that require more creative and
innovative solutions. This is not reverse discrimination. It is an acknowledgment that to achieve
real equality, sometimes different people must be treated differently.
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and deterrence are of prime imp0l1ance to the offender's community CR. v. Gladue
at para. 42).

56

... Leaders of gangs and gang members make a very deliberate choice to
lead a criminal lifestyle. R. v. Gladue was never meant to shield organized and
violent cocaine traffickers who pre?, upon and exploit the most vulnerable
members of our society for profit. 5
These comments demonstrate that repeat and serious offenders who are entrenched in an
outlaw lifestyle may indeed require incapacitation. In addition, although courts must
impose the least restrictive sentence available for an offender,52 the necessity of
individuality within the sentencing process means that restorative justice principles do not
form a blanket policy or compulsory social theory to be used for all offenders at the
sentencing stage. Indeed, restorative justice measures are only appropriate if the offender
consents and participates voluntarily. 53

Interviews with Aboriginal street gang members involved in the Ogijiita Pimatiswin
Kinamatiwin in Winnipeg, Manitoba indicate that they accepted that as gang members,
they are going to go to jail or prison as a consequence. 54 While incarceration is not a
solution to inner city violence, gang members agreed with a "get tough on crime"
approach, and agreed that if they commit crimes, they should suffer the consequences. 55
Restorative justice theory may intetpret these assertions as efforts by these gang members
to accept responsibility for their actions, to be accountable for them, and to acknowledge
their wrongdoing. Non-restorative justice theorists may interpret these assertions by gang
members as simply resignation that on this occasion they were caught, and as acceptance
of incarceration as a legitimate sentencing goal without any desire for reparation with the
community.
Ibid. at paras. 43-44 and 56.
Criminal Code, supra note 2 at ss. 718.2(d).
II " Let My People Go: Human Capital Invest ment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation
in a Deliberative Democracy- A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice", supra
note 29 at 34.
54 Elizabeth Comack, Lawrence Deane, Larry Morrisselte, and Jim Silver, "If You Want to Change
Violence in the 'Hood, You have to Change the 'Hood: Violence and Street Gangs in Winnipeg's Inner
City" online: Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatiwin <hltp:iiogijiitapk.ca/ChangeTheHood.htm> ["If You Want
to Change Violence in the' Hood, You have to Change the' Hood: Violence and Street Gangs in
Winnipeg's Inner City"]'
" Ibid.
II
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Research in relation to youth involved in some types of criminality indicates that
suppression ought to accompany the provision of social development programs. 56 In
addition, the degree of criminal entrenchment, as indicated by a criminal record, may play
a role in determining the degree of social development programs and social
opportunities. 57 Fmther empirical research ought to be conducted to determine the nature,
timing and degree of reintegrative social development programs and social opportunities
for organized crime outlaws, and how to individualize provision of these services. The
comments of the Aboriginal street gang members and the youth research data regarding
suppression combined with social development suggests that emphasis on or the
implementation of restorative justice measures at the sentencing phase, may not be the
appropriate time. And, sentences of imprisonment do not mean that slow reintegration
and rehabilitation beginning with institutional programs cannot ever occur.

4.5.3.3

Legal Application of Restorative Justice Principles in Post-

SentenCing Criminal Justice Processes
" ... [T]he door is never closed on the possibility of restorative justice.,,58

Most restorative justice measures, such as police cautions, diversion or aite1'llative
measures, victim-offender conferences, restorative conferences, and sentencing or healing
circles, function before or during a prosecution or at the sentencing phase where federal
terms of imprisonment are not imposed. However, some reintegrative conferences or
efforts may encourage dialogue among offenders, victims and community after the

" Irving A. Spergel, "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem" (Paper
presented to the 2010 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit Conference, Toronto, Ontario, 25 March 2010) online:
2010 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit <http://www.gangsummit.com/Assets/Spergel%20Speech.pdf> ["A
Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem"] at 19-20. The interaction of
social-development and suppression strategies was more effective with chronic offenders and older youth
than were social development contacts alone, particularly for those youth with pre-program arrests for
property crime.
7

58

Ibid.

"Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 91.
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imposition of a sentence59 or during incarceration, such as through training, education,
counseling and communication with victims or sufferers of wrongdoing. 6o
These oPPOliunities are also advocated within the Spergel model of gang prevention and
intervention, now referred to as the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang
Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program mode1. 61 The third component ofthe
Spergel model advocates the provision of 0ppoliunities in the form of programs to
increase educational and employment OPPoliunities. 62 Like the restorative justice
approach, the Spergel model advocates reintegration through involvement in conventional
activities. Opportunity provisions have been found to be the most effective strategy for
cities with chronic gang problems, and community mobilization is the most effective
strategy for cities with emerging gang problems. 6J However, opportunity provision
policies and community mobilization policies often remained the least utilized. 64
Certainly, the removal of offenders from society during prison sentences, such as those
likely to be imposed on organized crime outlaws, poses significant hurdles to using
restorative justice measures and providing oPPOItunities for reintegration. At that point,
restorative and reintegrative programs would most often fall within the purview ofthe
correctional branches of provincial and federal governments. Policies, rather than the
statutory or common law, would govern their implementation, management and
""Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation
in a Deliberative Democracy- A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice", supra
note 29 at 39.
60 "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 92.
61 "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem", supra note 56 at 1. This
Spergel model, as discussed in this Chapter in section four "Requisite Three for Anti·Organized Crime
Measures,"includes community mobilization to create programs to strengthen institutions in the
community; social intervention in the form of programs that seek to increase the resilience of individuals
against gang membership; provision of programs to increase educational and employment opportunities;
suppression by augmenting legal system responses to gangs; and organizational changes and development
alter the administration of agencies that deal with gangs.
62 Ibid. at 10.
Kimberly Tobin, Gallgs: All/lldividual alld Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) at 150. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model 'according to Irving Spergel and G. David
Curry, "The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process" in Arnold P. Goldstein
and C. Ronald Huff, eds., Gallg Illterve/ilioll Handbook (Champaign: Research Press, 1993).
.. Ibid. at 150. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model according to Irving Spergel and G. David
Curry, "The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process" in Arnold P. Goldstein
and C. Ronald Huff, eds., Gang Intervention Handbook (Champaign: Research Press, 1993).
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resources. The most significant role of the state in restorative justice and reintegrative
65
measures may lie in funding and coordination of correctional and community efforts.

During incarceration, reintegrative and re-educative programs exist for offenders, but
seemingly less so for organized crime offenders. However, not every prison or
correctional centre has programs tailored to address the specific needs of organized crime
outlaws. One list offederal programs specific to Aboriginal offenders provides for many
different kinds of programs66 - some for all offenders and some for patticular types of
offenders. 67 Only one program in Manitoba, the Gang Intervention Program, specifically
targeted gang members and violent offenders. 68 In spite of likely many common
problems, there are issues that make organized crime offenders different from common
criminals. Reintegrative and re-educative programs in prison settings may need to be
specifically designed for organized crime outlaws, and may need to be offered in every
incarceration facility. Indeed, the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
recommended in its repOlt on organized crime that" ... the Correctional Service of Canada
develop stronger rehabilitation programs, including mental health assessments, for
offenders involved in organized crime", and that these programs continue on release in
order facilitate reintegration into society.69

After incarceration and on release, the means to continue or to implement reintegrative
and reparative measures already exist in law. Further, the philosophy or principles
underlying correctional release fi'om prison accord with some of the principles advocated
by proponents of restorative justice, such as information for victims, easement of

"Let My People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation
in a Deliberative Democracy-A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice", supra
note 29 at 67; and "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 106.
66 Nicola Epprecht, "Programs for Aboriginal Offenders: A National Survey" FORUM on Corrections
Research (13 August 2009) online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/textipblctiforum!e 121!e 121 n-eng.shtml>. The list includes substance abuse with a Native
Spirituality component; unresolved childhood trauma; Aboriginal mothers; development of life skills; and
65

anger management.
Jbid. The types of offenders includes sex offenders generally; sex offenders who specifically perpetrate

67

incest; offenders who perpetrate domestic violence; violent offenders; and mentally disordered offenders.
68

Jbid.

69

Canada. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The State of Organized

Crime, 41" ParI., 1" sess. (March 2012) at 18.
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offenders back into the community, and the facilitation of "human capital development"
of offenders. 70 However, some Parole Boards are reluctant to release individuals whom
courts have found to be members of criminal organizations,?1 and thus, they may delay or
fail to utilize reintegrative and reparative measures for these offenders.
The concept of parole is based on the belief that a gradual, controlled, and
suppOlted release helps offenders re-integrate into society as law-abiding citizens
and helps contribute to a safer society. This concept is suppOtted by long-term
studies and Canada, like many other countries, has made conditional release
programs part of its criminal justice system.
Protection of society is the paramount consideration in any release
decision. The [National Parole] Board members will grant parole only ifin their
opinion:
the offender will not present an undue risk to society before the end of the
sentence; and

the release ofthe offender will contribute to the protection ofsociely by
facilitating his/her relurn to Ihe community as a law-abiding cilizen.72
[Emphasis added].
The Corrections and Condilional Release AcP3 allows victims to obtain information
about the service of federal prison sentences by offenders from whom they have suffered
harm.74 Aside from temporary absences, the Act also allows federal inmates to obtain

"Let My People Go: Human Capital InveSlment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation
in a Deliberative Democracy- A Modest Contribution for Criminal Law and Restorative Justice", supra
note 29 at 8. Archibald refers to human capital development or human capacity enhancement as:
.. .the consteliation of individual life choices, private sector encouragements and supporting
government programmes and policies that enable members of the workforce to upgrade and
illlprove their knowledge, skills and abilities in ways that help thelll to participate 1II0re
productively in the workforce. [Emphasis addedl.
71 R. v. Panglllan, supra note 49 at para. 89; and Laurence L. Motiuk & Ben Vuong, "Prison Careers of
Federal Offenders with Criminal Organization Offences: A Follow-Up" Correctiollal Service Canada (13
January 2010) online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/texlirsrchibriefsIb421b42eng.shtml> at 8. In R. v. Pangmall, the Court of Appeal did not consider, but noted, the indications by the
Parole Board that it " ... would not be inclined to grant early release to those individuals who were found to
be members ofa criminal organization." Motiuk and Vuong found that federal offenders with criminal
organization offences were significantly more likely than offenders without such offences to be released
later in their sentence, but that they were more likely to receive unescOlied and escorted temporary absences
than offenders not convicted of organized crime offences.
72 Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, "National Parole Board" (26 September 2009) online:
Government of Canada <http://www.victimsfirst.gc.ca/serv/roJ/npb-cnlc.html>.
13 S.C. 1992, c. 20 [Corrections alld Conditional Release Act].
74 Ibid at s. 26. Section 26 states:
26. (I) At the request ofa victim of an offence committed by an offender, the Commissioner
(a) shall disclose to the victim the following information about the offender:
(i) the offender's name,
(ii) the offence of which the offender was convicted and the court that convicted
the offender,
70
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release on day parole, full parole, or long-term supervision75 the purposes of which are to
reintegrate and rehabilitate offenders. 76 The National Parole Board may impose
conditions of release which seek to reintegrate and rehabilitate offenders, such as
conditions of residence in the community.77 The Act also contains conditions for federal
(iii) the date of commencement and length of the sentence that the offender is

serving, and
(iv) eligibility dates and review dates applicable to the offender under this Act in
respect oftemporary absences or parole; and
(b) may disclose to the victim any ofthe following information about the offender, where
in the Commissioner's opinion the interest of the victim in such disclosure clearly
outweighs any invasion ofthe offender's privacy that could result from the disclosure:
(i) the offender's age,
(ii) the location ofthe penitentiary in which the sentence is being served,
(iii) the date, if any, on which the offender is to be released on temporary
absence, work release, parole or statutory release,
(iv) the date of any hearing for the purposes of a review under section 130,
(v) any of the conditions attached to the offender's tempormy absence, work
release, parole or statutory release,
(vi) the destination ofthe offender on any temporary absence, work release,
parole or statutory release, and whether the offender will be in the vicinity afthe
victim while travelling to that destination, and
(vii) whether the offender is in custody and, if not, the reason why the offender is
not in custody.
(2) Where a person has been transferred from a penitentiary to a provincial correctional facility,
the Commissioner may, at the request of a victim of an offence committed by that person, disclose
to the victim the name of the province in which the provincial correctional facility is located, ifin
the Commissioner's opinion the interest of the victim in such disclosure clearly outweighs any
invasion of the person's privacy that could result from the disclosure.
75 Ibid. at Part II.
76 Ibid. at s. 100. Section 100 states:
100. The purpose of conditional release is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and
safe society by means of decisions on the timing and conditions of release that will best facilitate
the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens.
77 Ibid. at s. 133. Section 133 states:
133. (l) In this section, "releasing authority" means
(a) the Board, in respect of
(i) parole,
(ii) statutory release, or
(iii) unescorted temporaty absences authorized by the Board under subsection
116(l),
(b) the Commissioner, in respect ofunescOlied tempormy absences authorized by the
Commissioner under subsection 116(2), or
(c) the institutional head, in respect of unescorted temporary absences authorized by the
institutional head under subsection 116(2).
(2) Subject to subsection (6), evelY offender released on parole, statutory release or unescorted
temporary absence is subject to the conditions prescribed by the regulations.
(3) The releasing authority may impose any conditions on the parole, statutory release or
unescorted temporary absence of an offender that it considers reasonable and necessary in order to
protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the offender.
(4) Where, in the opinion of the releasing authority, the circumstances of the case so justifY, the
releasing authority may require an offender, as a condition of parole or unescorted tempormy
absence, to reside in a community-based residential facility.
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inmates to pm1icipate in "human capital development" activities while serving their
sentences. 78 Further, a case management team implements the strategy for an offender
who is released into the community.79 This case management team is a multidisciplinary
team comprised of a parole officer, a correctional officer, and a correctional manager, and

it may also include correctional or vocational instructors, a psychologist or psychiatrist, a
Chaplain, an Aboriginalliason officer, an Elder or community member, police officer,
police liason officer, volunteers, and caseworkers from aftercare agencies or community
residential centers. The legal provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,
and their implementation in the community tlu'ough a case management team,
demonstrate that the legislative power and philosophy already exists to implement
restorative justice measures for organized crime outlaws who are released prior to the
completion of their sentences. These provisions are available to be utilized.

The Regina Anti-Gang Services or RAGS program exemplifies a collaborative restorative
justice approach for organized crime members. It provides services for member who are
(4.1) In order to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of an offender, the releasing
authority may, as a condition of statutory release, require that the offender reside· in a communitybased residential facility or in a psychiatric facility, where the releasing authority is satisfied that,
in the absence of such a condition, the offender will present an undue risk to society by committing
an offence listed in Schedule I before the expiration ofthe offender's sentence according to law.
78 Ibid at s. 18. The Corrections and Conditional Release Act provides for work release during the service
of a federal prison sentence:
18. (I) In this section, "work release" means a structured program of release of specified duration
for work or community service outside the penitentiary, under the supervision of a staff member or
other person or organization authorized by the institutional head.
(2) Where an inmate is eligible for unescorted temporary absences under Part II or pursuant to
section 746.1 of the Criminal Code, subsection 140.3(2) of the National Defence Act or subsection
15(2) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, and, in the opinion of the institutional
head,
(a) the inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society during a work
release,
(b) it is desirable for the inmate to participate in a structured program of work or
community service in the community,
(c) the inmate's behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the work
release, and
(d) a structured plan for the work release has been prepared,
the institutional head may authorize a work release, for such duration as is fixed by the
institutional head, subject to the approval of the Commissioner if the duration is to exceed
sixty days.
(3) The institutional head may impose, in relation to a work release, any conditions that the
institutional head considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect society.
79 Public Safety Canada, "People Who Work With Offenders" (12 April 2010) online: Public Safety
Canada <http://www.publicsafety.gc.calprglcor/acc/ffl-eng.aspx>.
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primarily out of prison, but also provides services for members who are inmates. Regina,
Saskatchewan is home to over 300 known gang members, 75 per cent of whom are
between the age of12 and 20. 80 The RAGS project began in 2007, and seeks to "reduce
criminal activities committed by young Aboriginal gang members.,,81 The project targets
gang-involved Aboriginal youth and young adults in a neighbourhood of Regina,
Saskatchewan that has a high gang presence and dispropot1ionate level of crime, and
provides "intensive support services to reduce involvement in gang life and to facilitate
leaving gangs.,,82 However, some RAGS programming is provided in correctional
facilities. 83 Police services, corrections, addictions counselors or services, front-line
support workers, educators, and federal pa11ners use a "wraparound process" - that is to
say, a "collaborative community process that actively engages youth and their families,
service providers and community pat1ners in inclusive case management and safety
planning, service provision and SUpp011.,,84 The wraparound process emphasizes various
reintegrative processes. It seeks to reduce anti-social behaviour; provide available
services to families; increase pro-social peer associations; increase family cohesion; and
reduce placements outside the home. 85 RAGS is a pilot project that is in the process of
evaluation, but preliminary results indicate some positive effects.

86

Similarly, the Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatwin87 program in the North End of Winnipeg,
Manitoba, works with Aboriginal gang members who have sought to remain in their
gangs, but not engage in criminal activity.88 It began in 2001, and teaches pa11icipants

"Regina Anti-Gang Services: RAGS" (30 July 2010) online: Public Safety Canada
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.calprglcp/ythgnglcpaO I-rags-eng.aspx>.

80

Ibid.
Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. As of July 18, 20 II, the evaluation process had begun.
81

82

87 Larry Morrissette, "Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatwin" (Paper presented to the 2010 Canada-U.S. Gang
Summit, Toronto, Ontario, 24-26 March 2010) online: 2010 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit
<http://www.gangsllmmit.com/Assets/OPK%20LESSONS%20LEARNED.pdf> ["Ogijiita Pimatiswin
Kinamatwin"]; and Lawrence Deane, Denis C. Bracken & Larry Morrissette, "Desistance Within an Urban
Aboriginal Gang" (2007) 54 Probation JOllrnaI125["Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang"] at 127.
This name means '''learning to become a protector and provider for the community.'"
88 "Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang", supra note 87 at 126.
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construction skills while they renovate North End houses. 89 It seeks to help paliicipants
" ... reframe their negative life experiences in a way that enables them to move towards
positive Aboriginallife.,,90 It gives paliicipants a sense of purpose, pride, dignity, and
reparation in their community.91 As pali of the derelict housing renewal project, two
Aboriginal carpenters who were ex-federal inmates and who had led non-criminal lives
for over 20 years, were hired as trainers for the Paliicipants. 92 Unfortunately, the program
cannot reach all who wish to paliicipate and who would benefit from its effects. 93

While RAGS and the Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatwin program are examples of
restorative justice programs that involve organized crime outlaws, they are specific for
Aboriginal organized crime members. These programs are tailored to address the needs
of these paliicular outlaws, and may not work for any and all organized crime outlaws.
As criminological and sociological theoretical insights have suggested and as the outlaws
discussed in Chapter Two demonstrate, organized crime outlaw groups may form in
different ways and circumstances and their members may join for different reasons. For
instance, an Aboriginal street gang members may have had poor attachment, belief,
involvement and commitment and failed to bond with a conventional law-abiding group.
An outlaw motorcycle gang member may have been a criminal and biker who was
stigmatized in his relations with conventional societal members, and came to identify
with an organized crime group that held similar values and beliefs as he did and the
association facilitated his criminal activities. A member of La Cosa Nostra may have
differentially associated with Mafiosi family members his entire life, internalized their
values and norms, and adopted their identity in a ritualized ceremony. Each of these
organized crime outlaws may need specific and individualized restorative justice

89 "If You Want to Change Violence in the 'Hood, You have to Change the 'Hood: Violence and Street
Gangs in Winnipeg's Inner City", supra note 54.
90 "Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatwin", supra note 87.
91 "If You Want to Change Violence in the 'Hood, You have to Change the 'Hood: Violence and Street
Gangs in Winnipeg's Inner City", supra note 54.
92 "Desistance Within an Urban Aboriginal Gang", supra note 87 at 128.
93 "If You Want to Ch,mge Violence in the 'Hood, You have to Change the 'Hood: Violence and Street
Gangs in Winnipeg's Inner City", supra note 54. The progmm has 9.5 employees, and a budget 0[$450
000 per year. At least 30 more Aboriginal men, most associated with street gangs, would like to work with
Ogijiita Pimatiswin Kinamatiwin. About $1 million dollars more per year would be required to increase
employment to this level.
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processes in order to experience pro-social relations, adopt conventional values and
norms, abandon his outlaw identity, and internalize a law-abiding social identity. Each
restorative justice program must suit the individual organized crime outlaw and recognize
the processes that occurred that led to him adopting the identity of an organized crime
group.

4.5.4

Evaluations and Recommendations

Insights from restorative justice theory present idyllic goals toward which society should
strive in order to maintain social order or public peace. However, just as society is not
idyllic or often peaceful, restorative justice is not always flawless or applicable. While
restorative justice should be an option to employ for organized crime outlaws, the timing
of its use and the voluntariness of its participants are important considerations. And,
restorative justice processes must be individualized to the organized crime outlaw.
At the sentencing stages of criminal justice, the criminal law imposes some constraints or
limitations regarding the implementation of restorative justice principles for organized
crime outlaws. Conflicts among sentencing principles, particularly the emphasis on
denunciation, deterrence and incapacitation for organized crime outlaws, stymie
principles of rehabilitation and reintegration - perhaps necessarily so given the need to
protect society against serious crime. At the post-sentencing stages of criminal justice
during imprisonment and on release from imprisonment, some limitations on
programming that emphasize restorative justice measures for organized crime outlaws in
prisons and cOll'ectional facilities, likely exists. However, these limitations are not legal
limitations. Adequate funding and implementation of policies based on restorative justice
can breathe life into the legal provisions surrounding cOll'ectionallaws that govern
organized crime outlaws. Laws and legal policies do not necessarily pose a hindrance in
this regard.
Given the need to emphasize deterrence, denunciation and incapacitation in sentencing
criminal organization offenders for serious offences; and given that "getting tough on
crime" in relation to organized crime outlawry may be appropriate and required, as
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opined by some organized crime outlaws, the emphasis on or the implementation of
restorative justice measures at the sentencing phase may not be the appropriate time to
employ these measures. Rather, restorative justice measures ought to be implemented
during service of a sentence.
Programs that specifically target organized crime outlaws (including associates, exmembers, and members of organized crime groups), and that utilize restorative justice
principles, should be implemented during the correctional phase of the administration of
criminal justice. This correctional phase includes the service of a sentence, as well as
release from custody prior to the termination of a sentence.
Programs during incarceration that employ restorative justice measures, such as
reintegrative shaming in order to attempt to build a "conscience" that will instill a
common and conventional value structure, and in order to offer pro-social interactions to
encourage the creation and maintenance of bonds between conventional society members
and organized crime outlaws. A gentle denunciation, that is to say, denunciation with
forgiveness attached, may encourage reintegration and rehabilitation. FUliher, restorative
justice measures ought to be offered and re-offered throughout incarceration in order to
continually attempt to reach resistant organized crime outlaws and to "keep the door
open.,,94

Based on the analysis of Requisite Four and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations:

Recommendation Ten: Restorative justice services ought to be made available at any
time during an organized crime outlaw's involvement in the criminal justice system - they
should be offered and reoffered continually. Howevel~ these services should be
implemented, or attempted to be implemented, during the correctional phase ofthe
administration of criminal justice.

Recommendation Eleven: Restorative justice services should be tailored to meet the
individual needs of the organized crime outlaw.

" "Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework", supra note 4 at 91.
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Recommendation Twelve: Empirical research must be conducted on restorative justice
programs that seek to rehabilitate and reintegrate organized crime outlmvs into
conventional society in order to determine and implement the most appropriate program
for a particular organized crime outlaw.
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4.6

REQUISITE FIVE FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES
Requisite Five
Rooted in Diffirential Association and Social Learning in Subcultures, and
Deviance and Labelling TheOlY:
Anti-organized crime measures must limit and prevent differential association and
anti-social learning within the subcultures of outlaws.
a.
These measures must reduce the internal cohesion and power of gangs or
organized crime outlaws, and the reinforcement of their identities through
ongoing anti-social interactions with one another in order to prevent the
perpetuation of their identity and the empowerment oftheir reputations,
for instance. For instance, such measures must ban associations to some
degree and in some circumstances.

4.6.1

Overview

Requisite Five stems in part fi'om criminological and sociological insights that seem to
prove the age-old adages of "the apple does not fall far from the tree" and "birds of a
feather flock together." It also stems fi'om insights from deviance and labelling theory as
set forth in Requisite Seven. Deviance and labelling theory does not advocate labelling,
and asserts that internalization of a label reinforces a deviant or outlaw identity. To some
extent, therefore, conflict exists between insights from differential association and social
learning in subcultures, and deviance and labelling theory. Conflict exists because
banning anti-social associations is a possible anti-organized crime measure using the
criminal law, but it may include proscription, and proscription is arguably one of the most
severe forms of formal labelling that could occur. However, the option of proscription, in
spite of a conflict with labelling theory, must be canvassed as a plausible anti-organized
crime measure.

Two methods to prevent "bad apples" and flock mentalities exist, and will be analysed in
this section. Proactive and reactive methods can be used to limit and prevent differential
association and anti-social learning within the subcultures of outlaws. Proactive methods
target gang members, gang members who would like to leave the gang, or individuals
who are on the periphery of gang membership, and offer pro-social learning enviromnents
and interactions in the law-abiding community. Reactive methods may include these
community-based proactive methods, and they may utilize criminal law measures to react
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or respond to criminal offences through suppression - that is to say, through the
imposition of punitive sanctions.

4.6.2

Proactive Anti-Organized Crime Methods to Limit and

Prevent Differential Association and Anti-Social Learning Within
Subcultures of Outlaws
One ofthe first steps to effecting proactive methods is to raise community awareness and
involvement in preventing organized crime. In this vein, police forces and communities
in the Fraser Valley, British Columbia have recently launched a poster-ad campaign
depicting a young child in prison garb and posing like a gangster.! The caption reads:
"When I grow up, I want to be just like Daddy.,,2 This campaign took place in 2011 in
the Fraser Valley of British Columbia where some well-known organized crime outlaws,
such as the Bacon brothers and United Nations member Clay Roueche, have been born
and bred. 3 The community seeks to maintain and foster pro-social bonds with its
members in order to prevent anti-social interactions. It also targets at-risk youth.
However, community members must simultaneously recognize that anti-social bonds can
be maintained and fostered just as easily within groups and families in their community.
A multitude of other programs have been implemented by various communities in N0I1h
America in order to enlist communities to reduce anti-social interactions with organized
crime members 01' youth at-risk and their gangs, and to thus, to reduce the internal
cohesion and power of gangs 01' organized crime outlaws. These other programs have
been discussed in this Chapter in section four "Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures. "

1 Kim Bolan, "Parents Urged to Help Stamp Out Gangs" The Vancouver Sun (7 January 2011), online: The
Vancouver Sun
<http://www.vancouversun.comlnews/Parents+urged+help+stamp+gangs/4073755/stOIy.html>.
2
3

Ibid.
Ibid.
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4.6.3

Reactive Anti-Organized Crime Methods to Limit and

Prevent Differential Association and Anti-Social Learning Within
Subcultures of Outlaws

4.6.3.1

Reactive Methods of Suppression and Specifically Reactive

Methods of Suppression Via the Criminal Law
Suppression stems from deterrence theory4 in its attempts to modify individual behaviour
through punitive sanctions. It also has links to social constructionism and social control
theory as the state uses its legal institutions and other social control methods in order to
maintain behaviour which accords with social norms, and in order to address the social
problem of gang membership and activity. Suppression methods for youth include
increased surveillance, metal detectors in schools, curfew and truancy checks, increased
arrest and imprisonment of gang members. 5 Suppression also exists in the form of law
enforcement, such as by police agencies creating gang task forces or integrated units;
prosecution offices creating specialized prosecutors; and governments passing legislation
that targets gangs and gang activities. 6 However, law enforcement efforts alone, or law
enforcement efforts that are over-emphasized will likely not succeed. 7

Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) at 154.
, Ibid.
• Ibid at 156-57.
7 Ibid at 150. Tobin asserts:
... Law enforcement is often the primary agency in a suppression strategy. However, pure law
enforcement suppression has a weak record of success. Extreme policing that increases
surveillance and targets high-risk areas without community support reinforces the "us versus
them" attitude (Klein, 1995; Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2005). There are some situations
where extreme policing has led to officers essentially creating a gang oftheir own. In Los
Angeles, Community Resources against Street Hoodlums (CRASH), an elite antigang unit, was
formed to control gang crime. It came under fire in 1998 and was disbanded in 2000 because of
criminal charges against CRASH officers and systematic enforcement of the law through unlawful
means. The charges against CRASH officers included murder, drug charges, bank robbelY,
shooting unarmed suspects, stealing, assault, planting evidence, and perjUlY. The Rampart
Scandal, as it came to be known, involved a secret fraternity of more than 30 antigang unit
members and supervisors. Their behavior resulted in more than 100 convictions being overturned
on the basis oftainted evidence and credibility issues (see Kirk and Boyer, 2001; see also
Streetgangs.com, n.d.).
Tobin cites research ofMalc()lm W. Klein, The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and control
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Cheryl L. Maxson, Karen M. Hennigan & David C. Sloane,
'''It's Getting Crazy Out There': Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community?" (2005) 4
Criminology and Public Policy 577; and Michael Kirk & Peter J. Boyer, "L.A.P.D. Blues" (2001) PBS
Frontline online: <www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/bare.html>.
4
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Suppression also occurs through civil injunctions which seek to prevent gang activity by
controlling legal, rather than illegal, behaviour. s This form of prevention and intervention
seems akin to social control methods in that it reinforces positive social norms by banning
behaviour that potentially threatens or violates those norms. For instance, injunctions
may regulate gangs who carry pagers, wear insignia, use hand signs, or meet and occupy
certain areas. 9 While civil injunctions reduce gang presence in the ShOli term, I 0 they
often simply displace gangs, and fail to address the root of the problems that give rise and
perpetuate gang activity. I I In addition, empirical evidence exists to demonstrate that
injunctions used in areas with less gang activity may serve to increase gang cohesion and
fuel gang activity, 12 and thus, ought to be employed in areas where gangs already have an
a cohesive identity. 13

4.6.3.2

Proscription as a Reactive Method of Suppression

The primary reactive method of limiting and preventing differential association and antisocial learning within the subcultures of outlaws via the criminal law, lies in preventing
association by criminalizing celiain groups; by banning association of individuals with
members of celiain organized crime groups; or by banning association among members
of celiain organized crime groups. The law allows the government to implement
proscription, as discussed in this Chapter in section two "Requisite One for AntiOrganized Crime Measures" at subsection eight "Proscription as a Solution to
Definitional, Investigative, Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial Problems within Criminal
Organization Legislation." Arguments for proscription will not be reiterated in this
section. Instead, this section will set forth the ways in which the criminal law allows for
orders of non-association, and the merits and demerits of such non-association orders.

, Ibid. at 156.
Ibid.
10 Ibid. Tobin cites Cheryl L. Maxson, Karen M. Hennigan & David C. Sloane, '''It's Getting Crazy Out

9

There': Can a Civil Gang Injunclion Change a Community?" (2005) 4 Criminology and Public Policy 577.
" Ibid. Tobin cites Beth Bjerregaard & Carolyn A. Smith, "Gender Differences in Gang Participation,
Delinquency, and Substance Use" (1993) 9 lournal of Quantitative Criminology 329.
12 Ibid. Tobin cites Cheryl L. Maxson, Karen M. Hennigan & David C. Sloane, "'It's Getting Crazy Out
There': Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community?" (2005) 4 Criminology and Public Policy 577.
" Ibid. Tobin cites Jean Marie McGloin, "Policy and Intervention Considerations of a Network Analysis of
Street Gangs" 4 Criminology and Public Policy 607.
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4.6.3.3

Non-Association Orders in Bail Conditions as a Reactive

Method of Suppression
Non-association orders exemplifY one method of what has been termed "suppression" in
relation to anti-organized crime measures. As referred to in this Chapter in section five
"Differential Association and Social Learning Within Groups and Subcultures" at
subsection three "Requisites for Anti-Organized Crime Measures According to
Differential Association and Social Learning Within Groups and Subcultures",
suppression is one of the five main components of the Spergel model of gang prevention
and intervention, now referred to as the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to
Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program model. 14 Non-association orders
are common in bail orders, probation orders, and conditional release after incarceration.
In relation to bail orders, they are employed largely because association may be a
problem if the accused or offender poses a threat to the administration of justice, for
instance, because of a history of intimidation of victims and witnesses. 15 Indeed, criminal
conduct in connection with criminal organization outlawry instills fear in witnesses, and
consequently, threatens police investigations and the administration of justice. 16 Nonassociation orders are also employed in an attempt to secure the good behaviour of the
accused or offender while on bail, probation or conditional release, and to facilitate
rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Non-association orders accord with the
insights from differential association and social learning theory perspective, in that such
orders prevent or reduce anti-social relations of an individual with a group or subculture
that encourages the anti-social values, norms and identity of that individual, and in so
doing, they may encourage pro-social relations instead.

14 Irving A. Spergel, "A Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to the Youth-Gang Problem" (Paper
presented to the 2010 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit Conference, Toronto, Ontario, 25 March 2010) online:
2010 Canada-U.S. Gang Summit <http://www.gangsummit.comlAssets/Spergel%20Speech.pdf>atl.This
Spergel model includes community mobilization to create programs to strengthen institutions in the
community; social intervention in the form of programs that seek to increase the resilience of individuals
against gang membership; provision of programs to increase educational and employment opportunities;
suppression by augmenting legal system responses to gangs; and organizational changes and development
alter the administration of agencies that deal with gangs.
15 R. v. Fisk, [1997] B.C.J. No. 542 (B.C.S.C.); and R. v. Payne, 2007 BCCA 541, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2391
(Q.L.) at paras. 45 and 48.
16 R. v. Payne, 2007 BCCA 541, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2391 (Q.L.) at paras. 45 and 48.
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Non-association orders as part of a bail order may be imposed where a court orders the
release of an accused person, and imposes various conditions to ensure the good conduct
of the accused including "other reasonable conditions.,,17 FUl1her, ifaccused are alleged
to be criminal organization members and charged with criminal organization offences
such as committing offences in cotUlection with that organization, a non-association order
may be imperative to maintain ongoing public confidence in the administration of
justice.

17

I8

If the accused are not members, then a non-association clause should not pose

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] at s. 515(4)(1). Sections 515( I), (2) and (4) state:

515. (I) Subject to this section, where an accused who is charged with an offence other than an
offence listed in section 469 is taken before a justice, the justice shall, unless a plea of guilty by the
accused is accepted, order, in respect of that offence, that the accused be released on his giving an
undertaking without conditions, unless the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity
to do so, shows cause, in respect oflhatoffence, why the detention of the accused in custody is
justified or why an order under any other provision of this section should be made and where the
justice makes an order under any other provision ofthis section, the order shall refer only to the
particular offence for which the accused was taken before the justice.
(2) Where the justice does not make an order under subsection (I), he shall, unless the prosecutor
shows cause why the detention of the accused is justified, order that the accused be released
(4) The justice may direct as conditions under subsection (2) that the accused shall do anyone or
more of the following things as specified in the order:
(a) repOlt at times to be stated in the order to a peace officer or other person designated in
the order;
(b) remain within a territorial jurisdiction specified in the order;
(c) notify the peace officer or other person designated under paragraph (a) of any change
in his address or his employment or occupation;
(d) abstain rrom communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other
person identified in the order, or rerrain rrom going to any place specified in the order,
except in accordance with the conditions specified in the order that the justice considers
necessary;
(e) where the accused is the holder ofa passport, deposit his passport as specified in the
order;

(e. 1) comply with any other condition specified in the order that the justice considers
necessary to ensure the safety and security of any victim of or witness to the offence; and
(I) comply with such olher reasonable conditions specified in the order as the justice
considers desirable. [EmphaSis added].
" R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] S.C.!. No. 65 (Q.L.) at paras. 40 and 41. The Court stated:
41 This, then, is Parliament's purpose: to maintain public confidence in the bail system and the
justice system as a whole. The question is whether the means it has chosen go further than
necessary to achieve that purpose. In my view, they do not. Parliament has hedged this provision
for bail with impOltant safeguards. The judge must be satisfied that detention is not only advisable
but necessmy. The judge must, moreover, be satisfied that detention is necessary not just to any
goal, but to mail/tail/ cOl/fidel/ce in the administration o/justice. Most importantly, the judge
makes this appraisal objectively through the lens ofthe four factors Parliament has specified. The
judge cannot cOluure up his own reasons for denying bail; while the judge must look at all the
circumstances, he must focus particularly on the factors Parliament has specified. At the end of the
day, the judge can only deny bail if satisfied that in view ofthese factors and related
circumstances, a reasonable member ofthe community would be satisfied that denial is necessary
to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. In addition, as McEachern C.J.B.C. (in
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any difficulty. However, such orders may be stigmatizing and may violate the freedom of
association.

In R. v. Farago, 19 the Alberta Comi of Queen's Bench determined that a bail condition
that prevented the accused from associating with Hells Angels members in Saskatchewan
violated his right to freedom of association in section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms.20 The Comi stated that the Crown had not established that unless a
non-association order was imposed that there is a substantial likelihood that he will
commit fmiher criminal offences while awaiting trial; that the safety of the public was at
risk; or that such restriction was necessary to maintain public confidence in the criminal
justice system. 21
4 Everyone in Canada has a Constitutional right of freedom of association.
Even taking into account the amendments to the Criminal Code that came into
effect on January 7, 2002, which were not in effect in May 1998 when the crime
alleged against Mr. Farago was alleged to have occurred, it is not a crime in
Canada to be a member of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club.
S Any person who is charged with an offence in Canada has the Constitutional
right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. "Reasonable" bail
conditions are conditions which reasonably support the statutory objectives of bail
and which relate to one of the three grounds for detaining an accused person
pending trial: the need to ensure that an accused will attend the judicial
proceedings; the need to protect the safety of the public including protecting the
public from any substantial likelihood that the accused will commit a criminal
offence while awaiting trial; and any other just cause including the need to
maintain confidence in the justice system especially in circumstances where the
prosecution case against the accused is strong and it is likely that conviction will
attract a lengthy term of imprisonment. In relatively recent amendments to the
Criminal Code, Parliament has given each of these potential grounds equal
weight: attendance at comi is no longer considered the primary ground. A
condition that an accused not associate with the Hell's Angels is presumably
directed to the second ground.

Chambers) noted in R. v. Nguyen (1997), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 269, the reasonable person making this
assessment must be one properly informed about "the philosophy of the legislative provisions,
Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case" (p. 274). For these reasons, the provision
does not authorize a "standard less sweep" nor confer open-ended judicial discretion. Rather, it
strikes an appropriate balance between the rights ofthe accused and the need to maintain justice in
the community. In sum, it is not overbroad. [Emphasis original].
I9 2002 ABQB 35, [2002] AJ. No. 42 (Q.L.) [R. v. Farago].
20 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11
[Charter].
R, v. Farago, supra note 19 at para. 6.

21
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6 The prosecution has not established that unless a restriction is imposed on
Mr. Farago's right of association with members of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle
Club, there is a substantial likelihood that he will commit filrther criminal
offences while awaiting trial, or that public safety will otherwise be imperilled.
Nor has it established that such restriction is necessmy to maintain public
confidence in the criminal justice system. The non-association condition is
removed. 22 [Emphasis added].

The above passage suggests that while non-association orders in bail conditions may be
useful in suppressing organized crime activity, courts may be unwilling to impose such
conditions due to their infi'ingement of the Charter. However, case law indicates
otherwise - that is to say, that many other courts have imposed such orders. 23 The case
law also indicates that court imposing non-association orders as bail conditions do not
adhere to a standard requirement of proof of a criminal organization or membership in
that organization. While some courts may impose non-association orders where criminal
organization charges are alleged,24 other courts impose such orders without such charges
being laid 25 and even where only a "high possibility" exists that the accused had
involvement in gang activities.z6
Deviance and labelling theory or social psychology concepts would likely agree that the
end result in R. v. Farago is correct, but not because non-association orders violate the
Charter. From the perspectives of deviance and labelling theory and social psychology

concepts, the imposition of non-association conditions means that an accused person is
formally being given a stigmatizing or degrading label. It means that a court is accepting
that there is a basis for the Crown's allegation that the accused is a member of a criminal
Ibid at paras. 4 to 6.
R. v. Coates, 2009 CarswellQue 8892 (Que. S.C.) at para. 54; R. v. Campbell, 2007 CarswellOnt 1780
(Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 45; R. v. T.(R.), 2006 CarswellOnt 5396 (Ont. C.J.) [R. v. T.(R.)] at para 8; R. v.
DUlllop, 2006 CarswellOnt 9695 (Ont. c.J.) [R. v. Dunlop] at para. 32; and R. v. Trail, 2005 ABQB 133,
2005 CarswellAIta 1754 [R. v. Trail] at Appendix A.
24 R. v. DUlllop, supra note 23 at para. 32. The COUlt ordered a broad condition on the accused: " ... Do not
associate with or communicate with directly or indirectly with ... any person who is known by you to
associate with any member ofthe Hells' Angels Motorcycle Club or organization ...."
25 R. v. Trail, supra note 23 at Appendix A. The Court ordered the following condition after the Crown
alleged to be a member ofthe Crazy Dragon Killers: " ... have no contact, direct or indirect, with any
known member of the Crazy Dragon Killers or White Boys Posse organizations nor with anyone else he
knows to possess a criminal record .... "
26 R. v. T. (R.), supra note 23 at para 8. This Youth Court imposed the following condition on the accused:
"You will not associate with anyone known to you to have a youth court or criminal record and you will not
associate with anyone known to you to have gang affiliations."

22
23
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organization, and that accused will be subject to bail conditions that contribute to
formally entrenching that label. In so doing, courts may be attempting to preserve the
respect and confidence in the administration of justice, and perhaps, to assist the accused
in behaving in a law-abiding fashion and increase pro-social relations with conventional
societal members. However, these good intentions do not prevent the application of the
negative label.

While non-association orders may benefit the community and the accused by suppressing
differential association and social learning in organized crime groups, they should only be
imposed if an evidentiary foundation exists to show that an accused person is a member
of a criminal organization. According to the Ontario COutt of Justice, at bail hearings, the
Crown must establish a strong prima facie case of gang or criminal organization
affiliation. 27 The Criminal Code does not define or criminalize offences cortunitted in
relation to "gangs." Thus, for a non-association order to be ordered, the Crown should
establish a strong prima facie case of criminal organization membership as "criminal
organization" is defined in the Criminal Code. Propel' proof requirements in order to
impose non-association orders would ensure that non-organized crime outlaws are not
incorrectly or unfairly labelled as members of a criminal organization, and thus, the
recipients of potentially negative social interactions that will further entrench an outlaw
identity.

Adherence by bail COutts to a standard proof requirement would contribute to satisfying
some of the insights from differential association and social learning theory, and avoid
some of the problems set forth by the insights from deviance and labelling theory and
social psychology. Deviance and labelling theory would assert that any label- whether
correctly imposed on an actual member of a criminal organization or incorrectly imposed
on a non-organized crime member - is formally stigmatizing. However, at least proper
and uniform proof requirements for non-association orders would ensure that if such
orders were necessary, that they are imposed only on accused persons who truly
organized crime outlaws.
27

R. v. C.(MJ. 2001 Carswell Ont 5118 (Ont. C.J.) at para. 17.
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4.6.3.4

Non-Association Orders in Probation Conditions as a

Reactive Method of Suppression
Prior to the implementation of the criminal organization legislation in the Criminal Code,
where sentences included probation orders, courts treated "gang assaults" as aggravating
factors,28 and imposed conditions of non-association on offenders who committed
offences in relation to a gang,29 but who were not necessarily members of a gang. 30
Notably, without statutory definitions of "gang" and what constitutes a connection of an
offence to a gang, courts determined in what circumstances the association of a gang in an
offence amounted to an aggravating factor at sentencing. The term "gang" in the past was
apparently common knowledge - it was socially constructed and need not be enshrined in
statute. Perhaps, proof requirements in relation to the term "gang" and membership in
that gang were less structured than with statutorily defined terms in the Criminal Code as
exist today.

However, even with definitions of "criminal organization" in the Criminal Code, and
specifications regarding aggravating factors and proof for connection of predicate
offences to the "criminal organization", the criminal organization provisions have not
clarified when and in what circumstances non-association conditions should be imposed.
They have not clarified when and for whom a label of "criminal organization" member
should attach. The formal social (or legal) construction of "criminal organization" may
have succeeded in encouraging courts to employ non-association conditions and
aggravated sentences simply due to its presence in the Criminal Code and advertisements

28 R. v. Lam, 1984 CarswellBC 1519, [1984] B.C.W.L.D. 3083 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 13. The British
Columbia COUIt of Appeal stated:
13
... This kind of gang assault on others is a very serious problem in the city of Vancouver
and elsewhere. To the extent that it is possible for the judicialY to bring a halt to it we must do so.
I think one way to do that is to impose appropriate sentences for those who see fit to palticipate in
this kind of conduct. ...
29 Ibid. at para. 13; R. v. Wilson, 1988 CarswellBC 1593, [1989] B.C.W.L.D. 274 (B.C. County Ct.) [R. v.
Wilson] at paras. 2 and 21; and R. v. Clail'Oln~ 1991 CarswellOnt 3249 (Ont. C.J. (Prov. Div.)) at para. 8
30 R. v. Wilson, supra note 29 at paras. 2 and 21. The British Columbia County Court held that although the
offender was not a member of the gang, he "let himself become involved in a ritualistic gang beating", and
the COUit imposed a condition of probation that he" ... not associate or communicate in any manner with
any of the co-accused in these proceedings nor the accused, John Yee, nor any person known to him to be a
member of or in any way associated with the Lotus Gang."
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of gangs as social problems. However, disparities in the imposition of non-association
conditions and aggravated sentences in relation to "criminal organizations" and their
members raise significant concerns in effectively remedying the problem of organized
crime. The below discussion of cases in which courts have imposed non-association
orders will reveal that no one can predict when, for whom, and on what basis, a court may
impose such an order.

The Criminal Code allows for non-association orders as conditions of probation. In R. v.

Shaker ,31 the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the nature of appropriate conditions for
probations orders given the broad residual power in section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal

Code to impose "other reasonable conditions. ,,32 The COUlt held, as the statutory
language provides, that before a probation condition can properly be imposed it must be
reasonable in the circumstances, and it must be imposed to protect society as well as to
facilitate the rehabilitation the specific offender and his reintegration into the community.
Notably, the COUlt stated that while reasonable conditions in a probation order will
generally be linked or connected to the particular offence, they need not be.

13 Before discussing the issue that arises in this case, I wish to make a few
general comments about the power to impose optional conditions under s.
732.1(3). The residual power under s. 732.1 (3)(h) speaks of "other reasonable
conditions" imposed "for protecting society and for facilitating the offender's
successful reintegration into the community". Such language is instructive, not
only in respect of conditions crafted under this residual power, but in respect of
the optional conditions listed under s. 732.1(3): before a condition can be
imposed, it must be "reasonable" in the circumstances and must be ordered for the
purpose of protecting society and facilitating the patticular offender's successful
reintegration into the community. Reasonable conditions will generally be linked
to the patticular offence but need not be. What is required is a nexus between the
offender, the protection ofthe community and his reintegration into the
community. See, for example, R. v. Kootenay (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Alta.
C.A.), and R. v. Traverse (2006),205 C.C.C. (3d) 33 (Man. C.A.), where appellate
courts have upheld conditions requiring abstinence from alcohol or drugs even
31
32

2006 SCC 44, [2006] S.C.J. No. 44 (Q.L.) [R. v. Shaker].
Criminal Code, supra note 17 at s. 732.1(3)(h). This section states:

(3) The court may prescribe, as additional conditions of a probation order, that the offender do one
or more ofthe following:
(h) comply with such other reasonable conditions as the COUlt considers desirable, subject
to any regulations made under subsection 738(2), for protecting society and for
facilitating the offender's successful reintegration into the community.
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though these played no part in the commission ofthe offence for which the
offender was sentenced. On the other hand, conditions of probation imposed to
punish rather than rehabilitate the offender have been struck out: R. v. Ziatas
(1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 287 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Caja (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 401
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lavender (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 551 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. L.
(1986),50 C.R. (3d) 398 (Alta. C.A.). In contrast, punitive conditions may be
imposed pursuant to s. 742.3(2)(1) as part of a conditional sentence: Proulx, [2000
SCC 5, [2000]1 S.C.R. 61] at para. 34.
14 The residual power to craft individualized conditions of probation is very
broad. It constitutes an impOltant sentencing tool. The purpose and principles of
sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code make it clear that
sentencing is an individualized process that must take into account both the
circumstances of the offence and of the offender. It would be impossible for
Parliament to spell out every possible condition of probation that can meet these
sentence objectives. The sentencing judge is well placed to craft conditions that
are tailored to the particular offender to assist in his rehabilitation and protect
society. However, the residual power to impose individualized conditions is not
unlimited. The sentencing judge cannot impose conditions that would contravene
federal or provincial legislation or the Charter. Further, inasmuch as the wording
of the residual provision can inform the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion
in imposing one of the listed optional conditions as I have described, the listed
conditions in turn can assist in interpreting the scope of "other reasonable
conditions" that can be crafted under s. 732.1 (3)(h). As we shall see, none ofthe
listed conditions is aimed at facilitating the investigation of suspected breaches of
probation. I will come back to this point later. 33
These assertions leave the door open for the imposition of a non-association order for an
organized crime offender in a probation order if that order protects society and facilitates
the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender in society. However, there must exist
an evidentiary foundation on which the sentencing judge can exercise his discretion to
impose a condition that will protect society and facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration,
and that is not linked or not connected to the offence for which the offender is being
sentenced. 34 Such conditions accord with insights from sociological and criminological
theOlY - namely, that limitations on anti-social relations of an outlaw offender with other
outlaws would indeed facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration because they afford the
outlaw offender an opportunity to have pro-social interactions with law-abiding
community members.

33
34

R. v. Shaker, supra note 31 at paras. 13 and 14.
R. v. Etijier, 2009 BCCA 292, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1520 (Q.L.) at paras. 18 and 19.
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In R. v. Smith/ 5 the Ontario Superior COUli of Justice followed the decisions in R. v.

Shaker and R. v. Timmins, and extended the principles and parameters of "other
reasonable conditions" to recognizances for sexual offenders or alleged sexual offenders
in section 810.1 of the Criminal Cade. 36 Thus, "any reasonable conditions ... that the
judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the defendant" need not have a
nexus to the offence respecting which the offender is being sentenced. 37 These
"reasonable conditions" may be linked or connected to " ... the prevention of further
offences similar to those for which the respondent has such a long and appalling
record",38 but they may not be. 39 Thus, non-association orders that protect society by
securing the good conduct of a sexual offender or alleged sexual offender, can be ordered.
This interpretation of "reasonable conditions" is likely equally applicable to the section
810.01 recognizances for organized crime outlaws, since the wording of sections 810.01
and 810.1 remain almost identical regarding the imposition of conditions.

4o

In R. v. Timmins,4! the British Columbia COUli of Appeal upheld a condition of nonassociation for an accused who pleaded guilty to transferring firearms without

35

36

[2007] OJ. No. 4839 (Q.L.), (2007), W.C.B. (2d) at 718 (Ont. S.CJ.) [R. v. Smith].
Criminal Code, supra note 17 at s. 810.1(3). Section 810.1(1) and (3.02) state:
810.1 (I) Any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit an offence
under section lSI, 152, ISS or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3), section 163.1, 170, 171 or 172.1,
subsection 173(2) or section 271, 272 or 273, in respect of one or more persons who are under the
age of 16 years, may lay an information before a provincial cOUit judge, whether or not the person
or persons in respect of whom it is feared that the offence will be committed are named.

(3.02) The provincial court judge may add any reasonable conditions to the recognizance that the
judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct ofthe defendant, ""
37 R. v. Smith, supra note 35 at IS.
38 Ibid. at para. 14.
39 Ibid. at para. 13.
40 Criminal Code, supra note 17 at ss. 810.01(1), (3) and (4). Sections 810.01(1), (3) and (4) state:
810.0 I (1) A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit an offence
under section 423.1, a criminal organization offence or a terrorism offence may, with the consent
of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial court judge.

(3) Ifthe provincial cOUltjudge before whom the patties appear is satisfied by the evidence
adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, the judge may order that the
defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of not
more than 12 months.

41

(4.1) The provincial court judge may add any reasonable conditions to the recognizance that the
judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the defendant, ""
2006 BCCA 354, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1767 (Q.L.) [R. v. Timmins].
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authorization under the Firearms Act contrary to section 99(J)(a) of the Criminal Code.
The sentencing judge imposed a probation order that required that the offender not attend
'''the Renegades Clubhouse at 1590 Fir Street in Prince George,

B.c., or any other

clubhouse of a like variety. ,,,42 The police conducted an investigation into the Prince
George Renegades Club and the Vancouver chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club,
and evidence of the firearms offence was obtained with the assistance of a police agent. 43
Ten individuals were charged on five indictments, and four accused were members of the
Renegades. 44 The accused admitted to police that he was a "striker" which is a
prospective member of the Renegades. 45 The Honourable Mr. Justice Low stated for the
Court:
7 In my opinion, the condition is not punitive. One of the purposes of a
probation order is to require the offender to remove himself fi'om associations that
tend to influence him into being involved in criminal enterprises. This is part of
the process of rehabilitating the offender. The appellant had associations through
the Renegades, some of whose members were involved in criminal enterprises,
and the police agent he dealt with was a former member and president of the club.
The condition was a reasonable restriction on the freedom and activities of the
appellant as an attempt to have him dissociate himself fi'om those who might.
tempt him to become involved in futlher criminality. It is no more restrictive than
requiring an offender to not associate with named individuals. Indeed, it is less
restrictive because it does not prevent the appellant fi'om associating with
members of the club at places other than the clubhouse.
8 The appellant says that the condition is not reasonable in the absence of some
connection between the subject offence and the Renegades clubhouse. He says
that the crime was not committed at the clubhouse, the agent had no ongoing
connection with the Renegades, and neither Massey nor McBeth was associated
with the club. Therefore, the appellant says there is no concern that he might
commit other offences if he attends the clubhouse.
9 In my opinion, there was a connection between the offence and the club
simply because the appellant knew the agent through the club. In any event, there
is no requirement of such a connection to make the condition imposed both lawful
and reasonable. Section 732.1(2) of the Criminal Code lists the conditions that
must be included in a probation order. Section 732.1(3) lists additional conditions
that may be prescribed. There is no requirement in either.section that there be
some connection with the circumstances of the offence for which the offender is
being sentenced. The final item listed in s. 732. 1(3)(h) provides that the
sentencing judge may order that the offender "comply with such other reasonable
Ibid. at paras. 1 and 2.
Ibid. at para. 3.
44 Ibid. at para. 5.
45 Ibid.
42
43
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conditions as the court considers desirable ... for protecting society and for
facilitating the offender's successful reintegration into the community." Tllis is
very broadly stated and it is significant that Parliament did not restrict this area of
discretion to those matters directly related to the offence itself It is enou~h that
the condition is reasonable and serves one or both of the purposes stated. 6
This decision in R. v. Timmins facilitates suppression through non-association orders. It
allows for the imposition of non-association orders in probation conditions without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that a group is a "criminal organization." It allows for the
admission of hearsay to show that an accused was a member or associate of that
organization. And, it does not require an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate that the
association or membership in that organization will not protect society and will not
facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender and his reintegration into the community.
The requisite proof for imposing conditions of non-association remains far from clear,
and generally, courts seem to impose such conditions without stringent proof
requirements. Some COUtts have imposed non-association orders where an accused is a
gang or "criminal organization" member, although there is no proof that the organization
is a "criminal organization." For instance, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v.
Sears47 imposed a very broad condition of non-association that the offender " ... not

associate or communicate with any member or associate of the outlaws motorcycle club,
Bandidos, Hell's Angels, Black Pistons, as known to the accused.,,48 The accused plead
guilty to firearms offences, but no criminal organization offences. The Crown stated that
he was a member of the Toronto chapter ofthe Outlaw Motorcycle Gang and had been
observed wearing Outlaw colours and paraphernalia. Similarly, the Ontario Court of
Justice in R. v. Ahmecf9 imposed a non-association order where it was satisfied that a
group was a gang but did not state that the group was a "criminal organization.,,5o

Ibid. at paras. 7-9.
R. v. Sears, 2005 CarsweliOnt 6923 (Ont. S.C.!.).
48 Ibid. at para. 14.
49 R. v. Ahmed, 2003 CarsweliOnt 7644 (Ont. C.J.).
so Ibid. at para. 35. The COUll imposed a condition that the offender " ... not to associate, be seen with, or
associate with any member of the Ledbury Crips ...."
46
47
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Fmther, the Court prohibited the offender from being in a "gang area" which was also a
"high crime area.,,51
Other COUtts have also imposed non-association orders without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a group is a "criminal organization" or that an individual is a member of that
group. The Ontario Court of Justice did so in R. v. Baile/2 for an offender who had a
"willingness to associate with known gang members.,,53 The offender was "not to
associate with anyone known to have a criminal or youth court record except incidental
contact at employment.,,54 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v. Boudreaull 5
considered a non-association order in relation to a long-term supervision order for an
offender who "purported to be" a member of the Hells Angels which "has been held to be
a criminal organization.,,56 It recommended as part of the terms of community
supervision that the offender "not associate with known members of the Hell's Angels .
Motorcycle Club HAMC.,,57
In contrast to these decisions, in R. v. Kil'/on,58 the Manitoba Court of Appeal disallowed
a probation condition that required the accused to "'not ... associate or communicate
either directly or indirectly with any person known to him to be a member or associate of
a gang including the Hells Angels motorcycle club.",59 The sentencing judge had used
the separate judicial finding of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R. v. Lindsa/o to
determine that the Hells Angels was a "criminal organization",61 and incorrectly found
that the accused had worn "gang colours" at the time of the offence. 62 The judge imposed
the non-association condition to protect the public and rehabilitate the offender. 63 The

SJ
52
13

Ibid at para. 39
R. v. Bailey. 2005 CarslVellOnt 7706 (Ont. C.1 .).
Ibid. at paras. 9 and 10.

" Ibid.

" R. v. Boudreault, 2005 CarslVellOnt 4358 (Ont. S.C.1.).
Ibid. at paras. 52 and 54.

56

Ibid.
2007 MBCA 38, [20071 M.1. No. 299 (Q.L.) [R. v. Kir/oll].
50 Ibid. at para. I.
60 [2005] 0.1. No. 2870 (Q.L.), 66 W.C.B. (2d) 454 (Ont. S.C.I.).
61 R. v. Kir/oll, supra note 58 at para. 4.
62 Ibid at para. 6.
63 Ibid. at para. 5.
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Manitoba Court of Appeal rightly stated that one court cannot rely on and is not bound by
the finding by another court that a group is a "criminal organization.,,64 In addition, the
condition was vague and unceltain in its wording, and thus, unenforceable and not
"reasonable" pursuant to section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code. 65 Further, no
evidentiary foundation existed to support a conclusion that the offence was committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization as required
by section 718.2(a)(iv).66

These disparities in the requisite evidentiary foundations for imposing non-association
conditions in sentences, are a concern. Offenders, whether organized crime outlaws or
not, do not know whether this sanction applies to them, and do not know on what basis
coUtis might impose it. FUtther, dangers exist when courts make non-association orders
without proper evidence. First, they may be imposing stigmatizing labels on offenders
who are not organized crime outlaws. Without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a
certain group is a "criminal organization", and without a connection ofthe offence to that
"criminal organization", the court is imposing a negative label and a punitive condition
without an evidentiary basis to do so, and thus, may doing so 011 a non-organized crime
outlaw or an individual who has not been proven to be a member of a "criminal
organization" and who has not committed an offence in relation to that organization.
While R. v. Shoker does not require linkage between an offence and a probation
condition, some evidentiary basis must exist that the nature of the alleged group as well as
association with tile alleged group will not allow facilitate the reintegration and
rehabilitation of the offender into the community and will not protect society. Without
proof that a group is a "criminal organization" and that an individual is a member of that
group, courts are assuming that a non-association order will assist in reintegrating and
rehabilitating an offender. Such order may not be necessary. Without proper proof
requirements, COUtts cannot possibly know. Speculation about the nature of celtain
groups and previous court decisions that have found certain groups to be "criminal
organizations" should not do when imposing liberty restrictions and stigmatizing labels.
64 Ibid at paras. 17 and 18 .
•, Ibid at para. 32.
66 Ibid.
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4.6.3.5

Non-Association Orders In Conditional Release Conditions

as a Reactive Method of Suppression
The Corrections and Conditional Release Acr allows for the releasing authority to
impose conditions on offenders who are released on parole, statutory release, or
unescorted temporary absence. 68 The statute does not specifically provide for nonassociation orders, and does not contain a broad power to impose "other reasonable
conditions" as the Criminal Code allows in relation to bail and probation orders. 69
However, the Regulations Respecting Corrections and the Conditional Release and
Detention of Offenders set forth a number of conditions designed to reintegrate and
rehabilitate the offender while securing his good conduct. 7o One ofthese conditions
S.C. 1992, c. 20 [Corrections and Conditional Release Act].
Ibid. at s. 133(2), (3), (5) and (6). These subsections state:
(2) Subject to subsection (6), every offender released on parole, statutory release or unescorted
temporary absence is subject to the conditions prescribed by the regulations.
(3) The releasing authority may impose any conditions on the parole, statutoty release or
unescorted temporary absence of an offender that it considers reasonable and necessaty in order to
protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society oflhe offender.
(5) A condition imposed pursuant to subsection (3), (4) or (4.1) is valid for such period as the
releasing authority specifies.
(6) The releasing authority may, in accordance with the regulations, before or after the release of
an offender,
(a) in respect of conditions referred to in subsection (2), relieve the offender from
compliance with any such condition or vary the application to the offender of any such
condition; or
(b) in respect of conditions imposed under subsection (3), (4) or (4.1), remove or vary any
such condition ....
69 Criminal Code, supra note 17 at ss. 515(4)(1) and 732. I (3)(h), respectively.
7. Regulations Respecting Corrections and the Conditional Release and Detention a/Offenders. S.O.R.l92620 [Regulations Respecting Corrections and the Conditional Release and Detention o/Offenders]at ss.
161(1)(c) and (2)(c). Section 161 states:
161. (I) For the purposes of subsection 133(2) of the Act, every offender who is released on parole
or statutory release is subject to the following conditions, namely, that the offender
(a) on release, travel directly to the offender's place of residence, as set out in the release
certificate respecting the offender, and report to the offender's parole supervisor
immediately and thereafter as instructed by the parole supervisor;
(b) remain at all times in Canada within the territorial boundaries fixed by the parole
supervisor;
(c) obey the law and keep the peace;
(d) inform the parole supervisor immediately on arrest or on being questioned by the
67

6.

police;
(e) at all times carry the release certificate and the identity card provided by the releasing

authority and produce them on request for identification to any peace officer or parole
supervisor;
(j) report to the police if and as instructed by the parole supervisor;
(g) advise the parole supervisor of the offender's address of residence on release and
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requires the offenders to "obey the law and keep the peace." Such a broad condition does
not specifically allow for non-association. Indeed, association with criminal organization
groups would not violate the law as the present criminal organization provisions exist in
the Criminal Code. However, if proscription were employed to criminalize certain
criminal organizations and membership in those organizations, then released offenders
could not associate with organized crime groups without disobeying the law, and thus,
breaching their release. In this way, the punitive measures in the criminal law could
facilitate non-association as a suppression method for organized crime offenders released
back into the community.

4.6.4 Problems with Reactive Methods of Suppression
A number of difficulties arise in relation to suppression methods, and in particular, with
respect to the imposition of non-association orders in relation to organized crime outlaws.
thereafter report immediately
(i) any change in the offender's address of residence,
(ii) any change in the offender's normal occupation, including employment,
vocational or educational training and volunteer work,
(iii) any change in the domestic or financial situation of the offender and, on
request of the parole supervisor, any change that the offender has knowledge of
in the family situation of the offender, and
(iv) any change that may reasonably be expected to affect the offender's ability
to comply with the conditions of parole or statutory release;
(h) not own, possess or have the control of any weapon, as defined in section 2 of the
Criminal Code, except as authorized by the parole supervisor; and
(I) in respect of an offender released on day parole, on completion of the day parole,
retul'll to the penitentiary fi'om which the offender was released on the date and at the time
provided for in the release certificate.
(2) For the purposes of subsection 133(2) of the Act, every offender who is released on unescorted
temporary absence is subject to the following conditions, namely, that the offender
(a) on release, travel directly to the destination set out in the absence permit respecting
the offender, report to a parole supervisor as directed by the releasing authority and
follow the release plan approved by the releasing authority;
(b) remain in Canada within the territorial boundaries fixed by the parole supervisor for
the duration of the absence;
(c) obey the law and keep the peace;
(d) inform the parole supervisor immediately on arrest or on being questioned by the
police;
(e) at all times carry the absence permit and the identity card provided by the releasing

authority and produce them on request for identification to any peace officer or parole
supervisor;
(j) report to the police if and as instmcted by the releasing authority;
(g) retul'll to the penitentiary fi'om which the offender was released on the date and at the
time provided for in the absence permit;
(h) not own, possess or have the control of any weapon, as defined in section 2 of the
Criminal Code, except as authorized by the parole supervisor. [Emphasis added].
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The first problem lies in the fact that the imposition of non-association orders via the
criminal law, particularly proscription, amount to coercive measures to limit anti-social
behaviour and create pro-social behaviour in organized crime outlaws. If sociological
and criminological theories regarding differential association and social learning in the
context of subcultures were to discuss anti-organized crime laws and proscription, they
might not advocate coercion so much as coaxing and convincing in order to effect
behavioural changes - or, perhaps coercion in conjunction with coaxing and convincing.
Generally, empirical evidence from the United States shows that communities most
frequently employed suppression as a means to combat gangs although it is the least
effective strategy.71 Thus, the law alone may not coerce organized crime outlaws into
behaving in pro-social ways and abandoning criminal subcultures, and coercion itself may
not be the whole answer. Consequently, suppression or coercion via court orders of nonassociation in one form or another, must be accompanied by or blended with community
education and support, as well as pro-active socialization programs.

Second, methods of suppression imposed by the criminal justice system, such as COUlt
ordered non-association conditions or conditions that limit association, are usually and
largely reactive in nature. That is to say, the accused outlaw must face criminal charges
prior to any orders being imposed. Thus, individuals who are at risk or beginning to
associate with organized crime groups cannot be subject to non-association orders using
criminal law provisions, unless reasonable grounds exist that the individual will commit a
criminal organization offence. In that case, a provincial court judge hearing the
application for preventative judicial restraint may order that individual to enter into a
recognizance, and impose "reasonable conditions" to prevent the commission of such
offence. The criminal law allows some conditions of non-association proactively - that is
to say, in preventative judicial restraint orders, such as when alleged sex offenders must
have no contact with persons under a certain age. Such conditions may also occur in
relation to individuals who pose a risk of committing a criminal organization offence.

Kimberly Tobin, Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2008) at 150. Tobin cites research within the Spergel model according to Irving Spergel and G. David
Cuny, "The National Youth Gang SUt'vey: A Research and Development Process" in Arnold P. Goldstein
and C. Ronald Huff, eds., Gang Intervention Handbook (Champaign: Research Press, 1993).
71
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Third, non-association orders that accompany judicial interim release orders are not
commonly made when a court detains an accused. However, the Criminal Code allows
for no contact orders with "other persons" deemed necessary by the superior court judge
upon detention of the accused for certain offences, such as murder.

72

Such provisions

could be used to prevent association during pre-trial and pre-sentence custody for coaccused who are allegedly members of a criminal organization provided that they had
72 Criminal Code, supra note 17 at ss. 516(1) and (2), 522(1)-(2.1) and 469. Section 522(1), (2) and (2.1)
allow the superior cOUli justice to order the detained accused to not communicate with "other persons":
522. (I) Where an accused is charged with an offence listed in section 469, no court, judge or
justice, other than a judge of or a judge presiding in a superior court of criminal jurisdiction for the
province in which the accused is so charged, may release the accused before or after the accused
has been ordered to stand trial.
(2) Where an accused is charged with an offence listed in section 469, ajudge of or ajudge
presiding in a superior court of criminal jurisdiction for the province in which the accused is
charged shall order that the accused be detained in custody unless the accused, having been given a
reasonable opportuniiy to do so, shows cause why his detention in custody is not justified within
the meaning of subsection 515(10).
(2.1) A judge referred to in subsection (2) who orders that an accused be detained in custody under
this section may include in the order a direction that the accused abstain from communicating,
directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order except in
accordance with such conditions specified in the order as the judge considers necessary.
Section 516( I) and (2) enable the court to make such orders when remanding the accused prior to a bail
hearing:
516 (1). A justice may, before or at any time during the course of any proceedings under section
515, on application by the prosecutor or the accused, adjourn the proceedings and remand the
accused to custody in prison by warrant in Form 19, but no adjournment shall be for more than
three clear days except with the consent of the accused.
(2) A justice who remands an accused to custody under subsection (1) or subsection 515(11) may
order that the accused abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness
or other person identified in the order, except in accordance with any conditions specified in the
order that the justice considers necessary.
Section 469 sets forth the offences for which orders under sections 516 and 522 can be made:
469. Every court of criminal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to tIy an indictable offence other than
(a) an offence under any of the following sections:
(i) section 47 (treason),
(ii) section 49 (alarming Her Majesty),
(iii) section 51 (intimidating Parliament or a legislature),
(iv) section 53 (inciting to mutiny),
(v) section 61 (seditious offences),
(vi) section 74 (piracy),
(vii) section 75 (piratical acts), or
(viii) section 235 (murder);
(b) the offence of being an accessory after the fact to high treason or treason or murder;
(c) an offence under section 119 (bribelY) by the holder ofajudicial office;
(c. 1) an offence under any of sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act;
(d) the offence of attempting to commit any offence mentioned in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (vii);
or
(e) the offence of conspiring to commit any offence mentioned in paragraph (a).
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commit these enunciated offences. FU11her, creative uses of pre-existing criminal law
provisions may succeed in effecting non-association orders for organized crime outlaws
without expressly intending to do so. Some courts have imposed conditions of bail that
prohibit accused individuals from communicating or associating directly or indirectly
with any persons known to the accused to have a criminal record except for members of
his immediate family or in relation to his employment. 73 The fact that criminal justice
principles require no contact or no association in circumstances to protect victims,
witnesses, and the administration of justice, suggests that non-association provisions
ought to exist in relation to individuals prosecuted for offences that are based on or
related to the power of a group itself. But for the power of the group, the offence would
not have occurred, and would not continue to occur. However, again, these criminal law
options remain reactive.

Fourth, while non-association orders in relation to organized crime prosecutions may
occur in relation to judicial interim release, such orders would likely not occur in relation
to post-sentence orders, since most sentences will involve terms of imprisonment of more
than two years. Thus, a sentencing cou11 could not order accompanying conditions to
attach to a federal sentence, such as could attach to a provincial sentence in a probation
order. Further, the only applicable power in the Regulations Respecting Corrections and

the Conditional Release and Detention of Offenders is to order conditions for offenders to
"obey the law and keep the peace", and this provision is likely too broad to specifically
contemplate non-association conditions. 74

R. v. Croi/oru, [2005] OJ. No. 6404 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 327-28. For instance, the Com1 made the
following order in relation to one accused, and such order mirrored those for a second co-accused:
327 First of all, I will deal with Mr. Gravelle. The conditions of his release are as follows:
(1) A recognizance be entered into in the amount of$2,000,000 without deposit with five
sureties .. ,
(6) He shall not communicate or associate directly or indirectly with any persons known to him
to have a criminal record except for members of his immediate family or in relation to his
employment.
(7) He shall not communicate or associate directly or indirectly with the following persons:
... Ion Croitorll ....
In R. v. Croitoru, ibid at para. 39, the accused were not charged with criminal organization offences, but
the Crown alleged that they comprised part of a family criminal organization.
14 Regulations Respecting Corrections and the Conditional Release and Detention a/Offenders, supra note
70 at ss. 16I(1)(c) and 2(c).
73
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Fifth, and likely most significantly, non-association orders may violate section 2(d) of the

Charter if they order no association or contact with a non-proscribed group, or with
members of a proscribed group if those members are not co-accused themselves in which
case non-association would often and even ordinarily occur. Such non-association orders
are precisely what Parliament meant to avoid in passing the criminal organization
legislation. It did not mean to ban association in or with a celiain group. However, if
detention can occur where necessary to effect public safety, such as by a detention order
in order to protect the administration ofjustice75 made in part because of association with
an alleged criminal organization,16 then proscription and non-association ought to be
implemented.

Sixth, non-association orders via the criminal law alone have questionable preventative
value without a replacement of positive social associations and pro-social learning in a
cultural rather than subcultural environment. Coercive suppression without reintegrative
efforts will not likely reduce the ties that bind organized crime outlaws to their identity
and to their group.

4.6.5

Evaluations and Recommendations

Bans on association with organized crime outlaws, such as via court ordered conditions of
non-association, are reactive. This method of suppression reacts to problems that have
already occurred - problems that have given rise to the formation of an organized crime
outlaw. Further, non-association still leaves the organized crime member or association
susceptible to anti-social interactions and outlaw norms and behaviours. As discussed
earlier in Chapter Three at section six "Deviance and Labelling Theory", in R. v. Myles,77
the Ontario Court of Justice noted at a bail hearing of an accused who had allegedly
resigned from the Hells Angels, that even resignation from a criminal organization may
not prevent or limit association. 78 Thus, bans on association alone cannot remedy the

R. v. Skeal'd, 2002 NSSC, [2002] N.SJ. No. 480 (Q.L.).
Ibid. at paras. 15-22.
77 [2007] OJ. No. 4985 (Q.L.) (Ont. S.CJ.) [R. v. Myles].
78 Ibid. at para. 19. This case is discussed in Chapter Three, section six "Deviance and Labelling Theory" in
subsection three "Application of Concepts within Deviance and Labelling TheOlY to the Identity of
Outlaws" at subsubsection two "Evidence of Deviance and Labelling in Relation to Gangs"

75

76
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circumstances of the organized crime outlaw and cannot secure his rehabilitation in and
reintegration into society. As a result, bans on association in non-association orders,
without more, cannot protect the public in the long-term.
Suppression of organized crime through non-association orders as allowed by provision
in the Criminal Code may limit and prevent differential association and anti-social
learning within the subcultures of outlaws. However, these orders should not be imposed
without the implementation of other policies that educate the community, that enlist
community support for pro-social interactions with organized crime outlaws, and that
provide programs of rehabilitation and reintegration for organized crime outlaws.
Court that impose any condition of non-association should have found beyond a
reasonable doubt, based on evidence tendered at trial or at a sentencing hearing, that a
group with whom an offender should not associate is a "criminal organization" as defined
in the Criminal Code; and that court should have determined, based on an evidentiary
foundation but not necessarily beyond a reasonable doubt, that the association of the
offender with the "criminal organization" will not facilitate the reintegration into or
rehabilitation of the offender in society, and will not protect the public. Similarly, COutts
that impose non-association conditions in bail orders should be satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that the accused is a member in a "criminal organization" and has commit
offences in connection with that "criminal organization." Without a proper evidentiary
foundation, non-association orders will not reduce the internal cohesion and power of a
group that has been "properly labelled" or "properly adjudicated" as a criminal
organization. That is to say, these orders will not have targeted the correct individuals or
groups, and will risk casting the social control net too broadly at significant sacrifice to
individual rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the Charter.
Based on the analysis of Requisite Five and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations:
Recommetldation Thirteetl: Courts should impose non-association orders in bail orders
where the prosecution has proven and the court has found on a balance ofprobabilities
that the accused persons are members of a "criminal organization " charges as defined in
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the Criminal Code, and that they committed their offences in connection with this
"criminal organization. "
Recon/mendation FOllrteen: Courts should impose non-association orders in sentences
where the prosecution has proven and the court has found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused persons are 01' were members of a "criminal organization" charges as
defined in the Criminal Code, and that they committed their offences in connection with
this "criminal organization. "
Recommendation Fifteen: Where courts order non-association orders, community
support and resources ought to be provided to organized crime outlaws in order to
facilitate pro-social interactions conventional societal members and institutions.

342

4.7

REQUISITE SIX FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES

Requisite Six
Rooted in Differential Association alld Social Learning in Subculiures, and Social
Psychology:
Anti-organized crime measures must prevent and limit the bolstering of organized
crime identities through the use of gang names and insignia in public and in private in
order to decrease their internal cohesion and the power of their reputation. For
instance, such measures must diminish or ban the display of names and symbols
associated with negative or violent identities of organized crime outlaws.

4.7.1

Overview

There are a number oflegal and non-legal ways to implement anti-organized crime measures
that will give effect to Requisite Six. This section will review proceeds of crime and
forfeiture legislation, also known as anti-money laundering and asset recovery regimes, and
the employment of civil forfeiture legislation in relation to criminal organizations. Both
measures seek to reduce the power and proliferation of organized criminals through the
seizure of the symbols which empower their violent reputation and which embolden their
identity as fearsome outlaws in society. This section will also evaluate statutorily mandated
community safety programs implemented by some Canadian provinces in an effort to prevent
organized crime outlaw members from wearing their patches, outlaw insignia, or outlaw
colours in celiain public places. In addition, this section will evaluate trade-mark and
copyright laws as they presently exist, and as they could be amended, that could prevent and
limit the bolstering of organized crime identities; decrease internal cohesion within organized
crime groups; and reduce the power of their reputations. At the outset, this section will
discuss the significance and power of the names and insignia of organized crime outlaw
groups.

4,7,2

The Power of "the Patch" or of Organized Crime Outlaw

Names and Insignia
The "power of the patch" refers to the power of the reputation of an organized crime outlaw
group. This power enables such a group to effect its purposes through intimidation and
violence. The "patch" refers to the names and emblems that adorn clothing and accessories
worn by organized crime outlaw group members, and to a more limited degree, worn by their
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associates. Most outlaw motorcycle gangs wear patches. However, not all organized crime
outlaw groups wear patches or clothing with group insignia. Some groups, such as the
Japanese Yamaguchi-gumi, use lapel pins and have business cards. t Others, such as the
Asian crime group the Born to Kill, had the initials of their group ("BTK") tattooed on the
webbed skin between their thumb and forefinger? Other gangs wore insignia on jewelry,
such as the Rock Machine outlaw motorcycle gang that wore a gold ring with an engraved
head of an eagle,3 and the Dark Circle hit squad that wore necklaces with a pendant of a palm
tree and island. 4 The Rock Machine used sweaters and rings to signify membership, and only
used patches after the group had patched over to the Bandidos. 5 Some newer organized crime
groups do not use a particular name or insignia. 6 However, for those groups that do use
names and insignia, the group's name and insignia or "patch" becomes synonymous with the
organized crime outlaw group and its reputation.
Organized crime outlaw group names and insignia are so important that some groups have
registered their insignia and names in order to protect their reputation. 7 As described in
subsection four "The Power of the Patch: Symbolization of the Reputation for Violence and
Intimidation" in section four "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs" in Chapter Two, organized crime
outlaw groups usually limit the use and display of their insignia and names to members only.
Members share the values and norms of the organized crime group, and enJlance the
reputation of the group by committing acts of violence and intimidation. Non-members who
use group insignia and names will dilute the reputation of the group because they do not
behave in accordance with the values and norms of the group - that is to say, they will not
Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 8th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsw0l1h, 2007) [Organized Crime] at
195.
'Stephen Schneider, Iced: The StOlY a/Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons
Canada, 2009) [Iced: The StOlY a/Organized Crime in Canada] at 477.
, Ibid at 409.
, Ibid at 413. According to Schneider, ibid. at 4 J 0, the Alliance was comprised of the Rock Machine,
independent drug gangs, and bar owners who collectively sOllght to battle against the Hells Angels in order to
rrotect and claim drug trafficking territOlY.
. ,
R. v. Leclerc, [2001] R.J.Q. 747, [200lJ Q.J. No. 426 (Q.L.) (Que. CI. (Crlm. and Pen. Dlv.)) at para. 49.
6 Canada, HOllse of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, The Stale a/Organized
Crime, 41" ParI., 1'1 sess. (March 2012) [The Siale a/Organized Crime] at 10.
, The Hells Angels Motorcycle Club has registered its trade-marks: R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLlI 24240,
[2005] O.J. No. 2870 (Onl. S.C.J.) [R.I'. Lindsay trial decision] at paras. 235-37 and 263-72. The
Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club has registered its trade-marks, as per Rivera 1'. Carler, (31 July 2009)
Central District of California Case No. 2:09-cv-02435-FMC-VBK (C.D. Cal.) [Rivera v. Carler] at 2.
1
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uphold the fearsome reputation. Some groups have launched lawsuits to prevent trade-mark
violation,8 or threatened legal action to do SO.9
For these reasons, organized crime outlaw groups often have very strict rules regarding who
can use and wear their names and insignia. For instance, the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club
Corporation in Oakland, California owns the "colours" ofthe Club, and has rules and policies
regarding their use. IO Each Hells Angels chapter in Canada must sign a licensing agreement
with the Corporation, permitting its members to use the trademarks by wearing them and
displaying them, and members must sign documentation acknowledging ownership of the
"colours" by the Club." The presence of rules that circumscribe the use and return of group
names and insignia, demonstrates that organized crime groups are fully cognizant of the
power of these names and insignia. These groups seek to protect their reputation from
interference not only from civilians, but also from law enforcement officials. Staff-Sergeant
Lemieux, as he was then, opined that the registration of trade-marks by the Hells Angels
began in order to prevent police agencies from retaining seized colours. '2
The seemingly paranoid, extreme, or at the very least, over-cautious, efforts of the Hells
Angels to protect their insignia from law enforcement are anything but, and foreshadow
recent attempts by law enforcement and governmental agencies to reduce the power of
. organized crime outlaw groups through the seizure and forfeiture of their insignia. In Rivera

• Peler Edwards, "Hells Angels seek to protect skull logo" (21 February 2009) Galdiran Wordpress online:
Go Idiron. wordpress.com <http://goldiron.wordpress.comi2009/02/21Ihells-angels-seek-to-protect-skull-logo!>
["Hells Angels seek to protect skull logo"]; and Rachel Mendleson, "Hells Angels get revved up over their
trademarks" Maclean's (26 February 2009) online: Macleans.ca <http://www2.macJeans.cal2009/02/26Ihellsangels-get-revved-up-over-their-trademarks!> ["Hells Angels get revved up over their trademarks"].
, John Freeman, "]CFD Cover of the Week - 17'h Feb 08" (18 February 2008), online: It Came From
Darkmoor. .. A Blog Dedicated to the British Corner oflhe Marvel Comics Universe
<htlps:llwww.bIogger.comicomment.g?bloglD=55 J094 J869814453320&postlD=89345152381 066736
I> ["ICFD Cover of the Week - 17'h Feb 08"].
.
,. R. v. Lindsay trial decision, supra note 7 at para. 269.
" Ibid at para. 237. These rules are described further in subsection four "The Power ofthe Patch:
Symbolization of the Reputation for Violence and Intimidation" in section four "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs" in
Chapter Two.
12 Ibid Law enforcement would not be able to use these trade-marks without violating the Trade-marks Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-I3, and cannot retain seized property indefinitely that belongs to a registered owner according
to section 490.4 ofthe Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] unless it a court has found it to be
proceeds of crime and ordered its forfeiture to the Crown pursuant to section 462.37 of the Criminal Code.
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v. Carter, 13 the Government in California applied to the United States District Court in order
to obtain a post-indictment Order Restraining Sale or Transfer of Trademark, and amendment
thereto, in relation to two registered marks of the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc. 14
Some members of the Mongols Club had been charged with having violated the RacketJnfluenced and Corrupt Organizations ll Act as well as other criminal statutes. 16 However, an
unindicted member of the Mongols Club successfully applied for a preliminary injunction
preventing law enforcement from seizing items bearing or displaying the trademark from
individuals who were not charged in the indictment. 17 The District Court held that the RICO
statute did not empower the State to obtain the forfeiture of a collective membership mark
used by a group - the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc.,18 and alternatively, no statutory
authority existed for the State to seize property bearing the mark from third parties. 19 A
federal judge upheld this decision. 2o
This decision of United States District COUli Judge Cooper in Rivera v. Carter outlines some
of the protections afforded to gang insignia within American trade-mark law:
A collective membership mark is used by members of a cooperative, an
association, or other collective organization to indicate membership in that
organization. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A collective mark is a subspecies of trademark, and
when registered, is entitled to the same protections afforded a trademark. 15 U.S.C. §
1054. It is well recognized that an entity earns an exclusive right to a trademark only
if the entity uses the mark in connection with its organization or product. .. . Any
plllpor!ed ownership ofa mark lVi/holl! a corresponding lise ofthe mark in its
intended manner is !herefore invalid as a matter of law.
Even ifthe Court were to accept the Government's evidence that Ruben
Cavazos controlled the use of the mark during his tenure as National President, there
is no support for the notion that a defendant's control of property belonging to a
13

Rivera v Car'e/~ supra note 7.

Ibid. at 2-3. This decision was upheld according to Kate Mather, "Federal Judge Rejects Bid to Seize
Mongols' Name and Logo", Los Angeles Times (0 I July 2011) online: Los Angeles Times
<http://articles.latimes.com/20 II/juliO IIlocal/la-me-mongols-logo-20 11 070 I> ["Federal Judge Rejects Bid to
Seize Mongols' Name and Logo"]. Mather set fOl1h the reasons for this attempt by the prosecution:
Prosecutors asked the judge to bar Mongol members from using, distributing or wearing the name and
logo, arguing that they were very closely associated with the gang and that removing them would
prevent the Mongols /Tom operating.
" Racketeer-/Jifluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970), and amendments thereto
[RICO].
16 Rivera v. Carter, supra note 7 at 3 and 10-11.
17 Ibid. at 3 and 23-25.
Ibid. at 11-14.
19 Ibid. at 15.
20 "Federal Judge Rejects Bid to Seize Mongols' Name and Logo", supra note 14.
14
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RlCO enterprise is sufficient to establish a forfeitable ownership interest in the
property. . .. Moreover, the Government's evidence demonstrates that the Mongol
Nation began using the collective mark in approximately 1969, and either Mongol
Nation or Mongols Nation, Inc. continues to use the mark to identify their members.
(Guevara Decl. ~ 6.) The Mongol Nation and Mongols Nation, Inc, by virtue of
having used the collective membership since 1969, having registered the mark in
2005, and having continued use of the mark to identifY members of the club, have
acquired and maintained exclusive ownership in the collective membership mark at
issue. 21 [Emphasis added].

The assertions in Rivera v. CarieI' exemplifY some of the legal impediments that confront law
enforcement and government in their attempts to combat organized crime outlaw groups that
use their reputation, that is to say, the power of their patch, to effect criminal enterprises.
Law enforcement and government cannot seize collective membership marks, which are a
"subspecies of trademarks", when a cooperative, association or collective organization uses
that mark, even though one of the members ofthat group engages in criminal activity in
connection with,

01'

allegedly in connection with, that mark. Essentially, there is power in

numbers. Collective use and collective interest in a mark afford it protection under the law.
A further legal impediment exists in relation to proof of usage. Based on the remarks of the
District Court in Rivera v. Carter, proof must exist that use of the mark did not cOl1'espond to
its intended usage, so that a court can find that the trade-mark protection is legally invalid,
and thus, can order that the items bearing or displaying the trade-mark be forfeited to the
government. If trade-mark laws required that owners of a mark demonstrate that their actual
usage did indeed correspond to the intended or declared usage of a mark, and not usage of the
mark in criminal-related activities, then collective membership marks such as those of the
Mongols and similar groups would not receive legal protection, and courts such as the United
State District Court in Rivera v. Carter would not be prevented from ordering forfeiture.

As this section will reveal, the use of proceeds of crime legislation, and amendments to trademark law as well as copyright law, could allow the government to control, and law
enforcement to use, organized crime outlaw group names and insignia that were used in
connection with criminal activities. Such control and use by non-members of organized
crime outlaw groups would diminish the power of the patch, and the reputation of the groups

21

Riverav. CarieI', supra note 7 at 11-14.
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would significantly change, and potentially be mined. With little or no reputation for
intimidation and violence, these groups would have much less power to engage in criminal
activities. In this way, the power of the patch is at the heart of some of the problems
associated with organized crime outlaws in Canada.

4.7.3

Using Proceeds of Crime Legislation to Pierce the Power of the

Patch
Proceeds of crime and forfeiture legislation, also known as anti-money laundering and asset
recovery regimes, seek to ensure that criminals generally do not benefit financially fi'om their
criminal activities by empowering COUlts to order that property that is proceeds of crime be
forfeited to the Crown. Thus, these provisions can negatively affect the economic means of
organized crime outlaws and the groups to which they belong. These laws not only can
pierce the power of the pocketbooks of organized crime groups, but they can also pierce the
power of the patch - through the seizure of property that symbolizes the violent reputation of
an organized crime group and that emboldens their identity as fearsome outlaws in society.
However, these proceeds of crime and forfeiture provisions will have no impact on organized
crime outlaws ifthey are not enforced or if they are not enforceable.
Proceeds of crime and forfeiture legislation exemplifY. pre-existing criminal law measures
and "Business as Usual" approaches because, for the most part, they preceded the
implementation of organized crime legislation. However, some gove1'llments that implement
anti-organized crime measures, also augment proceeds of crime legislation in order to bolster
the forfeiture and disposal of propetty specifically associated with organized crime. For
instance, the United Kingdom amended the Proceeds o/Crime Act 200222 in the Seriolls
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and extensively circumscribed the use of proceeds of

. by empowermg
. courts to make confitScatlOn
. orders; 23"1
. orders; 24 and
crtme
CtVt f1reezmg
extended orders for detention of seized cash?S This legislation also increased regulations

(U.K.), 2002, c. 29.
Serious Organised Crime alld Police Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c. 15, and amendments thereto, at s. 97.
24 [bid. at s. 98.
" [bid. ats. 100.
22
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regarding money laundering.

26

These financial measures had an effect on individual

criminals and organized crime groups.27 Proceeds of crime provisions that specifically target
organized crime groups may make membership in such groups less appealing - why would
an individual belong to a targeted organized crime outlaw group if the proceeds of his crimes
were more at risk of being forfeited? The answer depends on the enforcement and
enforceability of the provisions themselves.

Like the United Kingdom, the United States also uses proceeds of crime legislation to reduce
the power of organized criminals. RICO criminalizes the use of funds acquired from
racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in any " enterprise" which, like other telms in
Ihe Act, remains very broad?8 In addition, effolls at forfeiture pursuant to violations of RICO
have taken place.

29

As noted in the above section, the Government in California applied-

unsuccessfully - to the United States District Court in Rivera v. Carter 30 to obtain a post·
indictment Order Restraining Sale or Transfer of Trademark, and amendment thereto, in
relation to two registered marks of the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc.31 This decision
was upheld by a federal cOUlljudge. 32

In Italy, legal efforts to curb money laundering activities began in 1978 when section 648 of
the Italian Penal Code 33 criminalized profits obtained from aggravated robbery, aggravated
extOllion, and kidnapping for extortion. 34 In 1990, these laws were extended to include
money obtained from the production and sale of drugs, and in199J, fmlher measures were
introduced in an effort to regulate transfers of money through approved mediators or finance
Ibid. at ss. 102·07.
Peter A. Sproat, "To What Extent is the UK's Anli·Money Laundering and Asset Recover Regime Used
Against Organised Crime?" (2009) 12 Journal of Money Laundering Control 134 ["To What Extent is the UK's
Anti·Money Laundering and Asset Recover Regime Used Against Organised Crime?"] at 146.
28 RICO, supra note 15 at §1962(a)·(d). Subsection § I 961(4) states:
"enterprise" includes any individual, pal1nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associaled in fact although not a legal enlity ....
" Ibid. at § I 963.
26

27

30

Rivera v. CarIeI', supra note 7.

" Ibid. at 2·3.
""Federal Judge Rejects Bid to Seize Mongols' Name and Logo", ;upra note 14.
)) The lIalian Penal Code, trans. by Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlin (Littleton: Fred B. Rothman & Co.,
(978).
" Umberto Santino, "Law Enforcement in Italy and Europe Against Mafia and Organized Crime" Centro
Siciliano di Documentazione Giuseppe Impastato (2003) online: Centroimpastato
<http://www.centroimpastato.itlotherlang!mcdonald.php3> at Section 1.1.
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companies. 35 In addition, in 1993, the definition of money laundering was expanded to
include profits from not only aggravated robbery, aggravated extOllion, kidnapping for
extOllion, and drug dealing, but any reinvestment of profit from any type of crime. 36
Canada has followed the lead of these countries. As early as 1992, an integrated proceeds of
crime unit was established and evolved into the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Initiative or
IPOC which is comprised of various federal agencies, and which " ... contributes to the
dislUption, dismantling and incapacitation of organized criminals and crime groups by
targeting their illicit proceeds and assets.,,37 In 2005, the Canadian government amended the
proceeds of crime 38 and forfeiture order39 legislation in the Criminal Code to specifically
" Ibid
36 Ibid.

"Public Safety Canada, "2010-2011 Evaluation of the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Initiative: Final Repolt"
(20 I I) online: Public Safety Canada <http://www.publicsafety.gc.calabtldpr/evallipoc-20 II-eng.aspx> ["20 I02011 Evaluation of the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Initiative: Final Report"] at 1. In 1992 the Integrated
Anti-Drug Profiteering initiative was created, and in 1996 to 1997 13 IPOC units were created across Canada.
IPOC brings together the Canada Border Services Agency, the Canada Revenue Agency, the Public Prosecution
Service of Canada, Public Safety Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada Forensic Accounting
Management Group, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. While this recent evaluation finds, ibid at 59,
that IPOC " ... has had an impact on organized crime and crime groups." Unfortunately, it does not distinguish
between efforts and successes in seizing proceeds of crime using pre-existing Criminal Code legislation and
using criminal organization provisions that specifically target organized crime.
38 Criminal Code, slipra note 12 at s. 462.37. Section 462.37(1) to (2.05) state:
462.37 (I) Subject to this section and sections 462.39 to 462.41, where an offender is convicted, or
discharged under section 730, of a designated offence and the court imposing sentence on the offender,
on application of the Attorney General, is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that any property is
proceeds of crime and that the designated offence was committed in relation to that propelty, the court
shall order that the propelty be forfeited to Her Majesty to be disposed of as the Attorney General
directs or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the law.
(2) Where the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court that the designated offence of
which the offender is convicted, or discharged under section 730, was committed in relation to property
in respect of which an order of forfeiture would otherwise be made under subsection (I) but the court is
satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that that property is proceeds of crime, the COUlt may make an
order of forfeiture under subsection (I) in relation to that property.
(2.0 I) A court imposing sentence on an offender convicted of an offence described in subsection (2.02)
shall, on application of the Attorney General and subject to this section and sections 462.4 and 462.41,
order that any property of the offender that is identified by the Attorney General in the application be
forfeited to Her Majesty to be disposed of as the Attorney General dil'ects 01' otherwise dealt with in
accordance with the law if the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that
(a) within 10 years before the proceedings were commenced in respect of the offence for
which the offender is being sentenced, the offender engaged in a pattern of criminal activity
for the purpose of directly or indirectly receiving a material benefit, including a financial
benefit; or
(b) the income of the offender from sources unrelated to designated offences cannot
reasonably account for the value of all the propelty of the offender.
(2.02) The offences are the following:
(a) a criminal organization offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment; and
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target organized crime groups. The proceeds of crime provisions enable sentencing comts,
on application by the Attorney General, to order forfeiture of property declared to be
proceeds of crime in certain circumstances and in relation to certain offences. For instance, a
sentencing court that finds on a balance of probabilities that property is proceeds of crime and
that a designated offence was committed in relation to that property, may order it be forfeited
to Her Majesty The Queen. 40 A court may also order forfeiture even if it does not find a
connection between the designated offence and the property, but the comt must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is proceeds of crime. 41 Where a court is
sentencing an offender for a criminal organization offence punishable by imprisonment for
five years or more,42 the comt may order fOlfeiture if within the previous ten years the
offender engaged in " ... a pattern of criminal activity for the purpose of directly or indirectly
(b) an offence under section 5, 6 or 7 ofthe Controlled Drugs and Substances Act - or a
conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation to, or any
counselling in relation to an offence under those sections - prosecuted by indictment.
(2.03) A COUlt shall not make an order of forfeiture under subsection (2.0 I) in respect of any property
that the offender establishes, on a balance of probabilities, is not proceeds of crime.
(2.04) In determining whether the offender has engaged in a pattern of criminal activity described in
paragraph (2.01)(a), the court shall consider
(a) the circumstances of the offence for which the offender is being sentenced;
(b) any act or omission - other than an act or omission that constitutes the offence for which
the offender is being sentenced - that the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, was
committed by the offender and constitutes an offence punishable by indictment under any Act
of Parliament;
(c) any act or omission that the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, was committed
by the offender and is an offence in the place where it was committed and, if committed in
Canada, would constitute an offence punishable by indictment under any Act of Parliament;
and
(d) any other factor that the court considers relevant.
(2.05) A court shall not determine that an offender has engaged in a pattern of criminal activity unless
the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the offender committed, within the period
referred to in paragraph (2.01)(a),
(a) acts or omissions - other than an act or omission that constitutes the offence fOI' which the
offender is being sentenced - that constitute at least two serious offences or one criminal
organization offence;
(b) acts or omissions that are offences in the place where they were committed and, if
committed in Canada, would constitute at least two serious offences or one criminal
organization offence; or
(c) an act or omission described in paragraph (a) that constitutes a serious offence and an act
or omission described in paragraph (b) that, if committed in Canada, would constitute a
serious offence.
). Ibid. at s. 490.
,0 Ibid. at s. 462.37(1).
" [bid. at s. 462.37(2). Note that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights recommended in their
report on organized crime that the Criminal Code be amended in order to allow the ownership of proceeds of
crime to be proven on a balance of probabilities for organized crime offences: The Slale a/Organized Crime,
supra note 6 at 37.
" Criminal Code. supra note 12 at s. 462.37(2.02)(a).
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receiving a material benefit, including a financial benefit.,," or the income of the offender
cannot account for the value of the property of the offender,43

Like some of the other criminal organization provisions in the Criminal Code, the proceeds
of crime provisions contain specific penalties for specific types of offenders - that is to say,
for organized crime offenders who have commit criminal organization offences punishable
by imprisomnent for five years or more, The provisions specifY further penalties for
organized crime offenders who have engaged in a "pattern of activity," Thus, these proceeds
of crime provisions specifically target organized crime offenders and treat them as status
offenders to some degree,

Another problem with proceeds of crime legislation that specifically targets criminal
organization offenders, is that the sections depend on the criminal organization provisions in
the Criminal Code for their success, Ifthe prosecution does not proceed with criminal
organization charges, then these sections do not apply, A sentencing couti would have to
find based on evidence at trial, that criminal organization offences had been proved,
However, the "ordinary" or pre-existing proceeds of crime provisions - that is to say, those
that do not specifically target criminal organizations - allow for the seizure and forfeiture of
offence-related propeliy and have been and can be used for organized crime offenders who
commit "ordinary" or pre-existing Criminal Code offences,44

In spite of these difficulties, proceeds of crime and forfeiture measures can reduce the power
and proliferation of organized crime groups by seizing their property, such as clubhouses and
their contents, that are the products of organized crime outlawry and that display the insignia
of the group, Indeed, proceeds of crime legislation facilitated the 1997 raids of Rock
Machine clubhouses and properties in Montreal and Quebec and seizure of various propeliy
items as proceeds of crime,45 Specific proceeds of crime and forfeiture provisions that target
organized crime outlaws are not required, and likely over-complicate evidentiary
requirements to obtain such orders, Pre-existing proceeds of crime legislation can be used to

44

Ibid. at s, 462.37(2,01),
Ibid, at s, 462.37(1) and (2),

45

Iced: The Story a/Organized Crime in Canada, supra note 2 at 415,

43

352

make membership in organized crime groups less appealing simply if such legislation is used,
and if it results in forfeiture. Legislation that specifically target organized crime groups will
not pierce the power of the patch nor the economic power of the group ifits provisions are
too complicated and unfair. It will not be used and will not result in forfeiture.

Using Civil Forfeiture and Civil Proceedings To Pierce the

4.7.4

Power of the Patch
Like proceeds of crime proceedings, the use of trade-mark laws and community safety
programs, the employment of civil forfeiture legislation in relation to criminal organizations
exemplifies the use of an "ordinary" or pre-existing measure that could reduce the power of
organized crime groups through the seizure of their property which signifies their violent
reputations and which emboldens their identities as fearsome outlaws in society. Civil
forfeiture is also a non-criminal law measure. It is a measure that law enforcement and
prosecutorial services in the United States and Canada have used to target criminal
organizations.
The American approach to seizure and control of organized crime property and assets seems
to provide greater facilitation in civil proceedings than does Canadian legislation. RICO
makes specific provision for commencing civil actions in any district court of the United
States in relation to racketeering activities,46 and empowers the Attorney General with civil
investigative demand powers in o'rder to obtain information and documentation relating to
racketeering investigations. 47
In Canada, legislation also exists within some provinces to seize property of criminal
organizations, but remains less potent than the powers ofthe Attorney General in the United
States. The province of Ontario has passed specific legislation to combat organized crime
propelty, as set forth in the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 48 and the Regulations of the Remedies
for Organized Crime and Other Unlawflll Activities Act, 2001.

'6 RfCO, supra

49

The Ontario legislation

note 6 at § 1965.

" Ibid. at § 1968.
"S.O. 2001, c. 28 [Civil Remedies Act, 2001].
" O. Reg. 91102 and O. Reg. 498/06.
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seeks to provide civil remedies for individuals who suffer pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses
due to the unlawful activities of others; to prevent those committing unlawful activities from
keeping unlawfully obtained property; to prevent the use of celiain property from being used
in unlawful activities; and to prevent injury to the public as a result of conspiracies to engage
in unlawful activities. 50 The Act defines "unlawful activity" very broadly. 51 On application
by the Attomey General, a cOUli must order forfeiture of property that is "proceeds of
unlawful activity" unless it would "clearly not be in the interests of justice" to do SO.52
Similarly, if a court finds, on application by the Attorney General, that property is an
"instrument of unlawful activity",53 then the court must order forfeiture to the Ontario Crown
unless it would "clearly not be in the interests of justice" to do SO.54 These instruments
include property that was used to engage in unlawful activity that resulted in serious bodily
harm to another person or that resulted in the acquisition of other propelty.55 This definition
could arguably include gang insignia that is used in extOliions.
Similarly, the province of British Columbia enacted the Civil FO/jeiture ACl 56 which
empowers the director of civil forfeiture to apply to a court for an order of forfeiture of
property, in whole or in part, that is "proceeds of unlawful activity."S7 The term "unlawful

,. Civil Remedies Act, 2001, supra note 48 at s. I(a)·(d).
Ibid. at s. 2. "Unlawful activity" is defined as:
"unlawful activity" means an act or omission that,
(a) is an offence under an Act of Canada, Ontario or another province or territory ofCanada,
or
(b) is an offence under an Act of a jurisdiction outside Canada, if a similar act or omission
would be an offence under an Act of Canada or Ontario if it were committed in Ontario,
whether the act or omission occurred before or after this Part came into force.
12 Ibid. at s. 3(1).
.
13 Ibid. at s. 7( I). "Instrument of unlawful activity" is defined as:
"instrument of unlawful activity" means property that is likely to be used to engage in unlawful activity
that, in turn, would be likely to or is intended to result in the acquisition of other propel1y or in serious
bodily harm to any person, and includes any property that is realized from the sale or other disposition
of such property; ....
" Ibid. at s. 8(1).
lS Ibid. at s. 7(2). Section 7(2) states:
(2) For the purpose ofthe definition of "instrument of unlawful activity" in subsection (I), proof that
property was used to engage in unlawful activity that, in turn, resulted in the acquisition of other
property or in serious bodily harm to any person is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that the property is likely to be used to engage in unlawful activity that, in tum, would be likely to
result in the acquisition of other property or in serious bodily harm to any person.
" S.B.C. 2005, c. 29 [Civil FOIieilllres Act ofBC].
51 Ibid. at s. 3.
II
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activity" is defined very broadly, and extends beyond criminal activities. 58 The court must
order forfeiture to the government if the property is proceeds of unlawful activity or an
instrument of unlawful activity. 59 Notably, the individual subject to the order need not have
been found guilty of or even charged with a criminal offence. 60 Further, the individual
subject to the forfeiture order bears the onus to prove that he rightfully and fairly acquired the
propeliy.6t Only if the order is "clearly not in the interests of justice" may the COUlt refuse,
limit, or place conditions on a forfeiture order. 62

" Ibid. at s. 1(1). "Unlawful activity" is defined as:
"unlawful activity" means an act or omission described in one of the following paragraphs:
(a) if an act or omission occurs in British Columbia, the act or omission, at the time of
occurrence, is an offence under an Act of Canada or British Columbia;
(b) if an act or omission occurs in another province of Canada, the act or omission, at the time
of occurrence,
(i) is an offence under au Act of Canada or the other province, as applicable, and
(ii) would be an offence in British Columbia, if the act or omission had occurred in
British Columbia;
(c) if an act or omission occurs in a jurisdiction outside of Canada, the act or omission, at the
time of occurrence,
(i) is an offence under an Act of the jurisdiction, and
(ii) would be an offence in British Columbia, if the act or omission had occurred in
British Columbia,
but does not include an act or omission that is an offence
(d) under a regulation ofa corporation, or
(e) under an enactment of any jurisdiction if the enactment or the jurisdiction is prescribed
under this Act.
,. Ibid. at s. 5(1) and (2).
60 Ibid. at s. 18. Section 18 states:
18 In proceedings under this Act, an unlawful activity may be found to have occurred even if
(a) no person has been charged with an offence that constitutes the unlawful activity, or
(b) a person charged with an offence that constitutes the unlawful activity was acquitted of all
charges in proceedings before a criminal court or the charges are withdrawn or stayed or otherwise
do not proceed.
61 Ibid. at s. 6(2). Section 6(2) states:
6 (2) In the case of property that is proceeds of unlawful activity, the couli may grant relieftrom
forfeiture under subsection (I) if a party to the proceedings commenced under section 3 (I) proves both
of the following:
(a) she or he did not, directly or indirectly, acquire the property as a result of unlawful activity
committed by the party;
(b) she or he
(i) was the rightful owner ofthe property before the unlawful activity occurred and
was deprived of possession or control of the property by means of the unlawful
activity,
(ii) acquired the properly for fair value after the unlawful activity occurred and did
not know and could not reasonably have known at the time of the acquisition that the
property was proceeds of unlawful activity, or
(iii) acquired the property trom
(A) a person who was the rightful owner ofthe property before the
unlawful activity occurred and who was deprived of possession or control
of the property by means of the unlawful activity, or
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Rather than seek forfeiture of property, the province of Manitoba has also enacted civil
remedy legislation in The Civil Remedies Against Organized Crime ACf. 63 The legislation
specifically refers to "criminal organizations" and "criminal organization offences" as
defined in the Criminal Code, and enables a police chiefto seek damages from an individual
for "any injury to the public that results from the unlawful activity" of the individual. 64
Again, the term "unlawful activity" is defined very broadly, and extends beyond criminal
offences. 6s Like the Ontario legislation, the Manitoba legislation places an onus on the
individual subject to the civil order for damages to rebut the presumption that he is a member
of a criminal organization where the individual has been found guilty of a criminal
organization offence. 66 However, that the individual was acquitted of the criminal
organization charges, or that they were withdrawn or stayed, is irrelevant to rebutting such
presumption. 67
Civil forfeiture and civil remedy proceedings in Canada have occurred, and continue to
occur, in relation to propelty and assets held by alleged criminal organizations. Some
significant examples include the forfeiture of the Hells Angels clubhouse in Nova Scotia in
2003;68 and the forfeiture proceedings of the Nanaimo Chapter of the Hells Angels in British
Columbia pursuant to the Civil FOifeiture Ad9 as set forth in British Columbia (Director of
Civil Forfeiture) v. Angel Acres Recreation and Festival Property Ltd 70 According to an

evaluation of the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Initiative of Canada or IPOC, the efforts of
(B) a person who acquired the property for fair value after the unlawful
activity occurred and did not know and could not reasonably have known
at the time of the acquisition that the property was proceeds of unlawful
activity.
" Ibid. at s. 6(1).
63 S.M. 2002, c. 56, C.C.S.M. c. C107.
" Ibid. at ss. 1 and 7.
" Ibid. at s. 1(1). "Unlawful activity" is defined as:
"unlawful activity" means an act or omission that is an offence under
(a) an Act of Canada, Manitoba or another Canadian province or territory, or
(b) an Act of a jurisdiction outside Canada, if a similar act or omission would be an offence
under an Act of Canada or Manitoba if it were committed in Manitoba.
66 Ibid. at s. II (a).
67 Ibid. at s. Il(b).
os Iced: The StOlY a/Organized Crime ill Callada, supra note 2 at 425.
69 Civil For/eitures Act of BC, supra note 56 at s. 8.
70 2009 BCSC 322, [2009] B.C.J. No. 455 (Q.L.).
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the municipalities and provinces in conjunction with IPOC have had some impact on
di srupting organized crime through civil proceedings, and while some changes are
recommended to increase the efficiency of the initiative by modifying its theory, design,
strategy and personnel, the evaluators advocate continuing with IPOC. 71
While civil forfeiture and civil remedies may prevent and limit the bolstering of organized
crime identities through the use of gang names and insignia to some degree, this non-criminal
Jaw measure alone will not impact organized crime significantly, or significantly enough. It
relies on the commission of unlawful activity or criminal offences, and the power and
activities of law enforcement to come into play. Some provincial legislation extends very
broadly - perhaps too broadly - due to the employment of the telm "unlawful" rather than
"criminal" activity. Although Ontario allow for rebuttable presumptions of membership in a
criminal organization where the individual has been found guilty of a criminal organization
offence, the British Columbia legislation applies whether or not an individual has been found
guilty of 01' even charged with a criminal offence, and the Manitoba legislation makes
acquittals, stays and withdrawn charges irrelevant to rebutting presumptions of membership
in a criminal organization. These aspects ofthe civil remedy provisions negatively affect
perceptions of such laws as fair and just. However, some of these civil proceedings, such as
the British Columbia and Ontario forfeiture provisions which allow disposal of "instruments"
of "unlawful activity" 01' crime, do provide another useful tool to combat organized crime by
striking at the source of their power.

11 "20 I 0-20 11 Evaluation of tile Integrated Proceeds of Crime Initiative: Final RepOlt", slIpra note 37 at 20, 21
and 61. In its evaluation, Public Safety Canada asserts, ibid at 37:
... [T]lle provinces have been moving in the direction of civil forfeiture since 2001. The first province to
enact this kind of legislation was the province of Ontario (2001) .... [T]he Ontario civil seizures for
2008-2009 totaled $31.73 million. This success is due in part to the referrals made by the !POC Initiative
to the province. Over that same period, British Columbia, which started civil seizures in 2006, succeeded
in forfeiting $1.27 million, mainly due to IPOC referrals, and ... the IPOC national seizures totaled $16
million. Combined, the IPOC Initiative and the Ontario govemment figures alone provide impressive
results: more than $100 million of total seizures in 2007-2008 and 2008- 2009.
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4.7.5

Using Statutorily Mandated Community Safety Programs to

Pierce the Power of the Patch
Statutorily mandated community safety programs amount to non-criminal law efforts to
prevent organized crime outlaw group members from wearing their patches, group insignia,
or group colours in licenced establishments such as bars. These programs seek to diminish
the proliferation ofthe reputations of organized crime outlaw groups - that is to say, they
seek to diminish the "power of the patch" - by controlling activities of organized crime at the
community level. The attempt to prevent organized crime outlaws from displaying their
identity in public may reduce the social cohesion of the outlaw group, and may deteriorate
their identity as required by Requisite Six. It may also reduce the proliferation of their
reputation for violence and intimidation as many individuals will not recognize or know them
as members of organized crime outlaw groups, and thus, as individuals to be feared. It may
prevent some individuals who are on the periphery of conventional society from identifying
and associating with a criminal subculture, and learning the life of organized crime. In these
ways, community safety programs may maintain social order or equilibrium - or at least, a
false sense of it.
Some Canadian provinces have passed legislation aimed at thwarting criminal organization or
gang activities within communities, or that may affect communities. The governments of
Saskatchewan with The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Act,n and Manitoba with
The Liquor Control Amendment AcP3 have prohibited individuals from wearing gang colours

in any permitted or licenced premises. The Education Administration AcP4 in Manitoba
combined with The Public Schools Act7; allows the Minister of Education to ban the wearing

12 S.S. 2004, C.S·O.I as amended by S.S., 2005, c. 41; and 2006, c.R-22.0001 [The Safer Comml/nities and
Neighbourhoods Act] at s. 60.1.
13 R.S.M. 2002, C.C.S.M. c. LI60 [The Liquor Control Amendment Act] at ss. 120(9) and (10); and Manitoba
Justice, Project Gang-Proof: A Handbook For Families and Comn/unity Members, 2"d ed. (2004), online:
Manitoba Government <http://www.gov.mb.caljustice!safe!gangprooflganghandbook2004.pdt> [Project GangProof: A Handbook For Families and Commllllity Members] at 39. Sub·section 120(10) of The Liquor Control
Amendment Act defines gang colours:
In subsection (9), "gang colours" means a sign, symbol, logo or other representation identifying,
associated with or promoting a group of persons who conspire to engage in unlawful activities.
74 R.S.M. 1987, c. E 10, C.C.S.M. C. EI 0 [The Education Administration Act].
15 R.S.M. 1987, c. P250, C.C.S.M. c. P250 [The Public Schools Act].
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of gang colours, signs, symbols or identifying representations of gangs in Manitoba schools. 76
Notably, such legislation may not withstand Charter scrutiny.
In R. v. Bilz,77 the Saskatchewan Provincial Court determined that The Safer Communities
and Neighbourhoods Act was intra vires the Saskatchewan Legislature,78 and that wearing

Hells Angels colours or insignia amounts to expression. 79 However, the COUlt concluded that
the legislation violated the right to freedom of expression in sub-section 2(b)80 of the Charter,
and it was not saved by section 1. 81 The Ministry of Justice did not appeal the Provincial
Court decision, and re-wrote the legislation. 82 Given the decision in R. v. Bitz, these efforts
of communities to seize control of neighbourhood, schools and businesses and to preserve
conventional values may provide short-term relief for societal members who fear organized
crime outlaws. However, unless the legislation is used and withstands Charter scrutiny, it
will prove to be just another hollow aniti-organized crime measure.

4.7.6

Using Trade-mark and Copyright Laws to Pierce the Power of

the Patch 83
The power of trade-mark symbolism to induce consumer action stretches beyond marks in
commerce. Within the criminal milieu, organized crime outlaw groups often employ their
name 01' insignia not only to identify themselves as a group and to declare themselves to
others, but also to adveltise their reputation by wearing it on their sleeve - or on their back.
Organized crime outlaw groups use their names and insignia to commit crime. They
intimidate and instill fear in non-members in both the criminal subculture and conventional
The Education Administration Act, supra note 74 at s. 2 and The Public Schools Act, supra note 75 at 41(y);
and Projecl Gang-Proof A Handbook For Families and Community Members, supra note 73 at 39.
17 2009 SKPC 138,2009 CarswellSask 878 [R. v. Bitz].
78 Ibid. at para. 42.
19 Ibid. at para. 45.
80 Canadian CharIer a/Rights alld Freedoms, Part I ofthe Conslilulion Acl, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Acl1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.1I [CharIer] at s. 2(b).
" R. v. Bitz, supra note 77 at para. 81.
" The Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods Amendmenl Act, S.S. 2010, c. 30; and James Wood, "Rethinking
Gang Colour Law" Leader Posl (15 January 20 10), online: Leader Post
<http://www.leaderpost.comihealthiRethinking+gang+colourI2444033/story.html?id=2444033>.
13 Many of the ideas and contents of this subsection are taken directly, with modifications, from Carol
Fleischhaker, "Piercing the Powel' of the Patch: How Trademark Law Could Diminish the Power of Gang
Insignia" (2010) 14 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 21. They are reproduced in the thesis under the
terms ofthe Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial License according to the tenns and conditions for
Wiley Open Access online articles.
16
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society in order to effect their criminal endeavours. Over time, the violent and intimidating
reputation of the group builds, and simply the mention of their name or the display of their
insignia causes fear and produces acquiescent behaviour in others. This fearsome reputation
facilitates the group in it criminal activities - both commercial and non-commercial. Trademark and copyright laws enhance these organized crime outlaw groups' reputations by
providing various rights to trade-mark and copyright holders, and thus, contribute to the
social problem that is organized crime violence and crime. Unlike the proceeds of crime
legislation and forfeiture provisions in the Criminal Code, the Canadian government has not
amended trade-mark and copyright laws as patt of its anti-organized crime measures.
Some gangs have legally registered their names and insignia in order to protect their
reputation by preventing others from using it. For instance, the Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club, and the Mongol Nation Motorcycle Club, Inc. have registered their trade-marks. 84
Recently, the Hells Angels sued a Los Angeles fashion boutique that sold a t-shirt bearing the
message: "My boyfriend's a Hells Angel." The lawyer for the Hells Angels stated that the
lawsuit meant to "get them off the market, sequester them and have them destroyed.,,85
Further, the Hells Angels forced Disney Pictures to change a movie script because it referred
to the Hells Angels name, and successfully sued an author who used the Hells Angels winged
death head on the cover of his book. 86 The Hells Angels only had to legally threaten Marvel
Comics in order to prevent them fi'om using the name "Hell's Angel" for one of their comic
characters. John Freeman, a former editor of Marvel Comics, explained in a blog:
Ah, Hell's Angel - the most tortured superheroine in the Marvel UK pantheon, ever.
Legal threats from the Hells Angels (I kid you not) forced the name cahnge [sic] and
prompted legal searches to ensure all other MUK character names weren't infringing
other rights holders (it was okay to name a comic Warheads but we weren't to try
copyrighting the name on a missile ...) .... 87
The legal power of organized crime outlaw groups to prevent the use of their names and
insignia outside the criminal milieu, demonstrates that trade-mark and copyright laws afford
" R. v. Lindmy trial decision, supra note 7 at paras.·235-37 and 263-72; and Rivera v. Carter, supra note 7 at 2.
" Phil Villarreal, "Hells Angels Sue L.A. T-Shirt Maker For Copyright Infringement" (26 August 20 II) The
Consumerist online: consumerist.com <http://consumerist.comI20 11/08/hells-angels-sue-la-t-shirt-maker-forcopyright-infringement.html>.
""Hells Angels seek to protect skull logo", supra note 7; and "Hells Angels get revved up over their
trademarks", supra note 8.
87

"ICFD Cover of the Week - 17'h Feb 08", supra note 9.
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some protection afforded to these groups. Legal protection of their reputations remains a
force to be reckoned with.
This subsection analyses the extent to which trade-mark and copyright laws protect organized
crime outlaw groups' insignia within non-commercial and commercial illegal enterprises. It
also examines the extent to which trade-mark and copyright laws prevent law enforcement
from using this insignia. In addition, it demonstrates the power of organized crime outlaw
groups insignia generally, and the ways in which trade-mark and copyright laws enhance this
power. Further, it recommends amendments to the Trade-marks Act88 and the Copyright
Act89 in order to negatively affect the ability of these groups to engage in criminal enterprises

by diminishing the power oftheir patches.

4.7.7

Legal Protections Afforded to Gang or Organized Crime Outlaw

Group Insignia by Trade-mark and Copyright Laws
An analysis of the substantive hurdles posed by trade-mark and copyright laws for law
enforcement agencies that wage war against criminal organizations in Canada remains
essential in order to understand the interaction between intellectual property and criminal law
in the context of organized crime outlaw groups marks. An application of trade-mark and
copyright laws to these groups, their reputation, and their marks, illuminates the ways in
which trade-mark and copyright laws unintentionally enable these groups to expand the
power of their reputation, and thus, the ways in which these laws facilitate them in their
criminal enterprises. Within any commercial arena, including the criminal milieu, reputation
is everything.
A number of trade-mark laws apply to organized crime outlaw group insignia, and protect
their reputations by protecting their marks and names. For groups that have registered their
marks, laws regarding passing off, use, confusion, as well as depreciation of goodwill,
safeguard the rights of the groups to use their insignia within commercial trade areas. For
groups that have not registered their trade-marks, the laws regarding passing off provide

" Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 [Trade-marks Act].
&9 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [Copyright Act].
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protection. Copyright laws uphold the rights of these groups to reproduce their works, and
afford them protection against infringements of their rights, such as by the distribution of
copies oftheir works. As these legal measures protect the rights of organized crime outlaw
groups, they simultaneously augment the reputations of these groups, and prevent the
infringement of those rights and the sullying of that reputation by law enforcement agencies.
This subsection will examine the concepts within trade-mark and copyright laws that relate
to, and that may protect, insignia of organized crime outlaw groups.

4.7.7.1

Protections Against Passing Off

Both registered trade-marks and unregistered marks of organized crime outlaw groups benefit
from the laws regarding passing off. Passing off occurs when an individual sells his own
goods as if they are another person' s goods.9o The remedy of passing off exists separately
from statutory remedies, and may be employed regardless of invalid registration and
infringement c1aims. 91 Section 7 of the Trade-marks Act codifies passing off into statute:
7. No person shall
(a) make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business,
wares or services of a competitor;
(b) direct public attention to his wares, services or business in such a way as
to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the time he commenced
so to direct attention to them, between his wares, services or business and the
wares, services or business of another;
(c) pass off other wares or services as and for those ordered or requested;
(d) make use, in association with wares or services, of any description that is
false in a material respect and likely to mislead the public as to
(i) the character, quality, quantity or composition,
(ii) the geographical origin, or
(iii) the mode of the manufacture, production or performance
of the wares or services; or
(e) do any other act or adopt any other business practice contrary to honest
industrial or commercial. usage in Canada.92

Ruth M. Corbin, " Intention to Deceive: The Role It Plays in ' Passing OW" (2004) 18 I.P.J. 97 [" Intention to
Deceive: The Role It Plays in 'Passing OW"J at 98. Corbin cites Penyv. Truejill, [1842J 6 Beav. 66, 49 E.R.
749 (Eng. Rolls Ct.): "A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretellce that they are the goods of another
man."
" Bradley J. Freedman & Robert J.C. Deane, "Trade-marks and the Internet: A Canadian Perspective" (2001)
34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 345 ["Trade-marks and the Internet: A Canadian Perspective"J at para. 23.
" Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 7(b).
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The common law tort of passing-off protects trade-marks and trade-names, and seeks to
ensure honesty and fairness ofcompetition. 93 Historically, passing off required the individual
who allegedly misused a mark or falsely represented the mark, to have ill intent - that is to
say the intention to deceive. 94 However, case law in the 20 th century asserts that the tort of
passing off does not require ill-intent,95 and only requires a misrepresentation that causes
public deception or confusion. Essentially, it requires a demonstration of goodwill,
misrepresentation leading to confusion, and damage. 96
If an organized crime outlaw group obtained registration of its name and symbol, or if it used
it to a degree to which passing-off would protect them by having developed goodwill in the
mark, then the purpose or enterprise of the group would seemingly not matter - that is to say,
the tort of passing off would prevent others from using or misrepresenting the group name
and symbol in a way that leads to confusion and results in damage to goodwill. The common
law protection within passing off seems to require that the use of the trade-mark or name
occur in commercial activities or transactions, since section 7 of the Trade-marks Act relates
passing off to the provision of "wares and services." The test to determine passing off refers
to the consumer perspective in the context oftrade,97 and the definitional elements of passing
off refer to the actual use by a "competitor" within the course oftrade. 98 Thus, ifan
individual such as a non-member or police officer wore insignia or a trade-mark of an
" Kirkhi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. , 2005 SCC 65, [2005J 3 S.C.R. 302 [Kirkhi AG v. RilVik Holdings fne.J at
r.am. 63.
, "Intention to Deceive: The Role It Plays in 'Passing Off"', supra note 90 at 98. Corbin states that proof of an
intention to deceive may have been a necessary element of passing off originally, but that requirement does out
in the late 19 th century when the concept of "injury to goodwill" evolved.
9S Ibid at 99.
" Kirkbi AG v. RilVik Holdings fne., supra note 93 at para. 66.
97 British Columbia Automobile Association v Office and Professional Employees' International Union, Local
378, 200 I BCSC 156, [2001]4 W. W.R. 95 (S.C.S.C.) [British Columbia Automobile Association v Office and
Professional Employees' Inlemational Union, Local 378] at para. 117. The Court states:
117 What is the appropriate standard to measure whether there is a passing-ofl'l The defendant has
referred to the "reasonably prudent internet user" as the standard for confusion. I do not think that is the
test. The Supreme Cout1 of Canada in Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. (1992), 44 C.P.R. (3d)
289 [at 30 I], said that the standard is that ofthe ordinary average customer. The plaintiff refers to this
passage which I think accurately sets out the test:
The average customer will not be the same for different products, however, and will not have
the same attitude at the time of purchase. Moreover, the attention and care taken by'the same
person may vary depending on the product he is buying: someone will probably not exercise
the same care in selecting goods from a supermarket shelf and in choosing a luxury item. In
the first case, the misrepresentation is likely to "catch" more readily.
" Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 7(a).
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organized crime outlaw group and represented himself as a member, but did not do so within
a conmlercial setting, the tOlt of passing off would not protect the group that owns the
insignia or trade-mark. However, if this non-member or police officer wore that insignia or
trade-mark during activities that involved the provision of "wares and services", such as an
officer wearing a Hells Angels patch during drug dealing, then the tort of passing off may
apply and protect the rights of the group.99 The emphasis on economic relations and
enterprise within the concept of passing off demonstrates that this tort intends to regulate
improper usage in the context of business, and not simply the common usage by individuals
or a group of individuals who sport a Ilame and symbol, such as a Ilame or symbol of an
organized crime outlaw group. This emphasis on the economic or commercial context limits
any protections provided by passing off to organized crime groups with registered marks.

In British Columbia Automobile Association v. Office and Professional Employees'
International Union, Local 378,100 the defendant union created web sites which used the
name and trade-marks of the British Columbia Automobile Association. The British
Columbia Supreme Court held that the first web site that the defendant union created,
breached the Copyright Act due to its similar appearance to that ofthe British Columbia
Automobile Association, and its use of the trade-marks of the Association;IOI and that it
amounted to passing off of a trade-mark because the defendant created it with the intention of
misleading people who looked for the web site of the Association. 102 The Court held that the
second web site of the defendant amounted to a breach of copyright only. 103 In its assessment
of whether the web sites ofthe defendant amounted to passing off, the Court held that the fact
that the defendant was not competing commercially with the Association but rather
"attempting to communicate its message to the public about an ongoing labour relations

" To expand on or furthel' explain this act of passing off, the police officer is passing off his "wares and
services" - for example, his crystal methamphetamine - as being a product backed or endorsed by the Hells
Angels. Drug sales conducted under Ihe Hells Angels name are less subject to "drug burns" or "rip-offs" or
(heft. Someone who is not a Hells Angel would benefit from Ihis reputation because they would be bel1er able
(0 manuf.,cturc product and sell it.
100 British Coillmbia Alltomobile Association l' OfJice and Professional Employees'/lIIemational Union. Local
378, supra note 97.
10 1 Ibid at paras. 39, 42, 44,181 and 200.
102 Ibid. at para. 212.
103 Ibid at paras. 45, 46 and 20 I.
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campaign", remained significant. 104 Based on these assertions of the COUIt in this case,
passing off would protect insignia of an organized crime outlaw group from use by nonentitled parties. Therefore, law enforcement agencies could not use a seized mark of such a
group in cOlllmercial activities (that is to say, the provision of "wares and services"), without
committing the offence of passing off.

4.7.7.2

Right to Use Identical Mark

Section 4 of the of the Trade-marks Act defines "use":
4. (1) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with wares if, at the time of
the transfer of the property in or possession of the wares, in the normal course of
trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in which they are
distributed or it is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of the
association is then giyen to the person to whom the property or possession is
transferred.
(2) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is used or
displayed in the performance or adveltising of those services.
(3) A trade-mark that is marked in Canada on wares or on the packages in which they
are contained is, when the wares are exported from Canada, deemed to be used in
Canada in association with those wares. 105
The concept of "use" requires the trade-mark to be used in association with wares at the time
of a transfer or possession of property in the normal course oftrade, or the use or display of
the trade-mark in the advertising of services. 106
When an applicant seeks to register a trade-mark, it must provide a statement regarding the
use or proposed use of the trademark pursuant to section 30(a) of the Trade-marks Act. 10)
This use relates to the specific wares or services with which the applicant has used, or
proposes to use the mark. lOB If the use changes, the Trade-marks Act does not state that

10.

Ibid. at para. 126.

106

Ibid. at s. 4(1).
Ibid. at s. 30. Section 30 states:
30. An applicant for the registration ofa trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an application
containing
(a) a statement in ordinary commercial terms of the specific wares or services in association
with which the mark has been or is proposed to be used; ....
Ibid. at s. 4.

'0' Trade-marks Act. supra note 88 at s. 4.
107

108
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protection of the owner of the mark ceases,I09 and theAcl does not specify that an
amendment to the use be filed.
Registered trade-mark owners have the exclusive right to use their trade-mark tlu'oughout
Canada. Gangs that have registered their trade-marks in relation to wares or services have the
right to use their trade-mark tlu'oughout Canada. I10
Trade-mark protection in the Trade-marks Act only results from use of a mark as specified in
the Trade-marks Act, and does not result from any common usage. These legal requirements
in the definition of "use" in section 4 of the Trade-mark Act mean that gang members do not

use registered insignia when they merely wear them. In fact, no one who simply wears
insignia of a organized crime outlaw group - member or non-member - lIses the insignia.
Thus, these groups have no protection under the Trade-marks Act from non-members or law
enforcement officials from simply wearing their trade-marks. However, if the non-members
or officials wore the trade-marks in the normal course of trade, or used or displayed the trademark in the advertising of services, III then these groups do have protection according to
section 4 of the Trade-marks Act which defines "use" generally, and section 20 which
prevents use of a confusing mark.

4.7.7.3

Right to Use Confusing Mark

Organized crime groups that have registered their trade-marks receive protection against
others who attempt to register a similar mark. Pursuant to subsection 12(1)(d) of the Trade-

109

Ibid at s. 49. Section 49 states:

49. Ifa mark is lIsed by a person as a trade-mark for any purposes or in any of the manners mentioned
in the definition "certification mark" or "trade-mark" in section 2, it shall not be held invalid merely on
the ground that the person or a predecessor in title lIses it or has used it for any other of those purposes
or in any other of those manners.
110 Ibid at s. 19. Section 19 states:
19. Subject to sections 2 1,32 and 67, the registration ofa trade-mark in respect of any wares or
services, unless shown to be invalid, gives to the owner of the trade-mark the exclusive right to the lIse
throughout Canada of the trade-mark in respect of those wares or services.
I II Examples ofthese adveltising of services might include a situation where non-members wore the trade-mark,
and thus purported to be an outlaw motorcycle gang member for instance, during the sales of gang related items
or of motorcycles. They also might include officials who used a mark to advertise anti-gang support services.
Whether the "normal" course of trade" includes illegal drug transactions is not known. Thus, the "right to use"
mayor may not include illegal transactions such as drug trafficking.
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marks Act, a mark is not registrable ifil is " ... confusing with a registered trade-mark .... ,,112

Subsection 12(I)(d), therefore, prohibits law enforcement from creating and registering
marks that would be confusing with registered gang trade-marks. Such creation of confusing
marks might contribute to diluting the "power of the patch" if the confusing marks were not
used or displayed as members of organized crime groups would use them.
Section 20 of the Trade-marks Act prohibits the use of a mark in sales, distribution and
advertising, when such use causes confusion. I 13 Subsection 6(2) ofthe Trade-marks Act
defines "confusion":
6. . .. (2) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use
of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the
wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased,
hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the
same generaI cIass. .. .. 114
Confusion may reduce the general fame and reputation of a mark because it is not used or
displayed as the owner of the mark would want it used or displayed. Even the likelihood of
confusion will violate the rights of a trade-mark owner. I IS
The Trade-marks Act specifies some of the considerations that a court or Registrar must
consider in determining whether or not a mark or trade-mark causes confusion with another
trade-mark:

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 12(1)(d).
[bid at s. 20. Section 20 states:
20. (I) The right of the owner of a registered trade-mark to its exclusive use shall be deemed to be
infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who sells, distributes or advertises wares or
services in association with a confusing trade-mark or trade-name, but no registration ofa trade-mark
prevents a person from making
(a) any bona fide use of his personal name as a trade-name, or
(b) any bona fide use, other than as a trade-mark,
(i) of the geographical name of his place of business, or
(ii) of any accurate description of the character or quality of his wares or services,
in such a manner as is not likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to
the trade-mark ....
114 Ibid at s. 6(2).
Ramo Imports Ltd v Jaguar Cars Ltd, 2007 rCA 258, [2007] F.C.J. No. 999 (Q.L.) [Ramo Imports Ltd v
Jaguar Cars Ltd] at para. 38; and Veuve Clicquot Ponsordin v Boutiques Cliquot Ltee, 2006 SCC 23, [2006]1
S.C.R. 824 [Vel/ve Clieql/ot PO/lsordin v BolI/iques Cliql/ot Ltee] at para. 37.
112
113
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6. (5) In determining whether trade-marks or trade names are confusing, the court or

the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding
circumstances including
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the
extent to which they have become known;
(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature of the trade; and
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in
appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them. I 16
Judges or registrars place themselves in the position of a "casual consumer somewhat in a
hurry,,117 who is confronted with the two marks, and not in the place of the trade-mark
owner. I IS They consider "all the surrounding circumstances", including the similarities and
dissimilarities between the marks. 119 Trade-mark owners cannot be idle. They must protect
their marks from piracy, or risk losing the distinctiveness of their marks, and thus, also risk
losing the legal protection of those marks. 120
The trade area has relevance in determining whether confusion exists between marks. Thus,
trade-mark owners must remain vigilant against the use of their marks not only within their
own trade area, but in unrelated trade areas as well. A court may decide that the use of the
mark in a different commercial sector has no relation or connection to the original
commercial sector in which the mark was used. However, even if a court finds no connection
so as to cause confusion, the use of a trade-mark or trade name in a different commercial
sector may erode the distinctiveness of a mark.

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 6(5).
Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006]1 S.C.R. 772 [Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada
Inc.] at para. 56. The Supreme Court of Canada states:
116

117

(I)
The Casual Consumer Somewhat in a Hurry
56
What, then, is the perspective form which the likelihood of a "mistaken inference" is to be
measured? It is not that of the careful and diligent purchaser. Nor, on the other hand, is it the "moron
in a hurry" so beloved by elements of the passing-off bar: Morning Sial' Co-Operative Society Ltd. v.
Erpress Newspapers Ltd., [1979] F.S.R. 11 3 (Ch. D.), at p. 117. It is rather a mythical customer who
stands somewhere in between, dubbed in a 1927 Ontario decision of Meredith C.J. as the "ordinary
hurried purchasers" : Klotz v. Corson (1927), 33 O.W.N. 12 (Sup. Ct.), at p. 13. See also Barsaloll v.
Darling (1882),9 S.C.R. 677, at p. 693 .... [Emphasis original].
118 {bid. at para. 56.
1" (bid. at paras. 71-72; and Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 6(5).
120 Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., supra note 117 at para. 26.
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In MatteI, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada inc. ,121 Mattei sought to prohibit the use of the name

"Barbie" by a small chain of Monh'eal restaurants called "Barbie's." "Barbie's" served a
variety of meals, and referred to its barbecue items as "barbie-Q.,,122 The Supreme COUl1 of
Canada upheld the decision of the Trade-marks Opposition Board that the circumstances did
not create a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace between the BARBIE doll and
"Barbie's" because BARBIE's fame primarily related to dolls and doll accessories, while
"Barbie's" dealt with food products, restaurant services, and banquet services. 123 However,
in Remo Imports Ltd. v. Jaguar Cars Ltd, the Federal Court of Appeal asserted that where no
terms of registration confine a pal1y to operate in a particular market, a likelihood of
confusion between marks used in different markets, may exist. 124 Based on the decision in

Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada inc. , the use of a mark in a different trade area may not
violate section 20 of the Trade-marks Act, which section prohibits confusion.
The parameters of confusion, pallicularly as confusion operates in different markets or
unrelated trade areas, assume great importance for police or governmental agencies, and may
have a significant effect on law enforcement techniques in relation to organized crime outlaw
groups. Based on the statutory and common law, anyone who uses organized crime outlaw
group insignia in trade areas other than those in which the group operates, may not be in
violation of section 20 of the Trade-marks Act. Thus, iflaw enforcement agencies do not use
a mark in a manner that results in confusion, these agencies may, without violating the law,
use the mark of an organized crime outlaw group in an unrelated trade area, and ina mallller
which does not accord with the reputation of the group. For instance, law enforcement coul
use the mark to advertise anti-organized crime measures or establishes a business to sell
something contrary to the biker image and uses the mark in this trade. Such usage may
deteriorate the power of the reputation of the group.

Ibid.
Ibid. at paras. I and II.
123 Ibid. at para. 91.
124 Remo Imporls LId. v. Jaguar Cars Ltd., supra note 115 at para. 48.

121
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4.7.7.4

Prohibitions Against Depreciation of Goodwill

Section 22 of the Trade-marks Act provides legal protection against the dilution or
depreciation of trade-marks - even for organized crime outlaw groups who register their
insignia, but whose commercial transactions may be illegal at times. Section 22 states:
22. (1) No person shall use a trade-mark registered by another person in a manner
that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching
hereto ..... 125

The Trade-marks Act does not explicitly protect famous marks - that is to say, section 22
does not require a trade-mark to be famous in order to grant relief, but relief would not likely
be granted for a mark that was not well-known. 126 Trade-mark owners may seek relief
pursuant to section 22 for depreciation of goodwill that results from unauthorized use of a
mark that encouraged the purchase of dissimilar or other wares or services through
association with that mark. 127
In order to satisfy the requirements of section 22 of the Trade-marks Act, a trade-mark owner
must demonstrate four elements. First, an owner must prove that a user or non-owner used
the registered trade-mark of the owner in connection with wares or services. This use need
not include only competitive use. Second, the owner must prove that the registered trademark is sufficiently well known to have generated significant goodwill. Third, the owner
must prove that the user or non-owner lIsed the registered trade-mark in a manner that likely
affected that goodwill. Fourth, the owner must prove that the likely effect of the use would
be the depreciation of the value of that goodwill. 128
Courts have asserted that goodwill generates from years of "honest work" or "lavish
expenditure.,,129 In Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co., the
COUlt described the meaning of "goodwill" and its "depreciation":
Trade-marks Act, supra nole 88 at s. 22.
Daniel R. Bereskin, "The Protection of Famous Marks in Canada: Mattei and Veuve Clicquot", Case
Comment, (2007) 40 U.B.C.L. Rev. 277 at para. 21.
121 Robert G. Howell, "Depreciation of Goodwill: A 'Green Light' for Dilution ITom the Supreme Court of
Canada in an Accommodating InITastructure" (2008) 17 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 689 at
690.
128 Vellve Clicquol Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Llife, supra note 115 at para. 46.
129 Clairollnternational COIp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co., [1968]55 C.P.R. 176,2 Ex. C.R. 552
[Clairollnternational Corp. v. Thomas Slipply & Equipment Co.] at para. 41.
12'

126
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41

... To paraphrase Lord Macnaghten's expression in Trego v. Hunt [(1896) A.c.

7], the goodwill attaching to a trade mark is I think that portion of the goodwill of the
business of its owner which consists of the whole advantage, whatever it may be, of
the reputation and connection, which may have been built up by years of honest work
or gained by lavish expenditure ofmoney and which is identified with the goods
distributed by the owner in association with the trade mark.
42 Then what is meant by "depreciate the value" of such goodwill. To my mind this
means simply to reduce in some way the advantage of the reputation and connection
to which I have just referred, to take away the whole or some portion of the custom
othelwise to be expected and to make it less extensive and thus less advantageous. As
I see it goodwill has value only to the extent of the advantage of the reputation and
connection which its owner enjoys and whatever reduces that advantage reduces the
value of it. Depreciation ofthat value in my opinion occurs whether it arises through
reduction of the esteem in which the mark itself is held or through the direct
persuasion and enticing of customers who could otherwise be expected to buy or
continue to buy goods bearing the trade mark. It does not, however, as I see it, arise,
as submitted by Mr. Henderson, from danger of loss of exclusive rights as a result of
use by others as this in my view represents possible loss of exclusive rights in the
trade mark itself rather than reduction ofthe goodwill attaching to it. 130 [Emphasis
added].
According to the assertions by the Court in Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply &
Equipment Co., if organized crime outlaw groups or their members engage in commercial
activities, such as dealing in controlled substances, in connection with the group or by using
the group insignia, then the concept of goodwill may apply -albeit within the criminal
milieu. The activities of organized crime outlaw groups, such as drug manufacturing or
trafficking, that consistently avoid police detection and criminal prosecution generate
reliability, secure the confidence and repeated business of criminals who seek to engage in
those criminal activities without fear of infiltration. And, where there exists this "goodwill",
there exists the potential for depreciation.

Trade-mark law does not recognize the depreciation of goodwill through the use of a mark by
others where that use is not in association with wares or services - not just the act of wearing
a trade-mark. As discussed above in sub-sub-subsection "Right to Use Confusing Mark", the
concept of "use" in trade-mark law has a unique meaning. It requires a trade-mark to be

130 ibid. The concepts of "goodwill" and "depreciation" as set forth in Clairol international CO/po v. Thomas
Supply & Equipment Co .• supra, are referred to in Tommy Hilfiger Licensing inc. v. Produits de Qualitti l.M.D.
Inc .• 2005 FC 10, [2005] F.C.J. No. 17 at paras. 128-31.
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"used in association with wares" or "used in association with services.,,131 In addition, no
violation of trade-mark law occurs if the use does not likely depreciate of the value of that
goodwill.
Based on the definition in section 4 of the Trade-marks Act, and the interpretation of "use" in
sections 20 and 22 in the case of Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin
& Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of

Canada (CAW-Canada),132 the term "use" is not meant to include all uses by users of trademarks that belong to other individuals. 133 The Federal Court in that case held that the
meaning of "use" requires, in p31t, the sale, distribution or advertisement of wares or services
in association with a confusing trade-mark or in a way that depreciates the goodwill of the
trade-mark. 134 Thus, an organized crime outlaw group would receive no protection under
section 22 of the Trade-marks Act if an individual did not sell, distribute or advertise wares or
services, but rather, simply asserted an affiliation with a specific outlaw group or wore a
group symbol, even though such exploitation would depreciate the value or power of the
trade-mark of the organized crime outlaw group. Organized crime outlaws who have resorted
to violence to protect the value or power of their patch against depreciation by others may not
have done so due to the lack of legal recourse to protect trade-marks of organized crime
outlaw groups. Indeed, even though a legal recourse may have existed, Hells Angels member
Jean Violette beat Glen Louie in order to prevent Louie from wearing a Hells Angels belt
buckle and using the Hells Angels name during drug deals. 135 Violette was likely driven by a
lack of respect for the law and the power of his patch, rather than any unceltainty in
interpreting the meaning of "use" as it relates to section 22.

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 4.
(1997), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, [1997]2 F.C. 306 (F. C.) [Compagnie Generale des Etablissements MichelinMichelin & Cie v. National Automobile. Aerospace, Transportation and Geneml Workers Union a/Canada
(CAW-Canada)] at paras. 17 and 26. The Federal Court adopts the interpretation of "lise" for sections 20 and 22
of the Trade-marks Act in ClairolIntemational Corp. v Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.• supra note 129.
m Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelill-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
Tml1sportatioll alld Gel/eral Workers Union o/Cal/ada (CAW-Canada), supra note 132 at para. 29.
134 Ibid. at para. 47.
' 35 R. v. Violette, 2009 BCSC 1557, [2009] B.C.!. No. 2262 (Q.L.) (B.C. S.C.) [R. v. Violette] paras. 79-80 and
97-102.
'31
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4.7.7.5

Copyright Challenges

Given that the power of the patch stems from exclusivity of use by only chosen members who
will uphold its reputation, law enforcement agencies could seek to mass-produce and
distribute insignia of organized crime outlaw groups in order to make it available to anyone
to use in ways that do not uphold its reputation and that depreciate its goodwill or dilute it.
Such mass-production and distribution would mean that non-members of organized crime
groups would wear and use the insignia and name in ways that do not accord with the
reputation ofthe group, and thus, weaken or change the reputation. However, such
production and distribution may violate various provisions within the Copyright Act which
protect "works" from reproduction by individuals other than the copyright holder, unless a
defence can be established. Thus, the limitations on reproduction in the Copyright Act
protect insignia of organized crime outlaw groups from duplication, and can stymie law
enforcement efforts to diminish the power of the insignia of those groups.

Copyright is a creature of statute, and its statutory rights and remedies are exhaustive. 136
Section 5 of the Copyright Act provides copyright for the expression of ideas in a variety of
works.

137

Subsection 3(1) of the Copyright Act sets forth the rights of a copyright holder in

works:
3. (I) For the purposes of this Act, "copyright", in relation to a work, means the sole
right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material
form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public or, if the
work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof, and includes
the sole right
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work,
(e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or miistic work, to reproduce, adapt
and publicly present the work as a cinematographic work,
(f) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or miistic work, to communicate
the work to the public by telecommunication,
136 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society o/Upper Canada, 2004 SCC \3, [2004]1 S.C.R. 339 [CCH Canadian
Ltd. v. Lmv Society o/Upper Canada] at para. 9.
137 Copyright Act, supra note 89 at s. 5. Subsection 5(1)(a) states:
5. (I) Subject to this Act. copyright shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in
every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work ifany one of the following conditions is
met:
(a) in the case of any work, whether published or unpublished, including a cinematographic
work, the author was, at the date of the making of the work, a citizen or subject of, or a person
ordinarily resident in, a treaty country; ....
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(g) to present at a public exhibition, for a purpose other than sale or hiTe, an artistic
work created after June 7, 1988, other than a map, chart or plan,
and to authorize any such acts. 138
This subsection prohibits the production and reproduction of a work, or a substantial pRit of a
work, by anyone other than the copyright holder. Law enforcement officials who reproduced
a "work", such as insignia of an organized crime outlaw group, would be " ... adding one
more unit to the species beyond what existed before." 139 In doing so, these officials would be
prima facie infringing subsection 3(1) of the Copyright Act. They would also be violating
section 27(1) of the Copyright Act as only the owner of a copyright may sell, offer for sale, or
distribute a copy of a work.

14o

And, anyone who distributes infringing copies of a

copyrighted work for trade or to prejudicially affect the copyright owner, commits an offence
under section 42(1)(c) of the Copyright ACI. 141

If the reproduction by law enforcement was made for critique or review in accordance with
sections 29.1 of the Copyright Acl, then mass production and distribution could occur without
a violation of the Copyright Act. Sections 29.1 and 29.2 require a critique or review to be
dealt with fairly and for various attribution requirements to be satisfied:
'38 Ibid. al s. 3( I).
"9 David Vaver, "Need

Inlellectual Property be Everywhere? Against Ubiquity and Unifom,ity" (2002) 25
Dalhousie Law Journal I at 4.
14. Copyright Act, supra note 89 at s. 27(1). Subsection 27( I) states:
27. (I) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the
copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do.
14' Ibid. at s. 42(1). Subsection 42(1) states:
42. (I) Every person who knowingly
(a) makes for sale or rental an infringing copy ofa work or other subject-matter in which copyright
subsists,
(b) sells or rents out, or by way oftrade exposes or offers for sale or rental, an infringing copy of a
work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists,
(c) distributes infi'inging copies of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists, either
for the purpose of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the
copyright,
(d) by way of trade exhibits in public an infi'inging copy ofa work or other subject-matter in which
copyright subsists, or
(e) imports for sale or rental into Canada any infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter in
which copyright subsists
is guilty of an offence and liable
(I) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months or to both, or
(g) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding one million dollars or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years 01' to both.
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29.1 Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe copyright if.
the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.
29.2 Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe copyright if the
following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name ofthe
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal. 142
However, the Federal Court of Canada has interpreted the concept of review or criticism
narrowly. In Compagnie Gem?rale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National

Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union o/Canada (CAWCanada), the Federal Court rejected the argument by the defendants that their use of the work
in question was an entirely new work,143 and that their use was a parody in the form of a
criticism,144 since the defendants did not provide the source of the work, and did not treat the
original work in a fair manner. 145 The Federal Court asserted that parody should not be read
into the Copyright Act as including a form of criticism, 146 However, the Quebec Court of
Appeal in Productions Avanli Cim?-Video Inc. c. Favreau, 147 has asserted that parody may
have criticism as one of its purposes. 148 Thus, law enforcement could reproduce organized
crime outlaw group insignia for criticism if they do so fairly and provide sources, but they

Ibid. at ss. 29.1 and 29.2.
Compagnie G",u,rale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Alitomobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union o/Canada (CAW-Canada), supra note 132 at paras. 57-58.
'44 Ibid. at paras. 61-63.
'4l Ibid. at paras. 8, 10, II and 69-70. The leanet distributed by the defendant to Michelin workers depicted the
'42

143

Michelin Man or "Bibendum" with his foot raised in such a fashion as to imply that he would crush all
unsuspecting Michelin worker, and contained text relating to workers losing their jobs without unionizing. An
information bulletin and an information brochure distributed by the defendant displayed the word " Michelin."
'" Ibid. at para. 66.
' 47 1999 CarsweliQue 2742.
' 48 Ibid. at para. 12. The COUll stated:
12
Parody normally involves the humorous imitation' of the work of another writer, often
exaggerated, for purposes of criticism or comment. Appropriation of the work of another writer to
exploit its popular success for commercial purposes is quite a different thing.
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should avoid using parodies of works in any reproductions.
In addition to considering the nature of criticism in relation to a reproduction, courts have
considered other factors in relation to the fair dealing exception. The Supreme Court of
Canada in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Lall' Society of Upper Canada l49 set fOlih a number of
factors for courts to consider: the purpose of the dealing; the character of the dealing; the
amount of the dealing; alternatives to the dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of the
dealing on the work. ISO The Court characterized the fair dealing exception in the Copyright
Act as a right of the user,151 but asserted that the exception or right must not be interpreted

restrictively - a balance must exist between the rights of a copyright owner, and the interests
of a user. IS2
Some of the factors enunciated in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
regarding the fair dealing exception apply to the use by law enforcement of a copyrighted
work of an organized crime outlaw group, and seem to lead to the following conclusions:
widely distributed, multiple copies of works tend to be unfair; a significant or large amount of
material taken from a work contributes to unfairness; and, dealing with the work in a manner
that likely competes within the market of the work, suggests unfairness. Thus, mass
distribution by law enforcement of the trade-marks of organized crime outlaw groups might
lead a court to conclude that the dealing with the gang work by law enforcement was unfair
in a number of circumstances. For instance, it may be unfair if law enforcement did so in an
attempt to diminish the power of the mark, or if the criticism of the work by law enforcement

was in a public advertisement or during illegal commercial dealings in the same trade area as
a gang in order to negatively affect their reputation. Mass distribution ofthe trade-marks of
organized crime outlaw groups would require a large amount of the work being used or
reproduced, and the dealing would purposely tried to undermine the reputation of the work.
While there may exist a significant public interest in decreasing the power of organized crime
149 CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society 0/ Upper Canada, sllpra note 136. Notably, the Supreme COUl1 of
Canada in Society a/Composers, AUlhors alld Music Publishers o/Callada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36,
[2012) S.C.J. No. 36 (Q.L.) upheld and applied Ihe test set for ill CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society a/Upper

Canada.
is' CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society a/Upper Canada, supra note 136 at paras. 53-59.
III {bid at para. 48.
'" {bid.
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outlaw groups and their insignia, the impact on the holder of the right is very significant and
deleterious.

4.7.8

Amendments to Trade-mark and Copyright Laws In Order to

Diminish or Tarnish the Power of Gang or Organized Crime Outlaw Group
Marks
The American legal efforts in Rivera v. Carter, past legal attempts in Canada, and potential
legal pursuits, to ruin or diminish the power of the patch, necessitate a critique and reevaluation of the legal tools that trade-mark laws provide for law enforcement agencies in
Canada. Provisions within the Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act, as they presently exist,
and amendments to some of these provisions, may prove useful in attempts to dismantle
statutory protection for the marks of organized crime outlaw groups, and in attempts to dilute
01'

diminish the violent and powerful reputation associated with their names and insignia.

This sub-subsection recommends ways in which trade-mark and copyright laws can combat
organized crime.

4.7.8.1

Governmental Trade-mark Registration of Unregistered Gang

or Organized Crime Outlaw Group Insignia l53
While some organized crime outlaw groups have registered their names or insignia under the
Trade-marks Act in Canada, or in accordance with related statutory provisions in other
countries, others have not, and may have no or fewer common law trade-mark rights. As the
discussion to this point has shown, organized crime outlaw groups which have not registered,
perhaps ought to do so. The government of Canada, or its police agencies, could seek to
register the unregistered and unprotected marks used by organized crime outlaw groups, in
order to establish ownership and the right to use that insignia, and in order to control the
reputation of that name and insignia.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Masle/piece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc. 154 has held that
"[rJegistration itself does not confer priority of title to a trade-mark.,,'55 While the patty

This idea of governmental registration of unregistered gang marks, originated from Professor Graham
Reynolds, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
IS)
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seeking to register an unregistered trade-mark must advertise its intention,IS6 registration of
an unregistered mark would only become an issue and be subject to judicial review if the user
of an unregistered mark opposed the registration pursuant to section 38 of the Trade-marks

Act. IS7 Registration without challenge by an unregistered user, cOlild confer rights in an
unregistered trade-mark even if it had been used by another party.

In addition to potential problems posed by section 38 of the Trade-marks Act, section 30 of
the Trade-marks Act presents a hurdle for governmental registration of unregistered mark in
that it requires declarations by the applicant regarding the applicant's prior use of the mark
that it proposes to register, and regarding a belief that is has the right to do so:
30. An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an
application containing
(a) a statement in ordinary commercial terms of the specific wares or services in
association with which the mark has been or is proposed to be used;

2011 SCC 27, [2011]2 S.C.R. 387.
Ibid. at para. 35.
Jl6 Section 16 of the Trade-marks Act, supra note 88, sets forth the advertising requirements:
16. EvelY advertisement of an application published pursuant to subsection 37(1) of the Act shall set
out
(a) the trade-mark claimed;
(b) a note of any disclaimer;
(c) the name and address of the applicant and the representative for service, ifany;
(d) the application number;
(e) the date of filing of the application and the date of priority claimed pursuant to sectioll 34
ofthe Act, ifany;
(1) a summary of the information filed by the applicant pursuant to paragraphs 30(a) to (d) and
(g) of the Act;
(g) in the case of an application for a proposed trade-mark, a celtification mark or a
distinguishing guise, a note to that effect;
(h) where the benefit of subsection 12(2) or section 14 of the Act is claimed, a note to that
effect;
(i) the particulars of any territorial restriction applicable pursuant to subsection 32(2) ofthe
Act; and
(j) the particulars of any translation or transliteration furnished to the Registrar in accordance
with paragraph 29(a) or (b).
157 Section 38 of the Trade-marks Act, supra note 88, allows for opposition to the registration of a trade-mark:
38. (I) Within two months after the advertisement of an application for the registration of a trade·mark,
any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a statement of opposition with the Registrar.
(2) A statement of opposition lllay be based on any ofthe following grounds:
(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30;
(b) that the trade-mark is not registrable;
(c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark; or
(d) that the trade-mark is not distinctive. [Emphasis added].
Jl4
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(b) in the case of a trade-mark that has been used in Canada, the date from which
the applicant or his named predecessors in title, if any, have so used the trademark in association with each of the general classes of wares or services
described in the application;
(c) in the case of a trade-mark that has not been used in Canada but is made
known in Canada, the name of a country of the Union in which it has been used
by the applicant or his named predecessors in title, if any, and the date from and
the manner in which the applicant or named predecessors in title have made it
known in Canada in association with each of the general classes of wares or
services described in the application;
(d) in the case of a trade-mark that is the subject in or for another country of the
Union of a registration or an application for registration by the applicant or the
applicant's named predecessor in title on which the applicant bases the
applicant's right to registration, particulars of the application or registration and,
if the trade-mark has neither been used in Canada nor made known in Canada,
the name of a country in which the trade-mark has been used by the applicant or
the applicant's named predecessor in title, if any, in association with each of the
general classes of wares or services described in the application;

(e) in the case of a proposed trade-mark, a statement that the applicant, by itself

or through a licensee, or by itself and through a licensee, intends to lise the
trade-mark in Canada;
(i) a statement that the applicant is satisfied that he is entitled to lise the trademark in Canada in association with the wares or services described in the
application,158 [Emphasis added],
If a governmental body or agency has not used a mark that it intends to register in Canada,
and is aware that another party has used or is using the mark in Canada or another country,
section 30 may present some difficulty. Sections 30 and 38 ofthe Trade-marks Act, these
sections may have to be amended in order to permit the government of Canada, or it police
agencies, to register an unregistered trade-mark without potentially violating these
requirements of these provisions.

Once any registration is successful, the government of Canada or its police agencies could
not be idle owners. They may have to use the marks in order to build up a new reputation
that symbolizes the mark; to dilute or tarnish the existing reputation; and to gain the benefits
or protections afforded by statutory laws and common law regarding trade-marks, such as

15'

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 30.
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prohibitions against confusing marks, depreciation of goodwill and passing off. Law
enforcement could use those marks in ways that did not accord with the violent and
intimidating nature of the organized crime outlaw group, such as by mass distribution for
ordinary non-violent persons to wear the marks; by using the mark to pOliray being in the
group in a negative fashion; or by using the mark to advertise the power of the police in their
anti-organized crime initiatives. Any use of an unregistered and unprotected mark by any
one other than a member of the organized crime outlaw group, and in pmiicular, use by law
enforcement if the government registered that mark, would diminish the power of the patch.
Thus, a mark associated with violence and used in criminal activities, could be diluted and
tarnished, or its goodwill depreciated.

4.7.8.2

The Expansion of "Offensive" and "Scandalous" Marks in

Section 9 of the Trade-marks Act
In conjunction, subsections 9(1)(j) and 12(1)(e) ofthe Trade-marks Act prohibit the
registration of offensive mm'ks:
9. (1) No person shall adopt in connection with a business, as a trade-mark or
othelwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be
mistaken for,
(j) any scandalous, obscene or immoral word

Of

device;

12. (1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
(e) a mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10; .... 159
To date, coutis seem not to have interpreted the term "scandalous" to include or in relation to
criminal activity or offences. 160 The reference to nudity in a MISS NUDE UNIVERSE beauty
pageant was not considered scandalous or immoral. 161 The definition likely must extend
b~yond

innuendo Of distastefulness, and into offensiveness. Unclear, is whether it includes

illegality. The Oxford DictionGlY defines "scandalous" as:

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at ss. 9(1)0) and 12(1)(e).
Research for this thesis could not reveal any case law in Canada that interpreted "scandalous" as including
criminal activity or that interpreted "scandalous" in relation to criminal activity.
'" Bohllav. Miss Universe, Illc. (1992) 43 C.P.R. (3d) 462, [1992]3 F.C. 682 (F.C.) at para. 14, rev'd on other
grounds (1994) 58 C.P.R. (3d) 381, [1995]1 F.C. 614 (F.C.A.).
IS?

160
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adjective 1 causing general public outrage by a perceived offence against morality or
law. 2 (of a state of affairs) disgracefully bad. 16
However, a violation of "law" as set fOllh in this dictionary definition remains vague in the
context of trade-mark law. It does not necessarily include a violation ofthe criminal law, and
thus, a mark associated with criminal activity or that is used in the commission of a criminal
offence, will not, with cellainty, be considered "scandalous." In addition, while many
criminal offences may amount to scandals or may be publicly perceived as scandalous, other
criminal offences may not.

Generally speaking, Criminal Code offences attempt to enshrine social mores, values and
norms - that is to say, they attempt to codify some sense of morality into criminal laws. As
the dictionary definition above notes, the term "scandalous" implies the presence of moral
judgment within the Trade-marks Act. It remains far from analogous or synonymous with the
term "crimina\." However, the presence of a prohibition of registration based on moral
judgment in the Trade-marks Act, supports an argument for amending sub-section 9(1 )(j), or
9(1) in order to prevent the registration of insignia of organized crime outlaw groups where
that insignia is used to facilitate criminal activities - or rather, where it is used to facilitate
offences against legislated morality. Subsection 9(1 )(j) or section 9(1) could be interpreted
by courts having the requisite jurisdiction to include in their prohibitions the registration of a
mark that has been used by a member of an organized crime outlaw group in connection with
a criminal offence, such as an offence committed in violation ofthe Criminal Code 163 or the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 164 The connection could be found by any court having
the requisite jurisdiction to hear offences under the Criminal Code or the Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act, or perhaps by any COUll having the requisite jurisdiction to resolve trademark disputes. Such amendment would remove the uncertainty within the definition of
"scandalous" in relation to marks of organized crime outlaw groups.

162 Oxford Dictionaries (2009) online: AskOxford.com
<http://www.askoxford.com:80/concise_ oedloutlaw?view~uk>.
163 Criminal Code, supra note 12.
164 S.C. 1996, c. 19 [Controlled Drugs and Substances Act].
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The inability to register a mark used in connection with a criminal organization offence
pursuant to section 9(1 )(j) would ensure that insignia of organized crime outlaw groups
would not receive protection in the commercial realm to commit offences in the noncommercial or criminal realm. However, registration of a mark may occur before the group
has built its reputation or used its mark in connection with a criminal offence. Therefore,
amendments to the Trade-marks Act must also ensure that a trade-mark can be expunged if it
has been used in connection with a criminal offence, such as an offence under the Criminal
Code or the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

4.7.8.3

Stringent Proof of Purposes of a Mark in Section 30 of the

Trade-marks Act
In conjunction, subsections 30(a) and 37(1)(a) of the Trade-marks Act require the registrant
of a mark to complete a statement of purpose:
30. An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an
application containing
(a) a statement in ordinary commercial terms ofthe specific wares or services
in association with which the mark has been or is proposed to be used;
37. (1) The Registrar shall refuse an application for the registration of a trade-mark if
he is satisfied that
(a) the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30, .... 165
However, provided that this statement is obtained or given,166 the Trade-marks Act does not
make provision for an investigation or substantiation of this purpose. In order to prevent, or
more strictly regulate, the use of marks by gangs to facilitate criminal activities, the Trademarks Act could require more stringent statements of purpose regarding the commercial use
of a mark. It could also require subsequent proof thereof. Such proof could be business
records of sales or commercial transactions made using the mark, or evidence of advertising
services that marketed the specific wares or services in association with the mark. Organized
crime outlaw groups would not likely state illegal purposes on their statement of purpose, but
they may have difficulties providing proof of a legitimate purpose and would not be able to
register their marks.

165

166

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at SS. 30(a) and 37(1)(a).
[bid. at s. 37(1)(a).
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Notably, even if an organized crime outlaw group registered its mark and provided a
statement of purpose under subsection 30(a), section 49 of the Trade-marks Act still protects
that mark if it is used for a different purpose, and section 49 does not prevent a change in
purpose.
49. If a mark is used by a person as a trade-mark for any of the purposes or in any of
the manners mentioned in the definition of "cetlification mark" or "trade-mark" in
section 2, it shall not be held invalid merely on the ground that the person or a
predecessor in title uses it or has used it for any other of those purposes or in any
other of those manners. 167
An amendment to section 49 could require registrants to provide an amended statement of
purpose within a particular time frame in order to ensure that an organized crime outlaw
group cannot specify an initial purpose, and then use its insignia for a different and illegal
purpose.

4.7.8.4

Limitations on Renewal of Registration in Section 46 of the

Trade-marks Act
Section 46 of the Trade-marks Act sets forth the renewal procedures and times:
46. (1) The registration of a trade-mark that is on the register by virtue of this Act is
subject to renewal within a period of fifteen years fi'om the day ofthe registration or
last renewal.
(2) If the registration of a trade-mark has been on the register without renewal for the
period specified in subsection (1), the Registrar shall send a notice to the registered
owner and to the registered owner's representative for service, ifany, stating that if
within six months after the date of the notice the prescribed renewal fee is not paid,
the registration will be expunged.... 168
Section 46 could require that registrants provide a new or affirming statement of purpose at
the time of renewal, and could also require proof of the use of the mark from the time of its
registration to the time of its renewal. Although section 46 presently does not contain any
such requirement, this amendment may deter organized crime outlaw groups from renewing a
trade-mark for their group insignia if they cannot prove a legal purpose, and if an illegal
purpose exists.

167
168

Ibid. at s. 49.
Ibid. at ss. 46(1) and (2).
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4.7.8.5

Forfeiture of a Trade-mark and Expunging a Trade-mark Used

in a Criminal Offence
In some criminal proceedings where a person is convicted of an indictable offence, pursuant
to section 490.1 of the Criminal Code,169 and the related and almost identical section 16 of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 170 a court that is satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that items bearing trade-marks were offence-related, or that the offence was
committed in relation to those items bearing trade-marks, may order those items bearing
trademarks to be forfeited to Her Majesty the Queen, and to be disposed of by a designated
official. Specifically, subsections 490.1(1) to (2.1) state:
490.1 (1) Subject to sections 490.3 to 490.41, if a person is convicted of an indictable
offence under this Act or the Corruption ofForeign Public Officials Act and, on
application of the Attomey General, the court is satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that any property is offence-related property and that the offence was
committed in relation to that property, the court shall
(a) where the prosecution of the offence was commenced at the instance of the
government of a province and conducted by or on behalf of that government,
order that the property be fOifeited to Her Majesty in right of that province
169

Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 490.1. Quotation of Criminal Code subsections 490.1(1) to (2.1), infi'a

note 175.
and Substances Act, supra note 164 at s. 16. Subsections 16(1) to (2.1) state:
16. (1) Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where a person is convicted of a designated substance offence
and, on application of the Attorney General, the COUlt is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that any
property is offence-related property and that the offence was committed in relation to that propelty, the
court shall
(a) in the case of a substance included in Schedule VI, order that the substance be forfeited to
Her Majesty in right of Canada and disposed of by the Minister as the Minister thinks fit; and
(b) in the case of any other offence-related property,
(i) where the prosecution of the offence was commenced at the instance of the
government of a province and conducted by or on behalf ofthat government, order
that the propelty be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of that province and disposed of
by the Attorney General 01' Solicitor General ofthat province in accordance with the
law, and
(ii) in any other case, order that the property be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of
Canada and disposed of by such member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada as
may be designated for the purposes of this subparagraph in accordance with the law.
(2) Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction ofthe court
that the designated substance offence of which a person has been convicted was committed in relation
to property in respect of which an order of forfeiture would otherwise be made under subsection (1) but
the COUlt is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that that property is offence-related property, the court
may make an order offorfeiture under subsection (1) in relation to that property.
(2.1) An order may be issued under this section in respect of property situated outside Canada, with any
modifications that the circumstances require. . ..

170 Controlled Drugs
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and disposed o/by the Attorney General 01' Solicitor General o/that province
in accordance with the law; and
(b) in any other case, order that the property be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of
Canada and disposed of by the member of the Queen's Privy Council for
Canada that may be designated for the purpose of this paragraph in accordance
with the law.
(2) Subject to sections 490.3 to 490.41, if the evidence does not establish to the
satisfaction of the court that the indictable offence under this Act or the Corruption 0/
Foreign Public Officials Act of which a person has been convicted was committed in
relation to property in respect of which an order of forfeiture would otherwise be
made under subsection (1) but the court is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the property is offence-related property, the court may make an order 0//Olfeitlire
under subsection (1) in relation to that property.
(2.1) An order may be issued under this section in respect of proRerty situated outside
Canada, with any modifications that the circumstances require. l 1 [Emphasis added].
These provisions enable the Crown to seek forfeiture of property, such as items bearing
insignia of an organized crime outlaw group, that were seized by the police in an
investigation, and perhaps, even propelty of a group that was not seized by the police during
an investigation. It does not specify that the property need be tangible property, such as
rights to a trade-mark. Ideally, in order to facilitate forfeiture of property used in connection
with criminal organization offences, offence-related property in these forfeiture sections
would be amended to include both tangible and intangible property so that forfeiture may
occur in relation to the rights in the mark or work themselves, rather than simply items
bearing the mark or the work.

In Regina v. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corp.,l72 the Crown applied to the Ontario Superior
COlllt of Justice for forfeiture of personal propelty of convicted members of the Hells Angels
Motorcycle Corporation on the basis that the propelty was "offence-related propeliy,,173

171 Criminal

Code, supra note 12 at ss. 490.1 (l), (2) and (2.1).
[2009] O.J. No. 3503 (Ont. S.C.J.) [R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle CO/p.].
173 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, supra note 164 at s. 2. Section 2 states:
2. (I) In this Act,

172

"offence-related property" means, with (he exception of a controlled substance, any property, within or
outside Canada,
(a) by means of or in respect of which a designated substance offence is committed,
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission ofa designated substance
offence, or
(c) that is intended for use for the purpose of committing a designated substance offence; ....
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under section 490.1(2) of the Criminal Code, and related section 16(2) of the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act. 174 Pursuant to the Criminal Code, "offence-related property"
means the following:
2. In this Act,
"offence-related property" means any property, within or outside Canada,
(a) by means or in respect of which an indictable offence under this Act or the
Corruption ofForeign Public Officials Act is committed,
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of such an
offence, or
(c) that is intended to be used for committing such an offence; .... 175
This propelty included items, such as clothing and jewelry, that had the trade-marked
symbols ofthe Hells Angels on them. 176 The Crown in Regina v. Hells Angels Motorcycle

CO/po conceded that the property was not used at the moment that the offences for which the
accused were convicted, occurred. 177

The trial judge in the case, the Honourable Justice McMahon, had convicted some of the
individuals charged with predicate offences in the indictment (that is to say, offences which
underlay the other criminal organization charges). In addition, the trial judge had found that
Hells Angels chapters in Canada constituted a criminal organization under section 467.1 (1) of
the Criminal Code. Section 467.1 of the Criminal Code contains a rather complicated
definition that renders proof of a criminal organization quite difficult:
467.1 (1) The following definitions apply in this Act.
"criminal organization" means a group, however organized, that
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or
commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely
result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a
financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the
group.
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate
commission of a single offence.
"serious offence" means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of
Parliament for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or
R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle COIp. , supra note 172 at paras. 1-2.
m Criminal Code, supra note 12 at ss. 2(a)-(c).
176 R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle COIp., supra note 172 at paras. I and 23.
m Ibid. at para. 7.
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more, or another offence that is prescribed by regulation. 178
Section 467.1 does not criminalize the act of being in a criminal organization, nor does it
criminalize being a criminal organization. Individuals who are members or associates of a
criminal organization, as defined in section 467.1, must commit offences in connection with
that organization in order to be convicted of an offence. The Honourable Judge McMahon
had indeed found that some of the individuals charged had commit the predicate offences in
connection with a criminal organization offences contrary to section 467.12 ofthe Criminal

Code which prohibits the commission of an indictable offence" ... for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization .... ,,179

Subsequent to the trial, in the forfeiture application, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
held that the items which bore the Hells Angel death head logo were "offence-related
property", and were "intended to be used" for the commission of indictable offences:
Are these items of clothing and jewellery, bearing the deaths head logo
"offence-related property"? I find that these items are in a broad sense, "intended to be
used" for the commission of indictable offences. Hells Angels chapters in Canada
comprise a criminal organization of which one of the "main purposes is the
facilitation or commission of serious offences including trafficking in cocaine and
other drugs, extortion and trafficking in firearms". McMahon J. stated in his decision
of R. v. Ward, as follows at paragraph 97:
Based on the evidence of Mr. Gault and Detective Sergeant Davis, and the
words of MI'. Ward himself I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Hells Angels Motorcycle Club of Canada is a criminal organization as defined
by section 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that one of the main purposes or activities of the Hells Angels
Motorcycle Club in Canada is the facilitation or commission of serious
offences including trafficking in cocaine and other drugs, extortion and
trafficking in firearms. Further, I am satisfied that the facilitation of these
offences has resulted in the direct and indirect receipt of material benefit by
the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club and individual Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club members who have benefited.
24 The use ofthese items is intended to further the organizational purposes. It is
23

Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 467.1.
R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle CO/p., supra note 172 at pam. 10. Section 467.12 of the Criminal Code, supra
note 12, states:
467.12 (I) Every person who commits an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fOUlteen years.
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (I), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to prove
that the accused knew the identity of any ofthe persons who constitute the criminal organization.
178
179
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used to intimidate and extort, and to serve as a badge of trustworthiness in the conduct
of drug deals. It matters not, that at the precise moment of ext01lion, the trademark is
not displayed, or that the person actually handling drugs does not wear the item.
Persons at the upper levels ofthe Hells Angel's hierarchy ensure that lower level
associates do the dirty work. 180
As a result of this determination, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that the property
should not be returned to the Hells Angels corporation l8I pursuant to subsection 490.4(3) of
the Criminal Code,182 and related subsection 19(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances

Act. I83 Both ofthese subsections allow for the restoration ofpropel1y if the applicant person
has an entitlement or right to the property, or " ... appears innocent of any complicity in, or
collusion in relation to, the offence.,,184

The Trade-marks Act could be amended so as to empower the Registrar of the Register of
Trade-marks to expunge a registered trade-mark of an organized crime outlaw group if a
COUll has ordered the forfeiture of items bearing that trade-mark based on a finding that they
R. . v Hells Angels Motorcycle Corp., supra note 172 at paras. 23 and 24.
Ibid. at paras. 27-30.
182 Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 490.4. Subsections 490.4(1) and (3) state:

180

181

490.4 (I) Before making an order under subsection 490.1(1) or 490.2(2) in relation to any property, a
court shall require notice in accordance with subsection (2) to be given to, and may hear, any person
who, in the opinion of the court, appears to have a valid interest in the property.
(3) A COUlt may order that all or part of the property that would otherwise be forfeited under subsection
490.1 (1) or 490.2(2) be returned to a person - other than a person who was charged with an indictable
offence under this Act or the Corruption ofForeigll Public Officials Act or a person who acquired title
to or a right of possession of the property from such a person under circumstances that give rise to a
reasonable inference that the title or right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the forfeiture of
the property - if the court is satisfied that the person is the lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to
possession of all or part ofthat property, and that the person appears innocent of any complicity in, or
collusion in relation to, the offence.
183 Controlled Drugs alld Substances Act, supra note 164 at s. 19(3). Subsections 19(1) and (3) state:
19. (I) Before making an order under subsection 16(1) or 17(2) in relation to any propelty, a court shall
require notice in accordance with subsection (2) to be given to, and may hear, any person who, in the
opinion of the court, appears to have a valid interest in the property.
(3) Where a COUlt is satisfied that any person, other than
(a) a person who was charged with a designated substance offence, or
(b) a person who acquired title to or a right of possession of the property fi'om a person
referred to in paragraph (a) under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that
the title or right was transferred for the pm'pose of avoiding the forfeiture of the property,
is the lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession of any property or any part of any property that
would otherwise be forfeited pursuant to an order made under subsection 16(1) or 17(2) and that the
person appears innocent of any complicity in an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or of any collusion
in relation to such an offence, the court may order that the property or PaIt be returned to that person.
184 Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 490.4(3).
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are offence-related propel1y. Presently in the Trade-marks Act, the Registrar bas tbe power to
expunge. However, sucb power is discretionary rather than mandatory. Sections 43 and 44
of the Trade-marks Act empower the Registrar to expunge the registration of trade-marks if a
registered owner of a trade-mark does not provide representations or information required on
an application for registration. 18S And, section 46 of the Trade-marks Act empowers the
Registrar to expunge registration if a registered owner does not pay the prescribed renewal
fee. 186 The proposed amendment would expand this pre-existing power to expunge based on
orders of forfeiture.
The addition of such a provision or amendment could mean that if forfeiture were ordered in
one jurisdiction in Canada, for instance by a provincial or superior court in one province, then
a trade-mark would be expunged across Canada by the Registrar of the Register of Trademarks. Thus, all members of an organized crime outlaw group would lose their power based
on the illegal actions of one member. The American case of Rivera v. Carter 187 demonstrates
a concern by the judiciary to limit the rights of the collective based on the actions of the few.
However, a statutory provision in the Canadian Trade-marks Act could alleviate this concern
by relying on the evidentiary requirement within the forfeiture sections of the Criminal Code
(0

prove a connection between the offence and the trade-mark, or by containing the

evidentiary requirements within the criminal organization provisions that mandate proof of a
connection between the offence and the criminal organization 188 which is the trade-mark
owner. Organized crime outlaw groups would have notice that if they provide their name and
insignia to members, then they suffer the consequences ofthe actions of those members who
use the name and insignia for illegal purposes.

4.7.8.6

Expropriation by the Government of a Registered Trade-mark

Used in a Criminal Offence l89

Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at ss. 43 and 44(1) and (3).
Ibid at ss. 46(1 )-(3).
187 Rivera v. CarIeI', supra note 7.
'88 Criminal Code, supra note 12 at ss. 467.12 and 467. \3.
'85
18.

189 This idea of expropriation of a registered trade-mark of a gang into the name ofthe govemmen!, originated
from Professor Graham Reynolds, SchuHch School of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
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The Trade-marks Act could be amended to empower the Government of Canada, a province,
or a territory, to expropriate a trade-mark if that trade-mark has facilitated or been used in
connection with a Criminal Code or the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offence; or if
the trade-mark is found to be offence-related propeliy. In addition, section 9 of the Trade-

marks Act which prohibits the adoption and commercial exploitation of a number of
predominantly public or governmental marks,190 could be amended to prohibit the adoption
or commercial exploitation of registered trade-marks that have been expropriated by the
Government of Canada, a province, or a territory. A power of expropriation could exist
separately from the power to expunge so as to allow the Government of Canada to control
and prohibit the use of trade-marks in the event that the Registrar of the Register of Trademarks did not exercise its power to expunge a trade-mark. Further, a power of expropriation
would enable the Government of Canada to assume the rights in the mark or work
themselves, rather than simply assume control over items bearing the mark or the work that
had been ordered forfeited.

As noted above, subsection 490.4(3) of the Criminal Code and subsection 19(3) of the

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act/ 9/ allow for the restoration of property if the applicant
person has an entitlement or right to the propeliy, and has not participated in the offence
relating to the seizure of the property. If the Trade-marks Act allowed the government or a
governmental agency, to expropriate trade-marks, then the "lawful owner" of the insignia of
any organized crime outlaw group, and arguably any items bearing that group insignia, would
be the government or its agency. Thus, expropriation could prevent these groups from
applying pursuant to sub-section 490.4 of the Criminal Code, for the retul'll of property
bearing their insignia.

190 Trade-marks Act, supra note 88 at s. 9(\); and Calladian Olympic Association v Regis/rar a/Trade Marks
(1982),59 C.P.R. (2d) 53, [1982]2 F.C. 274 (F.C.) at para 3. Section 9(\) prohibits the adoption of
a~proximately 21 types of marks many of which relate to marks associated with governments or nations.
I I Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 490.4(3) and Con/rolled Drugs and Substances Act, supra note 164 at s.
19(3).
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4.7.8.7

Mass Distribution of a Trade-mark l92

The power of organized crime outlaw groups results, in part, from the association of a
reputation for violence and intimidation with the group name or its insignia. Organized crime
outlaw groups often allow only members to use the group name and wear the group insignia,
in order to ensure that the group reputation perpetuates in accordance with group values,
beliefs and behaviours. One way to diminish the power ofthe insignia of an organized crime
outlaw group is to dilute it through mass production and distribution to individuals who will
wear or use the insignia in ways that discord with the group's reputation for violence and
intimidation. Indeed, the statutory protection for trade-mark owners under the Trade-marks

Act in Canada, and the statutory provisions prohibiting dilution in the United States,
demonstrate a recognition of the power of insignia within commercial settings, and the ability
of non-owners to deteriorate or diminish this power.

If the Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act were amended to allow for expropriation of a
registered trade-mark or copyright work by the government, then the legal difficulties
evidenced in Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National

Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union ofCanada (CAWCanada), regarding reproduction and parody would not exist. With expropriation provisions,
law enforcement officials could disseminate insignia of an organized crime outlaw group in
various forms en masse in an effort to dilute, and subsequently tarnish or blur, the reputation
associated with that group's name and insignia.

If the Trade-marks Act or Copyright Act were not amended to allow for expropriation of a
registered trade-mark by the government, then law enforcement officials could engage in
mass distribution of the insignia of an organized crime outlaw group under the protection of
section 25.1 of the Criminal Code. In order to ensure that officers can effectively enforce the
law,193 section 25.1 justifies acts or omissions of public officers, such as peace officers, who
commit "offences" while enforcing the law, or while investigating a criminal offence or
activity. Section 25.1 has restrictions. It does not empower officers to cause death or bodily
192 The development of the ideas pe!taining to trade-mark and copyright issues within mass distribution of gang
marks, came from Professor Graham Reynolds, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
193 Criminal Code, supra note 12 at s. 25.1(2).
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harm , to obstruct justice, or to violate the sexual integrity of an individual. 194 It does not
excuse an officer from criminal liability associated with the illegal collection of evidence, 195
or associated with a violation of Pali I of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and its
regulations. 196 Subsection 25.1 (8) and (9) state the requisite circumstances for justification
for the commission of an offence:
(8) A public officer is justified in committing an act or omission - or in directing the
commission of an act or omission under subsection (10) - that would otherwise
constitute an offence if the public officer
(a) is engaged in the investigation of an offence under, or the enforcement of,
an Act of Parliament or in the investigation of criminal activity;
(b) is designated under subsection (3) or (6); and
(c) believes on reasonable grounds that the commission of the act or omission,
as compared to the nature of the offence or criminal activity being
investigated, is reasonable and proportional in the circumstances, having
regard to such matters as the nature of the act or omission, the nature of the
investigation and the reasonable availability of other means for carrying out
the public officer's law enforcement duties.
(9) No public officer is justified in committing an act or omission that would
otherwise constitute an offence and that would be likely to result in loss of or serious
damage to propelty, or in directing the commission of an act or omission under
subsection (10), unless, in addition to meeting the conditions set out in paragraphs
(8)(a) to (c), he or she
(a) is personally authorized in writing to commit the act 01' omission - or direct
its commission - by a senior official who believes on reasonable grounds that
committing the act or omission, as compared to the nature of the offence or
criminal activity being investigated, is reasonable and propOltional in the
circumstances, having regard to such matters as the nature of the act or
omission, the nature of the investigation and the reasonable availability of
other means for carrying out the public officer's law enforcement duties; or
(b) believes on reasonable grounds that the grounds for obtaining an
authorization under paragraph (a) exist but it is not feasible in the
circumstances to obtain the authorization and that the act 01' omission is
necessary to
(i) preserve the life or safety of any person,
(ii) prevent the compromise of the identity of a public officer acting in
an undercover capacity, of a confidential informant or of a person
acting covertly under the direction and control of a public officer, or
(iii) prevent the imminent loss 01' destruction of evidence of an
indictable offence. 197

'" Ibid at s. 25.1(11).
'" Ibid at s. 25.1(13).
196 Ibid at s. 25.1(14).
197 Ibid at s. 25.1(8) and (9).
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Section 25.1 does not specifically mention the kinds of "offences" that it contemplates, nor
does it circumscribe the definition of "offences." However, ideally, subsections 25.1(8) and
(9) of the Criminal Code would be amended in order to explicitly provide authority to public
officers to commit infringements or violations of the Trade-marks Act and offences under the
Copyright Act.

4.7.8.8

The Use of a Trade-mark and Trade-name in Different Trade

Areas to Deteriorate Distinctiveness
The decisions in Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc. [98 and Remo Imports Ltd. v. Jaguar
Cars Ltd., [99 indicate that the use of a mark in a different trade area may not amount to

confusion which is prohibited by section 20 of the Trade-marks Act. Although the increased
use of a mark in unrelated trade areas may not amount to confusion, it still may reduce the
general fame and reputation of a mark. Law enforcement agencies that use insignia of an
organized crime outlaw group in trade areas different from those used by the group, could
dilute or diminish the power of a group's insignia and name without violating trade-mark
laws. The trade-mark owner, Mattei, in the case of Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc.,
recognized this potential outcome when it asserted that BARBIE transcends products it
originally sought to distinguish. 2oo Mattei argued that the fame of BARBIE exists in relation
to a diversity of products such as dolls, lotions and perfumes, food products, bicycles,
backpacks, books, and construction pads, and that nothing prevents Mattei from using the
trade-mark in areas other than its primary market. 2Q[ Goodwill within a reputation may cross
over into other trade areas. The Supreme Court of Canada in Mattei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada
Inc. recognized that this argument was accepted in the dissenting judgment in Pink Panther
Beauty Corp. v. United Artists COI]).202 However, the COUlt rejected this argument, and

Mallet, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., supra note 117.
Remo Imports Ltd. v. Jaguar Cars Ltd., supra note 115.
200 Mallei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., supra note 117 at para. 4.
Ibid. at para. 4.
'.2 [1998] 3 F.e. 534 at para. 58. The Supreme Court in Mallei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., supra note 117 at
para. 62 described this argument:
62
In Pink Panther, a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the registration of the
"Pink Panthel" as a trade-mark for a line of hair care and beauty product supplies over the oppositiou
of an existing trade-mark holder which had produced a very successful series offilms of the same name
stmTing Peter Sellers as Inspector Clouseau. McDonald J.A., dissenting, complained that "it is
precisely because of the fame and goodwill associated with the name 'The Pink Panther' that the
198

199

2.,
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focused on the lack of confusion between BARBIE and the restaurant services when it
dismissed the claim by MatteI. 203
The dilution or diminishment of the insignia of an organized crime outlaw group through the
creation of business activity in trade areas different from those in which a group operates,
presents a significant economic commitment by law enforcement in its war against organized
crime. It would require governmental action that goes beyond simply enforcing the law, and
that mischievously meddles in business affairs. The nature of such a law enforcement
endeavour may raise some ethical and fairness concerns relating to intentional governmental
interference in the business of targeted individuals who mayor may not have been previously
found to be members of a criminal organization, and who mayor may not have been
convicted of a criminal organization offence. In addition, this undet1aking may produce
unintended consequences. If the power of the insignia of an organized crime outlaw group
can be reduced by its use in unrelated trade areas or by businesses that do not contribute to its
reputation, then the power of a group's mark may also be augmented by its use in unrelated
trade areas or by businesses that do contribute to its reputation. Chris Brown describes the
positive correlation or association that may exist between marks in different trade areas, and
that become a derivative of dilution:
The difficulty in defining dilution and in delineating its objectives has led to the
creation of a net that plaintiffs can cast over any similar shape moving in the water.
While [Frank] Schechter originally conceived the problem to be addressed by dilution
as the use of the identical mark of one company on another company's product, the
current evolution of the doctrine in several circuits allows each mark holder his or her
own penumbra of propertied expression. One commentator's professed shock that the
person who coined the name Federal Espresso actually admitted to thinking of Federal
Express and appreciating the connection exemplifies the sense of entitlement of those
who want to protect similar brand names. Despite extensive discussion of nodes and
links, no article has yet demonstrated that the name Federal Espresso would cause
harm to the brand Federal Express. Quite possibly it strengthens the original brand
by building afresh network o.fnodes. While everyone hearing Federal Espresso may
automatically think ofFederal Express, thereby increasing that brand's nodal

203

appellant has chosen that name for its business" (para. 58). However, his objection was rejected by the
majority ....
Mallei, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., supra note 117 at para. 74.
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connections, thaI outcome does nol demonstrate that those hearing or seeing Federal
Express will consequently think ofFederal Espresso. 204 [Emphasis added].

While Brown's comments relate specifically to the American concept of dilution, the
phenomenon that he describes could seemingly occur with any mark. Such phenomenon
necessitates the exercise of caution by law enforcement agencies that use of the names and
insignia of an organized crime outlaw group in different trade areas. These agencies would
have to ensure that the increase in notoriety, in and of itself, does not enhance the group
reputation, rather than deteriorate it.

4.7.8.9

The Commercial Use of a Mark of a Gang or Organized Crime

Outlaw Group in Criminal Activities by Law Enforcement in Order to
Diminish the Power of the Mark20s

4.7.8.9.1

The Use by Law Enforcement of a Seized Registered

Trade-mark of a Gang or Organized Crime Outlaw Group
The use of names and insignia of organized crime outlaw groups by undercover officers in
illegal commercial transactions such as drug transactions or extOliions, would dilute, tarnish,
blur, or depreciate the goodwill of those names and insignia ifthose undercover officers did
not uphold their obligations in those enterprises. The reputation of an organized crime
outlaw group serves to prevent "drug burns" and dishonesty among thieves. Ifundercover
officers did not adhere to the "integrity" that is associated witll group's names and trademarks in their undercover activities, then that "integrity", the reputation, and the power of
that name and insignia would diminish. That is to say, if undercover officers violated the
"integrity" of a patch by ripping people off in a drug deal, or by not acting in a violent and
intimidating way during an extOltion, then they would diminish the power of the patch.
One of the difficulties for undercover officers who seek to diminish the power of the patch by
using it in ways contrary to the reputation of the organized crime group, is gaining access to
or use of paraphernalia that bear organized crime insignia. For items bearing trade-marks

2(', Chris Brown, "A Dilution Delusion:

The Unjustifiable Protection of Similar Marks" (2004) 72 U. Cin. L.R.
1023 at 1039.
'" The ideas associated with law enforcement using the mark ofa gang in undercover operations involving
commercial transactions in order to diminish the power of the mark, originated from Professor Steve Coughlan,
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie Law School.
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that have been seized, and have been forfeited to the Crown, such as occurred in Regina v.
Hells Angels Motorcycle Corp. /06 law enforcement agencies have access to real insignia of

an organized crime outlaw group, and do not have to concern themselves with violating the
Copyright Act in producing such items. However, legal obstacles within the concepts of use

as defined in section 4 of the Trade-marks Act; passing off as enshrined into law by section 7;
confusion as set forth in sections 6 and 20; and depreciation of goodwi11 as embodied in
section 22, prevent law enforcement agencies from using seized or forfeited name or insignia
of an organized crime outlaw group in commercial transactions - even illegal commercial
transactions.
Section 25.1 of the Criminal Code may enable law enforcement agencies to overcome these
obstacles. Although the use of a seized item bearing the registered trade-mark of an
organized crime outlaw group by law enforcement would amount to an offence under the
Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act, section 25.1 allows peace officers to commit "offences"

in various circumstances with the proper authorization. This section could be amended to
expressly allow officers to commit Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act infringements or
violations, such as exist in sections 4,7,20 and 22, while enforcing the law or investigating a
criminal offence or activity.

4.7.8.9.2

The Use by Law Enforcement of an Unregistered Mark of a

Gang or Organized Crime Outlaw Group
The right to use an unregistered mark of an organized crime outlaw group receives protection
under the trade-mark law concept of passing off even if that mark is not formally registered
under the Trade-marks Act?07 Thus, the use by law enforcement of an unregistered mark of
an organized crime outlaw group in commercial transactions may still amount to passing off,
and thus, the commercial use of that mark may be an offence under section 7 of the Trademarks Act. As argued above, section 25.1 of the Criminal Code could be amended in order to

expressly allow officers to commit Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act infringements or
violations while enforcing the law, or investigating a criminal offence or activity.

206
207

R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle CO/p., supra note 172.
"Trade-marks and the Internet: A Canadian Perspective", supra note 91 at para. 23.
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4.7.8.9.3

The Use by Law Enforcement of a Reproduced Registered

Trade-mark of a Gang or Organized Crime Outlaw Group
Copyright and trade-mark laws present a number of difficulties for law enforcement agencies
that might seek to diminish the power of organized crime outlaw insignia by using it. Law
enforcement agencies may not possess any, or may only possess a very small number of,
copyright works or items with the registered trade-mark of an organized crime outlaw group,
since they primarily acquire these items by seizing them in the course of criminal
investigations. The more individuals who use a registered trade-mark of a gang or a
copyrighted work contrary to its reputation, the more the reputation of that mark or work will
diminish .. However, there may not be enough works or items to effect an undercover
operation, and law enforcement agencies cannot simply copy or reproduce the work. They
must overcome sections 3 and 27 of the Copyright Act which prevent law enforcement from
reproducing the work of a copyright owner. Reproduction of a substantial pat1 of the work of
an owner so as to make the original work immediately apparent in the infringing work, is
primajacie prohibited unless reproduction amounts to fair dealing. 2os
Sections 3 and 27 of the Copyright Act209 could he amended in order to allow the
reproduction of works that have been used in a Criminal Code or the Controlled Drugs and

Substances Act offence; that are offence-related property; or that an offence was committed
in relation thereto. In addition, or alternatively, section 25.1 of the Criminal Code could be
amended in order to expressly allow for the infringement of copyright works in instances
where those works were used in connection with the commission of a criminal offence during
an investigation; or where a cOUl1 of competent jurisdiction has declared that those works
were used in connection with a criminal offence. These amendment would allow law
enforcement agencies to reproduce works to meet the needs of their undercover operations.

Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union a/Canada (CAW-Canada), supra note 132 at paras. 57-58.
209 Copyright Act, supra note 89 at 55.3 and 27.
.
208
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4.6.7

Evaluations and Recommendations

Laws that target both the economic vitality of organized crime, and the reputation and
identity of organized crime groups, remain very significant in countering organized crime.
The "heat" or presence of law enforcement around the activities of organized crime groups,
and the involvement of the courts in ordering seizure and disposition of their propelty, makes
organized crime members more wary, and may hinder their eff0l1s to produce illegal
substances and engage in illegal endeavours. Although, the seizure oftheir assets may have
some, albeit limited,210 impact on the overall criminal organization. However, the collective
contribution of proceeds of crime and forfeiture laws, civil forfeiture laws, statutorily
mandated community safety programs, and trade-mark and copyright laws, may have more
impact. To date, trade-mark and copyright laws have not been amended to augment antiorganized crime measures.
The reputation for violence and intimidation within the name and insignia of organized crime
outlaw groups empowers them to commit criminal acts, and trade-mark and copyright laws
contribute to this end. Trade-mark and copyright laws can be used to protect reputations of
organized crime outlaw groups as these reputations are manifested through their names and
insignia, and thus, enhance organized crime violence. The purpose of trade-mark law in
regulating commercial relations and transactions, to some degree, limits the protection
provided to organized crime outlaw groups in their use of their insignia in criminal activities.
However, in other ways, the provisions in trade-mark law that prohibit depreciation of
goodwill, dilution, and passing off, and the ability of copyright law to restrict reproductions
of works such as these group marks, insulate organized crime outlaw groups from law
enforcement agency efforts to diminish the power of the group names and insignia. The
proposed amendments to the Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act in subsection six "Using
Trade-mark and Copyright Laws to Pierce the Power ofthe Patch" of this section,
individually and in conjunction with one another, could prevent organized crime outlaw
groups from receiving trade-mark protection for insignia used in criminal offences. rfused as
210 "To What Extent is the UK's Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recover Regime Used Against Organised
Crime?", supra note 27 at 146. Sproat asserts that although anti-money laundering and assets recovery regimes
have allowed the state in the United Kingdom to take £360 m from criminals from approximately 2006 to 2009,
serious organized crime has approximately £20 000 m of capital, and launders approximately £64 000 m to £192
000 m during this same time period.
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suggested, and amended as recommended, trade-mark and copyright laws may deter
organized crime outlaw groups fi'om registering their insignia at all, and prevent them fi'om
receiving statutory legal assistance in propagating their reputation and facilitating their
criminal purposes. The dilution and tarnishment of the insignia and names of organized
crime outlaw groups can negatively affect the power of organized crime outlaws within the
criminal milieu and the fear that they instill in conventional society.

The amended proceeds of crime and forfeiture provisions, the use of civil forfeiture laws,
new statutorily mandated community safety programs, and proposed amendments to trademark and copyright legislation, could prevent and limit the bolstering of organized crime
identities; decrease internal cohesion within organized crime groups; and reduce the power of
their reputations. These laws could pierce the "power of the patch." In so doing, they could
reduce organized crime and violence in society, and thus, reduce fear or panic. They could
effect social control, contribute to social order, and foster respect for the law.

Based on the analysis of Requisite Six and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes the
following recommendations:

Recommendation Sixteen: Individuals should only be subject to fOifeiture orders if they
have been found guilty of a criminal offince, and the property relates to or is connected to
the commission of that offince.
Recommendation Seventeen: Proceeds of crime andforfeiture legislation, also known as
anti-money laundering and asset recovelY regimes, ought to be used in order to seize ofJencerelated property, such as the insignia and clubhouses oforganized crime outlaw groups and
members. When forfeiture under the Criminal Code cannot occur, civil fOifeiture proceedings
in this regard ought to take place.
Recommendation Eighteen: Statutorily mandated community safety programs implemented
by some provinces in an efJort to prevent members of organized crime outlaw groups from
wearing their patches, group insignia, or group colours in certain public places should be reevaluated, and where possible, voluntary participation should be encouraged, such as exists
in the Bar Watch and Restaurant Watch programs in British Columbia.
Recommendation Nineteen: The Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act should be amended in
a number ofways. These amendments should:
a.
allow the government to register unregistered insignia of organized crime
outlaw groups in order to assume control over the reputation ofthose groups;
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b.

expand the terms "offensive" and "scandalous" in section 9 of the Trade-

marks Act in order to prohibit the registration of marks of organized crime outlaw
groups where those marks are used in connection with criminal offences;
c.
augment the laws that regulate registration and renewal of trade-marks, and
requiring stringent proof of the purposes of a mark within section 30 of the Trademarks Act;
d.
increase the power of the Registrar to expunge and expropriate marks that
facilitate or are associated with the commission ofa criminal offence;
e.
empower governments to expropriate ofregistered trade-marks where such
marks have been used in connection with a criminal offence.
f
allow law enforcement to diminish the power of organized crime outlaw
groups through mass distribution of their names and insignia; through the use of a
group trade-mark or trade-name in different trade areas; and through the use of a
group mark in illegal commercial transactions.
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4.8

REQUISITE SEVEN FOR ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME MEASURES

Requisite Sevell

Rooted in Deviance and Labelling TheOlY, and Social Psychology:
Anti-organized crime approaches must avoid the imposition offormal negative
labels, stigmatization and degradation in social and legal processes in order to
prevent potential deviants or outlaws fi'om being ousted from larger society, and
thus, deepening the chasm between non-outlaw members of society and outlaw
members of society.

4.8.1

Overview

A number of anti-organized crime measures, those grounded in criminal law as well as
those implemented by communities, result in the imposition of negative labels,
stigmatization and degradation of organized crime outlaws and potential outlaws.
According to insights from deviance and labelling theory and social psychology,
preventative judicial restraints, proscription of criminal organizations and membership in
those organizations, as well as some community action programs, may widen the schism
between non-outlaw conventional members of society and organized crime outlaw
members of society.

As discussed in section six of this Chapter "Requisite Five for Anti-Organized Crime
Measures", conflict exists among some requisites due to conflicting insights from
different sociological and criminological theories. For instance, Requisite Seven does not
advocate the imposition of labels, but Requisite Five, based in part on insights from
differential association and social learning in subcultures, advocates reducing anti-social
interactions among organized crime outlaws in order to prevent the perpetuation of their
identity and the empowerment of their reputations. Banning anti-social associations is a
possible anti-organized crime measure using the criminal law, but banning can involve
the imposition of labels via proscription - that is to say, the formal labelling through
criminalization - of certain organized crime groups. In this Chapter, the negative aspects
of various anti-organized crime measures that impose labels will be canvassed and
evaluated.
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4.8.2

Anti-Organized Crime Measures and the Imposition of

Negative Labels, Stigmatization or Degradation
4.8.2.1

Criminal Justice Processes Generally and Organized Crime

Trials Specifically
As asserted in Chapter Three in section five "Deviance and Labelling Theory" at
subsection two "Application of Concepts within Deviance and Labelling Theory to the
Identity of Outlaws", some empirical evidence asserts that public labelling further embeds
deviance for some offenders. I In addition, ordinary or pre-existing criminal justice
processes assign negative labels to accused who are charged with criminal offences, and
further embed deviance such as gang membership.2 Accused who are charged with
criminal organization offences face very specific and very negative labels, and one
expects that these accused may face more intense stigma, more severe ostracization, or
more negative social interactions as a result. However, some research indicates that
labelling alone within the criminal justice system may not account for gang membership
and particularly gang membership by individuals of ethnic minority groupS.3 FUl1her
empirical evidence regarding the effects of the present Criminal Code provisions on
criminal embeddedness need to be conducted to determine whether specific labels of
"criminal organization" result in more severe consequences for those labelled. If such
labels increase criminal embeddedness, then use of ordinary or pre-existing Criminal
Code offences to deal with the criminal acts of organized crime outlaws may remedy this

result.

I Sean Maddan, The Labeling oiSex Offenders: The Uninlended Consequences of Ihe Besl Intentional
Public Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008) at 32.
2 J6n Gunnar Bernburg, Marvin D. Krohn & Craig J. Rivera, "Official Labeling, Criminal Embeddedness,
and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory" (2006) 43 J. of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 67 at 69 and 77. Berburg, Krohn and Rivera assert that juvenile justice intervention
increases gang membership by a factor of 5.2.
3 Robert M. Gordon, "Criminal Business Organization, Street Gangs and "Wanna-Be" Groups: A
Vancouver Perspective" (2000) 42 Canadian Journal o[Criminology 39 at 55. Gordon asserts that
individuals from ethnic minorities may be more often surveyed and arrested, and thus, prosecuted.
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4.8.2.2

Preventative Judicial Restraints Against "Anti-Social" or

Dangerous Behaviour
The Canadian government created preventative judicial restraint measures in order to
circumscribe the libelty of individuals believed to be a risk of committing a criminal
organization offence. In section 810.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 4 a provincial
COUlt judge may impose a peace bond or recognizance on an individual for up to twelve
months if there are reasonable grounds to fear that the person will commit a criminal
organization offence,s and up to two years if the person has been previously convicted of
a criminal organization offence and there are reasonable grounds to fear that the person
will commit another criminal organization offence. 6 The court may impose significant
controls on the liberty of the individual, such as treatment, electronic monitoring,
geographical limitations, residency requirements, abstention provisions, as well as
firearms and weapons prohibitions.? Like other recognizances, if the individual refuses to
enter into the recognizance, the judge may commit the individual to prison for a term not
exceeding 12 months. 8 Like other such recognizance provisions in the Canadian
Criminal Code, a breach of such a recognizance amounts to a criminal offence and is

punishable for up to two years imprisonment. 9

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code] at s. 810.01. Section 810.0 I states:
810.01 (I) A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit an offence
under section 423.1 , a criminal organization offence or a terrorism offence may, with the consent
of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial court judge.
(2) A provincial court judge who receives an information under subsection ( I) may cause the
parties to appear before a provinCial court judge.
(3) If the provincial court judge before whom the parties appear is satisfied by the evidence
adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, the judge may order that the
defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of not
more than 12 months.
(3. I) However, if the provincial COUlt judge is also satisfied that the defendant was convicted
previously of an offence referred to in subsection (1), the judge may order that the defendant enter
into the recognizance for a period of not more than two years. ...
, Ibid at s. 810.01(3). Section 2 of the Crimillal Code defines "criminal organization offence":
"criminal organization offence means
(a) an offence under section 467.11, 467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence committed for the
benefit of, at the direclion of, or in association with, a criminal organ ization, or
(b) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an accessory after the fact in relation to,
or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a); ... .
6 Ibid at ss. 810.0 I( I )-(3- 1).
7 Ibid. at ss. 810.01(4.1)-(5.1 ).
'Ibid. at s. 810.01(4).
9 Ibid at s. 811.
4
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Canada is not alone in its approach to formally label organized crime individuals via the
criminal law. In the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, '0 and subsequent amendments in the
Serio liS Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, the United Kingdom created anti-social

behaviour orders which enable government council or a chief officer of police to apply
for a court order prohibiting an individual from engaging in specified activities for up to
two years." The individual must have acted in an anti-social manner that caused or was
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, and the order must be necessary for the
protection of the public. 12 Failure to comply with an anti-social behaviour order may
result in a summary conviction offence and imprisonment for up to six months or a fine or
both; or it may result in an indictable offence and imprisonment for up to five years or a
fine or both. 13 Such orders are available not only for organized crime members, but also
for a variety of persons, such as youth, young offenders, parents of youth, and sexual or
violent offenders.
Preventative judicial measures like those in section 810.01 of the Criminal Code do not
amount to status offences,14 and thus, do not punish a person for their state of being.
However, these preventative judicial measures do effectively ostracize organized crime
outlaws from the mainstream of society by imposing a label of "other" - sometimes even
before these individuals commit a crime. Such orders cannot help but encourage or

10

I[

(U.K.), 1998, c. 37.
Ibid at s. I as amended by the Serious Organised Crime alld Police Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c. 15 at ss.

139-43.
Ibid at s. 1(1). Section I of the Crime alld Disorder Act 1998 states:
1
Anti-social behaviour orders
(I) An application for an order under this section may be made by a relevant authority if
it appears to the authority that the following conditions are fulfilled with respect to any
person aged 10 or over, namely(a) that the person has acted, since the commencement date, in an anti-social
manner, that is to say, in a mannel' that caused 01' was likely to cause harassment,
alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself;
and
(b) that such an order is necessary to protect persons in the local government
area in which the harassment, alarm or distress was caused or was likely to be
caused from further anti-social acts by him;
and in this section "relevant authority" means the council for the local government area or
any chiefomcer of police any part of whose police area lies within that area.
\3 Ibid at s. 1(10).
l< R. v. Budreo (2000), 142 C.C.C. (3d) 225, [2000] O.J. No. 72 (Q.L.) (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused
(2000),271 N.R. 197, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 542 (Q.L.) at paras. 24-26.
12
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entrench their subjects to internalize these labels, and taint their social interactions with
pro-social or conventional members of society. Further, a significant problem exists in
ordering alleged organized crime outlaws to comply with or be deterred by yet another
mainstream law - especially laws or legal mechanisms that they, perhaps with some
reason, perceive to be unjust.
The utility in employing preventative judicial restraint measures in order to thwart
organized crime activities, remains questionable. Preventative judicial measures seem
wise in that they do not require a criminal organization act to occur in order to control the
liberty of a potential organized crime outlaw and preempt organized crime activities.
However, the effectiveness of these preventative provisions can never really be evaluated,
since the number of criminal organization acts that did not occur cannot be determined,
and the avoided harm remains unknown. From a social constructionist perspective,
governments that implement judicial restraint measures in order to frustrate and stifle
organized crime acts, may be seen to be addressing the problem of organized crime
outlawry, but their methods escape evaluation due to the nnquantifiable nature ofthe
events that they allegedly prevented. Without knowing the effectiveness of the restraints,
it is hard to know whether formally labelling individuals is necessary and warranted. Due
to the significant restraints on the liberty of individuals subject to these orders, without
empirical evidence demonstrating their effectiveness and given the negative repercussions
from labelling, they should not be employed.

4.8.2.3

Proscription of Criminal Organizations and Membership in

Those Organizations
Arguments for and against proscription are set forth in this Chapter in section two
"Requisite One for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at subsection eight "Proscription as
a Solution to Definitional, Investigative, Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial Problems within
Criminal Organization Legislation." These arguments will not be reiterated here, other
than to briefly note the effects. From the perspective of deviance and labelling theory,
proscription of specific criminal organizations and of membership in those organizations
amounts to the imposition of a formal label, and thus, potentially results in stigmatization,
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ostracization and degradation of those labelled. These effects of proscription are not far
removed from those of preventative judicial restraint measures in that those individuals
who are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed an act that would
otherwise amount to a criminal offence, are treated as criminals and are subject to
significant restraints on their physical liberty and freedoms. However, specific and longterm empirical research in relation to the imposition of public labels or Criminal Code
labels of "criminal organization" member or "criminal organization" is required to know
the real effects of these labels on criminal embeddedness and recidivism. Some anecdotal
evidence exists from a spokesman of the Hells Angels, Rick Ciarniello whose
constitutional challenge of the criminal organization legislation was dismissed for lack of
standing in the British Columbia Supreme Court.'5 Ciarniello alleged in an affidavit that
as a result of the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice declaration in R. v. Lindsay 16 that the
Hells Angels is a criminal organization pursuant to section 467.1 of the Criminal Code,
he and other Hells Angels had suffered ostracism in the community.
[Ciarniello] gave specific examples of how people had treated him
differently after the Ontario ruling: he recalled going one night to a Joey
Tomatoes restaurant in Coquitlam, where he overheard a couple asking to be
moved because "they did not want to sit next to a criminal, namely a member of
the Hells Angels." This made him uncomfortable, so he decided to leave the
restaurant, he said.
"I have noticed a marked difference in the way that people respond to me
when I am wearing my colors," Ciarniello stated in his affidavit. "The mood has
gone from friendly and casual curiosity to fear, loathing and avoidance such that I
am made to feel uncomfortable wearing the HAMC [Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club] insignia."
He said staff members at the local Safeway near his Port Coquitlam home,
where he has purchased groceries for 20 years, were not as friendly as they used to
be, and he received similar treated at a Shell gas station. His affidavit also
claimed that, after the Ontario ruling, John Brice Sr. [then President of the East
End Charter in Burnaby, British Columbia] was refused service as a customer of
the Bank of Nova Scotia after two decades of doing business there. 17
If the criminal law as it presently exists results in such negative stigma from formal
labelling, one wonders whether proscription would be any worse. The actual effects of a

" Neal Hall, Hell To Pay: Hells Angels vs. The Million Dollar Ral (Mississauga: John Wiley & Sons
Canada, Ltd., 2011) [Hell To Pay: Hells Angels vs. The Million Dollar Ral] at 142-44.
16 R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLIl24240, [2005] OJ. No. 2870 (Ont. S.CJ.).
17 Hell To Pay: Hells Angels vs. The Million Dol/ar Ral, supra note 15 at 143.
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proscribed organized crime label - that is to say, one imposed not by the public or the
court, but by a government body - would also require evaluation in order to determine the
true negative effects of proscription in comparison to public labelling or formal criminal
justice labelling.

4.8.2.4

Community Action Programs

Community action programs, like some criminal law anti-organized crime measures, also
may label, stigmatize, degrade, and ostracize organized crime outlaws. As discussed in
this Chapter in section four "Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at
subsection two "Examples of Community Education and Action Programs That Foster
Pro-Social Bonds", some Canadian provinces, such as British Columbia and Alberta,IS
club and restaurant owners in various communities 19 have voluntarily joined Bar Watch
and Restaurant Watch programs. Bar Watch members allow police to enter their
premises uninvited; to use metal detectors to locate weapons and identification scanners
to identify patrons; and to escort "known gangsters" from their premises. 2o Restaurant
Watch members agree to call police if they identify a gang member, gang associate, drug
trafficker, or person with a propensity for violence on their premises; and tbey allow
uniformed and plain clothes officers to conduct random checks on their premises for
gangsters. 21 That members of the public actively look for "known gangsters" means that
they accept a label that has been - accurately or inaccurately - imposed on these "known
gangsters", and they perpetuate that label by ostracizing the "known gangsters" from their
establishments. These "known gangsters" are thus, socially forbidden to associate with
presumed conventional members of society. Some gangs have retaliated against
I. CBC News, "Calgary Bars, Clubs Band Together to Keep Watch on Customers" (28 April 2009), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.calcanadalcalgary/storyI2009/04128/cgy-bar-watch-safety-securitycameras.html>. Calgary, Alberta implemented a bar watch program similar to that in Vancouver in April of
2009.
" Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Upper Fraser Valley Bar Watch - Committed to Community Safely"
(10 Mal'ch 2009), online: RCMP in B.C.
<http://bc.rcmp.caiV iewPage.action?siteNodeJ d=50&languageJd= I&contentld=8526>. The Bar Watch
£rogram exists in various communities, and not only in downtown Vancouver or the Metro Vancouver are~.
o Darryl Dyck, "Bar Watch Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened" (20 March 2009), online: CBC News
<http://ww w.cbc.calcanadalbritish·columbialstory/2009l03120/bc-bar-watch-earls.html> ["Bar Watch
Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened"l.
21 CBC News, "New Effort Aims to Keep Gangs Out of Vancouver Restaurants" (17 July 2008), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.calcanadalbritish·columbialstory/2008/07117Ibc-vancouver-restaurantwatch.html>. Twenty-nine restaurants had become members as ofJuly 17,2008.
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participation in such programs by shooting at and writing threatening graffiti on Bar
Watch establishments. 22 This retaliation may indeed demonstrate the gangsters'
propensity for violence and intimidation, but it also demonstrates the maintenance of a
negative label and the potential widening of the schism between organized crime outlaws
or alleged organized crime outlaws and law-abiding citizens.
Another community action program that functions by relying on labels, is the Citizen
Community Watch Program in British Columbia. Less than a month after a gang-related
shooting at a restaurant in an affluent neighbourhood on the West side of Vancouver,
British Columbia, police increased surveillance of organized crime outlaws by enlisting
an "army" of volunteer citizens to keep a watchful eye for licence plates known by police
to be associated with gang members, and to inform police who will dispatch a "quickresponse" team that will be visible in bars and other places. 23 The Citizen Community
Watch Program had 117 members in December 2010, and was used in the past to assist
police in locating stolen vehicles. Police hope to increase the Program to 200 members,
and use the squad in order to target gangster's licence plates. Vancouver Police Chief Jim
Chu described the technique: '''The volunteers will create an invisible net around highprofile gang hangouts and report to police when they spot a licence plate from the list. ",24
The effectiveness of these watchful eyes remains questionable. Such vigilance may assist
in preventing violence by unleashing a police presence on a gang presence. It may assist
police in locating gangsters after any violence has occurred, and thus, facilitate law
enforcement and criminal charges. However, the real purpose of these community
actions programs may be their ability to empower citizens who feel powerless and fearful
of organized crime outlaws and their violence and intimidation. In relation to the Citizen
Community Watch Program, Deputy Chief Warren Lemcke warns, '" If you are a gangster
coming into Vancouver, we're going to see you because we'll be watching.",25 These

Darryl Dyck, "Bar Watch Restaurant Defaced, Others Threatened" (20 March 2009), online: CBC News
<http://www.cbc.calcanadalbritish-columbialstoryI2009/03120Ibc-bal·-watch-earls.html>.
23 Lori Culbert, "City Gets Creative to Combat Gangs" Leader-Post (17 December 20 I0), online: Leader
Post <http://www.leaderpost.com/news/City+gets+creative+combat+gangs/3992071/story.html>.
22

24
2S

Ibid.
Ibid.
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programs also enable the community to band together, and collectively label or reasseli or
perpetuate a label for individuals whom police or another societal group has declared
"gangsters", or who have declared themselves to be "gangsters."

Simply because an organized crime measure involves the community, does not mean that
it has purely positive consequences for the entire community - both conventional
members of society as well as organized crime outlaws. Empirical research is required to
determine the extent of any negative effects of community action programs, such as
Citizen Community Watch, and Bar and Restaurant Watch. However, in spite ofthe fact
that such programs do not accord with some of the principles within deviance and
labelling theory, these community action progranls do accord with some of the principles
within social control and bond theory as discussed in this Chapter in section four
"Requisite Three for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at subsections one "AntiOrganized Crime Measures That Foster Pro-Social Bonds", and two "Examples of
Community Education and Action Programs That Foster Pro-Social Bonds." A conflict
exists between empowering the community, and perpetuating negative labels. It is not
easily resolved.

If labels were fairly and justly assigned to the "known gangsters" about whom
conventional society members should beware, then community action programs that
engage in such crime prevention may be justified. For instance, if a court of law indeed
found, based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that a particular group is a criminal
organization or a particular individual is a member of a criminal organization, then a label
has been imposed pursuant to ilie administration of justice. And thus, arguably,
community action programs that watched for convicted criminal organization offenders or
members of declared criminal organization groups, would have some reasonable basis to
perpetuate the imposed label. And, sentencing and post-sentencing reintegrative
measures could then take place. However, if those criminal organization laws lack fair
andjust processes, as has been argued in section two "Requisite One for Anti-Organized
Crime Measures", then community action programs only perpetuate negative, unfair and
potentially inaccurate labels, and thus, they further stigmatize, ostracize and degrade
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those subject to the labels. Reintegration would remain difficult if those labelled rejected
the labelers, and perceived the law to be unjust and unfair.
Proscription is another method of imposing a label pursuant to some regulated means that
is subject to legislative and judicial review. As discussed in this Chapter in section two
"Requisite One for Anti-Organized Crime Measures" at subsection eight "Proscription as
a Solution to Definitional, Investigative, Evidentiary, and Prosecutorial Problems within
Criminal Organization Legislation", the Governor in Council on the advice of the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness can proscribe terrorist groups and
assess the change in status of such groups,26 and proscription is subject to judicial
review. 27 A similar means of labelling organized criminal groups could be legislated.
Thus, community action programs could rely on the formal proscription of criminal
organizations and members of those criminal organizations in casting their watchful eyes
and conducting their "duties."

4.8.3

Evaluations and Recommendations

No method of "properly labelling" a criminal organization and a member of a criminal
organization, exists. Pmt of the difficulty stems from the fact that a definition of
"organized crime" or "criminal organization" is amorphous and elusive. Whether by the
public, by a court of law using the present Criminal Code provisions, or by a legislative
body subject to judicial review, the application of labels to organized crime outlaws is
based on information that is available at the time, and is affected by the biases and
perceptions of those applying the labels. Sometimes it is speculation, sensationalized,
and not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, as social constructionism asserts, the
constmction of reality or the imposition of a name or label on reality is subject to the
chinks in the knowledge base of society and subject to the power of some to impose their
view on "others."

26
27

Cl'lininal Code, supra note 4 at s. 83.05.
Ibid at s. 83.05(5)-(6.1).
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In order to determine whether more severe labelling, greater stigmatization and more

negative social interactions occur in relation to individuals publicly declared to be
organized crime members or formally labelled as such in a cOUlt oflaw or by a legislative
body, fUlther empirical research must occur. FUlther research is also required in order to
determine any negative effects of labelling offenders using preventative judicial restraint
measures. Ordinary or pre-existing Criminal Code offences may remedy any enhanced
criminal embeddedness, and thus, could be used instead of criminal organization offences
and related provisions.
If community action programs are to be used, they should target individuals whom a court
of law has determined to be a member of a criminal organization. Further, if the
Canadian government employs proscription, then community action programs should
only target individuals or groups so proscribed by a legislative body, such as the
Governor in Council on the advice of the Minister for Public Safety or Solicitor General
or both.
Based on the analysis of Requisite Seven and the foregoing conclusions, this thesis makes
the following recommendations:
Recommendation Twenty: Empirical research should be conducted in order to
determine whether more severe labelling, greater stigmatization and more negative social
interactions occur in relation to individuals publicly declared to be organized crime
members orformally labelled as such in a court of 1mI' 01' by a legislative body, as
opposed to organized crime members who are not so declared 01' labelled.
Recommendation Twenty-One: Community action programs should only target
individuals whom a COUl'l of law has determined to be a member of a criminal
organization, or who are members of a group proscribed by a legislalive body, such as
the Governor in COllncil on the advice of the Ministerfor Public Safety 01' Solicitor
General or both.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Crime is an inherent and normal part of society because it reflects differences among the
values and norms of individuals and groups. As social constructionism and deviance and
labelling theory posit, those individuals or groups in power in society define or label
those individuals who are deviant and criminal. They also define and label who is an
outlaw.
Crime may ebb and flow, but it will not cease to exist because differences among groups
and the presence of power over some by others, wilInot change. This societal state - that
is to say, a societal state that includes a celtain level of crime - is one of mal-order.
Societal disorder occurs when a social problem develops and moral panic ensues. It
occurs when a threat to social mal-order becomes heightened or acute. Societal disorder
requires an increased response by a community, its government, its media, and its
individual members to the perceived social problem. Organized crime outlawry has been
perceived as a social problem in Canada.
Just as crime and criminals are an inherent and normal part of society, so are organized
crime outlaw groups and their outlaw acts. And, organized crime too, will not end.
However, it may abate with legal and non-legal anti-organized crime measures.
Theory tells us what these anti-organized crime measures should do. The seven requisites
synthesized from the criminological and sociological theories discussed in Chapter Three
of this thesis and applied to the organized crime outlaws described in Chapter Two ofthis
thesis, set f01th ways in which anti -organized crime measures can prevent an organized
crime outlaw from pmticipating in anti-social learning of the norms and values of an
organized crime outlaw group, and from adopting or internalizing the norms and values of
that group. These requisites suggest ways to stop or hinder organized crime outlaws from
perpetuating and reinforcing the identity of the group - namely, by preventing or limiting
the use or display of this identity in a mallller that accords with the values and n01ms of
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the group. The implementation ofthe requisites in Chapter Four can preclude the
creation or formation of organized crime outlaw identities, and it can pierce the power of
organized crime outlaw group identities by hindering their associations with one another,
by limiting the use of their reputations for violence and intimidation, and by negatively
affecting their reputations for violence and intimidation.

The present approach to combating organized crime by the Canadian government does
not give effect to all ofthe requisites discussed in this thesis. The government in Canada
responded to the organized crime problem as social constructionism predicts it would namely, by passing legislation that lacks substances and practicality in order to calm
moral panic, to appear to address the social problem, and to legitimize the present
institutions of the state. This response focuses on the law as the only or the main remedy
to the problem, and in so doing, fails to include a substantive, coordinated, collective, and
comprehensive community approach to organized crime in society. This failure
contributes to the problem of organized crime in society because it allows organized
crime outlaws and organized crime outlaw groups to perpetuate.

The government cannot legislate the organized crime problem away. It cannot reduce,
manage or control organized crime outlaw groups simply by legislating a definition of
"criminal organizations" or "organized crime outlaw group" and criminalizing activities
in which those groups engage or are commonly believed to engage. Such an approach
should not occur for four main reasons. First, the differences among the characteristics,
attributes, formation, rules and regulations among organized crime outlaw groups makes
a legal definition very difficult to formulate, and even more difficult to prove. Laws that
make the commission of an offence in connection with a criminal organization more
aggravating than other offences, require proof requirements of not only the criminal
organization, but also of the connection of the offence to that organization. Further, to be
fair, such provisions should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Such evidentiary
hurdles hinder prosecutions because proof of a criminal organization and proof of
connection requires complex and significant amounts of evidence that is difficult to
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obtain by investigators and is difficult to present to COutts based on the usual laws of
evidence and procedure.
Second, legislated definitions seek to define the essence of the outlaw groups, rather than
the nature of their outlaw acts. They essentially criminalize who organized crime outlaws
are, rather than the criminal acts that they commit and how they commit them. The

essence of organized crime outlaw groups is the fact that they have a group identity and
the role of that identity in how they commit crime - namely, by using the violence and
intimidation association with the reputation ofthe organized crime outlaw group name or
insignia to facilitate their acts. The presence and use of this identity is what distinguishes
them from other criminals. It is who they are that distinguishes them from other
criminals. However, organized crime outlaws commit crime - they conunit criminal
offences as they existed in the Criminal Code prior to the implementation of any special
or specific criminal organization offences.
Third, because organized crime outlaws commit ordinary or pre-existing criminal acts,
anti-organized crime measures should not legislate a special definition, since pre-existing
offences in the Criminal Code can be used to prosecute the criminal acts of these outlaw
groups. Courts can impose more punitive sanctions ifthe criminal acts are more severe in
comparison to others in the same offence category. Criminal organization provisions
provide some benefits to law enforcement, such as not having to establish investigative
necessity to obtain judicial authorization to intercept private communications for criminal
organization offences. However, a convoluted, ineffective and unfair definition does not
provide a sound foundation on which to justify increased police power. For these three
reasons, legislating a definition of "criminal organization" fails to meet the lessons
learned from social constructionism and social control and bond theory that comprise
Requisite One.

Fourth, the current legislative provisions in the Criminal Code already come very close to
criminalizing the state of being of organized crime outlaws. As discussed in section two
of Chapter Four, these provisions impose more punitive sanctions and set forth
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aggravated factors based on the fact that an individual is a member of a criminal
organization and that he has committed an offence in connection with that organization.
"Ordinary" criminals or non-criminal-organization members are not subject to these
increased punitive measures. The criminalization of who people are amounts to a status
offence, and remains legally, socially and politically unpalatable. That being said, the
insights from social constructionism and social control and bond theory that comprise
Requisite One indicate that proscription of organized crime outlaw groups will only
capture the groups that the government was targeting when it legislated the current
definition of "criminal organization" in the Criminal Code. Proscription more directly
addresses the problem groups that the government sought to capture in its definition. It is
likely the most effective way to capture "criminal organizations" and "gangs" and
"organized crime outlaws" since it makes it a crime to be exactly who they are, and does
not try to force their group into a convoluted and problematic statutory definition.
However, as deviance and labelling theory and concepts from social psychology assert in
Requisite Seven, anti-organized crime approaches should avoid the imposition of fOlmal
negative labels, stigmatization and degradation in social and legal processes in order to
prevent potential deviants or outlaws from being ousted from larger society, and thus, to
not deepen the chasm between non-outlaw members of society and outlaw members of
society. The imposition of a formally sanctioned definition likely does just that, and thus,
should not be used as an anti-organized crime measure.

Criminal laws based on definitions of "criminal organizations" or "organized crime
outlaws" may succeed in their aims when the law targeting organized crime outlaws is
used for and against organized crime outlaws only, and does not ensnare non-organized
crime outlaws 01' non-outlaws. Only when organized crime outlaws alone are subjected to
more aggravated punitive sanctions due to adequate proof requirements at sentencing
hearings, and non-outlaws are not mistakenly subjected to penalties that did not mean to
ensnare them, will anti-organized crime laws be substantive, fair and just. Only then can
these measures give effect to general detenence, and foster belief and commitment of
law-abiding citizens to formal societal values as synthesized from social constructionism
and social control and bonding theory and stated in Requisite One.
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Criminal laws can also contribute to the goals in Requisite Foul' that stem from social
control and bond theory, differential association and social learning in subcultures, and
social psychology. For instance, some provisions of the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act' allow for the re-integration and rehabilitation of organized crime offenders

who are serving significant sentences - that is to say, federal time. Also, probation and
conditional sentence order conditions imposed pursuant to the Criminal Code can also
provide for re-integration and rehabilitation of organized crime offenders who are serving
sentences of two years less a day. Institutional incarcerative settings can provide prosocial learning in pro-social learning environments for organized crime outlaws who are
not eligible to serve sentences in the community. In these ways, criminal laws can
maintain or foster positive social and symbolic interactions or situated activities between
organized crime outlaws and members of conventional society.
Criminal laws can also contribute to the prevention of stigmatization, ostracization, and
sensationalizing organized crime outlaws through media, and the control or management
of glorification of organized crime outlaw lifestyles and the power of their reputations.
These goals stem from social constructionism as set fOlth in Requisite Two. For example,
criminal laws can impose restraints on media through publication bans, provided that
these restraints accord with principles of freedom of expression in the Charter. Noncriminal law measures and non-law measures that involve the media could likely have a
much more significant impact on organized crime outlaw groups. For instance, the media
can effect anti-organized crime adveltising campaigns in order to discourage
membership; to create new non-criminal identities for these offenders if the offender has
a willingness to change; and to sensationalize the powers and victories of law
enforcement in order to de-sensationalize organized crime outlawry. Such non-criminal
law and non-law measures would also involve members of the community, and thus,
reinforce pro-social values and norms among the law-abiding and increase their internal
cohesion.

1

S.C. 1992, c. 20 [Corrections and Conditional Release Act].
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Criminal laws can also contribute to the goals based on differential association and social
learning in subcultures, and deviance and labelling theory as set f0i1h in Requisite Five.
Suppression techniques instituted through bail orders and sentencing conditions can limit
and prevent differential association and anti-social learning within the subcultures of
outlaws, and thus, reduce the internal cohesion and power of organized crime outlaws,
and reduce the reinforcement oftheir identities through ongoing anti-social interactions
with one another. Thus, to some degree, the criminal law can prevent the perpetuation of
their identity and the empowerment of their reputations by stopping members from
associating with one another.

Non-criminal law measures rather than criminal law measures, also may have negative
impact on organized crime outlaw groups in very significant ways. For instance,
amendments to Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act laws as proposed in section seven of
Chapter Four could give effect to Requisite Six which contains lessons learned from
differential association and social learning in subcultures, and from social psychology.
Namely, amendments to trade-mark laws and copyright laws could prevent and limit the
bolstering of organized crime identities by limiting or preventing the use of gang names
and insignia. Limits on such usage could decrease the internal cohesion and the power of
the reputations of organized crime outlaw groups.

Non-law measures, rather than criminal law measures, could give effect to the assertions
from social control and bond theory and social psychology as set f0i1h in Requisite Three.
Namely, community education and action programs, such as SNAP®, the Interministry
Committee on the Prevention of Youth Violence and Crime in British Columbia, and bar
watch and restaurant watch programs, could foster pro-social bonds among societal
members in communities with organized crime problems by facilitating attachment to
conventional others; commitment to obeying societalmles; involvement in conventional
activities; and belief in a common and conventional value system.

While the means exist to give effect to many of the requisites in Chapter Four, these
means must be implemented. Laws that allow for restorative justice measures should be
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employed. Resources to implement programs for organized crime outlaws and those at
risk of becoming such outlaws, must be provided. Further, empirical research is required
to ensure that proposed anti-organized crime measures will effect their actual goals.
However, there appears to exist a lack of empirical research regarding organized crime
outlaw identity formation generally and particularly in relation to adults. There appears
to be a lack of programs or measures designed to prevent individuals fi'om adopting and
internalizing organized crime outlaw identities; a lack of measures that specifically seek
to negatively affect or prevent the use of the power of organized crime group identities;
and a lack of specific restorative, reintegrative and rehabilitative programs that are
tailored to organized crime outlaws after they have internalized the values and norms of
an organized crime outlaw group. And, there exists a lack of empirical research to
demonstrate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such programs.

As this review ofthe anti-organized crime measures discussed in Chapter Four
demonstrates, the criminal law plays a role in effecting anti-organized crime measures.
However, the law alone should not be the chief focus in developing solutions to organized
crime problems in society. Criminal laws can effectively contribute to reducing,
managing, or controlling organized crime. However, they are but one tool in an arsenal
of measures that can prevent and reform the formation of organized crime outlaw
identities, diminish the power of the reputations of organized crime outlaw groups, and
reintegrate and rehabilitate organized crime outlaws. The focus of anti-organized crime
measures must shift to the reasons for organized crime outlaw identity formation, and the
ways in which organized crime outlaw groups use and perpetuate this identity through
their reputation for violence and intimidation. Reconstruction of the concept of organized
crime outlaw and organized crime outlaw group to reflect the importance of their identity
and reputation will allow for a refocusing and reformulation of anti-organized crime
measures that are substantive, fair and just, and it will reduce reliance on unfair, unjust,
and ineffective criminal laws to resolve problems posed by organized crime groups in
society.
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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommelldatioll Olle: Parliamellt should employ pre-existing Criminal Code and other
statutOlY provisions in order to enforce the law against organized crime outlaws and
organized crime outlaw groups.
Recommendation Two: Parliament should have expanded, and continue to expand as
necessQ/Y, law enforcement powers in relation to organized crime outlaw investigations.
Recommendation Three: Parliament should proscribe the specific groups that it deems
criminal organizations.
Recommelldatioll Four: Law enforcement agencies, communities and media groups
should work cooperatively in launching anti-organized crime initiatives, such as antiorganized crime advertising campaigns that target all members ofthe community which
has or is developing an organized crime problem. Namely, such campaigns should target
all community members - youth who are not involved in gangs, youth who are involved in
gangs, law-abiding adults, organized crime outlaw group members, as well as potenlial
organized crime members.
Recommendation Five: The media should impose self-regulations to guide its depictions
of crime and organized crime, and to deliver effective anti-organized crime messages.
Recommendatioll Six: Empirical research ought to be conducted in relation to and prior
to any anti-gang advertising campaign that the law enforcement agencies, communities,
and/or media groups implement.
Recommelldati01l Seven: Criminal laws that have anti-organized crime mandates should
be used in conjunction with community-based education and action programs.
Recommendation Eight: Community-based education and action programs that have
anti-organized crime mandates should be empirically evaluated in the short-term, as well
as in the long-term in order to determine whether they foster pro-social bonds among
societal members, and IJpecifically, to determine whether they achieve the goals of
attachment to conventional others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in
conventional activities; and belief in a cOlmnon and conventional value system.
Recommendatioll Nille: Community-based education and action programs that do not
have anti-organized crime mandates, such as school programs, extracurricular
programs, social clubs, athletic associations, should also be empirically evaluated in
order to determine whether they foster pro-social bonds among societal members, and
specifically, to determine whether they achieve the goals of attachment to conventional
others; commitment to obeying societal rules; involvement in conventional activities; and
belief in a common and conventional value system.
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Recommendation Tell: Restorative justice services ought to be made available at any
time during an organized crime outlaw's involvement in the criminal justice system - they
should be offered and reoffered continually. Howevel; these services should be
implemented, or attempted to be implemented, during the correctional phase of the
administration of criminal justice.
Recommendation Eleven: Restorative justice services should be tailored to meet the
individual needs of the organized crime outlaw.
Recommendation Twelve: Empirical research must be conducted on restorative justice
programs that seek to rehabilitate and reintegrate organized crime outlaws into
conventional society in order to determine and implement the most appropriate program
for a particular organized crime outlaw.
Recommendation Tltirleen: Courts should impose non-association orders in bail orders
where the prosecution has proven and the court has found on a balance ofprobabilities
that the accused persons are members of a "criminal organization" charges as dejined in
the Criminal Code, and that they committed their offences in connection with this
"criminal organization. "
Recommendation Fourteell: Courts should impose non-association orders in sentences
where the prosecution has proven and the court has found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused persons are or were members ofa "criminal organization" charges as
dejined in the Criminal Code, and Ihal they committed their offences in connection with
this "criminal organization. "
Recommendation Fifteen: Where courts order non-association orders, community
support and resources ought to be provided to organized crime outlaws in order to
facilitate pro-social interactions conventional societal members and institutions.
Recommendation Sixteen: Individuals should only be subject tofO/feiture orders if they
have been found guilty of a criminal offence, and the property relates to or is connected
to the commission ofthat offence.
Recommendatioll Seventeen: Proceeds of crime andfO/feilure legislation, also known
as anti-molley laundering and asset recovery regimes, ought to be used in order to seize
offence-related property, such as the insignia and clubhouses of organized crime outlaw
groups and members. WhenfO/feiture under the Criminal Code canllot occur, civil
fO/feiture proceedings in this regard ought to take place.
Recommendation Eighteen: Statutorily mandated community sq(ety programs
implemented by some provinces in an effort to prevent members oforganized crime
outlaw groups ji'om wearing their patches, group insignia, or group colours in certain
public places should be re-evaluated, and where possible, voluntmy participation should
be encouraged, such as exists in the Bar Watch and Restaurant Watch programs in
British Columbia.
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Recommendation Nineteen: The Trade-marks Act and Copyright Act should be
amended in a number of ways. These amendments should:
a.
allow the government to register unregistered insignia of organized crime
outlaw groups in order to assume control over the reputation of those groups;
b.
expand the terms "offensive" and "scandalous" in section 9 of the Trademarks Act in order to prohibit the registration ofmarks of organized crime outlaw
groups where those marks are used in connection with criminal offinces;
c.
augment the laws that regulate registration and renewal of trade-marks,
and requiring stringent proof of the purposes ofa mark within section 30 of the
Trade-marks Act;
d.
increase the power of the Registrar to expunge and expropriate marks that
facilitate or are associated with the commission of a criminal offence;
e.
empower governments to expropriate ofregistered trade-marks where
such marks have been used in connection with a criminal offence.
f
allow law enforcement to diminish the power oforganized crime outlaw
groups through mass distribution of their names and insignia; through the use of
a group trade-mark or trade-name in different trade areas; and through the use of
a group mark in illegal commercial transactions.

Recommendation Twenty: Empirical research should be conducted in order to
determine whether more severe labelling, greater stigmatization and more negative social
interactions occur in relation to individuals publicly declared to be organized crime
members orformally labelled as such in a court of law or by a legislative body, as
opposed to organized crime members who are not so declared or labelled

Recommendation Twenty-One: Community action programs should only target
individuals whom a cOllrt of law has determined to be a member of a criminal
organization, or who are members ofa group proscribed by a legislative body, sllch as
the Governor in Council on the advice o/the Ministerfor Public Safety or Solicitor
General or both.
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